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ABSTRACT 
 
As this thesis argues, the pursuit of professionalism in journalism should be understood 
as a discourse that hegemonises the discursive formation of journalism and produces 
news that fulfils professional needs.  Professionalism articulates and states its object, in 
this case war, rather than apprehending it through fidelity to normative criteria, such as 
the objective truth of ‘reality’.  Conceiving of professional journalism as such provides a 
means of understanding and analysing media production outside of the theoretical 
bounds of ‘ideology critique’.   
 Empirically, this thesis takes Australian war journalism during the invasion of 
Iraq, 2003, and professional journalistic discourse observed in interview with a selection 
of Australian Iraq war correspondents as its object of analysis.  Previous analyses and 
critiques of journalism generally, and war journalism specifically, rely heavily on some 
conception of journalism as ideological.  As this thesis argues this category of analysis 
is theoretically redundant and the discourse perspective provides a more fecund and 
insightful critique of journalism. 
 The thesis provides a historical and critical account of professionalism’s 
emergence, eventual domination and hegemony of the journalistic field.  It is argued 
that professionalism, as an articulation of social and cultural norms, retains its central 
cultural legitimacy in journalism, and is expressed through the journalistic norms of 
objectivity, independence and news values.  It is argued that within the contemporary 
cultural conditions of postmodernism and neo-liberalism these modern norms are no-
longer credible and useful in journalism. 
 The empirical analysis of the professional discourse undertaken by the thesis 
demonstrates journalism as a pragmatic and contingent process of meaning creation, 
which legitimates and normalises its practices, forms and pre-occupations.  In this 
sense the discourse, as a regime and process of meaning creation, produces its object, 
or makes war ‘real’ for news audiences, rather than reflecting the independent reality of 
war.  In the context of the Iraq invasion, 2003, the thesis reveals many limitations, 
contradictions and inconsistencies within journalistic norms and subjectivities.  The 
thesis also demonstrates how the discursive needs of professional journalism tend to be 
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coincident with the strategic communication intent of military and political power.  This 
stands in marked contrast to journalism’s professed normative democratic function and 
to analyses of war journalism that consider this normative function irresistibly dominated 
by military and political power. 
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PART ONE – METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
CHAPTER ONE – THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis professionalism and professional journalism are understood as discursive.  
Professionalism is a discourse articulated by journalists, circulated and objectified in 
their production of news.  The Iraq invasion, 2003 provides this study’s empirical 
context, in which professionalism is observed.  I argue professionalism-as-discourse 
produces specific effects within both news journalism of war and within journalistic 
subjectivity.  Professionalism in journalism, as a set of concepts, identities and 
practices, makes war real for news audiences.  In this sense, professional journalism 
brings war into existence for news consumers according to the discursive requirements 
and constraints of professionalism, rather than through fidelity to the objective reality of 
war.  This observation contradicts professionalism’s central normative claim, which is to 
be a neutral observer of objective social reality.  However, in the contemporary era, 
professional journalism produces a highly contingent account of war for consumers of 
mainstream war news, while promoting its ability to produce evermore truthful accounts 
of reality.  Furthermore, the thesis identifies professionalism as a discourse which 
diverts journalistic self-reflexivity, preventing journalists from reconsidering their socio-
political function or their professional norms, in light of this contradiction.  Although 
journalists are to varying degrees aware of the contradictions of their practice, 
professionalism is a form of fantasy preventing reflection and an adjustment of 
normative practice.  Practically, professional journalism presents a popular, dramatic 
and parochial representation of war, laced with exciting narratives and journalistic 
archetypes.  Importantly, professionalism also enables the militarisation of journalistic 
endeavours during war and, conversely, ‘journalises’ the military, through close, 
sympathetic coverage of military activities.  This thesis considers these aspects of 
professionalism as ‘useful’ within the contemporary political economies of warfare and 
war journalism, which have commodified war reporting and introduced commercial logic 
into war coverage.  This thesis’ critical discourse-theoretic position is hesitant to provide 
normative direction or inspiration for journalism. It does however demonstrate the 
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theoretical possibility of journalism producing counter-hegemonic discursive 
articulations and consequently reformulating the function of journalism beyond, or 
indeed, in spite of, professionalism. 
This thesis thus analyses the influence and effect of Australian journalistic 
professionalism on the production of public information and on the formation of 
journalistic subjectivity in the context of the Iraq invasion, 2003.  My argument is 
constructed using discursive analysis of in-depth interviews with Australian Iraq war 
journalists and of the news stories they produced.  Through this methodological 
approach an innovative means of understanding professional journalism is presented, 
yielding new insight into the formation of news journalistic knowledge. 
Professionalism has consistently featured as a significant area of critical inquiry 
in journalism studies.  Engaging with and developing this tradition, I apply concepts 
drawn from discourse theory to professional war journalism.  The thesis demonstrates 
professional journalism can be understood as an articulatory practice of enunciation and 
meaning creation.  These practices hegemonise the processes of journalistic social 
meaning creation and they sustain contemporary forms of political, military and 
economic hegemony.  This study thus expands our knowledge of professionalism’s 
influence in journalism.  Importantly, I make clear the complicit role the media play in the 
administration of society and politics - in the present case through the normalisation of 
war and military logics.  I understand journalism as a discourse of realism that itself 
constructs accounts of war yet overlooks this central ‘useful’ role within contemporary 
formations of power.  Rather than critiquing journalism’s normative function, I analyse 
how professional norms produce problematic journalism.    
Much energy has been expended in critiquing the quality of journalism’s social 
function (Tuchman, 1978; Hall et al, 1978; Gans, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Soloski, 1997; 
McChesney, 2004b).  In developing this criticism, I argue professionalism in journalism 
necessarily produces knowledge that normalises war and legitimates journalism’s role in 
this process. This conception contrasts sharply with journalism’s perceived normative 
liberal-democratic function as a ‘watchdog’ or Fourth Estate of government.  My 
argument is, however, not concerned with the quality of professionalism’s attainment of 
positive absolutes, such as truth and reality.  Rather, I am interested in the kinds of truth 
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and realities that professionalism produces.  The extent to which this aspect of 
journalism is overlooked by journalists themselves is a significant consideration.  In 
short, I am concerned with the constraining role played by professionalism in journalism.  
I argue dogmatic adherence to professional discursive requirements does not achieve 
valuable social knowledge of war.  Rather, through the dogmatic application of 
professional principles to war journalism a form of public knowledge is produced that 
necessarily normalises and legitimates war.  
This study applies concepts drawn from discourse theory to the problem of 
professionalism in journalism.  Discourse theory has been widely applied to social 
science research.  Until recently studies of journalism have tended to analyse 
journalism’s ideological message content and the ways in which journalism embodies 
cultural ideology (Hall et al 1978; GUMG 1976; 1980).  My thesis combines this 
theoretical concern for meaning with an interest in the formation of identities, practices 
and institutional norms most commonly associated with media sociology.  Through my 
use of discourse theory I provide insight into the way in which news-meanings are 
generated and how journalism functions as a discursive regime in its own right.  In the 
area of war journalism studies discourse theory has seldom been applied.  Studies of 
war journalism have tended to emphasise the domination of the media by the military 
rather than analyse how media norms and practices are ‘useful’ to military strategy.  
Consequently, this thesis provides new insight as it demonstrates how journalism during 
war constructs contingent accounts of war and contributes to the normalisation of 
contemporary forms of military-political power. The thesis demonstrates the utility of this 
innovative use of theory. 
Discourse theory permits the analysis of professionalism in journalism to move 
beyond concerns over journalism’s normative function or that journalism is captured by 
ideology.  Rather, the discourse perspective reveals professional journalism as a 
contingent set of practices and concepts which function as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 
1980), regulating what may be said by journalists.  This approach to journalism, 
augmented by the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), permits understanding 
journalism as a purposefully deployed, yet contingent set of concepts, ideas and 
statements that organise the activity of journalism.  Journalism here constructs and 
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produces truths about the world on which it reports, rather than reflecting an 
independent reality, as is its normative claim.  As a discursive project, professionalism 
hegemonises the production of social knowledge, de-legitimating other journalistic 
knowledge forms.  This thesis is avowedly non-positivist in its conceptualisation of 
knowledge generation, in sharp contrast to the naive empiricism of professional 
journalists (Tuchman 1978).  The contradictions and contingencies of the empirical 
objective journalistic method are vividly illustrated by my analytical method, which 
demonstrates objectivity as a central legitimating concept in journalism.  Additionally, I 
argue professionalism is continuously concerned with its own legitimacy and 
reproduction.  It is through professionalism that journalists hegemonise the social 
process of public information provision, in which they remain pre-eminent.  This 
perspective enables an understanding of journalism freed from the rigidities of ideology 
critique and permits a conceptualisation of journalism as produced through 
contingencies and articulatory practices of naming and definition.  
Within journalism studies, professionalism has been conceptualised as central to 
understanding the social and institutional processes of news production.  In early 
studies, professionalism was understood as produced through a range of demographic 
factors, with education levels receiving particular emphasis and being connected to a 
more politically committed or involved journalism (Johnstone et al 1972).  In such 
studies scholars sought to understand journalists as individuals.  Early studies sought to 
apply the science of demography and behavioural psychology to journalism in order to 
measure professionalism.  Later, sociologists investigated how an ideology of 
professional journalism was produced through processes of socialisation, the 
routinisation of journalism work and the commitment to conservative professional 
values.  Professionalism here was conceived as a set of conventional occupational 
norms and a politically neutral means of apprehending and understanding the world.  
However, critical scholars identified these aspects of professionalism as contributing to 
the establishment cast which characterised the journalism of the later twentieth century.  
Hallin (1992) has called this journalism’s high modern era, in which the normative, 
democratic function of journalism was considered achieved, yet journalism was 
ultimately a conservative form.  Media sociologists, cultural critics and political economic 
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analysts have shown professionalism plays an integral role in the reproduction of 
dominant cultural and political ideologies and of status quo social institutions.  This 
thesis argues by contrast that accounts of war are made real through discursive 
practices rather than as ideological constructions.  In this view journalism normalises 
and legitimates war, reporting it in accordance with professional and administrative 
needs, rather than providing either a normative watchdog role in relation to power or a 
crudely ideological representation of war.  Crucially the discourse, with its commitment 
to objective, positivist norms, operates as a form of ideological fantasy (Žižek 1989) in 
which the contingencies of discursive projects are overlooked and they are considered 
fully complete, fixed systems of meaning.  The result is journalists do not perceive their 
role in reproducing and legitimating contemporary forms of military and political 
hegemony through their professionalism.  
Recently, scholars have begun to demonstrate the utility of discourse theory in 
understanding journalism (Carpentier 2005; Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006; 
Andrejevic 2008).  These scholars have proposed new directions for critical journalism 
research and innovative uses for contemporary discourse theory, such as investigating 
the role played by journalism in the ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991) of modern society 
(Andrejevic 2008).  This thesis builds on this work and seeks to demonstrate how 
professional practice is produced by the contingencies of discourse, how journalists 
bring information about war into existence and to illustrate the discursive processes that 
form journalistic identity.  Importantly too, my use of discourse theory helps identify the 
role played by professionalism within broader political and military projects, rather than 
the capture of journalism by ideology.  This study therefore seeks to achieve a more 
nuanced, insightful understanding of news production than that facilitated by ideology 
critique.   
 The thesis seeks to achieve this critical progress through reconceptualising 
professionalism.  Until recently ideology provided the central critical impulse within 
social science research.  However, the concept of ideology has been problematised as 
a means for obtaining understandings of the operation of professionalism.  Ideology has 
been progressively re-theorised since its inception as a critical concept by Marx and this 
genealogy is presented in Chapter Three.  As I demonstrate, ideology as a critical 
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concept has been exhausted and is of little use to the present study.  It is thus 
necessary to reinvigorate the analysis of professionalism with an array of analytic and 
theoretic concepts which facilitate critical progress.  Chapter Three argues that 
discourse theory provides the necessary theoretical tools.  Simply, discourse theory is 
concerned with how social meaning is produced and circulated, and the social dynamics 
that structure this process.  This thesis therefore considers professionalism, not as 
ideology, but as a discursive formation of meaning to be analysed. 
I argue professionalism in journalism constructs both public knowledge and 
journalistic subjectivity in accordance with the professional needs of journalists and 
news institutions.  In this sense, professionalism disguises a journalistic form which 
contradicts professionalism’s normative ideals, and this is revealed through analysis.  
That is, accounts of war are produced through news discourse and made real for 
audiences through the operation of discursive strategies and logics, rather than through 
an objective, truthful representation of social reality, achieved by normative 
professionalism.  The thesis further demonstrates how professionalism operates to 
prevent meaningful journalistic self-reflection upon their social role. Central to my 
argument is that this fantasy ensures that the role played by professionalism in 
legitimating contemporary military and political logics goes unaddressed.  In making this 
argument I demonstrate the complicity of journalism, as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 
1980) in the maintenance of Western militarism.  Professionalism thus operates as 
hegemony within journalism.  The discourse theoretic understanding of meaning 
construction, however, theoretically permits the articulation of counter-hegemonic 
journalistic forms.  Ultimately, this posits the possibility of alternative methods of public 
knowledge creation or substantive changes to the dogmatism of professionalism.   
This introductory chapter has begun to outline my argument by first providing an 
overview of the central thematic concerns and motivation for conducting the research.  
Next, this chapter presents these central themes in greater depth.  I provide a 
discussion of the thesis’ theoretical innovation and comment briefly on my contribution 
to the field of journalism studies.  A brief survey of the general structure of the thesis is 
then provided, presenting the development of the argument.   
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1.2 JOURNALISM 
Broadly an interest in and concern for the idea and craft of journalism has motivated my 
inquiry into the contemporary condition of mainstream news journalism.  Journalism is a 
primary means by which public knowledge is generated within Western, liberal-
democratic societies.  Critics have however questioned the quality of public information 
produced by journalists. This debate has experienced renewed interest in the era of 
neo-liberal globalisation as technological and economic changes affect the news 
industry (Bagdikian, 2004; McNair 2000; 2006).  Nonetheless, mainstream news 
journalism continues to play an important role in informing and educating the public.  
Indeed, journalism remains deeply entrenched within prevailing liberal political theory, 
as a primary organ of representative democracy.  Here, it is held that normative, 
professional journalism produces public knowledge with veracity and independence, 
permitting the monitoring and moderation of social and political power.  This function is 
understood as journalism’s normative, watchdog or Forth Estate role (Siebert et al 
1956).  This function of journalism has been the subject of numerous critical studies 
which have questioned whether journalism performs this function effectively (Hall et al 
1978; Gitlin 1980; Hallin 1986; McNair 1999; McChesney 2004a; 2004b).  Recognising 
these criticisms, this study seeks to move beyond this critical interest, as I am 
concerned not with the quality of journalism’s normative achievements, but with how a 
commitment to normative goals produces problematic journalism.  
 This inquiry is both timely and necessary, given the contemporary challenges to 
traditional journalism.  Technological and economic developments continue to change 
the structure and practice of the news industry, through processes such as corporate 
conglomeration and digitalisation (Bagdikian 2004). Professional journalism is subject to 
ongoing public criticism too.  News journalism has been roundly criticised for its descent 
into commercialism, punditry and scandal-mongering and for its alleged abrogation of its 
normative function (McNair 2000; 1999).  The current state of professional news 
journalism is therefore one of my central concerns.  I argue the perceived corruption of 
journalism is an inevitable consequence of professionalism, rather than a result of failing 
to carry it out correctly. 
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1.3 PROFESSIONALISM 
This thesis demonstrates the analytic category of professionalism remains central to 
journalism studies.  This category has featured prominently in the literature as a primary 
means of understanding journalism.  Although the meaning of professionalism is 
contested, the variety and persistence of analytic approaches to professionalism 
pursued within the discipline are testimony to its ongoing importance.  Professionalism 
is a potent socio-cultural category, central to liberal theory (Siebert et al 1956) 
embodying concepts of ethics, skill, knowledge and public service (Kovach and 
Rosenstiel 2003). Professionalism maintains its central analytic relevance too, through 
its resistance to precise definition as an analytic category.  Consequently, 
professionalism has been subject to a range of definitions.  Professionalism has 
frequently been defined as ideology.  In this thesis I have sought a theoretical 
perspective that helps to describe the current form of contemporary Australian war 
journalism and which can conceive of the formation of journalistic knowledge outside 
ideology.   
A fixed definition of professionalism is not agreed upon by scholars.  The use of 
this analytic category is recurrent within the journalism studies literature (Johnstone et al 
1972; Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980; Gitlin 1980; Soloski 1997; McChesney 2004b). 
However, this variety of understandings of professionalism offers much scope for critical 
purchase upon the field.  I too employ the contested category of professionalism in 
order to analyse journalism and I conceptualise the professional discourse as the 
persistent core of contemporary news journalism.  The historical development, cultural 
significance and meaning of professionalism within journalism are detailed in Chapter 
Five.  
 
1.4 WAR 
This study is further contextualised by my concern and interest in interrogating the 
quality of public information produced by journalists.  Specifically, the public information 
concerning issues of war and conflict and the administration and policy of warfare is my 
central interest.  The recent Iraq invasion has been selected as that event of global 
importance and resonance in which this assessment of journalism takes place.  
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Contemporary limited wars, involving technologised (largely Western) military forces, 
are extremely destructive and expensive operations and political policies.  
Contemporary war is also a complex media event, involving thousands of media 
professionals, massive quantities of resources and highly sophisticated reporting and 
news management strategies.  Furthermore, war is also among the most consequential 
and controversial actions that political and military leaders may conduct.  The ‘media 
war’, however, which combines wartime events with cultural martial discourse and 
dramatic narratives, has frequently presented modern Western conflict as sanitised and 
relatively bloodless (see Chapter Two).  Regardless of its level of technological 
advancement however, war remains organised, systematic, rational killing and 
destruction, characterised by horror and, commonly, by atrocity.  The Iraq invasion in 
2003 has been the most recent expression of these features of modern warfare, both 
mediatised and real.  Thus the thesis is timely in providing a case study of professional 
influence in the production of war news.  
In recent decades the meaning of war has changed in other ways too.   In the 
television age, and now arguably in the digital age, war has come to be produced and 
commodified as a media product designed for consumption by Western audiences.  In 
this context, warfare is represented less as a complex political and military activity with 
profound sociological and economic consequences and rather as a consumer product.  
War is produced as a form of entertainment, designed and packaged to appeal to 
consumer sensibilities.  The Iraq invasion provides therefore a political, military and 
media event of the greatest magnitude, public importance and controversy through 
which the performance of the professional media may be usefully empirically observed 
and analysed.  
 
1.5 THEORETICAL INNOVATION 
It is also my concern to provide an innovative perspective with respect to the discipline 
of journalism studies.  As noted, many authors have considered the problem of 
professionalism in journalism.   Likewise many have written about the experiences of 
war journalists in relation to military and political power (Hallin 1986; Tumber and 
Morrison 1988; Kellner 1992).  This study applies concepts drawn from contemporary 
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social and political theory to the longstanding issue of professionalism.  This application 
will be demonstrated as both theoretically and methodologically innovative.  Currently 
such theoretical tools are underutilised in journalism studies, a situation this thesis 
seeks to rectify.  Specifically, this thesis employs the discourse and social theory of 
Michel Foucault and the discourse-theoretic and political theory of Laclau and Mouffe to 
describe the way in which professionalism in journalism produces journalistic 
subjectivity, articulates journalistic norms and necessarily brings war into existence and 
visibility within the field of journalism.  I draw upon Žižek's (1989) psychoanalytic 
concept of 'ideological fantasy' to provide a sophisticated reconceptualisation of the 
older category of 'ideology' and in order to describe the manner in which journalists self-
consciously overlook the limitations of professionalism. 
 This theoretical perspective facilitates a powerful critical analysis of the formation 
of contemporary professional war journalism.  This perspective also permits the re-
conceptualisation of professionalism outside ideology.  Through this analysis the 
contingent, pragmatic construction of professionalism is demonstrated.  Here, news is 
constructed in accordance with the discursive needs of journalists and their employers.  
Rather than as a representation of an objective reality outside discourse, war is made 
real in war journalism through contingent discursive processes and is consonant with 
the needs of professional journalists.  Discourse theory also allows one to conceptualise 
meaning, both professional and journalistic as unfixed.  That is, while discourses are 
powerful in articulating and fixing certain meanings, which can solidify into hegemonies 
and horizons of meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), this solidification is not absolute.  
Theoretically, space exists within discursive formations for counter-hegemonic 
articulations and constructions.  Indeed, no hegemonic discursive project is ever 
completely successful under conditions of fundamental social antagonism1, posited by 
this conception of discourse theory.  Thus, professional journalistic conceptions of their 
normative socio-political function and the discourses concerning war are subject to 
discursive logics.  These conceptions are, therefore, contingent and contestable.  
                                                
1 The concept of fundamental social antagonism which is socially constitutive is here understood as the competitive 
dynamics of discourse, in which discourses compete to establish meaning.  No discourse, in this conception is ever 
completely successful and can never become a total, closed system of meaning (ideology).  This conception then 
posits the possibility of discursively driven social and political change (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2004).  
Further, see Chapter Three. 
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Through an analysis of the practices of war news production and professional discourse 
observed in interview, this thesis seeks to identify and analyse the discursive strategies 
of meaning construction that construct both professional subjectivity and the external 
social reality which is journalism’s object.  In this sense, discourse does not generate 
social reality, merely knowledge of that reality.  Furthermore, discourse theory 
demonstrates the contingency of all forms of meaning and meaning construction, laying 
bare the processes of knowledge creation.   From this theoretical perspective ‘war 
news’ and ‘public war knowledge’ can be understood as ultimately contingent and 
produced through discursive processes of articulation, enunciation and naming rather 
than through direct fidelity to objective reality.  As stated, it is through discourse that 
social reality is given social meaning.  The thesis therefore theorises the potential for 
journalists to revisit and recast their avowed normative criticism of power.  Central to 
this normative criticism is a critique of those interests and processes which seek to fix or 
freeze meaning in certain hegemonic formations, such as political interests.  This 
capacity however, is restrained and mitigated by relations of power immanent to 
journalism. Indeed, the thesis theorises professionalism itself as a hegemonic discourse 
within journalism.   
 It is important to recognise however that arguments, conclusions and theoretical 
understandings drawn from discourse theoretic analysis make no claim on universal 
validity.  The thesis recognises its own contingency as an interpretation of evidence, 
rather than as an attempt to prove certain truths about professional journalism and the 
Iraq invasion, 2003.  The thesis’ theoretical position holds that meaning is created 
through relations of antagonism between discourses and that this dynamic process is 
socially constitutive.  That is, meaning is potentially always contested by competing 
discourses.  Interpretive understandings and persuasive argumentation are therefore 
this thesis’ highest goal.  In any case, rather than establishing positive truths, the 
insights and theoretical understanding of journalism that this thesis constructs present 
an innovative means for understanding contemporary professional war journalism, as a 
discursive formation. 
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1.6 CONTRIBUTION  
This section briefly outlines the contribution that this thesis’ theoretic-methodological 
approach makes to the academic field of journalism studies.  As noted in the review of 
the relevant literature, presented in Chapter Two, the sociological tradition in journalism 
studies has focused on the demographics of news workers (Johnstone et al 1972; 
Henningham 1995; 1996a) and on the behaviours, institutional norms and disciplines 
that structure their work (Tuchman 1972; Molotch and Lester 1974; Altheide 1976).  
Professionalism in this tradition has been an ongoing concern, with many writers tracing 
the evolution of the professional ethic, such as the development of the objective method 
(Schudson 1978) and paying close attention to the operation of values and ideologies in 
the production of mainstream news (Gans 1980).  Much of this research, especially that 
focusing on professional norms, employed the methods associated with sociology: 
ethnographic participation, observation, interview research and institutional analysis.    
 Within the sub-genre of war journalism studies, traditions of sociological and 
cultural inquiry feature prominently.  In the post-Vietnam era many studies have focused 
on the experiences and accounts of journalists who reported from the front lines of 
various conflicts (Tumber and Morrison 1988; Young 1992; Tumber and Webster 2006).  
From the cultural-political perspective, the domination of the media by the information 
management strategies of the military authorities is emphasised (Kellner 1992).  
Several writers have addressed the sociological aspects of war journalism, such as the 
culture of the press corps (Pedelty 1995; Bell 1996; McLaughlin 2002) and the 
institutional contexts within which journalists performed their work.   
 Seldom however has an interest for textual analysis, relations of power and 
hegemony combined with a sociological concern for the processes and conditions of 
news production.  This thesis’ approach demonstrates the value of this combined 
approach.  Here, the sociological, economic and institutional conditions of production 
are illustrated as mutually conditioning, interrelated and historically specific.  The 
conditions of professionalism are not natural or evolutionary, but purposefully created to 
fulfil certain journalistic needs, such as securing public legitimacy and producing a 
saleable commodity.  The thesis seeks to draw these distinct approaches in journalism 
scholarship and media studies together.  Specifically, the thesis maintains a sociological 
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interest in the conditions of news production, empirically observed through in-depth 
interviews conducted with journalists and editors concerning their reporting of the Iraq 
invasion.  Raw news data are provided by news articles and transcripts which these 
journalists produced and which form the second major data source drawn on by this 
thesis.  Discourse analytic concepts and techniques are then applied to both interview 
and news data in order to identify and understand the influence of the professional 
discourse on news production.  This combination of sources and analytic techniques 
provides a useful understanding of war journalism and permits an analysis of the 
relationship between the conditions of production and the news content so produced.   
 This contribution to the field, both methodological and theoretical is constructive, 
as it illustrates potential future directions for journalism scholars and it demonstrates the 
applicability of contemporary social and political theory to the discipline.  It is argued 
that this twofold contribution to journalism studies is both useful and novel.  The thesis 
also provides a timely empirical study of contemporary Australian war journalism, as this 
field of scholarship remains relatively undeveloped. 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is comprised of ten chapters containing introductory, theoretic, 
methodological and empirical considerations and observations.  The thesis concludes 
with a chapter uniting and discussing the various themes of the argument detailed 
below.   
 The thesis commences with a review of the relevant literature. Here two broad 
traditions are surveyed: critical studies of professionalism in journalism and the 
significant approaches taken by scholars of war journalism.  This review demonstrates 
that space exists within critical approaches to professional journalism for a re-
conceptualisation of professionalism as discursive.   
In Chapter Two, the theoretical context of the thesis is established and detailed.  
Firstly, a genealogy of the concept of ideology is provided, as this concept features 
prominently in critical studies of professional journalism and provides a theoretical point 
of departure for the present study.  Ideology, as a critical concept, is a central aspect of 
the intellectual inheritance of Marx, from which the discourse theoretical concepts 
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employed by this thesis have been developed.  This concept has been developed by 
subsequent theorists, and this chapter demonstrates how ultimately ideology has been 
exhausted as a directly useful analytic category, due to its theoretic totalisation.   
 Secondly, the concept of discourse is introduced, examined and its utility in 
providing critical-analytical purchase evaluated.  Of primary importance in this regard 
are the social theory of Foucault and the discourse and political theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe.  Specifically, both Foucault’s genealogical and archaeological analytic 
methodologies provide considerable inspiration to this study.  The genealogical method 
is employed in the thesis’ examination of the emergence and historicity of 
professionalism.  And Foucault’s archaeological approach is important in describing and 
delineating the discourse of professional journalism observed during the research.  The 
inclusion of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical innovations in discourse theory permits 
apprehending the dynamism of the discursive process.  The dynamism points to the 
contingency and instability of discursive forms.  Importantly, such conceptions make the 
identification of hegemonic intent possible, as well as positing the possibility for change 
in normative conceptions of journalism. 
 Chapter Four briefly discusses methodological considerations.  Here the central 
research questions are presented and the rationale of the thesis’ method explicated.  
The empirical techniques that were employed in the research process are also 
addressed.  Specifically, the selection, gathering and the treatment of the data and 
methods of analysis are discussed.   
 Chapter Five commences the formal analysis of professionalism conducted by 
this research.  This section is specifically concerned with providing an account of the 
historic emergence of professionalism as the hegemonic concept within the developing 
cultural, political and economic practices of journalism and their articulation within liberal 
political theory.  It is argued professionalism emerged primarily both in response to a 
social need for reliable information, free from egregious fiction and exaggeration and 
from a commercial imperative to massify the audience of such public information.  
Professionalism articulates both the public credibility journalism required and the 
professed neutrality and independence that the creation of a mass audience 
necessitated.  
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 Chapter Five concludes by placing professional journalism within its 
contemporary cultural and commercial context.  This section argues professionalism 
has served as the fundamental epistemological foundation for journalism.  However, in 
the contemporary era the certainties of professionalism have faced powerful critiques.  
Moreover, journalism’s normative function has been challenged by the contemporary 
conditions of neo-liberal globalisation, in which news journalism has become highly 
commodified.  I argue that professional journalism’s inability to contend with these 
challenges and critiques indicates the need to re-consider the suitability of professional 
norms for providing public information. 
 In Chapter Six the thesis provides an examination of the ‘archive’ of professional 
journalism. This archive is constructed through the research process and examined with 
reference to the discourse analytic methods proposed by Foucault (1972).  In providing 
this analysis the thesis presents the professional discourse of war journalism as it was 
observed, recorded and interpreted during the research process.  This analysis moves 
the focus of the thesis specifically onto the Iraq invasion in 2003.   
 Chapter Seven builds this argument, delineating, describing and analysing the 
power dynamics that characterise and influence the operation of professionalism within 
Iraq war journalism.  The analysis is conducted with reference to Foucault’s 
genealogical principles and the various categories, levels and intensities of power within 
professionalism are examined.  This section holds that while power is diffused 
throughout journalism, the discourse of professionalism, through both individual 
journalists and their institutional and organisational power relations, exerts hegemonic 
power.  Here ‘useful’ journalists are produced through discursive practices, which in turn 
produce journalistic knowledge that accords with the needs of contemporary, 
administrative and military power. 
 In Chapter Eight the argument focuses on the discourse as a dynamic process of 
naming and meaning creation.  This section builds on the insights of earlier chapters 
and more fully draws upon the discourse-analytic concepts of Laclau and Mouffe.  
Chapter Eight demonstrates how discursive processes of antagonism, articulation and 
the operation of discursive logics advance professionalism as hegemony by legitimating 
certain forms of war coverage.  Specifically, this chapter demonstrates how, through 
 
 
16 
professionalism, certain locations and forms of war coverage, that is, public war 
knowledge, are brought into existence and legitimated as ‘news’.    
 Chapter Nine expands this argument.  This section concentrates the analysis on 
the meaning that the professional discourse imparts to those aspects of war’s reality 
made real as news through professionalism’s function.  This chapter argues that the 
professional discourse constructs the meaning of war consistent with the discursive 
requirements of professionalism, rather than through the normative operation of liberal, 
professional journalism.  Specifically, this chapter describes the way in which 
professionalism produces problematic journalism which is highly conventionalised and 
ultimately reproductive of militarism and the logic of war.  This chapter (along with 
Chapter Eight) also demonstrates the contingency of these meanings and their 
constitution through antagonism and articulation, and ultimately, as hegemonic 
meanings sedimented as normalised, highly militarised news discourse. 
 
1.8 CONCLUSION  
The thesis then presents a complex argument that both traces historically the 
development of professionalism and analyses its function within the contemporary era.  
I argue that rather than achieving normative goals, contemporary journalism constructs 
public knowledge that accords with its own requirements.  That is, the need of 
professionalism to reproduce control over the discipline of journalism.  Indeed, the 
thesis also argues that the public knowledge so produced is ‘useful’ within the 
contemporary cultural, economic and political conditions, in particular within the 
administration of contemporary warfare.  The criticism of professional journalism 
presented here is that this journalistic function results directly from the pursuit of 
normative professionalism. Rather than journalism not being ‘objective enough’, this 
thesis identifies the pursuit and attainment of these norms as problematic in and of 
themselves.   Indeed, the pursuit of journalism’s normative goals has a significant effect 
on public knowledge formation.  It is argued therefore that in order to enact a form of 
journalism that retains journalism’s central democratic functions, a less professional 
form of journalism is required.  Firstly, however, it is necessary to locate this thesis and 
its methodological and theoretical approach within the tradition of journalism and media 
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studies.  It is also important to specifically position this thesis in relation to recent 
studies which have taken war journalism as their object of analysis, and it is to these 
tasks that the thesis now turns.     
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW:  JOURNALISM, PROFESSIONALISM 
AND WAR  
 
PART ONE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  The first is to critically review significant 
theoretical approaches towards the problem of professionalism and ‘ideology’ in 
journalism.  Secondly, this chapter surveys recent scholarship in the field of war 
journalism studies.  This chapter argues that although significant contributions have 
been made to conceptual understandings of professionalism in journalism, there clearly 
exists scope for fruitfully enhancing our understanding of professional journalism, 
especially during wartime.  Specifically, this section demonstrates the conceptualisation 
of professionalism as a discursive formation offers a novel means through which to 
conceive of journalism and its production of knowledge during war.  
A discursive understanding of professionalism builds on previous sociological, 
cultural and institutional conceptions that are here presented and critically reviewed.  As 
discourse, journalism is understood as an internally coherent body of statements 
operating as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1980).  This body of statements is expressed 
through contingent modes of articulation and enunciation which serve to normalise and 
regulate what may or may not be enunciated by journalism.    
This chapter also provides a critical review of recent scholarship concerning war 
journalism.  The extent to which the significant theoretical approaches to 
professionalism are present in this scholarship is examined.  On the basis of this review, 
a discursive conception of journalistic professionalism is held to yield a novel 
understanding of war journalism.  Most notably, such a re-conceptualisation enables an 
understanding of war news as a necessary and inevitable product of professional 
discourse.  In this sense, professionalism establishes the realm of possible statements 
about war that can be produced as news.  War journalism, in this conception, does not 
neutrally and independently reflect the reality of war.  Rather, the requirements of 
professionalism itself, expressed through routines, processes, values and organisational 
needs, articulate necessarily contingent representations of war within the discourse of 
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professionalism.  Furthermore, rather than an expression of journalism’s capture and 
exploitation by ideology, modern war journalism is an expression of the internal logic of 
the discipline and it describes war in accordance with this logic.  Thus, the discursive 
approach to professionalism provides the potential for critical insight into journalism that 
goes beyond those offered by the sociological, cultural or institutional perspectives 
which see journalists as constrained by external forces.  Indeed, much of the existing 
criticism of journalism concentrates on critiquing the quality of journalism’s normative 
function rather than concentrating on the discursive processes through which the 
normative function of professional journalism necessarily produces certain forms of 
knowledge.   
 In summary, this chapter critiques three significant approaches to understanding 
the influence of professionalism in journalism.  It argues the re-conceptualisation of 
professionalism presented by this thesis provides a fruitful line of critical inquiry.  To this 
end, this chapter demonstrates the shortcomings of previous theoretical approaches to 
understanding war journalism, before the discussion moves to more detailed description 
of the thesis’ theoretical posture, outlined in the following chapter. 
 
2.2 THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
Early studies of news sociology sought to understand the political, social and political 
attitudes of the press corps.  This research sought to understand the extent to which 
social variables influenced news production.  Such studies were primarily conducted 
through empirical quantification of the demographics of journalism.  Central to this 
research perspective is the nature of journalistic professionalism, a concept that has 
been widely identified, but its definition and meaning have remained elusive.  Johnstone 
et al (1972) conducted a benchmark study of the constitution of professionalism 
amongst American journalists.  The study provided a detailed, descriptive analysis 
based on a rigorous quantitative methodology.  Their study drew attention to the 
multifarious aspects of journalistic careers and training that inculcate professionalism, 
such as age, educational background and occupational experience.  The authors show 
clearly differences exist in conceptions of professionalism and identified a greater 
willingness for participant journalism in those urban, well-educated journalists.  
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Johnstone et al (1972) however provided little means to quantify the impact 
professionalism may have had on news production and merely described the 
demographics of American journalism and the tensions that exist therein.   
Assessing the development of professionalism amongst British journalists, 
Christian (1980) and Boyd-Barrett (1980) describe British professionalism as 
incomplete.  Professionalism coincides however, with the ongoing, wider changes to 
British society and economy, such as the decline of the industrial economy and the rise 
of the service sector, burgeoning commercialism and the development of the tertiary 
education sector.  As such, professionalism was argued to be a form of journalistic 
modernisation which paralleled wider socio-economic processes of development.  
Journalists however, remain not entirely in command of their occupation, as do other 
professional groups and are constrained by journalism’s institutional and legal context.  
Elliot (1978) describes this commercial and organisational dynamic of the news 
industry, detailing the attempts to fashion a professional ideology as characterised by 
the tension between corporate and individual interests.  The result is a form of 
journalistic “status anxiety” (Elliot 1978; 172) among journalists for whom autonomy is 
prized, but whose practice is structured by organisational and commercial imperatives.  
Professionalism however ameliorates any sense of journalistic anxiety, reinforcing the 
notion journalists control the media and operate autonomously.  Later, and in the 
Australian context, Henningham (1990; 1995; 1996) published widely on the topic of 
news professionalism, describing in detail the political and social demographics of the 
Australian news corps, in a manner similar to that of Johnstone et al (1972).  
Henningham’s (1995) survey of Australian political journalists found them committed to 
the liberal ideals of professionalism, along with being more elite (in terms of university 
education and socio-economic background) and more left-leaning politically than their 
counterparts in the broader journalism community.  In other studies (1996a; 1996b) 
Henningham found the acceptance of professional norms and identities, such as 
membership of professional associations and a commitment to the central professional 
values of objectivity, widespread among Australian journalists.   
Dunn (2004) has argued that Australian journalism is merely a ‘quasi’ profession 
that does not display all the characteristics of professionalism.  This is a theme common 
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to much scholarship in this area.  Dunn, however, employs a rigid notion of 
professionalism in her assessment.  For Dunn (2004) professionalism must include 
conventional signifiers such as a coherent body of skills and corporatist ideology, 
alongside established esoteric knowledge, an ethos of public service and an established 
ethical framework as defines the traditional professions, such as medicine or law.  
Whether or not journalism actually demonstrates these features is the subject of 
ongoing debate (Hartley 1996; Reese and Cohen 2000). 
 The studies described above identify a generalised professional attitude or 
ideology among journalists.  However, they are conceptually and methodologically 
weakened by their uncritical, instrumentalist use of the concept of professionalism.  
Notably, Johnstone et al (1972) adopt a position derived from an older tradition of 
American functionalist/behaviouralist sociology, in which professionalism is shown to be 
related to social factors, such as ethnic identity, class background, education, political 
persuasion and so on.  Johnstone et al (1972) found education levels to be particularly 
important in determining a participant ethic amongst professional journalists.  Although 
these studies establish the existence of a professional ideology and culture in 
journalism, it remained for other scholars to investigate the social and political meaning 
and the consequences of professionalism for journalism.  I consider the scholarship 
reviewed above as important first steps in analysing professionalism.   
 Interest in the nature of journalistic professionalism was paralleled during the 
1970s and 1980s by a critical sociological concern for the effect of these previously 
identified professional practices.  The effect of norms, organisational constraints and 
cultures, routines and values on news production was investigated.  Central to this 
research was the earlier sociological notion that people play a significant role in 
constructing their own reality (Berger and Luckman 1967; Goffman 1986).  Much 
research in this period was directed towards understanding the relationship between 
news practices, often understood as ideologies, and news products.  This scholarship 
sought to understand how journalists actively shape the world they report, rather than 
simply reflect it.   
 Tuchman (1972; 1973; 1978) argued that news, far from being a neutral, 
objective reflection of the world, is instead a contingent, bureaucratic construction 
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dependent on routinised processes of control and typification designed to handle the 
daily glut of potential news items.  For Tuchman the practices of objective 
professionalism classify and typify the chaotic events of the social world, serving to, 
“construct and reconstruct social reality by establishing the context in which social 
phenomena are perceived and defined” (1973; 129).  Further, objectivity, journalism’s 
central legitimating ethic (Schudson 1978), is a “strategic ritual” (Tuchman 1972), 
insulating journalists from accusations of bias or distortion.  In later work, Tuchman 
(1978) argues practices of professionalism construct reality from the perspective of the 
institutions in which they are embedded, which is ultimately conservative and 
reproductive of the social status quo.  Although this is understood as an ideological 
effect of news professionalism, for Tuchman (1978), following the phenomenological 
tradition, such constructions also offer social and cultural resources with which people 
negotiate their own lived experiences.  Nonetheless, Tuchman’s research firmly 
establishes bureaucratic, organisational and professional norms of journalism as sites of 
ideological production that, ultimately, constrain understanding (Tuchman 1978).   
 In other important research of this period, Molotch and Lester (1974) developed a 
typology of news events, again demonstrating that rather than reflecting the world ‘as it 
is’, news is shaped by those with the power to do so – journalists, significant public 
figures and, increasingly, public relations professionals.  Similarly, Altheide (1976) found 
in the production of television news, “the world of commonplace occurrence is not 
approached with uncertainty, but is instead conceived and then moulded through news 
procedures in order for it to be reported on”.  In both studies, the norms of objective 
professionalism are illustrated as a conventionalism that induces an uncritical approach 
towards news production processes and professional norms, resulting in a “taken for 
granted” perspective (1976; 176).   
 Studies such as these displaced the notion of news as a neutral, uncomplicated 
reflection of social reality.  While the professional ethos of journalism maintained a 
“naïve empiricism” (Tuchman 1978) towards the social world, this critical sociology 
noted the contingent and bureaucratic nature of news production.  Here, journalistic 
professionalism was identified as an ideology, in so far as it obscured the real 
processes of news production.       
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Born of the American sociological tradition, these studies were based on 
ethnographic, participant-observation methodologies. These researchers spent 
extended periods of time with journalists and within news institutions, observing and 
noting their work practices and attitudes.  This approach emphasised the practical 
nature and consequences of professionalism and the very clear impact of bureaucracy 
on daily news production.  These studies extended the view established by Johnstone 
et al (1972) – that professionalism has some effect.  However, although authors such as 
Tuchman and Altheide identified a professional ideology, the broader cultural contexts 
from which this ideology emerged went largely unexamined.  The American sociological 
tradition, from which these studies descended, was inclined to view journalism 
phenomenologically, that is, as social resources for making sense of the world in a 
taken-for-granted or ‘natural’ attitude (Schultz 1973).  This may in part be explained by 
the prominence of behaviouralism within American social science and the relative 
infancy of the critical tradition within the American context.    
Gans (1980) developed the critique with a notion of a wider ideological and 
cultural context for journalism, seeking to understand the values that journalists brought 
to bear on their ostensibly neutral, professional work.  This work merged two 
perspectives on professionalism.  The personal, political and cultural values and 
attitudes of American journalists, as noted by Johnstone et al (1972), were analysed in 
the context of the organisational and bureaucratic norms and routines of news 
production.  Gans (1980) identified a journalistic “para-ideology” in which “enduring” 
mainstream cultural values ensured journalistic output served to maintain the American 
social, political and economic status quo through their daily employment in news 
production.   
The findings of these critical sociologists have been reinforced by the work of 
later scholars analysing the social production of news.  Both Schudson (1978; 2003) 
and McNair (1999; 2006) provide clear accounts of the historical development and the 
contemporary state of social aspects of news production.  Streckfuss (1990), Zelizer 
(1993), Soloski (1997), Reese (1997) and Deuze (2005) have all detailed the operation 
of professionalism, its socio-cultural context and its specific effects on news production.  
Reese (1997) in particular details the routinisation of professionalism in his discussion 
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of the controversy of a self-professed socialist who, through careful exploitation of the 
neutral norms of professionalism while working at the Wall Street Journal, was able to 
pursue a news agenda sympathetic to American socialism.   
Gitlin (1980) studied the effects of such professional norms and practices on real 
world political activities in his analysis of media coverage of the Students for a 
Democratic Society movement of the 1960s.  Gitlin demonstrates how the mass media, 
in exercising professionalism, marginalise and stigmatise radical groups and alternate 
political viewpoints, and that professional practices and norms, “produce fields of 
definition and association, symbol and rhetoric, through which ideology becomes 
manifest and concrete” (Gitlin 1980; 2).  Here the connection between professional 
ideologies and wider cultural norms is explicitly made.  Gitlin’s study emphasises how 
those features of professional news practices identified in other studies define and 
shape events through their systematic framing techniques and how enduring values 
reinforce status quo, conservative and essentially uncritical perspectives.  Importantly, 
Gitlin’s work is explicitly aware of the role the media and journalistic practices contribute 
to the maintenance of cultural hegemony – placing journalism within the wider context of 
social and cultural power structures and ideological domination.  As such Gitlin’s study 
represents a powerful and sophisticated critique developed from the sociological 
perspective.  For Gitlin (1980; 10), as for Gramsci (1971):  
 
Those who rule the dominant institutions secure their power in large measure directly 
and indirectly, by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule and, if 
not usurping the whole ideological space, still significantly limiting what is thought 
throughout society. The notion of hegemony at work is an active one:  hegemony 
operating through a complex web of social activities and institutional procedures.  
Hegemony is done by the dominant and collaborated in by the dominated.2 
 
Importantly, Gitlin’s study develops the critique of professionalism advanced by 
American sociologists and connects American scholarship to developments occurring 
simultaneously in Great Britain, where the emerging field of cultural studies was actively 
                                                
2 The question of hegemony is further addressed in the following chapter. 
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analysing, critiquing and drawing attention to the role played by the media in the 
reproduction and maintenance of ‘the dominant ideology’.   
 
2.3 THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
The cultural perspective on professionalism in journalism is primarily concerned with 
how journalism reproduces and legitimates cultural norms and accepted social 
meanings.  Within British scholarship during the 1970s the media increasingly became 
the subject of critical inquiry as many authors identified its role in reinforcing dominant 
ideological cultural assumptions.  Several studies criticised the media’s stereotyped and 
sensationalised portrayal of marginal social figures such as muggers (Hall et al 1978) 
political activists (Murdock 1981) drug users (Young 1981) and gangs (Cohen 1981).  
 Where American critical sociologists concentrated their analyses on the practical 
aspects of news work and only later connected these with broader cultural concerns, 
the British cultural studies tradition directly connected media institutions to the dominant 
ideological structures of society.  For cultural critics, the media constructed a 
representation of social reality consonant with ideological interests – as Hall (1977) 
argued, the media had an “ideological effect”.  Whereas the American tradition of critical 
sociology had developed from a behavioural science and liberal tradition, content to 
demonstrate the media’s role in generating social and cultural knowledge, British 
cultural studies was avowedly neo-Marxist, initially influenced by Althusserian structural 
Marxism (Hall et al 1980).  
The cultural studies research program self-consciously rejected behaviouralist 
models of media production and effects, along with positivist methods.  Rather, cultural 
studies focused explicitly on the ideological role of the media and the media’s complicity 
in ideological meaning construction.  The leading cultural studies institution of the time, 
the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCCS), defined the media 
as, 
  
A major ideological cultural and ideological force, standing in a dominant position with 
respect to the way in which social relations and political problems were defined and the 
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production and transformation of popular ideologies in the audiences addressed (Hall 
1980; 117).   
 
The BCCCS’s study of the crisis of street crime in the 1960s and 70s clearly 
placed professional journalistic practices, values and norms as complicit with a wider 
political and ideological project of coercion, state power and control (Hall et al 1978; 60). 
Although in this study the media were considered less as functioning as ideological 
agents and rather as a site of contest between opposed social forces (Curran 2002; 
112) in a context of contested hegemony, elsewhere the direct ideological effect of the 
media was emphasised (Hall 1977). 
 The methods employed by British cultural studies scholars were necessarily 
diverse, as they strove to widen their critical inquiry beyond sociological understanding 
of production and to include all facets of cultural meaning production.  During the 1970s 
work concentrated on the ideological role of the media and employed a variety of 
methodological techniques, including political economic, content and semiotic analysis 
attempting to capture the “expressive interconnections of the culturalist position” 
(Curran et al 1982; 27).  Important work of this era (Hall et al 1978), however, did not 
completely resolve the emerging tensions between the structuralist position, that 
considered the media and journalists agents of ideological domination, and the 
Gramscian culturalist perspective which considered the media sites of contest over 
meaning (Curran et al 1982). 
 Operating within a more traditionally empirical framework than cultural studies 
theorists, the Glasgow University Media Group (1976; 1980; 1982; 1985) produced a 
powerful series of studies detailing the systematic, routine production of news as “a 
manufactured production of ideology” (1980; xviii).  These studies merged the 
sociological concern for practical news work with wider cultural concepts of ideology, 
illustrating the fruitful results of a multi-perspectival approach to journalism analysis.   
Methodologically, the Glasgow University Media Group merged the cultural studies 
sensitivity for message and meaning construction taken in the wider social and political 
contexts, with a detailed concern for the professional attitudes and organisational norms 
of liberal journalism.  However, the Glasgow University Media Group was explicitly 
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dismissive of theoretic or methodological approach that relied on economic determinism 
at its base (Althusserian Marxism3). Pure semiotic analysis was also rejected as a 
reductio ad absurdum (GUMG 1976; 416) which foreclosed upon the possibility of social 
critique.  In contrast the Media Group’s realist approach to semiotics relied heavily on 
content analyses, enabling, “a revelation of subtleties and refinements of ideological 
closure and imbalance by revealing [ideological] codes in operation” (1980; 417).  
However, these thinkers did not present a robust theory of ideology of their own, 
remaining uncomfortably between structuralist and post-structuralist conceptions.   
In their close analysis of coverage of industrial affairs (1976), economic crisis 
(1980) and the Falklands War (1985) the GUMG found mainstream news to defer to, 
and uphold the perspectives of the socially, politically and economically powerful and 
that, “journalism…rooted in a specific set of explanations about the nature of social 
reality is unable to encompass or explore the rationale of alternative world views” (1980; 
115).  This approach towards critical media/journalism studies provides much to inform 
the present study in its emphasis on the constraining function of news professionalism.  
However, its insufficiently rigorous analysis of the central concept of ideology weakens 
its critical power.  As noted above, the Glasgow University Media Group employed a 
largely unexamined notion of ideology.   
In the 1980s the generalised crisis in Marxism (see Chapter Three) that arose 
from the critique of structuralist theory gave way to post-structural and postmodern 
theoretical positions that identified the plurality of cultural meaning and fluidity of social 
relations.  These theoretical developments called into question the totalising notions of 
dominant ideological structures (Foucault 1978; 1980; Baudrillard 1983; Lyotard 19844) 
and sought to describe in theoretical terms the new era of post-Fordist production, 
consumerism and social and cultural plurality.   
 Following such theoretical developments, the structuralist notion of the media as 
an “ideological state apparatus” (Althusser 1994) was significantly weakened.  In this 
context the cultural and media studies tradition became characterised by a fracturing of 
perspectives and a renewed interest in the power of audiences to interpret and 
                                                
3 See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of the development of the critical concept of ‘ideology’, 
including its articulation by Althusser, as a structural totality. 
4 For further discussion of this epoch see Chapter Five. 
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creatively use media messages, as they were theoretically no longer subjected to 
ideological domination.  Rather than inculcating ideological world views or providing a 
competitive space for competing discourses, the media became understood by some as 
an enabling power.  
Some scholars, such as Fiske (1987; 1989a; 1989b) celebrated the power of 
media consumers in a plural and democratic cultural environment to create their own 
meanings and to subvert those of others.  This position is redolent of liberalist 
conceptions of individual sovereignty, in this case of intellectual sovereignty within a 
marketplace of ideas.  Others, propelled by the theoretical displacement of the dominant 
ideology thesis, addressed the issues around audience reception and media effects 
studies and reconceptualised the audience as active and capable of producing meaning 
autonomously (Morley 1992).  Notably, certain feminist authors argued women actively 
create and negotiate their own identities, in contradiction of models of female 
domination by mediatised patriarchal ideology (Zoonen 1991; McRobbie; 1996).  
Others, such as Hall (1996; 42) maintained the neo-Gramscian view that the media 
provided a field in which opposed discourses competed for dominance, or hegemony, 
rather than simply reproducing solidified cultural norms.  This view of journalism’s 
functional cultural role however tends to ignore the capacity of journalists themselves to 
influence the generation and flow of media messages – an aspect of media analysis 
emphasised by the sociological perspective.  Nor does this view recognise journalism 
itself as a potential field of ideological contest.  By contrast I seek to understand the 
extent to which journalists are able to exert agency within the news process.  The 
analysis presented below illustrates that journalists possess significant capacity in 
deciding and, in effect, producing knowledge, yet do so in accordance with 
professionalism. 
 
2.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
The role of media institutions in cultural production has also been of significant interest 
to journalism scholarship.  In particular, critical scholars have sought to understand the 
structural and institutional relations of power of news organisations and the impact of 
commercialisation on news production.  In this analysis the role of the journalist-as-
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agent is subordinated to their function within a news organisation.  Here, institutional 
needs and power take analytical and explanatory precedence with regards to 
professionalism.  Institutional dynamics have been generally considered by critical 
scholars to be supportive and fostering of doctrines of professionalism. But as media 
institutions and political, commercial and military interests become ever more entwined 
these relations are considered corrosive of professionalism’s normative, democratic 
role.  The dependence of media institutions on other nodes of social power, such as 
political and commercial interests, is held to further contribute to status quo 
reproductions and a reduced critical capacity of journalism.  This section briefly reviews 
some of the significant contributions to this branch of media and journalism studies 
arguing that understanding the relationship between the media and other institutions is 
crucial for understanding professionalism’s role in cultural production. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s both British and American scholars influenced by Marxist 
and Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973) analysis, began to critically 
reappraise the social and cultural position of large media institutions and to interrogate 
the role of state and private media as significant cultural producers.  Murdock and 
Golding (1977) identified that disparities in access to and control of media resources 
reflected the persistent class stratification of British society.  They stressed too the 
importance of understanding industrial and commercial control as a form of potential 
cultural control.  And while they warn against simplistic, determinate explanations of 
media messages, Murdock and Golding (1977) note that concentrated media ownership 
and commercial operation automatically tends to exclude the commercially 
unsuccessful and avoids the controversial or tendentious.  Garnham (1979) also 
cautions against reductionist Marxist interpretations and argues for understanding 
media organisations and businesses as economic and bureaucratic entities that resist 
simplistic analyses.  Nonetheless, both Murdock and Golding (1977) and Garnham 
(1979) stress the importance of media institutions as ideological formations.  In later 
work Murdock (1982) emphasises the manner in which commercial imperatives of 
media organisations generate cultural content that reduces social and cultural 
complexity.  As a result, “the critique is incorporated into a diffuse kind of populism that 
can be easily mobilised in defence of the status quo” (Murdock 1982; 147).   
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 Critical American political economy was also uneasy about processes of media-
corporate conglomeration and concentration of ownership which accelerated throughout 
the 1970s and 80s.  Both Schiller (1976; 1989) and Bagdikian (1983; 2004) have made 
considerable contributions to the analysis of media conglomeration and have 
persistently warned against the effects of highly concentrated media markets given the 
reduction in journalistic perspectives these processes are held to engender.   
The potential effect on the quality of news journalism of highly concentrated 
media markets, dominated by corporate interests is illustrated in the significant work of 
Herman and Chomsky (1986).  Herman and Chomsky (1988) propose the ‘propaganda 
model’ of media production, describing a media system that systematically avoids 
critical journalism, ultimately producing consent for the modern social, political and 
economic order.  This work echoed many of the concerns of the British cultural tradition 
in identifying journalistic mechanisms and conventions through which inherently 
conservative ideology is reproduced (Hall 1977; Golding and Elliot 1979).  This 
influential thesis and its radical functionalist interpretation of media organisations has 
been powerfully criticised however, as unable to account for the existence of counter-
hegemonic media messages (Corner 2003).  Nonetheless, the insight that media 
institutions, as part of the social, economic and political power bloc within Western 
nations, shy away from concerted social and political criticism remains powerful. 
Recently critical political economy has maintained the criticism of mainstream 
media organisation and their practices.  McChesney (2004a; 2004b) has criticised the 
conventions of professionalism and the organisations that sustain them as being 
structurally dependent on the legitimated public institutions of power, such as the state 
and government, the courts and business.   
 Importantly for this thesis the influence of commercial pressures, such as the 
need to produce journalism that is attractive to advertisers, are identified by critical 
scholars as having a negative effect on journalism’s normative function.  In this view, 
throughout the anglophone west the public service ideals of journalism and the 
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Habermasian concept of a public sphere5 of debate and discussion have been 
progressively eroded by the dominance of commercial values.  
McChesney (2004a) considers the unrelenting drive towards a massively 
concentrated media industry (in the US, but by extension Australia; see Chapter Five) 
and the commodification of news and journalism as the direct result of deliberate 
government policy.  Such policy has purposefully pursued media regulation through free 
market mechanisms rather than through more formal statutory regulation.  Such a 
regime deliberately supports commercial interests of profit making over public interests 
of information and knowledge provision.  The direct result has been the growth of media 
businesses of unprecedented size, commercial power and cultural and political 
significance and an emaciated public sphere (Bagdikian 2004).    
In Australia, the commercialisation and extreme concentration of ownership 
within media markets has also developed as a matter of government policy.  Successive 
federal governments have promoted de-regulation as the preferred form of media 
industry organisation.  Notably however, Australia, by comparison to the US, maintains 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), a significant public service broadcast 
service, modelled on the BBC.  Nonetheless, the Australian media sector is heavily 
concentrated, although Street (2001) cautions against simplistic correlations between 
corporate power and political power in the Australian context.  There is no clear dividing 
line separating the two and the image of the unscrupulous, manipulative and politically 
connected media mogul is popular, if not entirely accurate.  Street (2001; 132) argues 
that the social power that stems from the media is manifold, unstable and divided 
variously between owners, managers, editors, journalists and is affected by external 
factors, such as public opinion.  The relations of power within these corporate structures 
thus set the culture, terms and context in which media power is exercised.  This thesis 
takes inspiration from Street’s (2001) conception.  Thus, while the abilities and 
productions of journalists are not solely determined by their position with economic 
                                                
5 For further discussion of this concept see, Habermas, J (1989) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
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structures, the relations of power that characterise media organisations are considered 
to exercise a significant influence on journalistic production6. 
Hirst (2001) sees Australian journalists and their work completely enmeshed with 
corporate capitalism.  The division of labour, standardisation of practices and advanced 
technology has left journalists, many of whom now belong to the “white collar working 
class” (Hirst 2001; 63) and, like other workers, ultimately expendable.  Professionalism 
allows journalists to continue to see themselves as autonomous and encourages an 
uncritical attitude towards the relations of production that govern their work.  This lack of 
critical self-reflection inevitably sustains status quo reporting (Hirst 2001; 63-64).  In 
essence, while public service ideals are being steadily eroded by the encroachment of 
commercialism, journalists retreat into ‘head in the sand’ professionalism. 
Many critical scholars argue the commercialisation of the public sphere has 
irredeemably corrupted its idealised socio-political function and that the commodification 
of news and information has fundamentally altered the role played by the media in 
liberal political theory.  Within this conception, rather than serving the public interest and 
encouraging democratic participation by an engaged and informed citizenry, journalism 
can become a “alienating, cynicism-inducing, narcotising force in our political culture, 
turning people off citizenship, rather than equipping them to fulfil their democratic 
potential” (McNair 2000; 8). Others point to a rise of punditry, political communication 
and spin as damaging of journalism’s normative function (Louw 2005).   
 The advances of technology and the global reach of news services have made 
‘real time’ and close, vivid and ongoing coverage of war possible.  Nonetheless, the 
domination of the media by political and military public relations mechanisms and the 
commercially attractive possibilities offered by embedded and live battle reporting have 
been seen to enthral audiences with ‘video game’ aesthetics and drama.  The 
contributions of technology and access to deeper understandings of war have been 
questioned (Kellner 1992; Reese 2004; Louw 2005). 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Further discussion of the Australian media context is provided in Chapter Five.  
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2.5 THE NEXUS OF THREE PERSPECTIVES 
Thus this thesis positions itself at the nexus of three perspectives of media enquiry: the 
sociological perspective, concerned primarily with the production and organisation of 
news through professional practices and performed bureaucratically, the cultural 
perspective, concerned with the media as both a cultural producer and product, and the 
political-economy perspective, which understands media institutions as both politically 
and economically significant organisations.  All three perspectives see the media as 
significant ideological forces within society.  However I seek to develop the critique of 
professionalism and demonstrate new directions in which to proceed.  Each of these 
perspectives conveys a particular understanding of the function of journalistic 
professionalism.  This thesis seeks to achieve a synthesis of these disparate 
perspectives on professionalism and aims to provide a coherent understanding of the 
concept and its relationship with various aspects of news work, the wider culture and 
the institutions that house and nurture it.  It is argued that the discourse perspective 
provides this way forward. 
While the critical sociologists of the 1970s clearly identified professional practices 
as ideological, this concept was not rigorously defined, but was synonymous with values 
(Gans 1980) and a commitment to defensive work practices (Tuchman 1972).  Rather 
than revealing the social world objectively journalism was ideological in that it obscured 
the processes by which reality was organised.  This conception of ideology approaches 
the conventional Marxist understanding of ideology as false consciousness.  For the 
critical sociologists, news and information so produced – as ideology – provides 
resources and material for understanding the social world (Tuchman 1978).  The reality 
presented by professional journalism is socially constructed, yet provides the context for 
lived experience in the world, the practical reality of everyday life.  Professionalism is 
ideological insofar as it does not make clear its bureaucratic, routine processing of 
reality into news.  This thesis appreciates this insight, however this conception of 
ideology is insufficiently rigorous, presupposing an ultimate truth of social reality that is 
deformed by journalism or which could potentially be correctly transmitted by some 
reform of the practices of professionalism.  By contrast, in adopting a discursive 
conception of professionalism and setting aside questions of social truth and validity, I 
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pursue instead, questions of how truth is constructed in accordance with journalistic and 
organisational norms and needs.  These discursive practices serve to entrench 
professional journalistic power in relation to the production of knowledge and meaning.  
 The link between media messages and wider social and cultural values has been 
explicitly made by the cultural studies perspective.  For these thinkers the practical 
aspects of news production were directly connected with the wider cultural, social and 
political values circulating in society.  Journalists reproduced such cultural and political 
norms, as they were part of that culture, as much subject to ideological domination as 
other social agents. Here professionalism is a cultural norm that legitimates such 
meaning production. Initially cultural studies understood professional practices and 
media institutions as instrumental in maintaining the “dominant ideology” (Hall 1977; 
321).  Professionalism and the meanings that it creates thus contribute to the 
maintenance of ruling class dominance.  
In producing cultural hegemony, the media, and the professionals operating 
within them, legitimate, sanction and classify the social world in ways broadly consonant 
with the dominant social and cultural codes (Hall 1977; 345) although they operate with 
relative autonomy from direct ruling class power.  In any case, the media do not 
reproduce direct support for the dominant ideologies, as in a totalitarian media 
environment but “underwrite and underpin...the structured ideological field” (Hall 1977; 
346).   
 I see much value in considering how cultural values and norms resonate within 
discourse and how such norms are amplified in their discursive reproduction.  However, 
this thesis is cautious of seeing journalists merely as conduits for broad cultural and 
political ideologies.  Rather I argue that professionalism predisposes journalists to 
certain political and cultural representations, such as the deferential treatment of those 
in positions of social power.  Furthermore, journalists do not robotically reproduce 
dominant ideology, although each is located within a tangled web of social and cultural 
meaning or conceptual paradigms7.  Journalists, I argue, possess the capacity to self-
reflexively depart from or rigidly adhere to norms.  Professionalism however provides 
                                                
7 For instance the broad value-ideology systems of liberalism, Christianity and capitalism contribute significantly to 
the contemporary Western cultural paradigm.  
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the link between the personal, individualised world of experiences and the broader 
cultural and social context.  Professionalism provides the idiom in which experience is 
expressed as news.  A significant weakness in the cultural perspective on ideology, and 
by extension, professional journalism, is the imprecise analysis of the nature of the 
process by which journalists become recruited either into ideology (from Althusser) or 
hegemony (from Gramsci).  The discourse perspective, rather than seeing journalism as 
subject to over-arching cultural norms, sees journalism as pragmatically organised and 
originating in contingencies.  There exists no ideological essence to journalism, rather 
modes and forms of enunciation and articulation that reproduce professionalism and 
inculcate journalism’s public legitimacy.  Cultural ideology does not impose itself more 
or less successfully on sites of social meaning construction, such as journalism.  
Rather, for journalism cultural norms of truth, facticity and independence are important 
resources it invokes as it reproduces itself.  
The thesis also sees weakness in the conception of professionalism advanced by 
the institutional perspective (Murdock and Golding, 1977; Garnham, 1979; Herman and 
Chomsky, 1986).  Here professionalism is considered as an organisational and 
commercial norm which structures journalistic behaviour.  Changes in the press industry 
in the early twentieth century established objectivity, the cornerstone of professionalism, 
as the central journalistic ethic.  The news media has effectively exploited this for 
commercial gain and public credibility since.  However, as the institutional perspective 
powerfully argues, the organisation of journalism along such lines positions journalism 
as structurally dependent and consequently deferential to sources of official political, 
cultural and institutional power.  As such professionalism is reproductive of conservative 
social, cultural and political ideology.  Moreover, the institutional perspective draws 
attention to the manner in which commercial and competitive pressures leave media 
organisations, and by extension professionalism, incapable of resisting processes of 
commercialisation such as the development of 24-hour news cycles, technology 
intensive reporting, celebrity journalism and sensationalist, often superficial news.  Such 
are cogent criticisms.  However, the institutional perspective overlooks the power that 
journalists possess as agents within the news production process, and is too willing to 
conceive of media institutions as monolithic and ideologically dominant.  This 
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perspective de-emphasises the potential for counter-hegemonic journalism and the 
capacity of journalists to resist organisational pressures.  This thesis however does not 
dismiss the importance of media organisations altogether; rather it urges caution in 
attributing determining power to them, as to any other influence.  The notion of news 
organisations as powerful discursive formations that manage professionalism through 
such techniques as the allocation of resources and interventions by management into 
journalistic practice should be retained however. 
 Thus, I contend that the approaches to professionalism in journalism described 
above provide insufficient insight into its operation.  All three perspectives tend towards 
conceptions of journalism as dominated by ideology – professional, cultural or 
institutional.  By contrast I conceive of professionalism as a discourse; an internally 
coherent, self-organising, self-justifying and self-perpetuating regime of truth.  As a 
discourse, professionalism, rather than providing access to the objective social world 
brings into existence facts, subjects, events and issues through their articulation as 
news.  That is to say, professionalism provides the concepts with which to describe and 
represent social reality.  Phenomena are ‘made real’ by their being processed into news 
in accordance with this vocabulary. The understanding and operation of discourse 
employed by this thesis is more fully explored in the following chapter.  This chapter 
now turns to a discussion of the literature on war journalism in an effort to demonstrate 
how a discourse approach usefully contributes to an understanding of the production of 
war journalism.   
 
PART TWO 
2.6 WAR JOURNALISM 
This section establishes the rationale of the thesis’ approach to war journalism and 
locates the thesis within the field of war journalism studies.  This section critically 
reviews recent literature concerning war journalism and argues the discourse 
perspective has the potential to provide new insight into the field of war journalism 
studies. Conceiving of war journalism as discursive provides the theoretical means with 
which to understand war journalism and the relationship between the military and the 
media beyond the ‘paradigm of dominance’, which places journalists in a structurally 
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subordinate relationship to the military and political authorities.  This paradigm is a 
prominent feature of much war journalism literature.  Also prominent in the war 
journalism literature is the manner in which media representations of war reproduce 
cultural values, norms and orthodoxies – an echo of broader culturalist approaches to 
media studies.   
 This review shifts the critical focus away from journalists as dominated, 
ideologically constrained actors.  Instead I seek to conceptualise professional journalists 
as possessing the capacity to influence the construction and production of news.  I 
argue an analysis of how professional journalism makes the Iraq war ‘real’ for news 
audiences is a more fruitful form of analysis.  Thus, this section demonstrates how a 
discursive understanding of the practice and function of war journalists opens up new 
ways of understanding and being informed about war.  As the thesis emphasises the 
impossibility of constructing knowledge from any position outside discourse, this re-
conceptualisation shifts democratic concern for establishing the truth or otherwise of 
wartime experience.  In this thesis instead of seeking objective knowledge, I seek to 
understand methods of knowledge creation.   
 
2.7 DOMINATION  
The domination of journalism by military and political interests is a prominent theme in 
recent war journalism scholarship.  From this perspective war journalism reflects 
government and military interests and indicates the weakness, and at times 
unwillingness, of journalism to resist official perspectives.  This literature directly 
contradicts journalism’s normative role, as an independent, objective critic of power.  
This tradition in war journalism studies informs the present argument, as I seek to 
understand the dynamics of war journalism beyond domination. 
Hallin (1986) demonstrates that rather than contributing significantly to Vietnam 
War opposition, the Vietnam press corps simply reflected divisions that existed in elite 
opinion.  This view contrasts with the image of Vietnam journalists who have been 
valorised in popular culture as embodying critical, courageous professionalism.  Hallin 
(1986) proposes a theoretical model to illustrate his argument in which debate over 
military policy and war coverage is primarily conducted through the culturally specific 
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frames of reference, or ‘spheres’ of legitimacy and deviance.  Journalist’s coverage is 
‘indexed’ to the range of elite opinion, and criticism of military and political power may 
only occur within a ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’.  Through professional practices, 
such as objective treatment of fact and deference to official sources, journalists, rather 
than fulfilling their normative role as ‘watchdogs’, function as uncritical conduits for 
military and government communications.  This relationship between the media and 
military-political institutions has been further developed by Wolfsfeld (1997) and 
Robinson (2002a) in their respective studies on the effect of media coverage on 
government policy.  However, Hallin’s (1986) critique of professionalism did not extend 
beyond illustrating journalism’s dependence on existing political institutions and cultural 
knowledge. 
The literature concerning the Falklands War examines the dependence of the 
media on the military, which resulted from the strictness of coverage regulations.  This 
dependence is held to be reproductive of official perspectives and, consequently, of 
ideology.  The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) established the system that has 
become standard in controlling media access and information during times of conflict.  
During the 1982 Falklands War journalists were organised into ‘pools’, confined to 
various naval vessels, and only able to report the war subject to their respective press 
officer’s approval.  Information was systematically censored, suppressed and delayed.  
These measures both minimised the impact of bad or distressing news and also 
promoted the MoD as the only real source of reliable and accurate information 
(Knightley 2004; 481).  Although this press management policy was criticised by some 
voices in the British media at the time (Harris 1983) ill-preparedness for dealing with this 
novel situation contributed to the media’s general compliance (Jesser and Young 1997; 
272-273; Knightley 2004; 481).  Given its success in limiting critical inquiry and in 
encouraging pro-war nationalism, the system tested during the Falklands War became 
the template for managing the media in future limited conflicts (Jesser and Young 1997; 
277). 
The Falklands War produced two important studies of the social production of 
war news.  In their critical series analysing mainstream reporting, the Glasgow 
University Media Group (1985) attacked both the handling of British journalists by the 
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MoD and journalist’s complicity in fostering pro-war feeling.  The Glasgow University 
Media Group’s study pointed to the professional practices of war correspondents that 
permitted their exploitation, such as reliance on military information, protection and 
transport.  The Media Group combined a close analysis of news with broader 
institutional and cultural contexts, providing a powerful criticism.  Their critique is 
weakened however, by their insufficiently nuanced conception of ideology – an issue 
this thesis seeks to redress.  Similar to the conclusions drawn by Hallin (1986), the 
Media Group argue the media are generally complicit in the reproduction of dominant 
political ideologies – in this case nationalistic British conservatism.  This notion of 
ideology is redolent of the Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’.  This positioning 
journalists as unwitting dupes in the military’s management of information, unable to 
resist domination is problematic however as it extinguishes journalistic agency.   
 Other scholars, such as Tumber and Morrison (1988) paid close attention to the 
experiences and perceptions of Falklands War correspondents, seeking to demonstrate 
their degree of freedom from the dominant ideology of British nationalism.  Tumber and 
Morrison (1988), illustrating the extent to which journalists were active agents in their 
negotiation of their war experiences, argue that professionalism does not necessarily 
serve journalism well during wartime; objectivity and independence being irreconcilable 
with the need for protection by the military and the brutal realities of death and 
destruction (1988; 103).  Elsewhere coverage of the Falklands War has also been 
powerfully criticised as being heavily and willingly censored and ardently pro-British 
(Jesser and Young 1997; Knightley 2004).  For these critics professionalism possesses 
no capacity to resist military perspectives.  Tumber and Morrison’s study does however 
point to the importance of attending to journalist’s own experiences in reporting conflict 
and seeing them as part of a larger system.  They write, “to understand the creation of 
news, as distinct from social relationships as demonstrated by the news, it is essential 
to get to grips with people as operating within a system rather than operators of a 
system (Tumber and Morrison 1998; x).   
In scholarship concerned with the media’s performance during the Gulf War, 
1991 the dominance thesis continues to be emphasised.  Studies of Gulf War media 
performance emphasise the extent to which media management strategies appeal to 
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the weaknesses within journalistic professionalism for their efficacy.  Pursuing these 
criticisms this scholarship emphasises the ability of the military to dominate journalists 
and the reliance of journalists on the military (Kellner 1992; Zelizer 1992; Nohrstedt et al 
2000; Reese 2004).  These authors suggest that war resonates through powerful 
cultural understandings and that professional journalism during the 1991 Gulf War was 
zealous in its reproduction of pro-war ideology through these culturally established 
modes of understanding.   
When American-led coalition forces began to build up in the Persian Gulf in 
1991, the exclusionary tactics used in the Falklands and other limited conflicts were 
practically unworkable.  In fact, overt censorship was not required given the military’s 
total control over means of access, communication and transport (Jesser and Young 
1997; 280).  Once more the pool system was employed, severely restricting the ability 
of journalists to independently report from the war zone (Young 1992; 74-75).  Those 
journalists who chose to go it alone or remain in Baghdad during the conflict were 
labelled traitors and accused of threatening the success of the military operations 
(Knightley 2004; 492-494).   
Much of the reporting of the conflict came from official military news conferences 
and reports that downplayed any of the bloody, violent and horrific aspects of war and 
focused on the role of technology to enable the coalition military to fight a ‘surgical’, 
almost bloodless war (Thussu 2002; 204).  Although it was revealed after the war that 
only seven percent of ordinance dropped on Iraq was laser guided, ‘precision’ weaponry 
(Philo and McLaughlin 1995; 149), the world’s media reported the changed nature of 
war – that ‘smart bombs’ could pinpoint targets of military value, while leaving civilian 
populations unaffected and Western soldiers unexposed to risk.  Daily combat images 
and the video game aspects of the war kept journalists mesmerised and inattentive to 
the doctored statistics and fabricated success rates of many of these weapons 
(Knightley 2004; 496-497).  Indeed, much of this information was transmitted during 
minutely detailed and stage managed press conferences where journalists were, 
“spoon-fed – like animals at the zoo and the press officers were the zookeepers who 
threw us a piece of meat occasionally” (Hackworth, in Young 1992; 77).  As Kellner 
(1992; 134) has argued the combined forces of official news management and overly 
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credulous journalists meant networks, “picked up every rumour and piece of 
disinformation, instantly turning it into ‘news’”. 
For these authors, the 1991 Gulf war illustrated well the shortcomings of the 
modern media organisations and their heavy reliance on the military for access to the 
battlefield, to sources and to credible information.  Those journalists who tried to report 
from outside this system were blacklisted, excluded and demonised.  The military too 
proved itself expert at handling and controlling the media.  Wolfsfeld (1997; 198) writes, 
“...the Gulf War offers one of the clearest examples in recent history in which the 
authorities were able completely to dominate the press”.  The Gulf War was a great 
success for the military and its attempts to co-opt the media and dominate the flow of 
information about the war, allowing it to manipulate and mould the media’s 
understanding of war.   
Following the 1991 Gulf War the question of what influence professionalism has 
on war reporting arose.  Zelizer (1992; 67) called the Gulf War a “critical incident” for 
journalists in which satellite and digital technology first challenged existing reporting 
practices.  For Zelizer (1992) this new era displaced the archetype of the independent 
war reporter, replacing it with a news-form based on immediacy and drama, but also 
one criticised for privileging visual, made-for-TV aspects of war coverage.  Kellner 
(1992) criticises journalists for becoming utterly dependent on the military for protection 
and information. This criticism resurfaces in the literature on during the Iraq invasion, 
2003.  Kellner (1992; 2004) sees such closeness as corrupting the normative role of the 
media by inculcating a military logic into media coverage or a “militarisation of 
consciousness”.  This criticism is echoed by Reese (2004) in discussion of the Iraq 
invasion, 2003.  In showing how journalists enter into routinised, symbiotic relationships 
with military sources, Reese (2004) suggests war becomes known through military 
frames of reference, anchored in familiar cultural understandings of war, such as 
honour, duty, sacrifice and bravery.  Here journalism itself becomes ‘militarised’ (Reese 
2004).  For Reese (2004) developments such as the formal system of embedding 
journalists with military units and the de-contextualised, yet compelling coverage so 
produced provides evidence of militarisation.  This is an important critical insight which 
the thesis seeks to expand upon, by demonstrating the extent to which not only is 
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journalism militarised, but a converse process takes place.  Through the humanisation 
of soldiers and the telling military stories, which programs such as embedding 
encouraged, a journalisation of the military takes place, in which military perspectives, 
values and needs are normalised through journalism. 
 Several authors have articulated criticisms of the military-media relationship and 
have identified the norms of professional practice as deeply problematic in a war 
environment (Ward 1998; Carruthers 2000; Tumber and Prentoulis 2003; McLaughlin 
2003).  Others have highlighted the technological and informational aspect of news 
practices and how they shape war reporting (Tumber 2004; Cottle 2006; Tumber and 
Webster 2006), rather than emphasising the power of the military to dominate 
journalists.  For example, as others have done, Tumber (2004) criticises embedded 
journalists in Iraq for becoming socialised and habituated into military life, resulting in 
uncritical journalism.  Carruthers (2000; 158) calls the military-media, symbiosis which 
has been a feature of recent conflicts, a “ritualised and symbolic display of shadow 
boxing”.  These critics however approach professionalism from a normative perspective 
lamenting the adoption of military perspectives by journalists.  These authors consider 
the normative function of journalism to be corrupted and its weaknesses, stemming from 
its reliance on established, official institutions, exploited by the military.  This thesis, by 
contrast, views such aspects features of war journalism as necessarily related to the 
discursive requirements of professional journalism.  That is, domination necessarily 
results from the pursuit of normative professionalism.  While this thesis values the 
insights describe above, it is considered useful to extend our conception of 
professionalism in war beyond its social organisation and to consider the cultural and 
institutional context of war reporting.   
 
2.8 CULTURE 
The cultural perspective clearly identifies and critiques the cultural context of war as 
important within the study of war journalism. The degree to which professionalism 
deploys and is deployed by cultural and ideological forms is prominent.  Hallin (1986) 
demonstrated media coverage of the Vietnam War to be operating largely within the 
acceptable cultural sphere of ‘legitimate controversy’.  Rather than leading the critique 
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of America’s involvement in Vietnam, the press framed the war in culturally resonant 
terms, for example as a campaign against communism within the culturally acceptable 
American martial tradition.  Several authors support this criticism, considering journalists 
to quickly compromise their professional dispassion for patriotic reporting during times 
of war (Jensen; 1992; Zelizer and Hall 2004; Reese 2004).  Zelizer (2004) identifies the 
manner in which the imagery of war reduces its complexity to culturally resonant forms 
and depictions of conflict, such as patriotism, sacrifice, humanity, the nation-state and 
fairness.  As Zelizer argues, the representation and visualisation of war in such a way 
reinforces a “strategically crafted depiction” (2004; 218) that potentially undermines an 
accurate, transparent understanding of war.  During the Gulf War (and later, Iraq, 2003) 
new technologies facilitated strategic depictions, allowing journalists to broadcast live 
from Baghdad rooftops, the decks of Coalition warships and from desert bases.  
Television journalism was now capable of providing rich and fascinating coverage, and 
often returned journalists to the centre of the ‘war show’ (Zelizer 1992; 70).  Such live, 
rolling coverage allowed the characterisation of the journalist as archetype and the 
human face of the mythical war story that appealed to commercial values and 
community interest, yet provided little information (Reese 2004; 249).  The Gulf War 
possessed an ‘illusory’ quality (Kellner, 1992; Gerbner, 1992), resulting from the vivid, 
novel images broadcast and published throughout the war and partly resulting of the 
integration of military logic into the larger issues and public debate (Reese 2004; 249). 
 Pedelty (1995) explicitly details the cultural context of professionalism, arguing 
that the ideology of professional Western war correspondents must be understood 
specifically in terms of cultural practices and norms, obscured by objectivity.  Pedelty 
warns that to ignore this, “is to fall prey to a sort of vulgar idealism whose 
generalisations obfuscate rather than define the complexities of contemporary power” 
(1995; 6).  For Pedelty (1995; 172) journalists do just this, their “self-conscious non-
reflexivity” a form of wilful ignorance of their complicity with larger cultural and political 
ideologies that pattern their work, such as support for American neo-liberal expansion 
and military activity.  The thesis takes considerable inspiration from this argument and 
seeks to develop the criticism further. 
 
 
44 
The role of journalists reproducing cultural norms in the context of the Gulf War is 
addressed by Kellner (1992).  For Kellner (1992) mainstream cultural understandings of 
war and its meaning, as described above, constitute a hegemonic discourse, that is 
reproduced through media and journalistic professionalism, crystallising around themes, 
such as patriotism, heroism and Western righteousness.  Lewis (2004; 297) argues 
public support for the Iraq War 2003 was in part effected by the media’s coverage, “by 
the ways in which the media reproduced certain pro-war assumptions and by the 
exclusion of more critical forms of coverage”. 
 Tumber (2004) argues that the rigidities of professionalism become loosened 
during war, as the personalised experiences of journalists subsume objective, detached 
journalism.  Such coverage generates raw and emotional news, that while of high 
interest and dramatic impact often expresses a perspective habituated to military logics.  
Indeed, echoing Pedelty (1995), Tumber and Prentoulis (2003) argue the meaning of 
professionalism is becoming ever more ambiguous as objective, neutral methods 
produce seriously compromised journalism (Kellner 1992; Pedelty 1995; Reese 2004; 
Boyd-Barrett 2004).   
 This cultural perspective on war journalism is quick to identify the role journalists 
play in reproducing cultural assumptions and norms concerning war, such as the 
righteousness of American militarism – a feature of modern war journalism recognised 
and explored by this thesis.  The question of power however, is left largely unaddressed 
by this scholarship and a discussion of the ability of journalists to resist reproducing 
cultural ideology is absent from the literature.  Rather journalists are commonly seen as 
agents for the reproduction of Western political and cultural stereotypes. While 
recognising the contribution of the cultural perspective, I conceive of professionalism as 
a discourse that dominates the journalistic field and that by definition obscures any 
journalistic complicity in reproducing dominant cultural meanings.  In this conception the 
professional discourse articulates a sophisticated self-awareness of its own limitations, 
but nevertheless persists with pursuing a normative professional role in which limitations 
arising from professionalism are left unaddressed. 
 
 
 
 
45 
2.9 EMBED WITH THE MILITARY: IRAQ 2003  
The 2003 invasion of Iraq represents a significant milestone in the development of war 
journalism.  During the invasion, many of the features of war journalism outlined above 
were vividly expressed.  While journalism in the post-September 11 political 
environment has been criticised for not defending its own professional standards 
(Downie and Kaiser 2003; Mermin 2004; Miller 2004) the Iraq War threw this debate into 
stark relief.  The Iraq War became the most covered conflict ever (Carlson and 
Katovsky 2003; xi).  Media outlets poured millions of dollars and their most advanced 
technologies into their coverage, and provided news consumers with rolling 24-hour 
news, real time broadcasts and slickly produced news specials, supplements and 
expanded editions.  These features of war reporting became standard during the Iraq 
War, rather being innovations as they were during the Gulf War (Zelizer 1992).  A 
concomitant development has been the ongoing refinement of news management and 
media containment strategies.  As we have seen these strategies have evolved 
throughout the post-Vietnam era (Jesser and Young 1997; Knightley 2004).  During the 
Iraq War they found their most sophisticated expression.  
The centrepiece of this news management effort, alongside a sophisticated 
public relations campaign, was the institution of the system of ‘embedding’ journalists 
with military units.  Although the idea is not novel, embedding became a central feature 
of media access to the Iraq War, involving far more journalists and proving much more 
controversial than ever before.  Debates over the merits of the embed system have 
become the defining features of the coverage of Iraq and consequently of the scholarly 
discussion of Iraq War coverage.  The embed system was at once criticised for 
symbolising the co-option of the news media by the military (Miller 2004; 90) and hailed 
as a break-through in close-up, detailed coverage of military operations (Bernhard 2003; 
87).  Of the 2000-plus journalists who covered the Iraq invasion and war some 600 were 
embedded with US and British forces (Carlson and Katovsky 2003; xiv).  The remainder 
operated as independent journalists, under no obligation to US or British authorities, but 
significantly less safe than those afforded the protection of the units with whom they 
travelled.  These two methods of reporting have opened up a wide debate amongst 
journalists and media commentators, some independent journalists accusing embedded 
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journalists of being military stooges (Schechter 2003; 90). Whilst many embeds relished 
the experience to travel with military units and were generally positive about the 
arrangements, many others expressed reservations (Carlson and Katovsky 2003).   
The main concern of the US authorities in devising the embed system was a 
concern to circumvent negative media perspectives and to encourage in-depth and 
positive coverage of the American and British armed forces.  The US Department of 
Defence policy is clear: 
  
We must organise for and facilitate access of national and international media to our 
forces, including those forces engaged in ground operations, with the goal of doing this 
right from the start.  To accomplish this, we will embed media with our units.  These 
embedded media will live, work, and travel as part of our units with which they are 
embedded to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of US forces in combat and related 
operations (US Department of Defence 2003). 
 
With this policy the US military sought to avoid the criticisms that had followed its 
previous heavy-handed media policies and to draw the media closer, encouraging 
identification between the embedded journalists and the military units with whom they 
travelled. As Bryan Whitman, the US deputy assistant secretary of defence for public 
affairs stated, journalists were to embed,  
  
…so they can develop relationships, so that they can provide the very deep and rich 
coverage that you get by being with a unit…Besides facilitating the type of access that 
they want to [sic], we know that any time a reporter can spend an extended time with a 
particular unit, he or she gets to understand what that unit’s mission is about; they can 
report more accurately on their activities (Whitman 2003). 
 
Many journalists embraced the Pentagon’s embed scheme with enthusiasm 
(Carlson and Katovsky 2003).  It was felt that such closeness and seemingly unlimited 
access to ‘the story’ was an unprecedented, positive concession to the media.  Much of 
the Western media however, generally assumed an uncritical posture in relation to the 
war and the coalition forces.  Profiles of hometown heroes, images of battle and 
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compelling close up footage of the military featured prominently.  Those with a broader 
view of the war, of strategy, historical context and underlying issues were to be 
frustrated by the limitations of embedding.  Research conducted by The Project for 
Excellence in Journalism found that: 
  
The embedded coverage…is largely anecdotal.  It’s both exciting and dull, combat 
focused, and mostly live and unedited.  Most of it lacks context, but is unusually rich in 
detail.  It has all the virtues and vices of reporting only what you can see (PEJ 2003).   
Critics of the embed system condemned the exercise as fundamentally 
obfuscating the realities of war.  Although this conflict was not the first to be called a 
virtual war, Oberg (2005) argues in Iraq the manipulated, virtual reality produced by 
embedded coverage represented a deliberate separation of news from actual reality. 
Scholars are ambivalent about embedding’s efficacy and especially concerned about 
the closeness that embedding fosters between journalists and the military they are 
covering (Tumber and Palmer 2003; PEJ 2003; Reese 2004; Seib, 2004).  While this 
thesis is sympathetic to the virtual war argument, it sees rather this representation as 
not virtual, but ‘made real’ and produced through its articulation in professional news 
discourse.  In this sense the discourse makes war ‘real’ in specific, dramatic and 
compelling ways.  
According to Kellner (1992) and Reese (2004), the routinisation of the military-
media relationship further contributes to the militarisation of consciousness and 
journalistic independence is fundamentally compromised. Tumber (1988) has identified 
these same phenomena in the UK media’s coverage of the Falklands War.  The 
closeness and willingness of the media to cooperate with the military, plays a powerful 
role in normalising military attitudes and logic for the wider public. The media establish 
definitions and reason in the wider culture and add to their taken for granted quality in a 
spiral of amplification (Hall, in Reese 2004; 249). 
It is this privileging of military perspectives that are the most important criticism of 
the embedding system.  Although coverage may have been lacking in context and rich 
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in descriptive detail it is the normalisation of the logic of militarism that is most affective 
of the public mind.  Boyd-Barrett (2004; 30) calls the embed experiment the, “logical 
conclusion and pure expression” of a tendency in the media towards ethnocentric and 
sanitised coverage.   
Embedding offered unprecedented access and possibilities for coverage.  
However, the meaning of conflict and combat was impossible to assess as questions 
over the causes and rationale for war were marginalised by action (Boyd-Barrett 2004; 
28).  This is confirmed by the Project for Excellence in Journalism’s (2003) research that 
found embedded coverage included little or no interpretation or analysis, that coverage 
was predominantly live and unedited, that soldiers were generally the only sources and 
that graphic material was avoided in favour of the dramatic.  Seib (2004; 60-63) writes 
that rarely were the public reminded of the connection between what was happening 
and the reasons for war.  Embedded coverage avoided contextualising the conflict and 
encouraged a disassociation in viewer’s minds of what they were viewing and the 
consequences of that military action.  Thus, argues Seib (2004; 39), “what was 
occurring would have been viewed as just one more ‘reality’ program, watched with 
practiced neutrality for a short while until boredom set in and viewers switched to 
something else”. 
These criticisms of embedding tend to unite critical perspectives already 
encountered in relation to coverage of previous conflicts. Through the institutionalised 
system of embedding, professionalism is further exploited and dominated, consistent 
with the journalistic experience of previous conflicts.  The literature generally 
characterises the military as powerfully establishing and maintaining this system.  The 
participation of journalists in embedding is granted only upon military sufferance. 
Embedding also inculcates a sympathetic attitude amongst journalists.  In this criticism, 
either the military successfully dominates journalists and achieves its aim of favourable 
coverage, or journalists who participate in the system of embedding are corrupted by 
the experience and their professionalism suffers as a consequence.  That the interests 
of professionalism and the military are coincident and that these interests necessarily 
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produce problematic journalism - as is this thesis’ contention – is not considered in the 
literature.   
The role of the journalist in war is fraught with ambiguity and complexity.  
Normatively, professional journalists are attempting to tell the story of the war by gaining 
access to the battlefield, witnessing the action and collecting the facts of the situation.  
This activity is potentially valuable.  However as is clear the media are also 
compromised by the propaganda role they are encouraged to play, alongside their 
cultural role in reinforcing ideology.  Although this is antithetical to, and indeed hidden 
by, the ethics of professional journalism, a theoretical understanding of the social 
function of journalism makes these roles clear.  The very mechanics of war reporting; 
the gathering of information, the processing and the packaging are subject to an array 
of influences (Taylor 1997; 120) which act to restrict the scope of any reporters view.  
The circumstances of battle, geographical and temporal constraints on individual 
journalists as well as differing communications capacities and media strategies 
employed by military authorities, contribute to a partial, incomplete view of events, often 
labelled the fog of war.  The real experience of war is complex, confusing and brutal, in 
which the participants themselves rarely have a full understanding of what is happening 
(Taylor 1997; 121). The claims of a news report to be revealing the reality of a situation 
must therefore always be weighed against the many factors that contribute to that 
report’s contingent construction.  To look at the media’s coverage of war, the world is 
not revealed ‘as it is’ but as a map of the broad preoccupations, interests and values of 
society (Carruthers 2000; 17) articulated through its journalists. 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided the rationale for the discourse approach to war journalism 
pursued by this thesis.  Specifically it has critically reviewed the concepts of 
professionalism and professionalism-as-ideology within the literature.  This chapter 
delineated three major approaches towards these concepts: the sociological, cultural 
and institutional perspectives that variously describe the nature and effect of journalistic 
professionalism.  The sociological perspective has been criticised for employing an 
insufficiently nuanced conception of ideology in its criticism of professionalism.  For the 
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sociological critique of professionalism professional practices and concepts obscure the 
‘reality’ of journalism, tending towards a conception of professionalism not dissimilar to 
the Marxist notion of false consciousness.  Secondly, the culturalist perspective was 
critically reviewed.  Problematic for this perspective is the tendency to see journalists as 
mindlessly reproducing the ‘dominant ideology’ and consequently dominated by larger 
cultural ideological formations.  Lastly, the institutional perspective emphasises the 
extent to which journalists are functional in the political economy of journalism, 
producing debased forms of journalism in the interest of the organisational, often 
commercial masters.  In conclusion of this section it is argued that a discursive 
understanding of professionalism provides a fruitful means with which to think of 
professionalism outside of these restricted approaches.  
As the following analysis will demonstrate professional discourse regulates how a 
legitimate professional identity must be constructed, as certain journalistic norms and 
values are sanctioned and other practices are disavowed.  In the context of the present 
study, these discursive controls operate to produce war journalism in accordance with 
professionalism, to make war real.  In this conception, professional war journalism, 
rather than providing an objective view of complex political, military and social affairs, 
demonstrates the constraint of journalism within the regime of professionalism. 
On the basis of my research I argue that professionalism is a hegemonic 
discourse within journalism that legitimates forms of news work and methods of 
understanding the social world.  Professionalism necessarily invokes and produces 
normative cultural and professional understandings and invites exploitation by military-
media managers cognisant of its norms.  Nonetheless, professionalism provides an 
ultimate defence of journalism practice and a crucial legitimating ethic.   
Furthermore, this thesis argues that professional journalists consciously pursue 
objective, independent practice, unaware of the deeper cultural values smuggled into 
their representations, yet aware of professionalism’s limitations.  They understand, for 
instance, its reliance on sources, its pretensions to neutrality and its reduction of 
complexity – yet they stay committed to professionalism in a peculiar state of 
professional denial, what Pedelty (1995; 172) has identified as “self-conscious non-
reflexivity”.  This thesis re-conceptualises this criticism, arguing professionalism in this 
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sense operates as a ‘fantasy’ (Žižek 1989) for journalists, that, while structuring their 
relation to the reality of their experience, permits them to overlook the recognised 
shortcomings of the professional system. 
Having provided this critical review of approaches to understanding 
professionalism in journalism, this chapter moved on to a critical discussion of how 
professionalism has been used in the literature concerning war journalism specifically. 
This chapter has illustrated the extent to which thinking about war journalism 
emphasises the notion that military interests dominate journalism consistently and the 
ideological role played by journalists in the representation of war. Lastly, this chapter 
specifically argued that analyses of professionalism in war journalism may 
constructively benefit from the use of the professionalism-as-discourse methodological 
and theoretical approach.  The theoretical context of this thesis, in which these concepts 
are more fully examined, is the focus of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE - THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
PART ONE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the theoretical approach adopted by the thesis in analysing the 
influence of professionalism on war journalism.  In this section the theoretic perspective 
this thesis applies to the problem of professional war journalism is explicated.  This 
chapter will proceed by providing a brief genealogy of the concept of ideology before 
outlining the thesis’ conception of discourse and its approach to discourse analysis.  
The usefulness of discursive concepts for the current analysis will be demonstrated.  Of 
important influence on this thesis’ theoretical framework has been the discourse theory 
of Michel Foucault.  My study takes much theoretical and analytical inspiration from both 
Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches to historical and social analysis.  
Key aspects of these theories are examined below and their utility for the present 
argument is demonstrated.  I argue however, that Foucault’s approach can be usefully 
enhanced with the incorporation of aspects of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse-political 
theory.   
By combining Foucauldian discourse analysis with later, post-Marxist 
conceptions of discourse, the thesis moves beyond discursive ‘rarefication’, for which 
Foucault’s theory has been criticised (McNay 1994).  This thesis’ position is that 
discourses are both fundamentally engaged in political projects and ultimately 
contingent.  These theorisations are applied to professional journalism.  I argue that the 
combination of a Foucauldian conceptual framework with post-Marxist discourse theory 
that centres on questions of hegemony provides a unique theoretical perspective which 
permits at once a conception of professional journalism as an institutionally constituted 
‘regime of truth’, yet as an ultimately contingent discursive project.   
 
3.2 IDEOLOGY 
It is necessary to briefly clarify the understanding of the concept of ideology presently 
employed.  Until this stage in the argument, a normative conception of ideology has 
been un-problematically used.  Indeed, in much of the journalism studies and media 
sociology scholarship this central analytic category has until very recently not 
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undergone critical reappraisal as it has elsewhere8 (Tuchman 1972; 1978; Molotch and 
Lester 1974; Altheide 1976; Gans 1979; Gitlin 1980; Reese 1997; Soloski 1997; Bennett 
2005).  Ideology has undergone considerable critical theoretical review in the fields of 
social and political theory however, and it is to this that we must briefly turn. 
As a descriptive term, ideology has signified a system of understanding the 
correspondence between reality and thought.  Ideology, connoting a certain falseness 
or deception, has, in this sense, often been contrasted with ‘science’– where science is 
held to yield ‘truth’ of social and natural realities.  For a statement, idea or policy to be 
labelled ideological means that it is disconnected from the conditions of objective reality.  
As Eagleton (1991) notes, in the post-Enlightenment era ideology came to be seen as 
that which diverts the empirical and rational human capacities from progress towards an 
ultimate socio-political and economic human state.  Indeed, the history and 
development of the various critiques of ideology have in the main been attempts to find 
an objective point outside ideology from which to reveal ideological conceptions 
(McLellan 1995; 1) 
It is in this sense that Marx and Engels wrote of ideology.  As Eagleton (1991; 
71) comments, “Marx and Engels inaugurate the major modern meaning of the term 
whose history we are tracing”.  For Marx and Engels (1964) the ideas that characterised 
a society during any given epoch were directly connected to and reflective of the 
dominant mode of production and the social relations thereof.  The material conditions 
of life establish the social and cultural conditions of existence.  And while they 
considered humans able to generate their own conceptions, beliefs and understandings 
of the world, these were directly consequent of their social and economic position: 
  
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence 
of men is their actual life-process …The phantoms of their brains [ideas] are also 
necessarily sublimates of their material life process, which is empirically verifiable and 
bound to material premises (Marx and Engels 1964; 37-38).   
 
 
                                                
8 For Gans (1980) for example ‘ideology’ is synonymous with ‘values’, such as capitalism, Christianity and the Law 
that structure journalist’s conceptualisations of social reality. 
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This conception inaugurates the ‘base-superstructure’ model which characterises 
conventional Marxist social analyses – that the ‘superstructure’ of cultural and social life, 
such as institutions and beliefs, are directly conditioned by the economic basis of 
society: in Marxist analysis of capitalism, by the private ownership of the means of 
production.  Ideas, as reflections of material conditions, are thus subject to control by 
those social forces controlling the means of production and the distribution of wealth.  In 
early Marxist conceptions, ideology directly reflects the material conditions of existence, 
directly reflecting the structural conditions that characterise the capitalist system.  It is 
these structural conditions that inculcate the ‘fetish’ of capital, in which social relations 
are mis-recognised as material relations (Marx, 1976).  Ideology is in this sense an 
‘effect’ of capital (Eagleton 1991; 84), a notion already encountered in this thesis 
discussion of the cultural studies media analysis.  Social illusions, as represented by 
ideological conceptions, and commonly understood as ‘false consciousness’, stem 
therefore from the real contradictions and illusions of capitalism – the concentration of 
capital accumulation and commodity fetishism for example9.  Ideology, can be dispelled 
through scientific analysis, which is how Marx conceived of his political economy.  It 
follows therefore that ideological changes can only be produced through the activity of 
changing the social structure (Eagleton 1991; 72) – for Marx, the practical work of 
revolution.   
It also follows that social ideas – ideologies – are vulnerable to control and 
domination by those social groups that control the material basis of society, in Marxist 
theory, the bourgeoisie.  While Marx and Engels never explicitly stated a theory of 
ideology within their critique of capitalism, their understanding of ideology as a reflection 
of socio-economic relations is clear.  Thus: 
 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is 
the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.  The 
class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same 
time over the means of mental production (Marx and Engels 1964; 60).   
 
                                                
9 For further discussion see Marx (1976) Capital:  a critique of political economy, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
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This understanding of ideology was not elaborated by Marx and Engels.  While 
their analysis concentrates on the connection between material and social relations, 
later thinkers have pursued the notion that ideology is cultivated by social groups.  
Simply, we begin to understand the attraction of the concept of ideology in analysing 
media production and consequently why the critical use of ideology has been 
widespread within media studies and media sociology.   
Briefly, this economic determinism ultimately restricted the power of conventional 
Marxist analyses in accounting for the circulation of ideology.  Later Marxists, such as 
Lukacs (1971), sought to theorise ideology as produced through a dialectical relation 
between social reality and thought.  From this perspective ideology is understood as 
bourgeois class consciousness adopted, or naturalised, by the working class, who 
remain unaware of their objective social position as exploited by capitalism.  For Lukacs 
(1971), inverting Marx’s precept, rather than objective relations determining 
consciousness ideology determines what can potentially be understood as objective. 
Thus social relations are reified and importantly for Marxist theory, economics, rather 
than remaining separate from ideology, is potentially ideological within the 
contemporary forms of objectivity.  The claim of theory and science to be outside 
ideology is thus jeopardised as all forms of thinking can potentially be contaminated with 
ideological thought.  Criticism therefore, from a position of ‘scientific understanding’, 
such as Marxism claimed, is significantly problematised.  For later theorists the object of 
revolutionary thought and action was refocused from the means of economic production 
to the means of ideological production – the social institutions and systems that produce 
and inculcate bourgeois ideology. 
 
3.3 HEGEMONY 
Following Marx and Engels, Gramsci also saw ideology as a product of structured social 
relations.  However, where Marx and Engels considered the economic ‘base’ of society 
determinate of the ideological and cultural ‘superstructure’, Gramsci followed Lukacs’ 
conception of ideology as emanating from the ‘superstructure’.  With the introduction of 
the theoretical concept of hegemony (1971) Gramsci theorised the ‘superstructure’ as 
autonomous from the economic ‘base’.  Rather than a direct result of economic 
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structures, ideology, a pure realm of disembodied ideas (Howarth 2000; 89), 
“organise[s] human masses, and create[s] the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle etc” (Gramsci 1971; 377).  Following Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (1985; 67) interpretation of Gramsci, ideology: 
 
is not identified with a ‘system of ideas’ or ‘false consciousness’ of social agents; it is 
instead an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, which 
welds together a historic bloc around a number of basic articulatory principles. 
 
Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’ describes social relations in which government and 
domination of the working class is achieved through their acceptance of capitalist 
relations.  Here, following the theoretical innovations provided by Lukacs, ruling class 
hegemony is sustained through the inculcation of ruling class - bourgeois - culture and 
values amongst the working class.  For Gramsci however, the apparatus of the state 
and social and cultural institutions serve to extend and preserve the hegemony of the 
ruling class.  For later media analysts, such as British cultural studies scholars, 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony provided much theoretical inspiration.  It continues to 
do so for this thesis, although it is understood as discursively constructed, rather than 
bluntly ideological. 
Rather than seeing the operation of ideology as Marx and Engels did, as 
representing the determination of consciousness by material reality, Gramsci 
understood hegemony as the, “whole range of strategies by which dominant power 
elicits consent for its rule” (Eagleton 1991; 116).  Gramsci therefore extends the 
analysis beyond the economic realm, to all aspects of culture, social practice and 
history.  This conception is clearly useful for those interested in the media’s cultural and 
political function.  When applied to the study of journalism, the concept of hegemony 
permits the critical analysis of conventional journalistic forms and practices, without 
requiring recourse to some notion of a fundamental economic basis of the industry.  
Furthermore, a notion of hegemony assists in conceptualising professional journalism 
as, on one hand hegemonic within the journalistic field, but also as supporting and 
reproducing larger cultural hegemonic forms, such as liberal capitalism, and in the case 
 
 
57 
of war, Western militarism.  The specific use of this concept is returned to below, as it 
has been revisited by later post-Marxist theorists (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), who have 
incorporated the concept of hegemony into broader discourse theory. 
 
3.4 STRUCTURAL MARXISM 
Ideology was sustained throughout the twentieth century as a central concept in Marxist 
analysis.  During the 1960s and 1970s ‘structural Marxism’ gained influence, with Louis 
Althusser as its most notable theorist.  Structuralist thought conceives of social positions 
(class, gender, race) as being defined within a social structure – as structurally given in 
relationship to one another.  In Althusser’s thought ideology locates social subjects 
within the social structure; ideology interpellates subjects or ‘hails’ them into certain 
social positions (Althusser 1994).  For example, certain ‘positions’ or identities, such as 
‘working class’, are constituted by ideology.  Structuralism rejects, as did Gramsci, 
ideology as a ‘false consciousness’ arising from within subjects – Althusser (1994; 121) 
criticises Marx’s notion of ideology as “a pure illusion, a pure dream…whose status is 
just like the dream…before Freud”.  Rather structuralism posits a material existence that 
determines the subject; ideology is not a ‘false’ representation of reality, as its source is 
material reality itself (Larrain 1979; 154).   
Althusser’s theory of ideology becomes ontologically problematic however.  Two 
criticisms here are pertinent – the first, Althusser’s theory of ideology has difficulty 
accommodating social practices that are not directly related to production, and 
secondly, it posits a notion of ideology as pre-existing,  a-historical and inherent to 
society – not, as Marx stipulates, emanating from real and contradictory socio-economic 
relationships.  In removing the capitalist ‘base’ from his theory, Althusser’s ideology 
becomes total, foreclosing on the possibility of transcending capitalist social relations 
and incapacitating subjects for any constituting role through political struggle (Lovell 
1980; 245).  Thus, although Althusser provided a compelling account of how individuals 
are subjectified by ideological structures, there exists little hope in his theory for an 
emancipatory politics which can free people from ideological subjectification. 
Ideology therefore, as an analytic category, has been deeply problematised by 
theoretical development and its utility within Marxist and neo-Marxist theoretical 
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frameworks is questioned.  Although an understanding of ideology as ‘mode of thought 
and practice’ may have some descriptive use, for the purposes of this thesis ideology as 
a Marxist analytic concept bears little further utility as an analytic category.  The 
problems for media analysts here are obvious, as journalists come to be understood as 
without agency and constrained within a-historical ideologies, such as professionalism.   
Foucault (1980) outlines his critique of the concept of ideology concisely, arguing 
the concept is ontologically naïve as it refers to its opposite – truth, which Foucault’s 
discourse theory fundamentally rejects.  Nonetheless, as outlined below, the theoretical 
exhaustion of ideology as an analytic category does not foreclose on the possibility of 
social and political critique.  Indeed, pursuing a critical analysis of journalism that seeks 
to understand the hegemony of ‘professionalism’ is considered a valuable empirical 
exercise.  
Rather than a concern for the falseness or otherwise of social theory and reality 
later theorists have concentrated on the extent to which language, and the conditions 
that characterise the operation of language, makes certain understandings, or 
meanings, possible.  In particular structural understandings of language as discourse 
inform the early discourse theory of Foucault (1972; 1994).  The role of the state and 
institutions in constructing subjects through discourse features in later Foucauldian 
(1977; 1981) analyses, and in the social and political theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) which demonstrates how discourses are mobilised in pursuit of political projects.  
This understanding provides analysts with very sensitive and insightful means of 
analysing political and social relations outside of ideological formations.  Only here can 
ideology be reintroduced theoretically, as a means of understanding the techniques by 
which discursively constructed political projects are advanced.  As Žižek (1989) has 
described, ideology operates, not as fetish, but as fantasy in which ideological 
conceptions are recognised ironically, not as illusion, yet acted on as if people were 
unaware – what Žižek (1989; 32-33) calls a double illusion.  As this thesis’s pragmatic 
approach to understanding professionalism adopts the discourse theory of both 
Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe as its central analytical methodology, it to this branch 
of social theory and philosophy that we now turn. 
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3.5 DISCOURSE 
Simply, the analysis of discourse is concerned with the analysis of language, and 
meaning produced through language, as a social act of meaning production.  That is, 
discourse, as an object of study, contains shared social meanings.  Discursive analysis 
seeks to understand the social conditions and contexts of meaning production, rather 
than to interpret and understand meaning, in and of itself.  However, as will be 
demonstrated the conceptual understanding of discourse has been radically widened in 
the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).  While Laclau and Mouffe expand 
their conception of the discursive to include the entire social realm, it is nonetheless 
through language that this realm is apprehended and constituted.  For Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) there are no extra-discursive social meanings available and no ‘truth’ or 
non-ideological knowledge possible – all meanings are constructed through language.  
It is in this sense that war is ‘made real’ through news discourse. 
The study of discourse seeks pragmatic understandings, beyond descriptive 
analyses available through positivist science.  Language in this scheme is no longer an 
abstract set of rules or utterances providing a clear and uncomplicated representation of 
reality or experience, but a medium of meaning negotiation and construction (Wood and 
Kroger 2000; 4).  For scholars of discourse, language is the key component or 
connection between a physical world of external reality that is empirically unknown and 
the world of lived experience (Lovell 1983; 17).  Similarly for this thesis, it is the 
language of journalism and its uses that are centrally important.  For scholars of 
discourse positivist science and its obsession with factual, independently verifiable 
knowledge is profoundly compromised by language.  Indeed, as language constitutes 
the building material of the social world, it is the necessary object of analysis if one is to 
understand social behaviours beyond their elementary description.  In this conception 
language is considered action, given that through our use and deployment of linguistic 
and interpretive abilities, the social world is rendered knowable and through language 
use, certain meanings can be brought into existence.  It is through our use of language 
that meanings, thus socially useful knowledge, are pragmatically created.  This thesis, 
for example, is specifically concerned to understand how both conceptual and practical 
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language use constructs and makes war, and war journalism, ‘visible’ (Foucault 1991), 
‘real’ and known.  
In pursuing this research interest, one is led to question the self-perception of 
journalists and their systems of professional organisation, theory and practice that 
constitute their social function.  The central journalistic value or ethic (ideology) of 
objectivity, for instance, can now clearly be understood as discursively formulated.  
Objectivity, as an arrangement of words and ideas relating to journalism organises and 
orients journalists, both theoretically and practically, towards their world.  This discourse 
provides journalists with a framework of intelligibility that facilitates the fulfilment of their 
normative socio-political function.  It is argued that there exists a discursive formation of 
professional (war) journalism that is constructed by, and in turn constructs, those 
journalists and their practice as war correspondents.  The notion that discourse is 
constructive has its origins in the view of the relationship between discourse and 
knowledge attributed to the social theory of Foucault and which will be demonstrated as 
usefully expanded by the political discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).   
 
PART TWO 
3.6 FOUCAULT AND JOURNALISM 
Only recently have researchers begun to attend to journalism as a discursive formation 
in its own right and to consider the implications of Foucauldian theory on media 
production (Louw 2001; Nolan 2004; Andrejevic 2008).  In a study of journalist’s 
conceptions of defamation laws, Dent (2008) has proposed conceiving of journalism as 
a ‘discursive formation’, in which the dominant discourses concerning what it means to 
be a journalist - the “truth of journalism” (Dent 2008; 200) - are contained.  Similarly, 
Howarth (2001) has proposed a Foucauldian approach to the analysis of political 
ideology, which offers useful theoretic and methodological advice to the present task of 
applying Foucauldian techniques to the analysis of journalism.  However shortcomings 
that are relevant to this thesis are also identified.  Howarth (2001) argues Foucault’s 
archaeological method risks rarefying discourse into a form of linguistic idealism and 
Foucault’s disavowal of the ‘truth’ or ‘anteriority’ of discourse poses problems for this 
method’s critical intent.  As noted below, Foucault’s discourse theory has been criticised 
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for ‘slipping’ into deterministic conceptions of power and domination (McNay, 1994).  
Howarth (2001) proposes the enhancement and the extension of Foucauldian theory 
through the incorporation of theoretical innovations provided by the post-Marxist 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and this thesis takes considerable 
inspiration from this proposal.  
Firstly however, Foucault’s conception of discourse and related understandings 
of theories of truth, knowledge and power will now be outlined and critically assessed.  
This thesis’ critical methodology finds specific utility in Foucault’s (1972) archaeological 
method and discourse theory.  This theoretical basis is briefly discussed before 
discussing to his genealogical approach in which issues of power/knowledge are more 
fully explored.   
 
3.7 THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF PROFESSIONALISM 
In his archaeological work Foucault is concerned to write an intellectual history of 
modern thought un-reliant on notions of the historical progress of knowledge and truth.  
Importantly Foucault’s history is freed from emphasis on a Cartesian, a-historical 
subject or human consciousness that is outside discourse and the sole origin of 
meaning (McNay 1994; 52).  In doing so Foucault constructs a specific historic-analytic 
method that privileges the rules and conditions of knowledge formation of a given 
historical period – establishing the possibilities of discourse, thus of meaning.  
Archaeology is the analytic method that describes the discursive conditions that ‘permit’ 
the formation of knowledge.  Foucault (1991; xi) calls this general historical condition 
the positive unconscious of knowledge.  Initially, this underlying structure of knowledge-
possibilities was termed the episteme (Foucault 1972), but was later reconceptualised, 
less as a rigid cultural system of rules that determined knowledge and meaning and as 
a system of discursive regularities (McNay 1994; 66).  This second conception, termed 
the archive, is more an enabling system that permits the circulation, dispersion and 
fluctuation of discourses, in line with Foucault’s later conception of power as a 
productive and creative force.  As Mills states: 
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The archive of a given period is composed of the totality of discursive formations or 
ensemble of statements which constitute a given field of knowledge, for example, 
grammar, medicine or political economy (1997; 66). 
 
 Comprising the archive at the most basic level is the statement (Foucault 1972).  
Statements are the elementary unit of discourse, from which larger discursive strategies 
expand and are not any grammatically correct expression, but rather any expression 
that carries knowledge.  Taken together statements form larger discourses.  Importantly 
statements take their meaning from the discursive context in which they arise, as simple 
utterances can potentially hold many meanings (Mills 1997; 60).  Simply, statements 
contain truth-claims within them.  Discourses, formed of statements, are institutionally 
sanctioned, profoundly influencing the behaviour and thought of individuals.  Where 
Foucault (1979) illustrated this in his analysis of nineteenth century sexuality, this thesis 
points to the disparate statements, enunciations of journalistic professionalism that 
coalesce into the discourse of professionalism, delineating regularities of journalistic 
discourse – in effect what can legitimately be said by journalists – concerning either 
themselves or their production of social knowledge.   
 Following Foucault, discourse analysis is then the analysis of the arrangement of 
statements into discursive formations.  This methodological approach begins to provide 
entry points into understanding the discourse of professional journalism.  One is able to 
ask; what concepts are employed in constructing professionalism and what effects do 
these have on our understanding of journalism?  Why is it that certain concepts are 
employed and others excluded or left unstated?  What identities begin to be constructed 
through discursive statements? 
This general arrangement of statements, or discursive formation, provides the 
conditions of possibility for what can and cannot be said or considered truthful for a 
given period, context or location.  As Foucault (1972; 38) offers: 
  
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices, one defines a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functions, 
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transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience we are dealing with a 
discursive formation.   
 
Foucault offers a method for understanding the rules of formation that are the 
conditions of existence for a given discursive formation, but carefully emphasises the 
non-subjective, non-teleological nature of his analytic method that rather than 
generating a positive catalogue of statements, objects and discursive orders seeks to 
explore the contingency with which subjects and objects are formed and with which they 
exist, in keeping with his desire to demonstrate the discursive rather than subjective 
nature of history (Foucault 1972).   
 Foucault’s method begins with objects.  But rather than attempting to describe 
the fixity of those objects of discourse, Foucault understands objects as produced by 
discourse, radically altering a conventional understanding of the connection between 
words and things (Foucault 1972; 48).  Foucault neatly forecloses on the possibility of 
“interpreting discourse with a view to writing a history of the referent” (Foucault 1972; 
47) and instead suggests an interpretive method that analyses the “relations that 
characterise discursive practice” (Foucault 1972; 48) in order to understand the 
conditions that enable the appearance of objects, rather than an attempt to understand 
discursive objects as ‘things in themselves’.  In relation to the analysis of war journalism 
discourse, a contingent, discursive relationship between the ‘reality’ of wartime events 
and issues and their representation as ‘news’ will be demonstrated.  The significant 
questions concerning the analyst then are not so much concerned with what is reported 
as news, but rather how and why certain aspects of reality are attributed meaning and 
the effect this process of construction has on public understandings. 
Foucault’s analysis of discursive formations then describes the methodological 
steps taken in analysing the concepts that illustrate the unity of a particular formation 
and of the strategies in which these concepts are deployed.  In the context of this study, 
the discursive formation of professional journalism is held to be comprised of and given 
coherent unity by central concepts; fact, reality, and truth, or propaganda for instance.  
Concepts such as these are central for journalists concerned with producing a truthful 
account of war and executing their normative role in monitoring the use of political and 
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military power.  Simply, concepts provide the logical relationship between statements 
(Howarth 2000; 53) that form rules of discursive production.  Yet concepts are not to be 
understood outside discourse, “…one describes the conceptual network on the basis of 
the intrinsic regularities of discourse” (Foucault 1972; 62) 
Lastly, analyses of strategies of conceptual deployment within discourses 
illustrate discursive formations as “field(s) of possible options” (Foucault 1972; 66).  
Within the context of the constitutive regularities, discourses   
 
...give rise to certain types of organisations of concepts, certain regroupings of objects, 
certain types of enunciation, which form according to their degree of coherence, rigour, 
and stability, themes or theories (Foucault 1972; 64).   
 
Foucault’s ‘themes or theories’, produced by discursive strategies can be 
understood as larger conglomerations of concepts that cohere into the knowledge or 
theory of a given discursive field.  It is possible to identify journalism as a discursive field 
or formation (Dent 2008), in which professionalism serves as a unified theory or 
knowledge providing it with both practical and theoretical coherence.  Importantly, 
conceiving of strategies as produced and potentially contested within complex 
conceptual systems encourages an understanding of sedimented knowledge, not as 
produced through teleological human development, but through the systems of relations 
and possibilities of discourse.  As Foucault explains: 
 
Just as one must not relate the formation of objects either to words or to things, nor that 
of statements either to the pure form of knowledge or to the psychological subject, nor 
that of concepts either to the structure of ideality or to the succession of ideas, one must 
not relate the formation of theoretical choices either to a fundamental project or to the 
secondary play of opinions (1972; 70).   
 
A form of analysis is thus enabled in which the redundancy of the category of 
original and unified subject is demonstrated and the contingency, discontinuity and the 
dispersion that may determine subjectivities is made clear.  Analysis then, of the 
general arrangement of statements and the enunciative modalities that exist within 
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these arrangements begins to describe the discursive formation and the regularities of 
discourse contained therein.  Consistently articulated features of professional 
journalism, such as ‘news values’ or practices, such as ‘objective’ reporting provide 
sedimented regularities within journalism, the norms and conventions which this thesis 
explicitly seeks as its objects of analysis. 
 While this form of analysis may begin to trace the configurations of discursive 
formations, this method has been criticised as privileging ‘the discursive’ as prior and 
ultimately determinate of the non-discursive (McNay 1994; 71).  As such, the analysis 
will tend to emphasise the anteriority of discourse over the socio-economic or historical 
contexts of discourse.  In this sense discourse becomes rarefied, implying a formal 
principle of discursive regulation.  Although Foucault developed his method to surmount 
this ontological problem, others, such as critical discourse theorists noted above, and 
importantly Laclau and Mouffe, depart from Foucault’s distinction between the 
discursive and non-discursive.  For Laclau and Mouffe (1985) all social knowledge 
exists within discourse, a position which will be explored more fully below.   
Foucault’s archaeological understanding of discourse developed a notion of 
discursive formations and regularities that establish the boundaries of what can and 
cannot be said or thought within a given historical period.  In the context of this thesis, 
for example it is possible, as will be shown, to delineate discursive formation of 
contemporary war journalism.  However, as noted, a conception of a unity of discourse 
such as this tends towards a totalising, structural framework in which meanings become 
fixed.  Power, in this sense, is not accounted for besides the rigidities of structural 
frameworks.  Foucault’s anti-essentialist approach sought to avoid - by simply ignoring - 
the theoretical problems associated with structuralism, such as structural determinism, 
and from this perspective archaeological analysis alone is unsatisfactory.  In the later 
work of his genealogical period, a theory of power is introduced, providing a conception 
of power relations that permit the contestation of discourse, and thus of discursive 
frameworks, knowledge and meaning.  The analytical tools provided by this period of 
Foucault’s thinking are now considered, as they permit the analyst to begin to illustrate 
the contingency and incompleteness of discursive regimes.  
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3.8 GENEALOGY AND OBJECTIVITY 
In his genealogical work, Foucault enunciates a theory of power, permitting an 
understanding of discursive regimes within which a ‘microphysics of power’ operates to 
produce discourses and, consequently, knowledge.  The introduction of power as an 
analytic consideration deepens our understanding of discourse from a rigid, structural 
form of regularities to a dynamic, productive field.  Foucault’s conceptualisation of 
power and knowledge as inextricably linked provided his thought of this period with its 
most innovative and forceful insights.  For the purposes of my argument, it is necessary 
to demonstrate how an interest in power animates the previous analytical steps before 
demonstrating how a Foucauldian discourse perspective can be deepened with a 
radical reassessment of his conceptions.  It is noteworthy too that while some attempt to 
apply Foucault’s archaeology to journalism have been made (Dent, 2008), little theoretic 
or analytic energy has been spent on analysing journalism with reference to Foucault’s 
genealogical concepts.   
With the archaeological method Foucault runs the risk of ‘rarefying’ discursive 
practices (Howarth 2000; 65-66; McNay 1994; 86), creating an ontological problematic 
in which objects are literally produced through discourse (Foucault 1972).  In this sense, 
social relations, economics, institutions and politics are all subservient to discourse as 
productive of subjectivities and meaning.   
 Foucault addresses this theoretical problem with the introduction of a theory of 
power and a conceptual innovation, which merges and binds notions of ‘power’ and 
‘knowledge’.  For Foucault knowledge is never created and never exists outside of 
relations of power, arguing, “...truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power”, but “a thing 
of this world” (Foucault 1980; 131).  Here, Foucault fuses meaning production 
(discourses) with power relations that structure society, providing an analytical scheme 
that powerfully exposes the domination of aspects of the social world by forms of 
power/knowledge.  Foucault (1977; 1979) is thus able to demonstrate the relations of 
domination and power that through discourse produce social relations.  As Foucault 
(1979; 100) states, “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together”.  
Here, then, Foucault is not concerned to uncover essential meanings and definitions of 
knowledge, but rather to provide a means of understanding how certain types of 
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knowledge and truth are produced and under what conditions.  This is an especially 
useful means of conceiving the various relations and forms of knowledge that serve to 
produce war journalism through professionalism.   In particular, the addition of 
power/knowledge into theoretical conceptions permits the illustration of journalistic 
professionalism as a structured field of power relations that purposefully constructs and 
advances particular meanings, and forecloses on the possibility of alternatives.  With 
regards to this thesis’ stated analytic concern, genealogy has a number of 
methodological implications.  Genealogical analysis of journalism is sensitive to those 
forces which serve to organise, distribute, constrict or enhance the dispersion of 
professionalism during war and to how power and its effects are borne by 
professionalism itself.  This analytic concern is particularly interested, beyond the 
immediate organisational, geographic or sociological context of journalism, in attending 
to the broader historical and cultural processes that have born journalistic 
professionalism, not in search for origins, but for conditions of emergence of discursive 
formations.   
Genealogy is the examination of power relations that characterise discourses 
and a critique of these discourses with regards to their social and historical contexts - a 
critical function absent from archaeology.  Thus, this method is able to begin to offer 
analyses and criticisms of the dominatory effects of power, as well as enlightening the 
theoretical blind spots within archaeology.  Genealogical analyses of power, regulation 
and control produced celebrated studies of the modern prison system (1977) and 
contemporary sexuality (1979).  While Foucault sought to understand the controlling, 
dominating developments and uses of power/knowledge, he also rejected a notion of 
power as purely repressive and uni-directional (McNay 1994; 90).  Rather, power is 
understood as circulating through society, never controlled or completely dominated by 
any one group or interest.   
This thesis is cautious however, of pluralist liberal conceptions of power, such as 
those alluded to by Foucault.  Rather I understand discursive power as aggregating 
within powerful social formations – the institutional power of professional journalism and 
the news organisations that administer it, to take examples from this study.  As will be 
shown, in the current analysis it is possible to discern the effects of power on journalists 
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as they function within the administrative regime of professional war journalism and are 
produced as administratively ‘useful’.  Foucault (1979; 140) wrote of ‘bio-power’, in 
which discursive forces are linked directly to social, administrative and regulative 
function (Howarth 2000; 78), especially in the reproduction of efficient and productive 
populations.  
Although power/knowledge in conceived of as a disciplinary regime, discourse 
also contains within it the possibilities of resistance to domination.  However although a 
microphysical analysis may yield examples of resistance, in Foucault’s work how 
individuals can resist and exert power to produce other forms of knowledge and 
discourses is unclear. For, while discourses of sexuality may produce forms of sexual 
expression or penal regulation may produce forms of penal subjectivity, a profusion of 
discourse does not necessarily liberate subjects, although in Foucault’s conception, it 
may contain the possibilities of liberation.  Similarly, a profusion of discourse concerning 
war and war journalism does not necessarily lead to novel forms of subjectivity or 
understanding.  
Thus, Foucault’s conception of power/knowledge tends to ‘slip’ from a positive, 
productive conception of power to an essentially dominatory model in which 
countervailing power is uncertain (McNay 1994; 100).  Consequently, an interest in the 
productive capabilities of journalistic discourse is threatened by an explanatory role that 
may be attributed the economic and political powers of media owners and the political 
regimes within which they operate.  Although power may produce a multiplicity of 
effects, ultimately, in Foucault’s scheme subjects, or ‘bodies’ (journalists), become 
irresistibly subjectified by modern, disciplinary society, by a spectral, dominatory force.  
To innovate a potentially more illuminating theorisation of contemporary journalism 
therefore remains a central concern of this thesis.   
Nevertheless, Foucault’s discourse theory remains influential on this study.  The 
conception of history, social relations and knowledge as based not on ideology but on 
circulating, discursive flows of power/knowledge and his principles for describing and 
analysing discursive formations are particularly useful.  The Foucauldian theory of 
power, however, relapses into dominatory forms, escape from which is theoretically 
unclear, although posited within a microphysical understanding of power relations.  This 
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thesis seeks to extend Foucault’s insights into the normalising regulatory function of 
power/knowledge, on one hand by borrowing from his discourse analytic methodology, 
and on the other by integrating his conception of power with the later discourse theory 
of Laclau and Mouffe.  It is to a discussion of these discourse-theoretical conceptions 
that the argument now turns. 
 
3.9 LACLAU AND MOUFFE’S DISCOURSE THEORY 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe builds upon Foucault’s work, with a 
continued theoretical interest in the exercise of discursive power and potential 
domination.  Laclau and Mouffe however make significant critical developments in their 
theory; most importantly in their conception of the discursive.  Whereas Foucault 
considered discursive relations as separate from other forms of relations (productive, 
political, institutional, and technical), Laclau and Mouffe (1985) expand their 
understanding of the discursive realm to incorporate all social meanings – in other 
words the discursive in Laclau and Mouffe becomes co-extensive with the social.  As 
Laclau and Mouffe state: 
 
2. Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices.  
It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no 
object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any 
distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of 
a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a 
differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is structured under the 
form of discursive totalities (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 107). 
 
This development has profound effects on the potential for political and social 
change.  Where Foucault usefully describes the contours and power relations that 
comprise discourses, Laclau and Mouffe theorise discourse less as a dominatory 
system of power relations but as a contingent, contestable hegemonic project.  Thus, 
while an ultimate reality is granted, access to that reality, and consequently all social 
meaning, is possible only through discourse.  For Laclau and Mouffe (1985) all meaning 
is ultimately contingent and potentially all signifiers are constantly subject to slippage.  
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Antagonism, as the political contest of meaning, fundamentally characterises the social, 
provides the logic from which political projects may be initiated and in which meanings 
may become sedimented as hegemonies.  Here Laclau and Mouffe (1985) reinsert 
politics into their theory, identifying certain political actions, through which contest may 
occur and which contain the possibility of human emancipation.  In this sense Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory is useful in illustrating the limits, contingency and internal 
dynamics of the discourse of professional journalism.  Specifically, journalism can be 
understood less as rigid, dominatory system of discourse and immanent power 
relations, and more as an ultimately contestable political project seeking to hegemonise 
fields of social knowledge production. 
 
3.9.1 ARTICULATION 
Central to this discursive scheme is the process of articulation, or the way in which a 
discourse is structured and socially impelled.  This organisational concept differs from 
Foucault’s archive as it includes a sense of dynamism; while a discursive formation may 
have certain bounds or configurations, these are not necessarily rigid.  The limits of the 
social imaginary fluctuate with the fortunes of the various socio-political projects that 
compete to dominate social meaning production.  For example, professionalism is 
concerned with the advancements of certain concepts such as appropriate skill, 
knowledge and ethics.  Yet professionalism also physically organises and defines 
journalists, arranging them within legitimate organisations and engaging them in 
sanctioned activities associated with newsgathering.  Importantly however, the ultimate 
contingency of meaning prevents the stable, fixed imposition of meaning, rendering the 
discursive formations of journalism vulnerable to those meanings and identities 
excluded as illegitimate – the ‘other’ of professional journalism.  The identities of 
journalists, their practices and legitimacy are consequently ultimately fragile and in need 
of ongoing discursive cultivation, should they avoid negation by contrary discourses – 
such as military propaganda, accusations of bias or non-objective, ‘crusader’ or amateur 
journalism.  As the thesis’ demonstrates, new meanings, such as those resulting from 
technological, social or political change, can lead to the articulation of new definitions 
within professional journalism. 
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Theoretically however, this expanded notion of the discursive and the competitive 
dynamics of discursive articulations mean society as a whole becomes an impossible 
object of analysis.   The social is overflowing with surplus potential meanings which are 
never exhausted by any particular discourse (Howarth 2000; 103).  That is to say, 
notions of truth and objectivity are ultimately contingent, as such.  Rather than existing 
in a one to one correspondence between meaning and social reality, there exists a 
multiplicity of possible meanings to be invoked through articulation, leading to a fluidity 
and contestation of identity and knowledge.  Even when successfully hegemonic, no 
politico-discursive project (such as liberal journalism, or military propaganda, for that 
matter) can completely extinguish oppositional articulatory forces, as it is against them 
that a given discourse is defined.  Indeed, it is this field of surplus meaning that is 
termed the discursive, signifying the realm of potential meaning.  As Torfing (1999; 92) 
clarifies, the discursive is not a fixed differential identity within a discourse, but rather is 
discursively constructed within a “terrain of unfixity”, providing both the condition of 
possibility and impossibility of the partial fixing of meaning.  For Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985; 111) this field of surplus meaning is the field of overdetermination and provides 
the theoretical conditions for counter-hegemonic articulations. 
 However, although the impossibility of fixed meaning has been theoretically 
established, partial fixations through articulations are necessary, otherwise coherent 
systems of relational differences break down and coherent meaning becomes 
impossible.  As discourse circulates, seeking to dominate the discursive, meaning 
condenses around privileged discursive points, or nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; 112).  These points are rich, privileged signifiers that link chains of meaning and 
signification, strategically articulated and employed by discourses to extend and expand 
their dominance of the discursive.   
 
3.9.2 ANTAGONISM 
The notion of social antagonism illustrates the discursive dynamics through which 
identities and meanings are pursued, contested and constructed.  For Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) and Laclau (2005) antagonism constitutes a fundamental category of 
socio-political action.  Antagonism occurs between discourses and the social formations 
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that they constitute due to the impossibility of discursive success in producing fixed, 
total social identities.   
Discursive antagonisms are fundamental to the contingency of all identity.  The 
inability to fix meaning prevents the realisation of a certain identity, and to the 
construction of an ‘other’ - an antagonising force outside the discursive formation that 
contradicts or negates identity and which represents the antagonism or failure of fully 
realised identity.  In this thesis, professional identities are threatened by and defined 
against the antagonising force ‘outside’ professionalism – military officials, public 
relations operatives or non-conventional journalists, for example.  Identity is precarious 
and contested between forces ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ social and political formations, 
within or beyond the discursive frontier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  As Torfing (1999; 
124) describes, antagonism implies a constitutive outside in which a “radical 
otherness…constitutes and negates the limits and identity of the discursive formation 
from which it has been excluded”.  During the Iraq invasion journalists were faced with 
an antagonising force, or ‘other’, in the form of military media managers, who sought to 
control and potentially manipulate professional journalists, restricting the realisation of 
their professional identities.  In response, central nodal points of professionalism are re-
emphasised and those who act to prevent professionalism from occurring are 
condemned.  Ironically, professionalism itself forbids the expression of journalistic 
opinion – meaning military media managers are critiqued, yet practically little changes 
due to the professional reliance on military sources and information.  In this sense 
antagonism describes the limits to identity and the boundaries to discursive formations – 
ensuring the ultimate contingency of knowledge.  
The concepts of equivalence and difference (Laclau 2005) here become 
theoretically important, describing the processes or techniques by which discourses 
reach their limits.  Equivalence is an articulatory practice that dissolves differences of 
identity within discourses, permitting the unity of intra-discursive identities, defined 
against a negative, outside identity.  By contrast difference seeks to construct 
differentiated subject positions in order to marginalise contrary discourses by dividing 
oppositional equivalences (Howarth 2000; 106-107).  As Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 130) 
state succinctly, “the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political 
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space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing 
complexity”.  In this study, these concepts are used to describe the logics by which 
discursive concepts are articulated either within or outside professionalism.  
 
3.9.3 HEGEMONY 
Hegemony, as noted, is a concept signifying political or moral-intellectual leadership 
and is an exemplary form of political practice (Howarth 2000; 109) produced through 
articulatory practices. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, hegemony is de-coupled from 
notions of fundamental subjects or origins of meaning.  Rather, hegemony can only take 
place because of the open and incomplete character of society – it is the uncertainty of 
the discursive that allows articulatory practices to institute ‘nodal points’ or ‘concepts’ 
(Foucault 1972) which act to partially and contingently fix meaning in an organised 
system of differences (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; 135) such as professional journalism.  
In this sense hegemony is the practice of extending discursive formations, through 
articulation, into a position of social dominance in a context of antagonistic forces and 
which always involve relations of power and repression.   
The concept of hegemony is centrally important for this study.  This thesis 
conceives of overlapping realms or levels of hegemony within and throughout society.  
For example, professionalism hegemonises social meaning production within 
journalism, but professionalism itself is subject to the broader more general cultural and 
political hegemony of Western liberal capitalism.  Through hegemony, and the theoretic 
concepts that contribute to its production, professionalism in journalism is understood 
not simply as an ethical or qualitative standard, but as strategic dominance of a 
discursive field.  It is within journalism itself that the expansion and extension of 
discourse can be identified as taking place, as previously unfixed elements, such as 
privileged aspects of war journalism (embedding, Centcom) are articulated as within 
professionalism. 
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3.10 IDEOLOGICAL FANTASY 
The theoretical re-articulation of the concept of hegemony permits the re-introduction of 
the previously abandoned concept of ideology.  As noted above, both Foucault (1980) 
and Laclau and Mouffe (1985) critique the notion of ideology as presupposing an 
ultimate truth that is an accessible object of knowledge or objective category of analysis.  
As established in the above discussion, discourse theory holds the social is not a 
structural totality, but a field of discursivity, characterised by an excess of meaning, 
leaving society as a unitary, stable object impossible (Torfing 1999; 113).   For Laclau 
(1990), following Žižek (1989), the expansion of the discursive to incorporate all social 
meanings implies that extra-ideological reality is always already ideological.  Rather 
than in the Marxist sense of its use, ideology should then be maintained to describe the 
misrecognition of contingent, precarious nature of any identity, meaning or knowledge 
as fixed, fully realised or stable.  As Torfing (1999; 114) suggests:   
 
The ideological consists precisely in those forms that seek to construct society and 
social agency as decidable discursive forms within a totalising horizon that projects on to 
a particular discursive form an impossible fullness and transparency.   
 
Ideology here is the will to totality.  It is the urge of a discourse to exert itself as 
hegemony (Laclau 1990; 92) and in this sense is synonymous with Foucault’s (1979) 
notion of a discursive ‘will to truth’, and consequently as an aspect of all discourse.   
 Žižek provides a useful conception of this re-constituted ideology with his 
psychoanalytic notion of ideological fantasy.  For Žižek (1989) people may be aware of 
ideology and treat it with distrust or irony, but nonetheless act according to those 
representations.  As Žižek (1994; 316) writes: 
 
The illusion is not on the side of knowledge; it is already on the side of reality itself, of 
what the people are doing.  What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their 
activity, is guided by an illusion…what they overlook, what they mis-recognise, is not the 
reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity...the 
illusion is therefore double:  it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our 
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real, effective relationship to reality.  And this overlooked unconscious illusion is what 
may be called the ideological fantasy.  
 
This reintroduction of ideology continues to enhance my analysis.  The use of ideology 
here is not synonymous with the Marxist concept.  Rather, ideological fantasy does not 
describe a misapprehension on the side of knowledge, but describes the structuring of 
social reality itself.  In this conception, ‘reality’ is not illusory; rather, subjects are 
conscious of the construction of their social experience, yet act as if they were not.  As 
Žižek (1994; 316) writes, ”…even if we  do not take things seriously, even if we keep an 
ironical distance, we are still doing them”.  Žižek (1989) uses the example of the 
fetishisation of money, known to be just paper, yet treated as if it possessed real value 
to illustrate this point.  Likewise, I demonstrate that journalists at times articulate a 
consciousness of their limitations, of the questionable ontological status of objectivity as 
a central journalistic tenet, yet continue to pursue professional strategies structured 
around this illusion, what Pedelty (1995; 172) calls “self-conscious non-reflexivity”. 
 
PART THREE 
3.11 DISCOURSE THEORY AND PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISM 
The thesis adopts an interpretive analytical approach with the aim of generating an 
understanding of professionalism as a discourse and the conditions within which this 
discourse exists and operates.  The techniques and strategies by which professionalism 
enunciates and articulates, and the effect of these articulatory practices on the 
formation of knowledge are of particular interest to this thesis.  Analysis necessarily 
begins with the basic elements of discourse, statements and discursive practices that 
establish the discursive formation (Foucault 1972) and more broadly the concepts, 
strategies and articulations which advance professionalism and produce a coherent 
professionalised narrative of war within the journalistic field of discursivity (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985).   
 Central to understanding the strategies and articulations that characterise 
professionalism is an appreciation of power relations that striate the journalistic field.  
Specifically, the means by which power is deployed within statements of journalistic 
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discourse to produce truths and to attempt to close or suture unstable discourses is 
crucial.  Through these strategies, which establish and legitimate professional 
knowledge it is possible to identify professionalism as a hegemonic project, seeking to 
totalise its journalistic field of discursivity.   
 
3.12 USING THEORY 
I employ a pragmatic, interpretive approach to answering the research questions which 
are posed in Chapter Four.  As this section has made clear through its detailed 
discussion of theoretical considerations, a conceptually grounded analysis that 
integrates insights from contemporary social theory and empirical observations is the 
most appropriate analytical method.  From this position the rigorous, close textual 
analyses undertaken by critical discourse practitioners, for example, is considered 
inappropriate10.  Rather a thematically organised, interpretive method, guided by 
theoretical considerations and the problematisation of professionalism is employed.  
Thus methodologically, the analytical steps taken by this thesis are less a method in a 
mechanistic sense, but rather an approach or orientation, that seeks theoretically 
informed answers to the research questions outlined below. 
Following Foucault, this thesis seeks to analyse the “general system of the 
formation and the transformation of statements” (1972; 130) that occur within the 
discourse of professional journalism.  However, where Foucault’s analyses were 
primarily historical, constructing archives from many decades and centuries of cultural 
production, the subject matter of this thesis is the comparatively very brief, albeit 
intense, Iraq invasion in 2003.  In this sense the archive is not an exhaustive, historical 
compendium, but rather a less expansive collection of statements drawn directly from 
the Iraq invasion itself, in the form of news reports and interview data.    
 Next the processes, methods and articulations of power relationships within the 
discourse are addressed.  Here the strategies and techniques employed by journalists 
and news organisations to fuse and deploy power and knowledge are analysed.  In 
keeping with Foucault’s (1977; 1981) contention that power is omnipresent, the various 
locations of power and the forms of its expression, both in news organisations, the 
                                                
10 For a detailed discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis methods see Fairclough (1995a; 1995b)  
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military, within the press corps and amongst the public are analysed.  Specifically, 
strategies and techniques of knowledge formation that legitimate, normalise, discipline, 
exclude and produce meaning and identity are analysed and their effects evaluated.  
 
3.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has addressed the theoretical and analytical considerations of this thesis.  
Important in establishing the thesis’ theoretical orientation was the provision of a brief 
genealogy of the concept of ideology.  Ideology has been a central concept in social 
scientific research and in social theory, and this chapter has outlined its origin, 
developments and ultimate inadequacy as a useful analytic concept.  This chapter has 
explained how discourse has superseded ideology in attempts to understand modern 
social relations.  Specifically, I have presented and critically assessed the discourse 
theory of Foucault (1972; 1977; 1981) and demonstrated how these insights can be 
enhanced through the introduction of concepts drawn from the discourse theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985).  Before detailing the thesis’ analytic strategy a brief review of 
previous uses of ideology/discourse analysis was presented, demonstrating the novelty 
of my approach.  Finally, this chapter has outlined a theoretic-analytic strategy that 
harnesses useful aspects of both discourse theories and demonstrates how these 
conceptions can be usefully employed in answering the central research questions by 
providing an array of concepts with which to interrogate the data.  It is necessary now to 
move to a more detailed discussion of other methodological considerations and these 
are addressed in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the general methodological approach to the research and presents 
both the central research questions and the research paradigm (Kuhn 1996) within 
which this thesis operates.  The discussion covers the issue of the purpose of the 
methodological approach and the nature of the information so produced and 
interviewing from a non-positivist perspective.  Following this, the specific consideration 
of data selection, organisation and treatment as evidence is discussed.  The thesis 
seeks interview material as its data in the first instance and this is supported by 
provision of much ‘news data’, drawn from articles, broadcast transcripts and news 
databases.  This body of material is described and discussed and the number, form and 
location of interviews conducted for the research outlined.  Finally, potential 
shortcomings or problems with the methodology are identified and briefly addressed. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study’s primary research question is what effects did professionalism, understood 
as a journalistic discourse, have on reporting of the Iraq invasion 2003?  As stated 
above and more fully explored in the following chapter, professionalism constitutes a 
commitment to journalistic norms, which have specific effects in the production of war 
news.  In this thesis’ conception, professionalism can be identified as a framework of 
statements and concepts providing coherence to both journalism practice and identity.  
Here, the central theoretically informed research questions are stated: 
 
1) How did professionalism emerge historically?  How can professionalism be 
understood and conceptualised in the contemporary period? 
2) How can professionalism as articulated by journalists and editors be 
understood?  What concepts/claims underpin journalism’s assertion of 
professionalism? 
3) How does professionalism produce and influence journalistic practice, and in 
what forms?   
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4) How do relations of power construct professionalism and how does 
professionalism express power relationships? 
5) To what extent can professionalism be considered a hegemonic project and 
by what means is this hegemonic intent made visible? 
6) Finally, what possibilities exist within this understanding of professionalism for 
alternative discursive frameworks of interpretation and understanding to 
emerge? 
 
Professional news production potentially places limits on the range, depth and breadth 
of knowledge production, as knowledge created outside professionalism is potentially 
compromised and considered illegitimate.  This observation may carry significant 
implications for our understanding of war, and encourages us to reflect upon the 
desirability of the liberal, professional paradigm in producing socially useful knowledge.  
The relevance and utility of this approach is demonstrated by focusing on the Iraq war, 
2003 – an important historical event of enormous political controversy, in which the 
media are heavily implicated.  
 
4.3 PARADIGM – CRITICAL QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
This project is engaged with the broad traditions of journalism and media criticism 
outlined in the literature review.  Specifically, this thesis positions itself at the nexus of 
three critical projects: media sociology (Tuchman 1972; 1978; Schudson 1978; Gans 
1980; Gitlin 1980; Soloski 1997; Reese; 1997; Deuze 2005), media cultural studies (Hall 
et al 1978; GUMG 1976; 1980; 1982; 1985; Pedelty, 1995) and media political economy 
(Murdock and Golding 1977; Garnham 1979; Herman and Chomsky 1988; McChesney 
2004a; 2004b).  The thesis draws upon each of these traditions, yet it seeks to develop 
a new approach to the study of war journalism.  The thesis does this by deploying 
concepts drawn from discourse theory in the analysis of professionalism in the context 
of war journalism.  Specifically, the thesis employs theoretical concepts drawn from 
Foucault (1972; 1977; 1980; 1981), Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Žižek (1989) in the 
analysis.  The incorporation of discourse-theoretic concepts into the analysis of 
professional journalism sheds new light onto the problem of professionalism in 
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journalism and permits understanding journalism outside of purely sociological, cultural-
ideological or institutional contexts.  My approach permits understanding 
professionalism in war journalism, both in practice and journalistic identity, as 
discursively constituted and constructed.  When journalism is understood in these 
terms, the contingency of professional norms, practices and identities, and thus 
knowledge, is made clear.   
 As the following chapter outlines in greater detail, the thesis understands the 
normative, professional commitment to objectivist and positivist forms of knowledge 
creation highly problematic.  Centrally, the thesis holds that commitments to objectivist 
knowledge creation, such as those commonly associated with professional journalism, 
serve to mask the processes by which knowledge and ‘facts’ about the social world are 
created.  Addressing this problem is the central critical imperative of the thesis.  
Positivism11 is an essentially modernist doctrine of objectivist science, which this 
thesis considers naive.  Logical and empirical positivism seeks to enhance 
understandings of the (social) world through quantifiable experimentation, observation 
and description.  For journalists, independently verified ‘facts’ concerning the social 
world are of primary importance in producing their accounts.  For positivists, and 
objective journalists, reality exists ‘out there’, waiting to be apprehended through the 
application of (pseudo-) scientific techniques.  Such techniques form the basis of 
professional journalistic practice (see following chapter).  The ambiguity that necessarily 
results from linguistic representations, for example, is not considered.  This orientation 
entails a philosophical commitment to facts and absolute conceptions of truth and 
meaning.  The positivist approach is considered fundamentally inappropriate for this 
study.  Given my commitment to principles of contextualised, socially and culturally 
constructed knowledge and an interest in constructing a critique of contemporary 
journalism, a positivist approach is rejected.   
The thesis’ critical perspective, informed by Foucault (1972; 1977; 1980; 1981), 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Žižek (1989), is not neutral and passive, but socially and 
                                                
11 Notably, liberal journalism is avowedly positivist, conceptualising the social world as directly knowable through 
sense experience, primarily the direct witnessing of events or the reporting of eye-witness accounts – that is, the 
establishment of ‘truth’ through methods of verification.  This thesis is both a criticism of professional journalism 
specifically and positivist science generally. 
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politically motivated, seeking to problematise and/or rectify social issues.  The passivity 
and neutrality of positivism (ostensibly also of professional journalism) is considered 
problematic (Neuman 2000; 76).  
 Like positivism however, this thesis’ critical perspective is realist.  Whereas the 
thesis holds reality to be culturally, historically and materially constituted, positivism 
sees external reality as adhering to independent laws (Neuman 2000; 77).  
Furthermore, following Foucault (1972; 1977; 1981) and theorists such as Derrida 
(1978) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), this position rejects any notion of an ultimate 
reality or truth that can be ‘known’ absolutely – the central implied ontological 
assumption both of positivist science and objectivist professional journalism.  Rather, 
multiple possible meanings exist within conditions of radical contingency and 
overdetermination (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  That is to say, multiple truths, identities 
and subject positions are possible and are activated, at a fundamental level, through 
language use in ongoing processes of naming and definition.   
 Presently a methodological concern for achieving truths and falsehoods is set 
aside, in favour of an interpretive and thematic approach to the data, through which 
preferred interpretations emerge.  The research goal is to provide an interpretation of 
the social world and to contribute to social change, rather than establish scientific truths.  
The treatment of data and of evidence differs fundamentally from positivist approaches.  
My critical approach is rooted in interpretive analysis that seeks to ‘read’ and offer 
interpretive understandings of social phenomena, in this case journalistic articulations 
and performances of professionalism.  ‘Facts’, in an empirical sense, should be 
understood as contingent and context dependent (Newman, 2000; 77-78). 
 A reflexive acknowledgement of the purposeful construction of the research is 
central to the thesis.  This understanding of the research makes the narrative 
construction of the data, assembled and analysed in certain contingent ways, explicit.  
The selectivity with which interview subjects and data material is organised and 
analysed is acknowledged and this treatment of empirical material accords with the 
thesis’ critical intentions towards professional journalism.  Central to the methodology is 
a purposeful and wilful critique of professionalism and a desire to problematise 
normative aspects of professional journalism.  This critique draws attention to limitations 
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and contradictions that inhere to the professional model.  The identification of these 
professional shortcomings has the potential to improve journalism’s practical and 
theoretical basis.  The research seeks to illuminate the existence of certain forms of 
socially and politically dominant forms of naming and definition – the hegemonic 
professional discourse of journalism.  And it seeks to demonstrate how professionalism 
permits the entry of dominant, totalising discourses into public knowledge.  A primary 
research goal is to demonstrate the ‘closing’ of journalistic discourse and the rigidities of 
the journalistic form which results.  The possibility for re-articulating and re-defining 
professional journalism is identified.   
 My methodological approach to analysis combines interview material with public 
news discourse.  Analysis of this material indicates within professionalism, as observed 
in interview, certain points or concepts or identities which allow the ‘overcoming’ of the 
conventional professional identity or practice which dominates news reporting.  Good 
research, in this sense, aspires to “break away from fixed forms of subjectivity” 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2007; 274).  An explicit research goal is the encouragement 
of greater self-reflexivity amongst journalists and to encourage foregrounding the 
processes, contingencies and conditions of journalistic constructions, so as to make 
these considerations an integral part of journalism itself.  These suggestions for 
journalism are reflected in the research methodology which seeks to foreground both its 
own contingency and its stated political and disciplinary aims. 
 
4.4 THE PURPOSE OF THE METHOD 
The thesis holds that the understanding of journalism presented here offers, on the 
basis of the research findings, new insight into the limitations and contradictions of 
contemporary professional war journalism.  That is, the research exposes the discursive 
formation of professionalism, and thus illuminates shortcomings, contradictions and 
exclusions which characterise journalism as theory, identity and practice.  Through this 
analysis, and through comparison with the public news record, aspects of journalism 
practice and subjectivity which are contradicted, distorted or which result in limited 
possibilities of useful public knowledge, are illuminated.  The method of the thesis is to 
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use the discourse observed in interview to problematise, examine and interpret the 
public record (news reports).   
 By drawing attention to the power of professionalism within war journalism this 
approach produces an empirical basis from which, on one hand, to provide a timely 
critique of contemporary journalism.  On the other hand, this approach permits 
theorising the potential for alternate forms of journalism that do not rely so heavily on 
professional norms.  Journalism, therefore, that forecloses on meaning and knowledge 
through totalising articulations and enunciations, is to be criticised, as is the discourse 
that gives rise to such reporting.  The closure of journalistic space, or allowing the 
closure of journalism by others, is to be condemned. The totalising intent and limiting 
effect of professionalism in journalism is thus the target of this thesis’ critical energy.   
 However, the expansion of public knowledge through journalism and the 
democratic capacity to inform inherent in journalism is valued.  The discourses, norms 
and practices of journalism that make possible or encourage a variety or multiplicity of 
interpretations and meanings are thus to be encouraged.  As the analysis will show 
there is much that is subjective and experiential in journalism which may serve the 
public good more favourably than the idealised professional norm of objectivity and 
associated practices.  An analytical method that enables the identification of creative or 
open aspects of professionalism is thus considered centrally important. 
 For this reason the thesis’ method seeks an account of journalist’s experiences 
of war and war journalism through interviews.  In the interview process an account of 
war journalism is constructed which contains both direct statements of values, norms, 
concepts and discursive strategies, set alongside experiences, insights, judgements 
and idealisations concerning their practice and experiences.  These enunciations are 
used to problematise the public record, illuminating exclusions, absences and 
contradictions and to identify where journalism may benefit from the articulation of a 
more experiential, subjective knowledge.  This is not to state a preference for relativistic, 
or even subjective, knowledge.  Rather, this method provides criteria of value to be 
applied to journalism.  These criteria are the extent to which journalistic norms serve to 
illuminate and articulate into public knowledge something local, unknown, repressed, 
unofficial, under-reported, and excluded or outside normal experience.  In this sense, a 
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normatively experiential or subjective journalism, insofar as it usefully expands public 
knowledge, fulfils meta-professional norms of serving the public good, yet transcends 
the limitations of normative professionalism.   
 Furthermore, this research approach is opposed to foregrounding dominant 
discourses and official perspectives, such as realities defined in the interest of military 
and political power.  Such definitions are always strategically crafted accounts and their 
prominent reproduction in the public record is not considered an expansion of 
knowledge.  This is especially so during war, when official perspectives actively seek to 
close down differing interpretations of wartime reality. 
 The purpose of the method is therefore to provide an analytical scheme, which, 
informed by the thesis’ theoretical perspective, permits this analytical and critical energy 
to be used effectively.  Emerging from this approach to journalism analysis is the 
possibility of a ‘new professionalism’.  My analysis of contemporary war journalism 
indicates much within professionalism that is to be valued and maintained, however I 
also show journalism to be highly contingent, and this contingency is de-emphasised by 
professionalism.  And there is much in professionalism that the research identifies as 
disciplining and restricting the possibility of useful forms of knowledge.  Rather than 
seeking to control, limit or dominate the production of news discourse through 
professionalism, or through undisguised ideological reporting, ‘new professionalism’ 
champions a reflexive, open, multi-perspectival and non-total news form.  This new 
professionalism should be committed to the expansion of knowledge, rather than its 
limitation or closure, and consequently cannot commit to potentially limiting regimes, 
such as professionalism.  The admission of techniques of literary journalism, 
ethnography and of experiential knowledge alongside verifiable fact in professional 
journalism has the potential to greatly expand understanding, especially during wartime, 
when facts are in notoriously short supply.  The value of this thesis’ method therefore, 
and of journalism generally, should not be the conclusive truth of its empirical 
observations.  Rather this thesis is committed to providing practical, pragmatic insights, 
and to illuminating limitations within existing journalism. 
 A journalism which follows the suggestions presented here, however, will not 
necessarily become merely relativistic and narrowly subjective.  Without a firm 
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epistemological base, such as currently provided by professionalism, an ‘anything goes’ 
relativism in journalism is acknowledged as one potential outcome.  Without firm 
normative concepts of objectivity and independence at the heart of journalism, arguably 
any practice involving public knowledge formation could be construed as journalistic.  In 
the absence of professionalism, one may argue, journalism risks degenerating into ill-
informed or wilfully ideological speculation.   
 The danger of abandoning professional norms and the degeneration of 
professional journalism into openly ideological Fox News-style journalism (which several 
of the interviewees in this project both flatly reject and caution against encouraging) is 
always potentially a problem.  Such degeneration, however, is held to stem from poor 
ethical commitment to norms of honesty and fairness, rather than from self-reflexivity 
and a modified professionalism – if one wants reproduce certain ideological positions in 
journalism, one can do so professionally (Reese, 1997).  As this thesis makes clear, 
professionalism provides no protection from ideology, and indeed, professionalism 
disguises ideology well.  Heavily ideological journalism must be criticised for its 
problematic commitment to ethics, rather than for its lack of professionalism.  A simply 
more professional approach to journalism therefore, does not provide an adequate 
protection from ideological journalism.  Rather, more awareness of the construction of 
social knowledge, both on the part of journalists and audiences is desirable.  One 
method of achieving this is through removing from journalism the camouflage of 
professionalism and laying bare the contingencies, conditions and pragmatic 
circumstances that shape journalism production.  A potentially more open, democratic, 
diverse and self-aware journalism can thus be conceptualised from a critique of 
journalism’s present professional norms.  
 
4.5 INTERVIEWS AND DISCOURSE 
As its main source of primary data this project analyses telephone and face-to-face 
interviews.  These were conducted directly with a selection of journalists reporting for 
mainstream Australian news organisations from the Persian Gulf region during the 2003 
Iraq invasion.  Also interviewed in person were a selection of editors and producers who 
had direct professional relationships with these journalists. In total sixteen news 
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professionals participated in this study and were interviewed in a conversational, non-
structured manner either by telephone or face-to-face, in both private and professional 
settings.  It should also be noted that this group of Australia’s most experienced foreign 
correspondents, working for ‘premier’ news organizations, constitute a robust group of 
interviewees.  These journalists, as professionally trained interviewers themselves, 
participate in the research as knowledgeable, articulate, thoughtful and autonomous 
speakers.  In this sense the interview data is not pure, unconscious professional 
discourse.  Rather it is professional discourse which is constructed entirely in the 
interviewee’s knowledge of their responses being analysed by an academic researcher.   
 In-depth interviews therefore provide access to a professional discourse.  This 
discourse consists of journalists’ and editors’ on the record statements concerning their 
understanding of journalism and their experiences in reporting from Iraq and which 
complement the public record of news reports.  The contingency of this discourse is 
recognised.  Access has not been granted to the one, single and total professional 
discourse, but rather to one form of professionalism, produced for research purposes.  It 
is the central methodological intention of this research to compare this professional 
discourse, as observed in interview, with professionalism evident in the public news 
material produced by these journalists.  On one hand, through this method it is possible 
to construct a discursive formation of professional journalism, in which concepts, 
discursive strategies and enunciations that serve to regulate and discipline journalism 
are identified.  On the other hand, this method provides a means of observing how 
conceptual frameworks and professional narratives both shape the public record and 
are influenced by it, as well as providing an ‘alternate’ account of Iraq war journalism.  
This account can be used to perceive salient aspects of the Iraq invasion experience 
which were absent, emphasised or excluded in the public material, for instance.  A 
critical consideration of the effect of professionalism on public knowledge is thus made 
possible.   
 An analysis of the interview disclosures of journalists and editors is held to 
provide insight into the regulatory power of normative professionalism.  This method 
seeks to illuminate those aspects of journalistic subjectivity that are subject to 
domination by the discursive regime of professionalism and to identify the extent to 
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which professionalism ‘closes’ the identity and practice of journalism.  Finally, through 
this method those aspects of the professional identity upon which may be constructed a 
more open and reflexive journalism may be identified.  The central body of evidence 
that this thesis seeks to analyse is therefore composed of both interview material and 
the public record of news journalism produced by those journalists during the Iraq 
invasion period.  The starting point for the critique of professional journalism is not a 
political position on the correctness or otherwise of the Iraq invasion, but rather an 
unambiguous commitment to critique, disclosure and openness in the process of public 
knowledge formation. 
 It is necessary to add an important qualification however.  As noted, interviews 
do not provide direct access to the internal ‘truth’ of human experience or in this case to 
professional discourse.  Rather, it must be acknowledged that the presence of an 
academic researcher must necessarily influence the production of interview data and 
this is considered an inescapable reality of interview-based research.  As Alvesson and 
Skoldberg (2007; 193) write:   
 
How interviewees appear or represent reality in specific interview situations has less to 
do with how they, or reality, really are (or how they perceive reality out there); rather, it is 
about the way they temporarily develop a form of subjectivity, and how they represent a 
reality in relation to the local discursive context created by the interview. 
 
Thus interview data is to be understood as produced in a collaborative effort between 
the interviewee and the researcher.  In the context of reflexive, critical research the 
perspective of the researcher, in designing the research methodology, planning and 
conducting interviews and directing the interview process is not problematic, but an 
integral aspect of the research process.  Similarly, the contingency and selectivity of 
interviewee responses and narrative constructions are acknowledged as contingent, yet 
nonetheless they provide us with a narrative which illuminates contingencies in the 
public news record.  Thus, any claims on a systematic or neutral line of interview 
inquiry, or on the purity or ‘truth’ of interview responses, are both impossible and 
inessential.  This reflection upon the research methodology highlights a similar dilemma 
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for practicing journalists, who, while professing objectivity and independence, for 
example, necessarily select and exclude aspects of reality in their production practices.  
Importantly however, this insight does not invalidate knowledge so produced, but rather 
highlights the importance of consciously reflecting upon the process of representation, 
both academic and journalistic.  As Alvesson and Skoldberg (2007; 194) make clear:  
 
How representations are made is always in some sense arbitrary, since there is no 
unambiguous relation between language and ‘extra-linguistic’ reality.  Even descriptions 
and analyses that could appear good for some people – the emancipatory, for instance, 
or the apparently innocent (allegedly neutral) – are thus always potentially problematic.   
 
In this thesis, therefore, the rationale of an interview based methodology is based on an 
intention to on one hand stimulate the reflexivity of the journalists involved and on the 
other to construct an account of journalists’ experiences of war that may be read 
thematically alongside the news journalism that has been both individually and 
collectively produced.  The production of this account of war journalism, separate from 
news material, provides the possibility of insight into the public record.  The analysis of 
these accounts yields an understanding of the contingency of news journalism 
constructions.  
One must therefore be mindful of what is being achieved through the analysis of 
interview data.  While it is important to abandon the presumption that interview data can 
provide us with some kind of privileged insight into deep human and social realities and 
ultimate truth of experience, interview data can yield revealing insights into the 
localised, idiosyncratic and highly nuanced creation of knowledge, as the present data 
is acknowledged to be.  The value of this knowledge and generalisations drawn from 
interview data are contingent on the strength and credibility of the analysis. 
 
4.6 PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
The primary data in this study is comprised of transcripts of interviews conducted with a 
selection of Australian foreign correspondents who reported from Iraq during the war of 
2003 and some of their editors and producers.  Sixteen Iraq war journalists and editors 
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were interviewed in total.  Within this number were three journalists who reported from 
Baghdad both during and after the initial invasion.  Two more were stationed at Central 
Command, the Coalition media centre established outside the Qatari capital, Doha.  
Two of the interviewees were embedded journalists who travelled with military forces 
and one reported from Iraq as a ‘unilateral’ journalist and who travelled independently, 
accompanied by a photographer and interpreter and another reported from the 
Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq.  Six editors and producers were also interviewed.  
These interviewees were included on the basis of their being directly involved in the 
collation of Iraq war news either as senior editorial staff (Foreign editor/Editor) or as 
executive producers of radio news programs, the ABC’s AM, PM, and The World Today 
flagship daily news and current affairs shows.  Five of the interviewees were interviewed 
a second time as the richness of their accounts warranted further discussion.  The 
interviews were conducted both by telephone and face to face.  Interview length varied 
from approximately twenty minutes to up to an hour with the average length around half 
an hour.  The interviews took the form of a conversation over a range of topics including 
the journalist’s and editor’s professional conceptions and their specific experiences of 
Iraq and the production of Iraq war news.  While these discussions were conversational 
I ensured that areas of specific interest, such as professionalism, were covered in all 
interviews.  Specific questions about certain events were directed solely at those 
journalists and editors who had specific knowledge or interest in them, such as News 
Ltd’s Peter Wilson’s experience of being arrested by Iraqi soldiers.  The first round of 
interviews took place in May and June 2006 and was followed by a second round in 
November and December 2006.  The interviews conducted with editors and producers 
were partly conducted in these periods.  A further research trip facilitated the face to 
face interview of editors and producers in Sydney and Melbourne, Australia in 
December 2007 and January 2008.     
Interviewees were purposively12 selected for participation in this project on the 
basis of several considerations.  Firstly, the prestige, agenda setting news organisations 
in Australia (for the purposes of this study, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
                                                
12 As opposed to other qualitative sampling methods – see Neuman 2000; 195-221; Sarantakos 2005; 151-175 
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Fairfax Media Limited13 and News Limited14) and the journalists who reported for these 
organisations from Iraq and the Persian Gulf region were identified and selected for 
inclusion in this study.  Certain specific news locations, from where journalists were 
stationed or from where they reported have been identified.  These include broadly – 
the Iraqi capital Baghdad; the Central Command (Centcom) near Doha, in the Gulf state 
of Qatar; as an embedded reporter with Coalition forces; in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan) 
and as an independent, unilateral reporter in Iraq15 - locations determined as much by 
organisational needs or resource-use considerations, as by objective news criteria.  The 
experiences of journalists in or around these areas of Iraq were to be deemed relevant 
to the purposes of this study.   
Another consideration concerns the data available to supplement the first hand 
interviews.  The rationale guiding interviewee selection was in part informed by an 
understanding of the news coverage available, and the form it took.  For example, much 
television coverage of the war was produced, and this live-action, ‘on the ground’ TV 
footage provided the defining imagery of the Iraq invasion.  However, analysis of TV 
footage was considered technically too difficult and time consuming, given the discourse 
perspective’s concern for meaning construction, the deep complexity of television 
imagery and the volume of television footage generated during the three week military 
campaign.  Nonetheless, the prominence of television journalism and the technological 
advances that have ushered this prominence do bear upon the activities and 
understandings of non-television journalists and this is referred to in the analysis.  Thus, 
only radio and print news data was sourced.  Such data is readily available on news 
databases and on news organisation websites as transcripts, in the case of radio 
broadcasts.  Digital news was not considered for use in this study as news organisation 
websites are held to generally publish reproductions of that news available elsewhere – 
in newspapers, for example.  In any case, this news material is intended to provide only 
examples of news discourse and it is not the intention of the thesis to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of Australian Iraq War news.  Also, in terms of ownership, the 
                                                
13 Fairfax Media Limited publishes the two largest daily metropolitan broadsheet news papers in Australia, the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Age (Melbourne). 
14 Australian subsidiary of Murdoch controlled News Corporation. 
15 It should be noted that news ‘happened’ in these location in part due to the presence of news crews in these 
‘newsworthy’ locations. 
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Australian media market is one of the most concentrated in the world (Triffen 2002; Barr 
2000).  The state broadcaster, the ABC, provides a degree of balance against the 
heavily concentrated private media sector.  In this context the only publications of a 
serious, international news focus and national impact are the two Fairfax papers the 
Age and the Sydney Morning Herald and the News Limited publication The Australian.  
Other high circulation metropolitan and regional publications in Australia are considered 
‘tabloid’ format papers, such as the Courier-Mail, Daily Telegraph and Herald-Sun, and 
thus excluded.  Much Fairfax and News Limited material is syndicated through the other 
group publications, for example during the study period much duplication occurred 
between news published in both Fairfax papers, and News Limited reporting was 
circulated widely through the group’s papers.  Thus the pool of potential data within the 
Australian context is small. 
Only journalists who worked for News Limited, Fairfax Limited or the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation were considered for involvement.  Not only are these 
organisations considered the premier national news services, but their inclusion also 
allows a comparison between rival print organisations and between media – print and 
broadcast16.   
Given the relatively small size of the Australian press corps it was intended to 
conduct interviews with between ten and fifteen journalists, the final number determined 
by availability.  For the purposes of comparison it was also considered useful to 
interview editors from each of the news organisations, providing hopefully a deeper and 
more complex picture of the construction of war news.  It was intended there should be 
symmetry to the data – with one journalist from each organisation providing an account 
of each location.  In any case, during the period of study few organisations had more 
than one reporting team at any one location, seeking maximum possible coverage for 
their available resources. 
The process of gathering interview data using working journalists has proved 
irregular.  Although almost all journalists approached in this project were enthusiastic, 
their work schedules and physical locations dictated availability.  As a consequence 
some interviews were conducted relatively early in the research process, whilst the later 
                                                
16 Further discussion of the Australian media sector is provided in Chapter Five. 
 
 
92 
interviews may have taken place weeks or months later.  Consequently, the later 
interviews are supported by a greater depth of research and background material, and 
this is noted.  Also noted are absences of significant figures in Australian journalism, 
such as Fairfax chief correspondent Paul McGeough, from the sample.  Also noted is 
the absence of female voices within the data.  While the Australian press corps remains 
predominantly male, middle class and white (and especially so in the case of the foreign 
press corps) the female journalists considered appropriate for this study declined to 
participate.  This is a notable weakness in the data, as is the absence of non-white 
voices.  Future research into professionalism and war journalism would benefit from the 
inclusion of these voices.  Although most reporters were more than willing, some were 
unreachable as they were on assignment overseas and others firmly uncooperative.  
This sampling method, with purposive and illustrative concerns in mind, rather than an 
interest in representation or statistical validity is considered appropriate for this study as 
it provides a depth of context and a variation of perspective that as noted is considered 
highly in the interpretive scheme.   
The interview data was then transcribed into hardcopy text, presented here in the 
appendices.  Transcription was intended to render each conversation as naturally as 
possible into written form – so as to allow an authentic analysis.  However, it should be 
noted that, in the interests of time and manageability, transcription did not pay as close 
attention to the minutiae of utterances as a more narrowly linguistic analysis may have.  
It was considered sufficient for the purposes of this study to observe the general 
structure and content of the interviews.   
 
4.8 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Qualitative research is based upon the deployment of conceptual and interpretive skills, 
however it is susceptible to many potential problems which need to be identified and 
taken into account in the final analysis.  ‘Error’ (misinterpretation, false interview 
responses, poor interview style or technique) may be more difficult to define in 
qualitative research than positivist science, yet there remain many factors that may 
affect the research.  These can be managed throughout the research process through 
processes of revision and reinterpretation, although arguably never entirely eliminated.  
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Importantly rather than being considered potential sources of distortion and error, such 
‘problems’ are conceived as inherent tensions that exist and help to define qualitative, 
interpretive research.  Issues such as selectivity of data and the interpretation of 
evidence must be understood in the context of the research aims, which have been 
outlined above.  In seeking to problematise professionalism and construct an account of 
war which highlight the absences and exclusions of mainstream war journalism, 
selectivity and interpretation become necessary tools in the analytical process and 
should be embraced as such.  
The problem of bias frequently enters discussions of qualitative research 
(Sarantakos 2005; Neuman 2000; Kvale 1995; Minichello et al 1991).  Bias is the effect 
of subjective perspectives and beliefs in the research process.  With regard to interview-
based research, bias can be said to stem from either the researcher or the interviewee, 
or both.  In accordance with the method spelt out above, the issue of researcher bias is 
one to be considered and managed but does not compromise the integrity of the 
research project.  The absence of objective, empirical fact is embraced by the 
interpretive method, which views positivist methods with suspicion.  Regardless of what 
political stance or posture is assumed by the researcher, the value of one’s results is to 
be judged, like validity and reliability, on the accuracy and coherence of one’s theory 
and method.  One’s case is to be argued rather than proven, and to be supported by an 
interpretation of the evidence.   
Other more mechanical issues pertaining to bias in interview research exist too.  
These include errors and irregularities arising in the interview process.  Interview 
respondents may be misleading, forgetful or make errors and omissions due to an array 
of motivations.  As interviewer, the researcher may omit relevant questions, ask 
questions in the wrong order, he/she may neglect to pursue fruitful inquiry or may 
misunderstand the respondent.  An interviewee may intentionally mislead the research, 
for whatever reason17.  As has already been discussed, the present interview 
methodology is not strictly concerned with the accuracy or ‘truth’ of interview responses, 
                                                
17 This specific likelihood should be noted, as this research project is necessarily dealing with issues relating to 
professional reputation and status. 
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but rather interested in constructing a body of data that may be used to illuminate 
contradictions and shortcomings of professional practice.  
 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach to data collection/creation 
undertaken by this thesis.  It has also added to the theoretical considerations outlined 
above, detailing a cohesive analytic strategy that will be purposefully deployed below.   
 Firstly this thesis’ central research questions were introduced and the general 
theoretic concepts that guide this research reiterated.  This chapter then moved to a 
discussion of the qualitative research paradigm, within which this project falls.  
Specifically, the contrast between conventional positivist approaches and pragmatic, 
constructivist research has been emphasised.  In this section the importance of 
reflexivity and the notion of discursive and subjective openness have been emphasised.   
 The purpose of the thesis’ analytical and interpretive method was then outlined.  
Specifically, the thesis is concerned with offering a critique of the journalistic practice of 
public knowledge creation.  The thesis seeks to do this by using interview material to 
construct a discursive formation of professional journalism, with which to illuminate the 
public record of news material.  This second account, of war and war journalism, serves 
to illustrate the existence of absences, exclusions and contingencies in the public 
record.  A diagnosis of the effect of professionalism on war journalism is then made 
possible.   
In accordance with this approach, the perspective, values and political or social 
posture of the researcher must therefore be reflexively acknowledged and written in to 
the research.  The role of the researcher as author is acknowledged (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg 2007).  Where a positivist researcher, akin to a firmly objectivist journalist, 
seeks to objectify their work, a critical social scientist maintains an entirely different 
relationship with research, understanding themself to be a part of the research process 
and engaged with the social and political context.  Nonetheless, the critical perspective 
still appeals to notions of procedure, evidence, authenticity, credibility and forceful 
analysis to establish their work’s validity.  Relativism is also to be avoided.  All or any 
interpretations of the empirical observations should not be accorded the same weight or 
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value.  As noted, in this context, those interpretations which unfix or unblock 
subjectivities and displace dominant discourses are preferred over fixed identities, 
political positions or approaches.  It should be made clear that in the present research 
an intentionally critical approach which problematises professional norms and news 
practices is employed with the purpose of identifying and addressing potential 
shortcomings in contemporary journalism. 
 Discussion then moved to issues relating the selection and organisation of this 
study’s data.  Firstly, an understanding of interview data was introduced, with reference 
to the theoretical posture of this thesis.  It was argued that interviews should be 
considered a location of knowledge production, rather than the site of pure knowledge 
‘discovery’. The relationship between interviews and discourse was also briefly outlined, 
emphasising the construction of knowledge that takes place during the interview 
process.  These constructions are considered valuable as they provide both an 
alternate account of Iraq invasion experiences and an understanding of the 
contingencies of professionalism.  As professionalism is highly contingent it may also be 
amenable to progressive rearticulation.   
 This chapter then described the rationale that guided the selection and 
organisation of the data.  In particular the sample of interview subjects was described 
and justified with reference to their membership of the Australian quality, national press 
corps.  
 Lastly, potential problems that arise from this methodology have been identified 
and addressed.  Specifically, issues of error, distortion and bias have been raised.  It is 
important to understand these issues in the context of the research aims and the value 
of the thesis is held to depend upon the strength of its interpretations and argument, 
rather than on its fidelity to positive truths.  Having outlined the methodological 
consideration of this study, the following chapters present the thesis’ research findings.  
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PART TWO – HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
CHAPTER FIVE - THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the historical and cultural context for the emergence and 
development of professionalism within journalism and sets the context for the following 
discussion of professionalism in war journalism.  In doing so this section illustrates 
contingency of professionalism and demonstrates how it has become ‘sedimented’ as a 
hegemonic discourse in journalism.  This chapter also provides a discussion of the 
critical debate that has surrounded questions of professionalism, objectivity and 
ideology in journalism.  This chapter moves through three stages, initially providing an 
analysis of the historical emergence of professionalism and the slow development of 
this concept, before moving to a critical discussion of professionalism and then finally 
placing professionalism within its contemporary cultural and journalistic context.     
I argue subsequent to professionalism’s nineteenth century emergence, 
professionalism became hegemonic within journalism, although it has been powerfully 
criticised.  Professionalism persists as the central journalistic ethic, yet has been 
criticised as inadequate and inappropriate for pursuing journalism’s democratic ideals 
and accused of latent conservatism.  Indeed, critics see professionalism as the most 
significant obstruction for journalists to realise their democratic potential, and here this 
thesis concurs (McChesney 2003; 2004a). This chapter provides a historical 
genealogical account of journalistic professionalism in order to fully contextualise the 
following discussions of the ‘archive’ (Foucault 1972) of professional war journalism and 
the manner in which relations of power characterise and regulate contemporary war 
journalism.   
This historical account identifies crucial aspects of the development and the 
socio-political and cultural conditions that ushered the institutionalisation of 
professionalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  I argue that, rather 
than symbolising the teleological development of liberal values and political ideology, 
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the formalisation of journalistic professionalism was part of journalism’s incorporation 
and subsumption within the emergent, hegemonic ideology of liberalism.  The 
‘professionalisation’ of journalism coincided with the ‘massification’ of media audiences 
and the need for a standardised, reliable and saleable news ‘commodity’. Following the 
account of the incorporation of journalism into the hegemonic liberal capitalist system, I 
begin to analyse the effects of this incorporation on the production of knowledge. The 
analysis briefly critiques the normative function of professionalism, as it operates within 
the broader liberal system.   
After critically discussing the function of professional journalism, this chapter 
provides an account of the cultural and economic conditions of professional journalism 
in recent decades.  This era is understood as the postmodern period, in which older 
cultural and economic assumptions have been displaced in favour of an economically 
rationalist model of economic de-regulation, globalisation and individualisation.  
Significant cultural and economic changes have been wrought by postmodernism – later 
conceptualised as period of re-regulated neo-liberal globalisation – and journalism has 
been profoundly affected.  On one hand, socio-cultural criticisms during the 1960s and 
1970s drew attention to the conservative and establishment supporting function of 
professional journalism.  On the other hand, economic de-regulation and rationalisation 
has led to the commercial penetration of the cultural sphere, the concentration and 
conglomeration of media businesses and the increased commodification and consumer 
orientation of the news media.  I argue ‘professionalism’ as a normative occupational 
ethic, is incapable of coping with the onslaught of neo-liberal news media 
commodification.  Rather, professional journalism needs to be conceptualised, not as a 
fragile vestige and weakened institution of normative liberal political values, but as 
already within the current neo-liberal hegemony of economic globalisation.  The 
rearticulation and emphasis on ‘traditional’ professional, liberal values by contemporary 
journalists, rather than re-asserting the normative journalistic role, which is able to 
provide democratic critique, merely fails to acknowledge the role played by professional 
journalism within the contemporary forms of hegemony, such as Western militarism.   
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5.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ANGLO-PROFESSIONALISM  
The emergence of the professional discourse and the objective method is a relatively 
recent development, in the context of the history of the press.  This emergence 
however, should not be understood as a teleological achievement within the 
development of Western liberalism. The professionalisation of journalism, and the turn 
towards the neutral, objective method of reporting that persists as the guiding 
occupational ethic (Schudson 1978) today, results from certain particularities and 
contingencies of cultural and commercial developments of the late nineteenth-century 
specific to the Anglophone world.  Rather than being a successfully realised, integral 
liberal articulation, the journalistic discourse was subsumed within liberalism during the 
late nineteenth century.  The preference for ‘objectivity’ and the professional ethos, 
must be considered as enunciations of modern preferences for, and faith in, science, 
rationality, administrative function and control, rather than as a natural, pre-existing or 
transcendent form and method of knowledge generation or indeed as descending from 
the philosophical origins of liberalism (Siebert et al 1956).   
 Briefly, it is necessary to provide some historical context of the development of 
Anglo-journalism and press culture, before paying closer attention to changes that 
occurred in late nineteenth-century.  The early, pre-professional phase of journalism 
stretches from the earliest produced letters and pamphlets of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries through to the early 1800s.  In this period the ability to communicate 
information and ideas through printing emerged as a radical challenge to established 
social and political orders, as printed material profoundly altered the possibility and 
effectiveness of communication.  In this sense the development of printing and 
publication, and eventually ‘the press’ as such, must be considered as coincident with 
the wider cultural-philosophic turn towards liberalism that gathered pace over this period 
(Siebert et al 1956; 42-43).  The subversive potential of the new printing technology and 
publication was perhaps most dramatically realised with the 1517 publication of Martin 
Luther’s 95 Theses sparking the Protestant Reformation.  Henceforth, ‘news’ became 
increasingly viewed not only as the transmission of information, but also as a political 
instrument permitting the increased flow of knowledge and ideas (McNair 1999; 29). 
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Throughout this early period printing and publishing remained controlled by the 
state through various regulatory measures.  The modern concept of press freedom did 
not yet exist.  In an era of largely unquestioned monarchical legitimacy, press freedom 
was an unforseen consequence rather than a purposeful creation (Stevens 2007; 152).  
Nevertheless, the early press served as a means through which the rising capitalist 
class could agitate for political and economic reform, in which they held explicit self-
interest. The absolute power and ‘divine right’ of the European monarchs were 
increasingly viewed as incompatible with the emerging Enlightenment ideals of 
economic, political, spiritual and intellectual freedom.  The notion of a free press or 
‘open market of ideas’ was quickly incorporated as a central aspect of the rising 
bourgeois political doctrine (McNair 1999; 30) – only through the free and uninterrupted 
flow of ideas, opinion and intellectual diversity could ‘truth’, knowledge and prosperity 
emerge.  By the eighteenth century the transition from authoritarian to liberal principles 
of press organisation was complete (Siebert 1956; 44).  The freedom of expression and 
of conscience were thus included philosophically, and later legally (within constitutional 
arrangements), within the body of liberal thought.    
Whereas later the ‘professionalisation’ of journalism would require the 
renunciation of opinion and partisanship, and an avowal of neutrality in the press, in the 
early liberal period no such doctrine existed. As Smith (1978; 157) writes of early 
journalistic entrepreneurs, “[T]he preoccupation of the journalist lay quite outside the 
accurate reporting of facts;  there were no facts more important, nor more urgent, than 
the fate of fictions; it was these that provided the revenue, the market and the 
intellectual compulsion behind the product”.  The following brief discussion details the 
similarity of journalistic development in America, the UK and Australia, providing a 
simple comparison of journalistic development.  
Sloan and Williams (1994) note that early Americans saw journalism and the 
debate it fostered as close to concerns of society.  Rather than a product of reformist 
iconoclasm or the forces of reaction, the early American press found support from early 
colonial American political and religious ideology favouring individual inquiry and 
expression, that is, nascent liberalism.  Increasingly American colonial society found 
newspapers and periodicals useful for both commerce and political expression, and 
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philosophical urges were often diluted by practical matters of public and political 
importance (Sloan and Williams 1994; 206).  Generally, the press came to be regarded 
as a social and political necessity, not only lubricating the machinery of commerce, as it 
had done from its origins, but also fostering literacy and encouraging knowledge about 
an increasingly complex  social and political system.   
It was in England that during the nineteenth century the potential for mass 
audiences and massive commercial gain was first realised.  With this however was 
begun a process of incorporating more radical press elements into the mainstream, 
slowly extinguishing non-conventional and marginalised press voices which had 
heretofore flourished.  Previously, a high stamp tax forced a truly radical (and illegal) 
press underground.  This vibrant political culture gave voice and identity to English 
dissenters, protestors and radical agitators; although it is argued that in reality its 
political demands called for nothing more radical than reform (Stevens 2007; 188).  The 
abolition of the stamp tax however made legal, commercial publication more appealing 
for underground publishers.  Consequently, the radical press was virtually destroyed as 
papers re-made themselves as proto-tabloids, featuring working class rhetoric, 
formulaic crime news and scandal, and competed with mainstream publications for 
audience and advertising, foreshadowing later American developments.  
The early Australian press, developed from the British/American tradition, was 
transplanted into an embryonic colonial society in the early 1800s.  The early colonial 
press was unremarkable and often forcibly Protestant and didactic, reflecting the role of 
the press in an often unruly penal society (Mayer 1964; 10).  Deference to colonial 
governments and positions of power characterised early papers, in contrast to the 
voices of dissent heard loudly in early English and American papers.  The Sydney 
Gazette (1803-42), published “by authority”, has been described as “fulsome flattery of 
government officials and inane twaddle in other matters” (Mayer 1964; 10).  Throughout 
the nineteenth century however, the Australian press grew rapidly as developments in 
literacy, industrialisation and transport contributed to the creation of mass audiences.   
The reputation of early Australian journalists was low and notions of 
professionalism absent from journalistic consideration.  In a penal and frontier colonial 
society little value was placed on what would later become recognised as 
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professionalism.  Little regard was shown for concepts of truthfulness or political 
independence.  Indeed, the rising public esteem that early journalists enjoyed in 
revolutionary America, and later during the ‘new journalism’ period of the late nineteenth 
century, was notably absent in early Australia.  Rather, the social status of journalists 
was, and remains, relatively low.  Much of Australian press history and culture, both 
professional and otherwise, has been characterised by the banal.  As Mayer (1964; 
189) argues early journalists lacked education, self-respect and cosmopolitan 
experience and were generally treated with contempt.  Journalists possessed, “no 
definite organisation, [or] profession at all” and represented “many specimens of moral 
obloquy, so many hopeless outcasts from all paths of reasonably sane and tolerable 
behaviour” (Mayer 1964; 190).  A particularly evocative image is drawn of the ‘bush 
journalist’ or editor, working on the country papers of rural Australian towns and villages; 
such journalists represented, “a frowsy, unsanitary fragment, for the most part, of 
uninviting exterior and cheap morals and a yearning soul for spirituous and fermented 
liquors” (Mayer 1964; 197). 
By the late nineteenth century the same distinctions between popular and 
‘serious’ press existed in Australia as they did elsewhere.  In 1900 Sydney’s Daily Mail 
achieved a circulation of one million with its populist, lightly entertaining product.  While 
a ‘serious’ press existed (the Sydney Morning Herald began daily publication in 1840 
and the Age began in 1854), notions of formalised professionalism had not yet emerged 
or formed, mirroring the American experience.  Nonetheless, the new papers enjoyed a 
privileged position in colonial society, with little other indigenous literature available.  
The press industry enjoyed relatively light regulation.  Publishers and journalists could 
either be punished or supported by government patronage and no guiding ethos of 
public responsibility existed.  Rather, as Chief Justice Sir James Martin remarked, “the 
journalist publishes what he thinks will be profitable to him and the public pay him for his 
trouble” (in Mayer 1964; 465).  It was not until well into the twentieth century that a more 
formal professional Australian journalism emerged.   
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5.3 EMERGING PROFESSIONAL CULTURE 
As the discussion above makes clear, professionalism was an unknown concept 
throughout this early phase of journalism’s development.  The following discussion 
details the cultural and economic conditions that ushered professionalism’s emergence.  
Earlier, no central guiding ethos guided journalism’s development beyond the desire for 
free political expression and, where possible, commercial gain.  Rather, the 
establishment of the early press was the product both of technological and politico-
cultural development and was appended to the nascent political philosophy of classical 
liberalism; while a discourse of press freedom was well established, professionalism 
remained unelaborated or articulated.  Press culture however, changed markedly in the 
nineteenth century.  The social changes wrought by the industrial revolution, such as 
industrial manufacturing and the growth of urban, working populations created the 
conditions in which a mass audience for journalism and news could be created.  
Consequently enormous commercial opportunity could be realised by those press 
owners able to exploit the maturing industry effectively.  As the press industry became a 
mass industry and highly commercial, an occupational meaning was fostered among 
journalists who became ever more required to possess certain journalistic skills and to 
be able to produce evermore standardised journalistic fare.   
 The underlying reasons for the emergence of the professional doctrine of 
journalistic theory, practice and ethics at this time are debated, however analysts 
acknowledge the socio-political maturity that characterised late nineteenth century 
America and other societies as contributing powerfully to development of professional 
culture.  Schudson (1978) sees the decline of partisanship and the rise of professional 
journalism with its roots in the Jacksonian era (1830s), and the liberal social consensus 
and political engagement that this period fostered.  Baldasty (1992) emphases the 
commercial aspect of press development, arguing that newspaper owners traded 
political patronage for advertising revenues and promoted a non-political news, treating 
their readers as consumers rather than citizens.  Kaplan (2003) holds that the political 
crises of the mid-1890s and the rise of the Progressive movement de-legitimised the 
established political parties and allowed the press to break with political allegiance, 
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follow commercial imperatives and seek public legitimacy through impartiality, technical 
expertise and fact. 
Alongside commercial imperatives, central to journalism’s growing sense of 
occupational, if not professional ethos, was therefore the notion of public service and 
credibility. Within this public service ethos were knowledge, education and standards of 
quality and behaviour and independence were emphasised (Dooley 2000; 127).  
Although ideals of public service and independence may have been honoured more in 
their compromise than in meaningful realisation throughout nineteenth century, these 
were powerful discourses that captured public imagination in an era of expanding social 
and political complexity.   
In the late nineteenth century, the ‘new journalism’, promoted by the first ‘press 
barons’, such as W.R. Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, symbolised the growing maturity and 
professionalisation of the press.  Spurred by commercial imperatives, this style of 
journalism moved away from both crude political propaganda and proto-tabloid 
populism, towards a more appealing and saleable ‘product’.  Indeed, as was recognised 
at the time, the transition to mass audiences necessarily meant a transition from 
political, partisan and local news to standardised, moderated news designed to appeal 
to as broad an audience as possible.  From its first incarnation, professionalism 
inculcated a mainstream, moderate and palatable journalism designed to entertain as 
much to inform.  As Pulitzer argued, “what a newspaper needs in its news, with its 
headlines, and on its editorial page is terseness, humor [sic], descriptive power, satire, 
originality, good literary style, clever condensation and accuracy, accuracy, accuracy” 
(Pulitzer in Mott 1972; 440).  This new style of journalism importantly fostered an 
interest in public affairs and society, and this was reflected in the burgeoning 
circulations of most nineteenth century papers.  As Dooley (2000; 128) argues these 
developments help to establish “occupational meaning” both in the minds and actions of 
journalists but in the broader social structure too.  This orientation was however 
explicitly an expression of commercial logic.       
Although American journalism had long harboured a sensational bent the new 
sensibility was heavily criticised for its robust tabloidism, characterised by 
shamelessness in self-promotion, sensationalism, jingoism and publication of 
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unwholesome and salacious scandal in gritty detail.  As Mott (1972; 442) comments, 
“exploitation of crime and scandal were here allied with the crusading spirit, and their 
crusades were often sensational”.  Nonetheless, the new journalism, as promoted by 
Pulitzer, Hearst and others, symbolised an attempt to proceduralise journalism and to 
stabilise its body of practice, ethics and doctrine around core values that would add to 
its potential as a saleable commodity.  
Crucial to the entrenchment of professionalism was the first crisis of modern 
journalism.  This crisis took hold in the wake of the excesses of yellow journalism18.  
Much of the ‘yellow journalism’ was blatant fabrication and dishonest, and this period 
was essentially a ‘race to the bottom’, as rival publishers attempted to outdo each other 
and increase sales through spectacle and exuberance in which smut, prurience and 
sex-crime sensationalism were taken to an all time high (Mott 1972; 524).  The 
Progressive politics of the era however, expressed disillusionment with commercial and 
corporate power, particularly in the media19.  For a brief period muckraking journalism,20 
and its excoriating social criticism, flourished, and an embryonic professionalism was 
extant.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the press came broadly 
under attack as part of the systematic, Progressive challenge to established social, 
political and economic structures (Kaplan 2002; 190).  Indeed, by the early twentieth 
century, and as a direct result of the excesses of the ‘yellow’ period, the press was 
largely considered “corrupt and straightforward class propaganda” (McChesney and 
Scott 2004; 14).  Neither the press’s commercial or political power could survive in face 
of a deeply suspicious public that had begun to treat news and journalism with contempt 
and disgust.  This crisis of public confidence combined with the commercial imperative 
to sustain business would eventually lead to the establishment of modern, liberal and 
professionalised journalism in the post-World War I era. 
Journalism in the late nineteenth century was, then, a contradiction.  From the 
‘penny press’ era of the mid-1800s onwards, the commercial press had emphasised 
democratic populism and legitimacy derived from public service.  These values and 
                                                
18 For further discussion of this period of American journalism see Joyce (1989) The Yellow Kids, New York, 
Harper and Row. 
19 For further discussion of Progressive era, see Hofstader (1962) The Age of Reform, New York, Jonathan Cape.   
20 For an account of this era of journalism, see Serrin and Serrin, Muckraking, New York, New York Press, 2002. 
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attributes were supported both by an increasingly literate and politically sophisticated 
public, and by journalistic discourses celebrating and promoting political independence 
and public service of a mass audience.  Pulitzer’s ‘new’ journalism in particular identified 
with values of accuracy and veracity in reporting, infusing his journalism with ideas 
drawn from liberalism and enlightenment science, yet motivated also by the desire for 
mass appeal and profitability.  In this sense, by the late nineteenth century journalism 
could be publicly promoted as reason and science in action, yet it could also exist as a 
profit-earning commodity.  
The development of an objective, professionalised method in journalism received 
impetus partly as a result of journalist’s experience of the First World War.  
Professionalism, in this sense was a response to the attempts by military managers to 
obfuscate and propagandise during war.  The propaganda and information 
management strategies employed by the Great Powers led journalists to question the 
previously held assumption that, through perseverance and tenacity, the journalist could 
discover the ‘truth’ (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003; 72-74).  The First World War signified 
the death, in effect, of the naïve realism that had previously characterised the reporting 
of events.  As Lippman (1922) foresaw, liberal democratic governments in the twentieth 
century would require the public relations and image-conscious communications 
industries to, “create consent among the governed”.  News, it was argued, must 
therefore be constructed in accordance with an objective methodology which privileged 
factual information and dispassionate reporting, thus obviating the subjectivity of 
reporting and efforts of dissemblers (McNair 1999; 33).   Empiricism was thus placed at 
the heart of the journalist’s practice. 
 
5.4 PROFESSIONALISM HEGEMONIC 
The following section details the establishment of professionalism as central to twentieth 
century journalism, before the discussion turns to a critical discussion of 
professionalism’s hegemony.  From its emergence in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, liberal, professional journalism was held in high public esteem.  
Hallin (1992) refers to the post-WWII era in particular as the period of ‘high modernism’ 
in journalism.  Through the application of the objective method journalists were 
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considered able to pursue the public interest, reporting virtually unimpeded.  Journalists, 
editors and publishers were able to restore public faith too, through enunciation of a 
professional discourse.  With the establishment of the American Association of 
Newspaper Editors (1923) and the adoption of ethical standards of conduct, the growth 
in journalism education and professional courses and the sophistication of the 
commercial industry, journalism came to be both popularly and politically considered as 
an integral component of the modern, democratic system.  A brief period of radicalism in 
the 1930s notwithstanding, this high esteem continued throughout the 1940s and the 
Second World War era.   
Post-war, the trends that characterised press development continued, with 
widespread consolidation of the ownership and expansion of press empires.  Of central 
importance during this era however, was the expansion of news services and creation 
of truly mass audiences through the technology of initially radio and then television 
(Mott 1972; 813).  These were profound changes.  Although the professional discourse 
did not undergo reconsideration, the introduction of mass communications technology 
profoundly altered the composition of the media industries.  By the 1960s television was 
ubiquitous (later outside the US).  The spread and popularity of new technology 
reflected the optimism of the post-war boom years, as consumer driven growth resulted 
in great social change, such as the development of suburban geography, rapid 
technological development, changing family structures and accelerated corporate 
ownership across industries, including publishing and broadcasting (Davies 1994; 131).   
In this era, journalism had took on a firmly establishment cast (McChesney and 
Scott 2004) and was beginning to suffer criticism for its embrace of power.  As noted in 
the post-war era, the disinterested, objective doctrine of professional journalism that 
Lippman had promoted became increasingly seen as insufficient in addressing the 
significant social and political issues of the day.  Although journalists had gained 
prestige and power through their close association with political institutions and figures, 
their role in maintaining the status quo social structures were identified and questioned.  
This critique of professional journalism grew.  By the 1960s, as the civil rights and anti-
Vietnam movements were gaining momentum and widespread support, the mainstream 
press came to be seen as incapable of providing sustained political criticism and the 
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capacity to provide alternative narratives, analyses and interpretations from those 
expounded by official figures and sources.  In this sense professional journalism came 
to be identified alongside the established liberal, socio-political institutions currently 
criticised.  Professional journalism provided, “an effaced, deferential narration of the 
views of legitimate authorities from formal political society” (Kaplan 2002; 194) and 
symbolised much that was ill with modern liberalism.  Through the institutionalisation of 
instrumental and technocratic power liberalism had become an inherently conservative, 
rigid and dominating force.  In the terminology of the era, professional journalism 
became evermore considered an ideology, maintaining the legitimacy of liberal 
democratic systems.   
 
PART TWO 
5.5 THE PROFESSIONAL METHOD 
This section deals specifically with the criticisms of professionalism that emerged in the 
later twentieth century and in response to the perceived ‘establishment cast’ of 
journalism, produced through the professional discourse and method.  Professionalism 
is best understood as a purposefully created and reproduced strategy of legitimation 
within journalism, solidified in the early twentieth century.  For instance, on one hand, 
the notion of objectivity is commercially saleable to consumers wanting accurate ‘news’ 
about social reality.  On the other hand, it provides a moral grounding for journalists 
committed to ‘truth’.  The power and legitimacy of these ideas grew throughout the first 
half of the twentieth century, consistent as they were with the emerging liberal 
international political and economic system.  However, as many have noted (Tuchman 
1978; Gans 1980; Gitlin 1980; Reese 1997; McChesney 2004a; 2004b), objectivity, as 
the central tenet of the professional discourse, works to obscure the processes, routines 
and values which influence the construction of news and thus the character of the public 
information that journalism produces.  In attempting to eliminate ‘bias’ from the news, 
the discourse of objectivity is itself obscurant.   
Objectivity is an articulation of faith in facts and their central importance in 
producing knowledge, and a disavowal of values in journalism.  Not only does this 
discourse defend against charges of bias, but asserts that truth and factual information 
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can be established if ‘truth claims’ are subjected to rules and practices deemed 
legitimate by a professional community (Schudson 1978: 7), that is, subjected to 
discursive controls.  Similarly, objectivity has been described as bringing the techniques 
of social science to journalism – seeking truth through the rigorous methodology of the 
scientist (Streckfuss 1990; 975).  As such objectivity is the central legitimating ethic in 
professional journalism. 
A loose body of doctrine has grown around the notion of objectivity, focusing on 
fairness, balance, truthfulness and the importance of verification. These concepts have 
become fully integrated and articulated into the discourse.  However, the discourse has 
never become fully ‘fixed’ and these concepts have never coalesced into standardised 
procedure or rules of evidence (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003: 74-75).  Nonetheless they 
continue to guide journalistic practice and provide its public legitimacy.  Journalists and 
media organisations have however sought to codify the discourse and promulgated 
codes of ethics and standards of behaviour and practice.  These specialised skills, 
knowledge and the ethos of public service are used as evidence to support journalism’s 
claim on professional status (Reese 2001; 175), although this claim continues to be 
contested (Ognianova and Endersby 1996; Singer 2004), illustrating further the 
incomplete fixing of professionalism as a hegemonic discourse.  Objectivity is a 
journalistic virtue and professionalism a commitment to these ethics (Hausman 1992; 
12) and although objectivity has been criticised as an unattainable and ultimately flawed 
method for generating knowledge, it has withstood these attacks to remain the central 
concept of modern, professional journalism (Schudson 1978; 9-10).  Professionalism 
asserts what type of information is reliable, but it also symbolises an intellectual and 
political commitment to engage with the world from an ostensibly neutral, dispassionate 
perspective.   
Critics have argued that objectivity, rather than ensuring an unadulterated and 
accurate picture of reality, actually masks the ongoing process of meaning and reality 
construction inherent in the news production process.  Objectivity may be a commitment 
to facts, however ‘facts’ are themselves cultural constructs (Pedelty 1995: 7) and can 
only be communicated by the establishment of shared, contextual meanings.  This 
notion has been pursued by scholarship concerned with investigating the values and 
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routines that determine the news (Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980; Gitlin 1980; Altheide 
1980).  The most powerful criticisms of journalism arose from the adversary culture of 
the late-1960s, when substantive political and social assumptions, such as capitalism, 
the law, organised religion and education came into serious question (Schudson 1978; 
185).   
Although criticisms of professional journalism were made as objectivity was 
ascendant, Hallin (1992) calls the mid-twentieth century as a period of ‘high modernism’ 
for journalism.  In this period the public status of media institutions grew and there 
existed little controversy over the political role or ethical bearing of journalists (Hallin, 
2000).  It was a period of Cold War moral absolutes and stable relationships between 
the establishment and the press.  Hallin (1992) argues that in the 1990s, when this 
economic, social and political stability began to break down, journalism did not emerge 
reinvigorated but had its remaining energy sapped by ever increasing news 
commercialisation.  
Social science has attacked journalism’s epistemology as naïve, arguing 
journalism is incapable of examining the true nature of the social and political structure 
(Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980; Gitlin 1980; Reese 1997; McChesney 2003; 2004a; 
2004b).  Objectivity – in trying to avoid distorting values and bias in reporting, had for 
many become the greatest bias.  The effect is a tendency towards status quo 
representations of reality, and away from critique and considered interpretation of 
issues and events. Objectivity is, to many critics, incapable of delving below the surface 
of ‘taken for granted’ reality to uncover values that should be open to question.   
 
5.6 THE PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY21 
It is still a point of debate as to whether or not journalism can be classified as a 
profession (Golding and Elliot 1979; Soloski 1997; Reese 2001; Singer 2003; Dunn 
2004; Tumber and Prentoulis 2003).  It is unlikely however, that journalism will ever be 
formally considered a profession similar to medicine or law.  Rather, entry into 
                                                
21 This section employs the term ‘ideology’ descriptively, referring to professionalism as a set of occupational 
norms.  This thesis has set out its critique of ‘ideology’ as an analytical category in Chapter Three.  The use of 
ideology by the authors reviewed here must be considered normative, whereas in this thesis the term has undergone 
considerable theoretical reconsideration and has been superseded by the critical concept of discourse.   
 
 
110 
journalism remains unregulated and non-exclusive, articulating its democratic ideals, 
unlike the prestige professions which control entry through educative and examination 
processes.  Nevertheless, the adoption by journalists of routines and conventionalised 
practices and conceptions which constitute the exercise of power within professional 
journalism can be identified and critiqued.  This section details the criticisms that have 
been levelled at journalism as a result, for critics - the ‘ideology’ of professionalism.  As 
is clear from previous chapters, the thesis takes issue with the conception of 
professionalism as ideological, but nonetheless a discussion of these criticisms is 
necessary so as to identify several problematic aspects of modern journalism practice 
and function which the thesis rearticulates as discursive both in origin and character.  
In an early study Johnstone et al (1972) report that the ideology of objective 
reporting matured in the first half of the twentieth century, although note that by the 
1970s was beginning to be criticised as being socially complacent and neutral.  Golding 
and Elliot (1979) discuss professionalism broadly, conceiving of it as a form of 
occupational control enacted by media organisations, rather than an expression of a 
conceptual system specific to the occupation.  Likewise, Christian (1980) writes that the 
development of a professional ideology was a response to the changing structure and 
character of the British press, the most important change being the process of 
commercialisation, which sought a standardised, reliable product.  Soloski (1997; 140), 
as we have seen, talks of the, “ideology of professionalism” that controls journalist’s 
behaviour. 
Tuchman (1972; 660) has suggested that objectivity and the professional 
practices it symbolises are little more than a “strategic ritual” that protects journalists 
from the risks of their trade by providing a, “bulwark between journalists and their 
critics”.  Tuchman rejects the positivist notion that the fulfilment of the normative, 
professional journalistic role necessarily leads to a, “mirror of society’s concerns and 
interests” (1978; 183).  Rather, the news is a ‘frame’, a concept used to understand the, 
“principles of organisation which govern events…and our subjective involvement in 
them” (Goffman 1986; 10-11).  News frames, deployed routinely, intuitively and 
‘objectively’ constitute the ‘news net’ that orders and defines newsworthiness (Tuchman 
1978; 21-22).   
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Professionalism then, is a product of the institutional, idiosyncratic circulation of 
power within news organisations and the daily, sanctioned routines of journalists, rather 
than a neutral set of norms and practices. Journalists, in their daily work, enacting 
professionalism, undertake ritualised behaviours and operate within institutional 
constraints to impose and apply meanings.  News, as a product of this ongoing meaning 
negotiation, does not mirror society but, “helps to constitute it as a shared social 
phenomenon” (Tuchman 1978: 184).  In attributing meaning to an event the news 
defines and publicly ‘creates’ that event.   
A similar understanding of professional journalism is expressed by Gitlin (1980; 
9) who writes, the media are, “a significant social force in forming and delimiting of 
public assumptions, attitudes and moods – of ideology, in short”.  With regard to 
professional journalism however, the operation and effectiveness of ideology is 
reproduced through economic, political and social structures and is embodied by 
mainstream, commonsense understandings of the world. As Pedelty (1995; 7) 
describes, in liberal capitalist societies, “[the] dominant means of communication are 
rationalised in an obfuscational idiom of neutrality, independence and objectivity” 
masking the ideological nature of ‘commonsense’ or normal understandings.  As Gans 
(1980) identifies, journalism operates completely within the hegemonic cultural and 
political structures in this non-reflexive manner, mitigating the possibility of fundamental 
social critique.  
Several other thinkers broadly echo these perspectives.  Altheide (1976; 24) 
writes that the, “organisational, practical and other mundane features of news work” 
encourage a perceptual method that fundamentally distorts events and occurrences.  
Altheide calls this the ‘news perspective’ and it is analogous to a news frame governed 
by objectivity.  Gans (1980; 183) describes the “implied bargain” that journalists strike 
with the public.  Invoking a detached, objective professionalism allows journalists the 
autonomy to choose the news in exchange for leaving out their personal and political 
values.  By being conscious of the conventions of professionalism and working to fulfil 
them, journalists can remain unconscious of the deeper cultural values and political 
ideologies that colour their work (Pedelty 1995; 172).   
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Professionalism hides the connections between ‘the news’ and its economic, 
institutional and political contexts, while the media retains the appearance of an 
independent institution.  As Bennett (2005; 188) writes, “as one reality comes to 
dominate all others, that dominant reality begins to seem objective”.  In describing the 
professional ideology as a “journalistic paradigm” Reese (1997) argues that by 
assuming the appearance of neutrality and dispassion, press reporting becomes all the 
more ideologically effective.  “In a large part”, writes Reese (1997; 425), “the media 
accept the frames imposed on events by officials and marginalise and de-legitimate 
voices that fall outside the dominant elite circles”.  Soloski (1997; 143) agrees, but adds 
that while the news legitimises and supports the existing politico-economic system, a 
journalist’s selection of news stories does not reflect a conscious desire to report the 
news so as to maintain the status quo, but rather reflects the journalist’s position within 
the hegemonic system and central role the professional discourse plays within it.  
Similarly, McChesney (2004b) argues that the biases of professional journalism are built 
in and as a product of the objective model entwined with the process and structure of 
press commercialisation.  For McChesney (2004b; 442), the conglomeration of media 
ownership has resulted in the increasing irrelevance of much journalism.  The pursuit of 
middle class audiences has meant an extended class bias in the selection and tone of 
material, “that even at its best serves a propaganda function” (McChesney 2004b; 442).  
Pedelty (1995) agrees asserting that the ideological content of news texts largely 
reflects the concerns of shareholders, press owners and especially advertisers, who 
profit from news production.  Professional news is then interpretable as a symbolic 
liberal capitalist world view, fundamentally supported by those who control and manage 
news production.    
In pre-professional times an editor could claim the selection of a story 
represented their values, something unacceptable now (McChesney 2004a: 68), leaving 
an editor open to accusations of bias, as interpretation and analysis are contrary to the 
fact based neutrality of professionalism.  Story selection based on official sources 
mitigates controversy, but allows those in positions of power great control over the news 
agenda.  As journalists are loathe to antagonise their sources, reporting can often 
degenerate into simplistic repetition of “what sources said” stenography.  Nonetheless, 
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official sources are to be safely reported upon without raising the ire of those who would 
accuse the media of bias.  Also widely acknowledged, professional journalism is flawed 
in its focus on events or technical issues and the avoidance of processes or contexts in 
the news.  In political reporting the focus tends to be on strategy or policy rather than 
the outcomes or implications of policy (Schudson 2003: 54).  Issues make little 
appearance in the news unless associated with an event - unless something happens, 
editors have no ‘hook’ with which to justify a news story.  Providing a meaningful context 
or explication of processes usually commits a journalist to a certain position, something 
forbidden by objective professionalism. 
Scholarship has investigated these problems thoroughly, examining journalistic 
practices as they work to construct the news. For these scholars the journalistic product, 
rather than being an objective, unbiased representation of reality, news is in fact a 
complex and deeply nuanced product of institutional, ideological and social 
circumstances and as such operates to construct social reality (Molotch and Lester 
1974; Altheide 1976; Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980) rather than reflect it.  
It is important now to turn to an examination of journalism in the recent historical 
and contemporary era.  Having examined the origins and development of 
professionalism journalism, and explored criticisms of its socio-political function, part 
three of this chapter describes how professionalism has been thrown into crisis by the 
cultural and philosophic developments of the postmodern age.  The emergence of a 
neo-liberal socio-economic hegemony in the contemporary period is discussed and the 
consequences for professional journalism are explored. 
 
PART THREE 
5.7 JOURNALISM AND THE POSTMODERN ERA 
From the nineteen-seventies until the nineteen-nineties a new era for professional 
journalism can be identified.  In these years a widespread questioning of many modern 
cultural and economic assumptions took place.  The assumptions and certainties that 
characterised the modern era of journalism were critically re-evaluated.  In particular, 
given the criticisms outlined above, journalism’s role in sustaining the cultural and 
political status quo was attacked.  In this postmodern (Lyotard 1984; Jameson 1991) 
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era a fundamental reorganisation and re-conceptualisation of global society and its 
philosophic underpinnings has occurred.  The postmodern era has been characterised 
by scepticism and irony towards established conventions – in the present case by an 
assault on journalism’s modern, liberal meta-narrative (Lyotard 1984) as part of this 
wider critical project.  Much that the modernist sensibility valued has been questioned 
and discarded by postmodernism.  This ironic posture and a concomitant 
reconfiguration of economic and socio-cultural bases have impacted journalism 
significantly, most notably through the widespread profusion, commercialisation and 
conglomeration of the media industry.  I argue however, that contemporary journalists 
do not reconsider their practice in light of these criticisms and cultural and economic 
changes.   
As noted from the 1960s on, counter-cultural, identity, civil and international 
politics all contributed to a generalised questioning of the institutional, philosophic and 
cultural assumptions of modern society.  Journalism as a social and political institution 
has been caught within these shifting sands of controversy, political philosophies and 
social change.  A significant criticism, as noted above, held that journalism was guilty of 
sustaining moribund political and social institutions and was incapable of generating 
progressive critique (McChesney and Scott 2004).  Professional journalism was widely 
criticised as becoming a part of the establishment it was charged with policing, and its 
public legitimacy was increasingly questioned.   
 The post-1960s era is also significant with regard to socio-political and economic 
changes. The most significant of these were the radical restructuring of the economic 
bases of many Western economies in neo-liberal form, and the slow decline and 
eventual implosion of the Soviet Union.  These developments can be usefully described 
as the ‘rise of market liberalism’, or ‘globalisation’, which accelerated following the 
disestablishment of the Bretton Woods system of international currency and financial 
controls (Strange 1994; Stiglitz 2002).  The expansion of market logic into spheres of 
society and culture that have heretofore remained outside capital ignited a vigorous 
critique of role of capital in modern, consumer driven and technologically dependent 
societies and the impact of capital extension into other, previously non-commercial 
realms.  In this context post-modern intellectual activity sought to re-theorise modern 
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social reality and has had a profound effect on the understanding of social science, 
public policy, social identity and cultural production, including journalism.  However, 
what was begun as a substantial critique of modernist structures of liberalism, the 
market and ideals of progress, had, by the end of the twentieth century, become a 
highly relativised celebration of diversity, consumerism and technophile popular (and 
often private) democracy.  This profusion of discourse is however often emasculated of 
its critical politics and progressive potential.  Like other areas within the cultural-political 
realm, journalism has been profoundly impacted by these broad economic, political and 
cultural changes.  
The postmodern era has also been discussed, inaccurately, as the post-
ideological period. The rise of neo-liberal globalisation, and the subsequent collapse of 
state socialism as a competing political and economic system, has led to much 
discussion of the ‘end of ideology’ and even the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama 1993).  The 
disintegration of the communist system and rise of Western, liberal hegemony 
obliterated antagonistic positions, leaving journalists frequently without a coherent frame 
of reference for interpreting the world.  As Jameson (1991; 398) writes of this 
interpretive crisis, “conscious ideologies and political opinions have ceased to be 
functional in perpetuating and reproducing the system”.  Rather, the Western 
interpretive framework became obsolete and consequently major conflicts in the 1990s, 
such as the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, were interpreted 
superficially and crudely as a de-politicised heroic war of liberation (Gulf War) (Hallin 
1994), as almost unintelligible wars of interethnic hatred (as in the wars of the former 
Yugoslavia, Africa) and as a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Afghanistan, Middle East) 
(Huntington 1996). 
 In this era the supposed collapse of ideology, the ascendancy of neo-liberalism 
and the expansion of technology and market logic have been generally seen as marking 
a ‘crisis of modernity’.  Theoretical understandings of post-modernity identify, criticise 
and also celebrate the collapse of modern enlightenment narratives of human progress 
and stem directly from the above detailed context of late-capitalism.  As Jameson 
(1991; 3) notes, postmodernity merges all discourse into a commercialised cultural 
sphere; “the new social formation in question no longer obeys the laws of classical 
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capitalism, namely the primacy of industrial production and omni-presence of class 
struggle”.  Rather, the postmodern sensibility, driven by capital, has broken down 
previous categories of quality, acceptability and truthfulness into a highly relativised 
pastiche of aesthetics, culture and history.  
In this context the certainties of modern professional journalism are 
unsustainable and in the postmodern era these have given way to an ‘anything goes’ 
ethic within the media, as evidenced by a highly commercial, tabloid and lifestyle 
focused media product. 
For Baudrillard (1983) postmodernism was characterised by ‘hyperreality’ in 
which images and representations, appearing ‘more real than real’ refer to other forms 
of representation rather than to some unadulterated, objective and knowable reality.  In 
this sense, Baudrillard (1995) made the provocative, and ironic, claim that the Gulf War 
did not take place, but was rather a ‘simulation’ of a war, the representation, through 
journalism, which precluded any critical interpretations, privileging the special-effects 
and technological wonder immanent in this new style of hi-tech, non-ideological warfare.  
Such questions, concerning the ability of social actors to represent ‘knowledge’ raise 
fundamental doubts of the ability of journalists to fulfil their normative role as ‘truth’ or 
‘fact’ gatherers. 
 Others are less critical towards the expansion of capital into the cultural sphere.  
Rather, the neo-liberal market becomes a ‘cultural market place’ in which the production 
and consumption of media, culture and politics is radically democratised through market 
operations.  Where postmodern and post-structural thinkers were often pessimistic 
concerning the possibilities of generalised, systemic critique these thinkers celebrated 
the postmodern cultural sensibility.  For Fiske (1987) and Hartley (1996) postmodernity 
symbolises an era in which consumption is a practice de-coupled from ideology.  
Audiences, as consumers, are sufficiently powerful and creative to withstand the 
dominating effects of heavily commercialised and concentrated media systems.  From 
this perspective the market is an emancipatory institution itself.  Rather than imposing a 
socially and politically corrosive neo-liberalism, technology driven, global media markets 
deliver a cosmopolitan, radically democratic media culture, in which progressive forms 
of expression may be pursued.  For Jenkins (2006) new media technologies, such as 
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internet publication, so quintessentially postmodern in form and content, encourage 
participation and collective, ultimately positive practices of production and consumption.   
There are dangers inherent in both branches of postmodern theory.  As Curran 
(2005) argues, post-structural relativism and nihilism can lead to a powerlessness and 
impotence of critical thought in the face of neo-liberal power.  As noted, this can 
eventually lead to a radical postmodernism not dissimilar to a libertarian-pluralist view of 
a ‘semiotic democracy’ that, “enthusiastically embraced the central themes of sovereign 
consumer pluralism” (Curran 2005).  Although postmodern theory began with timely 
criticisms of modernist liberal hegemony, its development is, “best summed up as a 
movement from the vanguard to the avant-garde, from collectivist to aesthetic politics” 
(Curran 2005; 135).  This thesis, as noted, while recognising the cultural conditions 
described above and their impacts on professional journalism, nonetheless sees much 
value in adopting a theoretically informed, yet pragmatically realist position in analysing 
the discourse of contemporary journalism.  Next, a brief account of the effect of the 
postmodern era on journalism and the media is offered, before turning the discussion to 
the contemporary cultural and economic conditions and journalism’s place within them.      
 
5.8 JOURNALISM IN CRISIS 
Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, professional journalism suffered from both an 
epistemological and socio-political crisis (McChesney 2004a).  The Western media 
industry had changed markedly during the previous three decades.  Several progressive 
trends can be identified, such as the increased involvement and visibility of women, and 
later, other previously marginalised groups and identities.  In an era of ascendant neo-
liberalism the content of news became broader in both representation and attentive to 
consumer demands and predilections.  Although news agendas may have been 
democratised, critics argue such changes, especially in broadcasting, are driven by the 
expansion of the advertising industry (Schiller 1971) and much media content has been 
trivialised (Hallin 1994; McPherson 2006).  These critics argue this has resulted in a 
democratic deficit and in emasculating journalism of its critical potential through a turn 
toward poorly conceptualised ‘postmodern’ principles, in which pluralism trumps serious 
content.  Critical thinkers consider the turn towards easily digestible and simplified 
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programming and publication, problematic.  A de-politicising tendency towards political 
corruption and sleaze are the outcome of broader moves that follow market logic to 
greater and greater corporate conglomeration and a consequent intense 
commodification of journalism and news production (Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 
2004a).  In this conception, news, considered so socially and politically valuable by 
liberal democratic theory, becomes simply another product, re-packaged, branded and 
promoted  by values associated with the general entertainment industry, such as colour, 
info-graphics, image consultants and self-promotion, punditry, magazine talk shows, 
advertorials and sound bite news (McPherson 2006; 182).   
 By the 1990s the commercial media systems of Western, liberal democracies are 
widely considered to have been subsumed and debased by commercialism and 
popular, tabloid values.  Some writers celebrate this tendency as offering greater 
representation in the media of anti-elitist values and diversity (McNair 2006; Hartley 
1996; Fiske 1987).  Others consider the extension into and domination of the 
‘mediasphere’ by capital dangerously anti-democratic (McChesney 2004a, 2003; Hallin 
1994).  McNair (2006) identifies a central feature of this being the commodification of 
both news and culture more generally. 
 The ‘commodification of news’ refers to the process whereby ‘news’ is produced 
less as a social or public good, but as a commercial product to be privately consumed.  
In the postmodern era of professional journalism, McNair (2006; 96-97) argues that 
‘news-style’ has become entwined in the corporate brand strategies of large media 
organisations, such as CNN, the BBC, Fox News and latterly, Al-Jazeera.  
Commodification also requires, and has succeeded in achieving, a post-ideological 
status for news products.  In this context, journalistic values of professional objectivity 
are promoted as centrally important and much content turns away from critical 
perspectives and towards market-oriented, non-ideological journalistic forms such as 
talk show punditry and hyper-adversarial attack journalism often focused on political 
personalities and scandals rather than on substantive questions and inquiries.  McNair 
(2006) locates the commodification of news, within a broader trend toward cultural 
commodification, characteristic of the postmodern era.  ‘Objectivity’, while long a means 
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to compete in the cultural market place, in this scheme becomes simply a journalistic 
marketing tool and brand strategy no longer with connection to normative ideals.   
 Indeed, as McNair (2006; 90-96) argues, dissent and criticism too have become 
commodities in the capitalist system, yet paradoxically serve to legitimate the system by 
emphasising its tolerance of criticism. Many writers have celebrated these populist and 
anti-elitist views of the media system as democratic.  Here the ‘market’ is emphasised 
as the mechanism that provides social, cultural and political pluralism, and importantly is 
responsive to consumer choice and preference (Hartley 1996; Fiske 1986).   
From this perspective the erosion of class based identity, the rise of micro-politics 
(often concerned with identity) and the incorporation of labour and capital into a stable, 
market-based consensus is responsible for re-orienting attention away from systemic 
political, social and economic issues and encouraging the identification of audiences 
with consumer values, favouring entertainment and the imperatives of commercialism 
(Campbell 2004; Sparks 2000).   
Several pertinent criticisms stem from this analysis and apply within the 
Australian context of journalism.  Indeed, as globalisation proceeds apace, distinctions 
between media markets become increasingly irrelevant.  The same corporate interests, 
commercial imperatives and discourses of professionalism are evident on a global scale 
as neo-liberal structures and media forms become ubiquitous.  Concerns over corporate 
control of the Fourth Estate centre on the penetration and dominance of commercial 
values and interests within journalism, practices of self-censorship, co-option into non-
critical systems and the limitation of critical self-inquiry, all of which are visible in this 
thesis’ analysis of Iraq War journalism.   
The postmodern period of journalism’s development symbolises a period in 
which the both the political-economic structures and philosophic moorings of liberalism 
were slipped.  The repudiation of Keynesianism and the demise of a systemic 
alternative to capitalism gave rise to a leaner, meaner (Castells 2000) neo-liberal 
capitalism and have had a profound effect on professional journalism.  While the 
expansion of commercial values into the political and communicative realms has had 
the effect of producing a disillusioned and disenfranchised polity, the postmodern 
sensibility has fragmented political engagement into micro-issues of identity and 
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adversarialism, leading to an emaciation of, and withdrawal from, the public sphere as 
evidenced by the decline of Western civic engagement (Hallin 1994: 174).  The 
generalised trend in the postmodern era is identified as one in which commercial values 
of entertainment take precedence over the public service ideals of liberal journalism. 
This is a de-radicalising effect and insofar as it is a result of collapsed class structures, 
individualism and pluralist consumer values (Curran 2002; 51), it is quintessentially 
postmodern.  In this conception journalism becomes a “field of stylistic and discursive 
heterogeneity without a norm” (Jameson 1991; 17).  For Bourdieu (1996) journalism has 
become a morass of consumerism, de-contextualised imagery and bland entertainment.  
Bourdieu takes issue with those who celebrate this media culture too, arguing: 
  
Facility with the games of cultural criticism…is not universal.  Nor is the ability to spin out 
elaborate ‘readings’ of the ironic or meta-textual messages cynically manipulated by TV 
producers and ad people.  Anyone who thinks otherwise has simple surrendered to a 
popular version of one of the most perverse forms of academic pedantry (1996; 9) 
  
This thesis will illustrate many of the features of modern professional journalism 
discussed above in the following chapters.  These features, for which journalism has 
been much criticised, are clearly evident within contemporary war journalism, which is 
increasingly producing war as a commodity for the consumption of news audiences.   
Journalism and the media, like virtually all other aspects of human experience, 
have been penetrated, and to a large extent dominated by, capitalist accumulative logic. 
The thesis argues that, in the context of neo-liberal globalisation and the destabilising 
effects of postmodernism, journalists rearticulate a ‘high modern’ discourse of 
professionalism, which recalls a more certain era both in global politics and returns 
journalism to the certainty and legitimacy of professionalism.  Rather than reforming as 
a result of many of the criticisms of professionalism and adapting their method and 
practice to the neo-liberal reality currently faced, the rearticulation of a modernist, liberal 
discourse of professionalism illustrates journalism’s unwillingness to engage critically 
with contemporary socio-political realities and desire to remain uncontroversial, neutral, 
detached and wedded to commercial imperatives.  Journalism demonstrates itself as 
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unaware of the extent to which it has been co-opted into the neo-liberal processes of 
accumulative logic.  While the media conglomerates that dominate the industry provide 
clear evidence of journalism’s entwinement with capital, the journalistic product provides 
a somewhat more subtle example as the logics of consumption and entertainment come 
to dominate the content of serious news, such as the reporting from wartime battlefields.  
 In the contemporary era the economic changes and cultural dislocation and 
confusion represented by postmodernism have coalesced into a new period of 
hegemony; that of globalised neo-liberal capitalism.  In the 1990s a ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Stiglitz 2002; Nederveen Pieterse 2004) emerged among primarily 
Western, but increasingly global political elites, that saw neo-liberalism as the most 
beneficial and correct method of global administration (Frieden 2006).  This consensus 
symbolically solidified the liberalising measures undertaken in the 1980s and the 
political ideology of neo-liberalism as a new hegemony.  From the 1980s onwards the 
deregulation, marketisation, securitisation and individualisation of both economic and 
social processes had become the new political orthodoxy (Nederveen Pieterse 2004; 1) 
and socio-economic reality. 
 This neo-liberal hegemony has been critically described as ‘empire’ (Hardt and 
Negri 2000) in an attempt to conceptualise the unbounded, limitless reign of capital that 
subsumes all other aspects of human experience within its own accumulative logics.  
Although the accuracy of this characterisation is contested (Nederveen Pieterse 2004), 
it nonetheless draws attention to the new forms of hegemonic organisation and 
processes that dominate in our apparently post-political or ideological era.  Indeed, 
within globalisation, it argued that political power is abdicated to liberalised global 
capital.  As Harvey (2006) argues: 
  
Neo-liberalism meant, in short, the financialisation of everything and the relocation of the 
power centre of capital accumulation to owners and their financial institutions at the 
expense of other factions of capital.  For this reason, the support of financial institutions 
and the integrity of the financial system became the central concern of the collectivity of 
neo-liberal states that increasingly dominated global politics.  
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Although the power of finance capital can be seen as somewhat in abeyance 
since the onset of global financial turmoil in 2007, it is notable that political reaction has 
been primarily to shore up and stabilize the financial system rather than to initiate its 
wholesale restructure and discipline. 
 The era of neo-liberal globalisation is also characterised by the existence of a 
singular global power, the United States.  In the aftermath of the collapse of 
communism no other military or economic power threatens the pre-eminent global 
position of the US.  It has been a central political and strategic goal of neo-conservative 
American politics to maintain and expand American power and prevent the emergence 
of any economic or military rival (Donnelly 2000).  Indeed, the contemporary era has 
seen the re-emergence of meta-narrative (Lyotard 1984) that provide a coherent socio-
political vision, in the form of anti-terror, clash of civilisations discourse, which fits well 
with the re-confirmation of professionalism as the hegemonic model in journalism.  It is 
argued here that the neo-liberal era become solidified with the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  These events provided the political moment in which to enact the 
dominating intent of the neo-liberal/conservative United States, which initially found 
expression in war with Afghanistan and ultimately with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  The 
commercial nature of the war, symbolised by the use of military contractors, the award 
of reconstruction contracts, sophisticated public relations campaigns and the central 
place of energy supplies, clearly identified global power as being both capitalist and 
militarist. 
 Re-regulation, following the breakdown of the post-World War Two socio-political 
consensus, according to neo-liberal and neo-conservative logics has been ongoing 
since the 1980s.  This socio-economic reorganisation, following the turbulence 
surrounding policies of market deregulation, is expressed through the deliberate policies 
of marketisation and privatisation advanced by Western states and international 
organisations.  As noted, in the media neo-liberalist modes have become predominant 
and hegemonic, through which the new orthodoxy flows.  As Artz (2003) states, echoing 
Gramsci’s theorisation:  
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Capitalist hegemony needs parallel media hegemony as an institutionalised, systematic 
means of educating, persuading and representing subordinate classes to particular 
cultural practices within the context of capitalist norms. 
 
Thus the neo-liberal media is one way in which hegemony is reproduced.  As noted 
above, much of this fare systematically reproduces entertainment, consumer values, 
creating apolitical disengaged, “atomised, individualised entertainment culture” (Artz 
2003; 19).  Essentially, capitalist hegemony rests upon the inducement of global 
disengagement and the inter-class culture of pleasure based on continuous 
consumption (Artz 2003; 22), into which a commodified, critically emasculated and 
professional media culture fits seamlessly.  The extent to which these aspects of 
modern media fare are characteristic of contemporary war journalism is the subject of 
the following chapters.    
 
5.9 CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISM 
Contemporary Australian journalism faces the same pressures faced by journalists 
globally, with regards to the technological changes that threaten to disrupt more 
traditional journalism practices.  The general ongoing and largely irresistible processes 
of globalisation and commercialisation of journalism manifest themselves within a 
particularly Australian context. 
The Australian media industry is unique with regard to its structure.  High levels 
of concentrated media ownership and the promulgation of public media policy that has 
encouraged oligopoly within the commercial sector have long characterised the 
Australian media.  The largest Australian media organisation however, is the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the national, non-commercial public service 
broadcaster.  Along with its large presence within the media sector, the ABC is also a 
central Australian cultural institution.  The ABC maintains a significant position upon the 
Australian media landscape, not least due to its reputation as the benchmark provider of 
quality news and current affairs broadcasting (Lumby 2002; 325).  It should be noted 
however that ongoing funding problems, legislative restrictions on new-media 
development and debates over cultural relevance have wounded the ABC, leaving a 
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cloud over its future in the medium term.  The election in 2007 of a centre-left Labor 
federal government has yet to result in a substantive improvement in the ABC’s 
fortunes. 
Mainstream Australian journalism is a product both of its heritage and history, as 
well as of its contemporary political, economic and cultural context.  Although liberal, 
democratic values are said to persist and define Australian journalism, journalists and 
their organisations must also face the ongoing challenges of a globalising world and its 
attendant issues of multi-nationalism, corporatism and accelerated technological 
development (Van Druten 2006; 55-57).  The report of the Australian Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) Ethics Review Committee and the adoption of 
the committee’s recommendations underline the centrality of the liberal, “Fourth Estate” 
values in Australian journalism.  These ethical values can be found replicated within the 
institutional discourses of the large Australian media organisations covered by this study 
(Sydney Morning Herald 2006; The Age 2006) indicating the ongoing resonance 
traditional values have within the modern context.  Arguably it is in part through 
reference to these values that these organisations maintain and cultivate their 
legitimacy as “quality” sources of news.  The MEAA committee calls journalism “a public 
service and lubricant of democracy” and states, “seeking truth is at journalism’s core, as 
truth is one of the core goods of society” (MEAA 1997; 16).   
 Current Australian textbooks too, describe journalism in these familiar terms, 
couching the practice in the professional, liberal discourse (Hurst and White 1994; 
White 1997; Masterton and Patching 1997).  Henningham (1990, x) sees the value in 
journalism as a “vital ingredient to democratic life” (Conley and Lamble 2006; 3) and 
argues “basic to the functioning of a free and fair society is a press which is free and 
fair…free from restrictions and/or improper influences from governments, Parliaments, 
bureaucracies, courts, business, unions and their own employers and peers”.  However 
adding a touch of realism Henningham goes on to describe Australian journalism as 
“none of these things”, on one hand deformed by the political interests of government 
and the economic interest of proprietors and on the other frequently “unfair and 
irresponsible” (Henningham 1991; x).   
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This jaundiced view of Australian journalism is shared by Apps (1991; 70) who 
describes adherence to ethical codes constitutes a “paying of lip-service to the truth”.  
Although liberal, democratic and socially conscious values may not always be seen as 
at the forefront of Australian journalism in practice, especially in this era of “chequebook 
journalism” (Bowman 1990) and a deep public cynicism toward journalists’ ethics 
(Schultz 1994; 41; Conley and Lamble 2006; 3; Beecher 2005; 13), nonetheless 
discourses of professionalism are central to the institutional identities of Australian 
media organisations and as will be shown, to the identities of Australian journalists. 
The established practices and institutions of Australian journalism are subject to 
the socio-political and economic changes wrought by a globalising world economy, 
social and political systems.  For the Australian media sector this has meant 
incorporating new technologies into their business practices (for example diversifying 
and expanding into online news services) as well as both enacting and being buffeted 
by the trends towards a highly commercialised media market and evermore 
concentrated media ownership.  In this context the professional identities and abilities of 
individual journalists to assert their professional vision become a crucial site of tension 
between the larger and converging interests of political and economic structures and the 
idealised and normative goals of journalism.   
Under the liberal, democratic model, the press is responsible publicly for the 
maintenance and management of democracy and in the modern era ‘the media’ can be 
considered the pre-eminent institution of the Habermasian public sphere (Schultz 2002; 
102-103).  The commercial dominance of this sphere raises pertinent questions, which 
this thesis has identified, over the loss of diversity and loss of independence (especially 
with regards to news journalism), a potential consequence of an utterly commercialised 
and heavily concentrated media industry (Barr 2000; 6).    
In Australia this tension between public and private spheres is symbolised most 
potently (if not politically, then publicly) by the issue of concentrated levels of media 
ownership and the potential that this holds for undemocratic practices and indeed, the 
corruption of liberal, ‘Fourth Estate’ values.  Triffen (2002; 38) describes the 
“outstanding feature of contemporary [Australian] media as a whole is not just its 
commercial nature, but its sheer size and concentration…most of the Australian press 
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are in monopoly or semi-monopoly conditions”.  This is both a widely acknowledged and 
lamented feature of the Australian media industry.  Although the Australian media 
industry has a historical tendency towards oligopoly (Barr 2000; 3), the modern era has 
witnessed a massive concentration of media ownership.   
The current structure of media ownership (at the time of writing) is a direct result 
of media industry reforms undertaken by the Hawke/Keating Labor government in the 
late-1980s.  This structure is set to change once more in 2007.  Under the changes to 
‘cross-media’ and foreign ownership introduced by the Liberal government in 2006, 
ownership across industry sectors and national demographics will be dramatically 
liberalised, as will the current restrictions on foreign media ownership above a certain 
level of shareholding.  As of 2002, News Limited, the Murdoch controlled media giant, 
controlled a massive 67.8 percent of all capital city and nationally produced daily 
newspapers in Australia, including the only national quality daily, The Australian.  John 
Fairfax Holdings controlled 21.4 percent, including the quality titles the Age, the Sydney 
Morning Herald and Australian Financial Review (Schultz 2002; 111).   
The changes to media ownership enacted by the Labor government of the late-
1980s allowed significant concentration of ownership within one media sector.  These 
changes directly resulted in the conglomeration of News Ltd and the Herald and Weekly 
Times Group (previously the largest publisher in Australia), the creation of television 
networks out of regional and metropolitan services and the destabilisation of Fairfax.  
This media policy has been widely interpreted as offering favours and benefits to 
‘mates’ of the Labor government, specifically the Murdoch and Packer families (Schultz 
1994; 25-26; Chadwick 1989).  Cunningham and Flew (2002; 49) argue that a study of 
Australian media policy is in fact a study of the ways “in which the normative goals of 
media policy have been subverted by close patterns of interaction between Australia’s 
powerful media proprietors…and leading figures in both the Liberal and Labor parties”.   
Australian journalism is widely considered to have deteriorated in quality over this 
period, as media businesses turn from a central focus on news and current events to a 
more broadly commercial concentration on “entertainment” (Lumby 2002; Beecher, 
2005; 76).  This is most evident in the rise and rise of reality-TV and infotainment in both 
TV and print throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  Both forms merge the “reality” 
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aspect and legitimacy usually associated with news and current affairs with an interest 
centred on the “apparently banal aspects of everyday life” (Lumby 2002; 325).  The 
trends in news and current affairs are comparable and are characterised by a tendency 
towards populist, sensationalist and dramatic, yet inconsequential topics.  While this 
trend is most evident on the commercial television networks, it can also be seen in the 
proliferation of magazine/lifestyle subsections of news publications and on the strapped-
for-cash ABC with its increasing levels of cheap, appealing TV that avoids complex 
questions of society.  As Turner writes, the daily news agenda has shifted from serious 
issues of politics towards crime and away from “information-based issues of social 
issues and towards entertaining stories…and an overwhelming investment in the power 
of the visual, in the news as an entertaining spectacle” (Turner 1999; 59).   
The public service broadcaster and traditional guardian of journalism standards, 
the ABC, has found itself in an era of declining funding and government hostility under 
pressure to compete with commercial television and radio.  Such a trend results in the 
impoverishment of the ABC’s news and current affairs and the purchasing of externally 
produced, but cheaper television programs.  Jacka (2002) outlines the predicament of 
public service broadcasting (PSB) in Australia, arguing that while the ABC maintains its 
educative, comprehensive and democratic values it has been under constant political 
challenge since the 1990s and suffering from funding decreases in real terms (Jacka 
2002; 337).  Importantly, PSB in Australia has been legally restricted from expanding its 
broadcasting through digital multi-channelling and suffers a persistent shortfall in the 
funding required to adopt digital broadcast platforms (Jacka 2002; 341).   
This then is the context and culture in which Australian journalists exist and 
operate, an understanding of which is important when considering the production of 
Australian news.  The Australian media industry itself is highly corporatised and 
commercially driven.  For many decades the industry has been controlled by extremely 
wealthy and politically well-connected proprietors, the Packer and Murdoch families 
being the most well known and visible of these.  This situation has been actively 
supported and encouraged by successive federal governments most obviously through 
media policy that has allowed vast aggregations of wealth and media assets and 
restricted PSB from developing new media capabilities.  Many commentators 
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considered the media and its attendant policy issues as a crucial location of the 
widespread ‘culture wars’ which have been raging in Australia for the last decade 
(Manne 2005) between conservative and progressive political and cultural groups22.  
Nevertheless, the values of liberal democratic journalism persist within Australian 
journalism.  Although this discourse may face considerable challenge to its relevance, 
from corporate ownership, resource paucity and trends towards “infotainment”, as will 
be shown, the discourse of professionalism and ethics of ‘Fourth Estate journalism’ 
remain central to the identity of Australian journalists.  The enactment and impact of 
professional values on news discourse remains a central concern of this thesis and 
understanding of professional motivations must necessarily be contextualised by the 
economic and policy structures that bind the Australian media. 
 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
Professional journalism, as this thesis notes and will demonstrate in subsequent 
chapters, has not developed in order to cope with new socio-cultural and political 
orthodoxies.  This chapter has outlined briefly the development of professionalism and 
its contingent emergence from specific cultural and historical conditions.  This chapter 
has emphasised the powerful place occupied by the professional discourse, yet has 
also noted and examined several criticisms of professionalism.  In general, 
professionalism has been identified as leading to ‘status quo’, conservative reporting.  In 
particular, much criticism has been directed at contemporary news organisation 
incapable of combating the sophisticated PR campaigns waged by the administrations 
of neo-liberal states in relation to the Iraq war.  Further, much of the professional news 
media has been criticised for not pursuing more critically the rational for war or providing 
a more critical appraisal of the military invasion of Iraq itself and instead opting in a 
large part for regurgitated press briefings from Centcom, the accounts of embedded 
journalists travelling with the invading forces and reliant on the use of de-contextualised, 
overly patriotic and dramatised coverage.  
                                                
22 More specifically known as the History Wars, this political and cultural conflict has focused on differing 
interpretations of Australian history, experience and identity, with specific reference to colonial/Aboriginal 
Australian history.  Two works central to the History Wars are Keith Windshuttle (2003) The Fabrication of 
Aboriginal History, Macleay Press, Sydney and Robert Manne (2003) Whitewash, Black Inc. Agenda, Melbourne. 
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This chapter has also outlined the problematic position occupied by professional 
within the contemporary era in relation to both contemporary power and philosophic-
cultural critiques.  I have argued that professionalism provides journalists with a means 
to avoid confronting these problems and to continue to articulate a ‘high modernist’ 
professional discourse. 
 It is the argument of this thesis that the liberal, professional model of journalism 
is incapable of resisting the commercial and ideological imperatives and power of the 
contemporary neo-liberal state to shape news coverage, especially in relation to war 
journalism.  In retaining the professional model, in the face of fundamental economic, 
social, philosophic and political changes wrought by initially the postmodern period and 
latterly institutionalised by neo-liberal globalisation, professional journalism looks 
backwards continuing to invoke a body of doctrine inappropriate to the contemporary 
era.  However, as a ‘strategic ritual’ (Tuchman 1978) professionalism serves journalism 
well, providing public and institutional legitimacy, as it did in its period of initial 
emergence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Professionalism merely 
reflects and reproduces status quo public knowledge, rather than critically and 
progressively interrogating contemporary political, military and economic issues.   
 Finally, this provided an account of the contemporary political, cultural and 
economic conditions that shape the Australian news media sector, placing Australian 
journalism in the wider context this chapter has outlined.  This account has 
demonstrated the extent to which the Australian media are subject to broader trends 
within a neo-liberal globalised world, which has encouraged a highly concentrated 
commercial media sector.  Furthermore the contemporary conditions of the Australian 
public broadcaster, the ABC, have been detailed.  It is argued that the ABC has for a 
long period been under attack from a hostile government, emaciated by declining 
funding and embroiled in the so-called ‘culture wars’, all of which have affected its ability 
to offer powerful and critical news journalism. 
 The analysis presented in subsequent chapters serves to support this thesis, to 
provide a new and deeper understanding of Australian war journalism and to provide a 
theoretically innovative method in the analysis of professional journalism.   
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PART THREE – EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
CHAPTER SIX – THE DISCOURSE OF PROFESSIONALISM AND WAR 
 
PART ONE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the first of four chapters that deal directly with the analysis of interview 
and news data.  The analysis proceeds in light of my stated theoretical concerns and 
conceptual approach drawn from a review of the relevant literature and a consideration 
of the emergence of professionalism and its contemporary context.  Specifically, this 
chapter provides an initial analysis, identifying and delineating the discourse of 
professionalism as it is articulated in interview data.  Consistent with the discourse 
theoretical approach of this thesis, this chapter seeks to “analyse the general system of 
the formation and transformation of statements” (Foucault 1972; 130) within 
professional journalism.  Here a body of statements and concepts may be identified and 
the manner in which these statements ‘produce’ professionalism will be analysed.  In 
providing this conceptual scheme of professionalism, this chapter identifies areas of 
inconsistency, contradiction or tension within the discourse.  This analysis illustrates the 
extent to which professionalism can be considered a hegemonic discourse that 
successfully dominates the journalistic field.  It also illustrates the extent of 
professionalism’s contestability and its incompleteness.  Within these discursive limits 
the possibility of counter-hegemonic journalistic articulations is also considered.  The 
discursive formation of professionalism is also analysed with regards to the concept of 
‘articulation’, the active process through which discourse is constituted within the 
conditions of uncertainty that the earlier methodological comments have made clear.  
The following chapter deals more closely with the circulating power within 
professionalism which reinforces the regularities of the discourse. 
This chapter proceeds by first identifying the broad discourses that comprise 
professionalism within the interview material produced for this study.  The statement of 
discursive objects and their arrangement into coherent discursive strategies is 
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analytically central.  The concepts (Foucault 1972), or nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985) that serve to anchor the discursive strategies, and provide the conceptual basis 
for the larger discursive frameworks that comprise professionalism are also analysed.  
Here the process by which concepts and signifiers are articulated into equivalential 
chains (Laclau 2005) – in which disparate practices and norms of journalism are 
articulated and united as ‘professional’ – is analytically important.  Furthermore, an 
analysis of the general arrangement of discursive formations necessarily brings to light 
the conditions of possibility and the bounds of acceptable, legitimate journalism.  This 
conceptual plan of the discourse also begins to demonstrate professionalism as 
pragmatic and contingent rather than as ideological.  This chapter demonstrates how 
the discourse of professionalism makes war visible and ‘real’.  In this sense, journalism 
literally brings particular aspects of the Iraq invasion into existence in the public record 
through their statement and enunciation as news which accord with professional norms.  
 
6.2 OBJECTIVITY  
The first major strand of the professional discourse is the central discourse of 
objectivity.  As previously discussed the conventional ideal of objectivity is characterised 
as a professional dedication to factual information presented in a neutral style 
(Schudson 1978; Smith 1978; Tuchman 1978), commonly stated as journalism that is 
fact-based, fair, balanced and accurate.  
Objectivity is articulated in a variety of ways, illustrating the incomplete fixity of 
aspects of the professional discourse and a degree of discursive openness concerning 
its meaning.  Rather than objectivity possessing one rigid and fixed meaning, this 
analysis shows it is possible to articulate this concept in a variety of ways.  This 
discursive flexibility has a double function, on one hand the invocation of objectivity 
serves to provide legitimacy to a variety of journalistic practices.  In theoretical terms 
this illustrates the unification of a variety of signifiers (journalistic practices and 
concepts) into a chain of professional equivalence and the exclusion of other aspects of 
information generation as illegitimate (Laclau 2005).   
A rigid enunciation or articulation of objectivity may be described as ‘orthodox’.  
In this view the meaning of professional objectivity is fixed and is fundamental to 
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journalism.  Objectivity is unproblematic, achievable goal, without which the credibility of 
journalism is imperilled.  For some journalists, articulating a strict adherence to the 
tenets of objectivity ensures the maintenance of professional identity, the provision of 
‘objective’ news and the discharge of journalism’s normative obligations.  More nuanced 
articulations of this concept accept that achieving absolute objectivity is a chimera.  The 
concept of objectivity itself has been undermined by a more sophisticated and nuanced 
understanding of modern journalism.  From an epistemological point of view, according 
to these less dogmatic conceptions, representations, knowledge and perspectives can 
never entirely be freed from the subjectivity of those holding or making them.  
Paradoxically however, the limitations of objectivity are overlooked and this discourse is 
nonetheless invoked to justify and legitimate journalistic practice.   
 
6.3 THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVITY 
The discourse of ‘orthodox’ objectivity is enunciated by journalists as they make 
statements pertaining to their practice.  The concept of objectivity is repeatedly 
characterised as comprising a commitment to facticity and “fairness, balance and 
accuracy” (Murdoch 2006; McPhedran 2006a; Kerr 2006). Ian McPhedran, reporting for 
News Ltd and stationed in Baghdad for most of the Iraq invasion has a terse conception 
of professional objectivity that is characteristic of this professional discourse.  
McPhedran (2006a) asserts objectivity is reporting “without fear or favour” and that in 
doing so a journalist “put one’s own prejudices to one side and report fairly, in a 
balanced way and objectively”.  Lindsay Murdoch (embedded with US Marines, 
reporting for the Sydney Morning Herald) is similarly resolute in his conception of 
objectivity – “fair, balanced, accurate and getting it first” (2006) forms the basis of his 
professional practice.   
Articulated thus, objectivity is fundamentally central to the professional scheme.  
“Without it we are lost – without that and facts we are lost!” declares McPhedran 
(2006a).  In these enunciations objectivity is not simply an idealised goal, but an 
approach and a conception of journalistic practice that is applicable in all situations and 
circumstances.  It is a signifier uniting a variety of practices; a universal, scientific 
method that once mastered ensures a regular and predictable flow of news consonant 
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with news organisational requirements.  For Murdoch (2006), there is no difference 
reporting local crime stories to reporting on war; “…the same principles apply to writing 
a story in Australia…as they do when you’re writing about the war in Iraq when you’re 
there; you’re there, you report what you see and what you can get”. 
 These statements typify the orthodox position on objectivity.  This 
conceptualisation represents objectivity and professional journalism as 
epistemologically uncomplicated.  Such a conception implies a conception of reality and 
a relationship between a journalist, as an observer and reality itself, as something that 
may be defined, described and known accurately.  This position represents a 
conventional conception of journalism, in which the norms of individuated, rational 
liberalism are fully internalised.  Tuchman (1978) calls this position a “naive empiricism”.  
In light of this thesis’ theoretical approach it is possible to begin to discern the 
construction of discursive boundaries or frontiers (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Carpentier 
and Cammaerts 2006) outside of which forms of knowledge creation not reliant on 
objectivity are illegitimate and against which journalists define the professional identity.  
Effectively, discursive conditions are placed on knowledge formation and ‘good’ 
journalism is antagonistically defined against its outside (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) such 
as non-objective styles of journalism or strategies of information control.  Credible 
journalism is thus that which reproduces objective norms. 
 Other journalists enunciate a less rigid objective professionalism.  These range 
from orthodox positions similar to those above, tempered with the inclusion of concepts 
of analysis and contextualisation, to pragmatic views that disavow objectivity, yet 
maintain the centrality of those values that it represents:  truth, balance, fairness, a 
reliance on ‘facts’, for example.  Here, while differing in their specific discursive 
enunciations, essentially the same professional identities are established within the 
extending chain of equivalential professionalism.  Nonetheless, while this conception of 
professionalism differs in its treatment of absolute objectivity, the difference is rhetorical 
as both articulations commit themselves to the same techniques of journalism and 
derive their legitimacy from a commitment to truth, without seriously considering the 
truth production that journalists actively engage in.  In Foucauldian terms, the discourse 
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is understood as stating its object, bringing professionalism into existence through 
discursive practice.   
As mentioned, while the values of objectivity are “absolutely central” (Wilson, 
2006a) to practice there does exist a place for analysis and contextualisation that, “is 
intended to elucidate and educate one step further, adding value by telling people what 
you think, what the news event means and what it will lead to” (Wilson 2006a).  This 
assertion sits awkwardly with comment by News Ltd’s Peter Wilson (2006a), that 
professionalism is,  
 
an attitude that this (journalism) is not about me telling the world my unique wisdom and 
about how I understand everything, it’s about me just trying to understand what’s going 
on, as objectively as possible and communicating that without imposing my views on it.     
 
Such a position is ostensibly contradictory, illustrating the difficulty for journalists 
in negotiating the inconsistent epistemology of professionalism, yet also pointing to their 
unwillingness, or inability, to completely abandon it.  The concept of objectivity remains 
an important legitimating signifier for journalists.  Indeed, here it is possible to discern 
the emergence of fantasy of professionalism which describes journalist’s relationships 
and commitments to professionalism – in which journalists recognise their shortcomings 
yet persist with their established methods. 
 Other reporters who participated in this study enunciate their understanding of 
objective professionalism similarly. Principles of truth, fairness, balance and accuracy 
continue to be central concepts on which the professional credibility of journalism 
depends, yet these are complicated by the acknowledgement that objective purity is a 
flawed ideal.  Eric Campbell (ABC), stridently committed to objective professionalism, 
considers a loyalty to facts as crucially central to his practice.  Alternate forms of 
journalism, such as the New Journalism (Wolfe 1973) of the 1960s and 1970s which 
sought to explore alternate methods and modes of representation, are, “utter crap and 
an utter betrayal of the craft” (Campbell 2006).  An objective journalist must be 
dedicated to factual truth as a basis for knowledge. 
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Empathy with those reported on and sympathy with “the underdog” is considered 
legitimate however (Campbell 2006).  This may be a morally comfortable position from 
which to argue, however, statements such as these contrast with the orthodox 
discourse of objectivity, which depends on a dispassionate approach.  Indeed, 
Campbell (2006) adds, “as far as the bigger picture goes you have to take a very hard 
look at what’s going on, rather than trying to presuppose what the situation is”.   
 The least rigid statement of objectivity is articulated by the remaining journalists 
in this study.  These conceptions maintain the professionalism’s importance, while 
rejecting absolute objectivity as unachievable.  This more measured approach to 
professionalism emphasises the morality of the journalist, rather than a commitment to 
absolute conceptions.  For these journalists, objectivity is contextually and situationally 
dependent.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that this discourse is characterised by the 
same concepts that characterise more rigid notions of objectivity enunciated above.  
Here, objectivity as a goal is displaced by objectivity as an aspiration.  From a 
discursive view, absolutist notions of objectivity have given way to pragmatic concerns 
over achieving the goals of professionalism - that is, providing legitimate knowledge 
which continues to be defined in accordance with liberalist tenets.  Ultimately, the 
concerns are the same – to produce factual, verified and legitimate knowledge of reality. 
 Here professionalism is contingent on personal convictions and morality rather 
than adherence to any fixed external code.  As Bormann (ABC, 2006) argues, 
objectivity, rather than being a simplistic balancing act, “is a bit of a cliché…people have 
this idea that there are two sides to every story and the truth lies somewhere in between 
and that’s objectivity – objectivity is being true to your own observations”.  The 
professionalism of a journalist is based on how well they can suppress their biases and 
preconceptions and “approach the story in an honest way” (Willacy 2006a).  For Willacy 
(ABC), his credibility and integrity as a professional stems from the relationships 
cultivated with both audiences and sources.  But even though he disavows orthodox 
objectivity, he appeals to the objective method in asserting his professionalism: 
  
If I have sympathy with a particular issue I will go harder on the people in that issue to 
satisfy myself.  That doesn’t mean I will give the other people an easy ride, but it’s just a 
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matter of I want to get to the bottom of it…and any journalist who tells you they’re 
objective, or that you can be objective is telling you a bit a white lie – I just don’t think 
objectivity is achievable (Willacy 2006a). 
 
Here the statements made surrounding the pragmatic articulation of objectivity are 
based on a notion of honesty and ethical behaviour.  Although this conception of 
objectivity is freed from absolutist statements of truth and certainty, it still emphasises 
the scientific method and the professional techniques of fact based, verified reporting, 
and continues to embody the liberal ideal of the moral, conscientious citizen. 
Objectivity is stated by ABC Radio journalist Jonathan Harley (2006a) as, “almost 
like enlightenment” illustrating the difficulty journalists have in expressing their 
professionalism in the absence of objectivity.  For these journalists their professionalism 
has become an article of faith, rather than a tangible, clearly defined set of practices 
and goals.  Like the others, Harley sees professionalism based on trust, accuracy, 
truthfulness and integrity, but asserts that “there is a great danger in abandoning 
objectivity altogether” (Harley 2006a), indicating its residual importance and the 
constitutive problems that result from identifying the problematic core of 
professionalism.  In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) and Laclau’s (2005) conception, 
objectivity functions as an ‘empty signifier’, into which meaning is articulated according 
to discursive needs.  Nonetheless, objectivity stipulates an uncomplicated relationship 
between the individual and the external reality of experience. 
 The central uncertainty of the professional discourse is as problematic as the 
more strict interpretations described above.  Here, rigid objectivity is rejected.  The 
practices and values that objectivity signifies are rearticulated, preventing journalism 
collapsing into relativism, in which any form of information production is legitimate.  This 
central uncertainty, however, does not force a re-conceptualisation of journalistic 
epistemology and or potentially legitimate alternative forms of knowledge production23.  
Although postmodern arguments may have destabilised journalism’s epistemology (see 
Chapter Five), the discursive statements analysed here must be seen as performing 
‘discursive repair’.  Although quite different in their conception of the place of objectivity, 
                                                
23 Examples being the ‘new’ journalism of the 1960s and 70s, civic journalism and more recently ‘citizen 
journalism’.   
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these professional discourses are essentially not dissimilar.  Objectivity may be 
epistemologically problematic and thus it is rejected, however no other professional 
structure exists with which to replace it, consequently the discourse is re-articulated, 
enunciating the same professional values as those of the high modern era (Hallin, 
1992).  This is deeply revealing of the inherent contradictions of professional journalism 
and illustrates the discursive nuance and complexity which is attended to below.  Here 
then two discursive features are visible.  The discursive formation of objectivity is shown 
to be self-contradicted, and partially self-aware of its limitations – in this discourse, 
objectivity has become ‘fetishised’ and functions as a ‘fantasy’ which permits an 
awareness of objectivity’s shortcomings, but a commitment to it nonetheless. 
Crystallizing around three central nodal points, (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) 
objectivity legitimates professional perspectives and practices, articulating potentially 
disparate practices and conceptions into an equivalential chain of professionalism 
(Laclau 2005).  Although the separation of these points into distinct categories is 
somewhat artificial, the discourse being articulated as a coherent whole, this analytic 
technique permits a clear understanding of the assertive and reproductive power of 
discourse in maintaining established journalistic norms and reinforcing established 
identities.  As noted, the discourse serves to reinforce and maintain the social position 
and role of professional journalists, reinforcing the legitimacy of their method and the 
knowledge so produced.   
Firstly, a conventional journalistic understanding and approach with regard to 
reality is clearly enunciated.  More precisely, the liberal modernist notion, that reality or 
‘the world as it is’ is external to the subject, knowable and that journalists can accurately 
represent this reality to audiences is persistently reinforced through discursive 
statement. 
Secondly, the authority of journalists, both moral and professional, grounded in 
their professional skills and expertise is emphasised.  Journalists represent themselves 
as the legitimate conduit of information about the world and for representations of 
reality.  Such legitimacy rests discursively with their skills, expertise and mastery of the 
professional method, which constitutes the last category or discursive theme. This 
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theme emphasises the extent to which journalists must maintain an ‘outside’ to the 
professional discourse as a crucial aspect of the discourses vitality and sustainability.   
Thirdly, the professional method and practices it embodies are represented as 
the appropriate methodology for ensuring truthful representations of reality.  Clearly, as 
these discursive messages echo and reinforce each other, the discourse of journalists 
as legitimate, skilled and morally balanced informants is powerful indeed.  Theoretically, 
these concepts, articulated as discursive statements, should be understood both as 
‘objects’ (Foucault 1972) of discourse and as nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) 
around which the discursive formation is crystallised. 
 
6.3.1 REALITY 
This section illustrates the importance of the concept of ‘reality’ for the professional 
discourse.  There is a persistent notion within the professional scheme that reality is 
‘knowable’ (Schudson 1978; Tuchman 1978; Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001).  This notion 
is central to the modern, liberal model of journalism and broadly consonant with 
Western, rationalist cultural conditions identified previously (see Chapter Five).  
Through the application of professional ethics and technical skills journalists produce 
knowledge about the world which is accurate, truthful and reliable. That journalism is 
‘true’ is it’s central claim on credibility and relevance, distinguishing it from other ‘non-
fiction’ media forms, such as advertising and public relations, or indeed from any form of 
embellished or adulterated account (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2001).  Journalism 
mediates between the individual and external reality and without a legitimate claim on 
truthfulness, professional objective journalism is fundamentally devalued, it is argued.  
Thus, the professional and commercial industry of journalism seeks in part its own 
reproduction, rather than a robust and ongoing reconsideration of its own basis.  It is 
from this perspective that ‘reality’, as a central discursive object and as ‘knowable’, 
should be considered. 
 Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) journalist Eric Campbell (2006) 
contrasts his own approach with that of journalists whose tendency it is to report what 
they’d like to see, rather than ‘reality’.  He argues a journalist must, “go into a story, 
have a look at the facts and the situation on the ground and you [sic] report down the 
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line what you see”, not “what you would like to be the reality”, clearly excluding any form 
of subjectivity from the professional scheme.  This position is returned to again and 
again in Campbell’s interview, in which “the reality of the situation”, “what’s really going 
on” and “the reality on the ground” (2006) are repeatedly emphasised.  Although there is 
room for analysis in Campbell’s scheme, it must be based on “the real story on the 
ground” and not in “trying to presuppose what the story is” (Campbell 2006) or add to 
the story that which has not been witnessed or verified.  A journalist, in this liberal-
rationalist conception, need merely to witness their subject in order to accurately report 
‘what’s going on’.  Likewise, for McPhedran (2006a) during the invasion the central 
issue was to report, “what I was seeing…without getting tied up in moral questions”.  
There is little doubt then of the efficacy of the objective method.  In war there is often 
considered to be a heightened level of confusion and miscommunications than during 
times of peace24, but even in a war context the objective method is considered 
clarifying.  If a journalist maintains their impartiality and their honesty as a witness to 
events, then professionalism is credibly maintained.   
 
6.3.2 AUTHORITY 
This section builds on that above, detailing the centrality of ‘authority’ within the 
discourse of objectivity.  Although reality is central, a journalist is discursively accorded 
legitimacy and authority in transmitting and imparting representations of reality.  
Reporters are presented as authoritative or even expert witnesses to events through the 
semiotics of news presentation (Fowler 1991; 25), be it in a television news broadcast 
or within in the pages of a daily newspaper.  Professionalism sustains the legitimacy of 
these ‘gatekeepers’.  Discursively, this authority is enunciated as a moral authority25 
permitting journalists the freedom to turn their professional eye to widely disparate 
events and issues.  Persistent reference is made to the professional qualities and 
virtues that reinforce this authority; the concepts of honesty, truthfulness, loyalty, 
                                                
24 Often referred to as the ‘fog of war’.  Originally a military term used to describe battlefield confusion; it has been 
adapted to also describe the miscommunication, misinterpretation and uncertainty of communications during war, 
especially those of the media.  Also usefully refers to the ‘fog’ of propaganda that intensifies during war. 
25 Rather than a formalised system of regulation and registration that controls and administers other professions, 
such as medicine, law and teaching, journalism is self-regulated, thus its professional status is contested.  See 
Chapters Two and Five 
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dedication and empathy, for instance.  Crucially for the purposes of discursive cohesion, 
this moral authority spans the gap between tangible reality ‘as it is’ and technical 
journalistic method.  Discursively, the journalist is constructed as appropriately skilled 
and can be trusted to correctly and accurately represent reality to the news consumer. 
 The relationship between the audience and the journalist is built on “trust”; as the 
ABC’s Jonathan Harley (2006a) calls it “the only currency” a journalist possesses.  
Discharging their professional duties, a journalist must “dis-assemble and interpret” 
public affairs in order to provide the audience with an account that can be relied upon 
and on which they may base their judgements and opinions – crucial to journalism’s 
political function as a ‘Fourth Estate’ within liberal democracy.  In providing such, 
journalists must “minimise complicity” with official or powerful perspectives (Harley, 
2006a).  Trust is central to authority. As Willacy (2006a) suggests, being a dedicated 
practitioner of journalism “committed” to both the truth and to the subjects of journalism 
is crucial to sustained journalistic authority.  Similar concerns are expressed by other 
interviewees (Bormann 2006; Wilson 2006a; McPhedran 2006a).   
 Discursively, these invocations articulate journalists as embodying the values 
they espouse.  Bormann (2006) speaks of “my morality…is being true to myself and to 
the integrity of my profession” clearly asserting the correctness of his correct bearing. 
Campbell (2006) demands “a loyalty to no one but the story”.  These assertions should 
be understood in two ways.  Firstly, these claims concern abstract qualities such as 
morality, integrity and loyalty and are not open to examination the way the practical 
aspects of journalism are, such as the use of skills, reporting techniques and story 
selection.  For example, one may examine a journalist’s output for the uses of certain 
sources and interviewing techniques, but ‘loyalty to the story’ or being ‘true to oneself’ 
are impossible to assess.  Secondly, they reinforce the overarching discourse of 
professionalism by rearticulating its central principles.  The authority of professional 
journalism derives, in this sense, from the self-identification of journalists.  Journalists 
here are stating their professionalism as conviction and commitment rather than by 
regulation. The articulation of professionalism in these terms, such as morality, integrity 
and loyalty, serves to contribute to the wider cultural norm that journalists are legitimate 
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in occupying important social and political roles.  These articulations solidify the 
discourse around those concepts/nodal points. 
 
6.3.3 PROFESSIONAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUE 
The last concept or ‘nodal point’ identified within the discourse of objectivity for 
discussion is that of the correctness of professionalism as an appropriate method for 
obtaining representations of reality, to which journalists are morally committed.  This 
section describes how in enunciating the professional discourse, journalists are 
persistently reinforced as the most legitimate source of news and information.   
 Central to the professional method are the journalistic skills of reporting which 
are applied and through them reality is apprehended.  If, as some of the interviewees 
hold, objectivity is a problematic ideal, it is through the professional method that 
truthfulness and accuracy are achieved.  As the ABC’s Mark Willacy (2006a) argues, 
bias and prejudice can be suppressed, masked and hidden through the mastery or skills 
such as balance, neutrality and verification.  Using a metaphor of conflict, Willacy 
(2006a) calls journalism a, “daily battle”, evoking an image of a journalistic struggle, 
both to report the ‘truth’ and bring chaotic reality within the professional scheme.  In this 
sense the professional method provides both order and a compass with which to 
navigate the events of the world, but also a template in which to fit events.  As Tuchman 
(1978) argued, the objective method is an “organising principle”, allowing journalists to 
orient themselves to the world.  Moreover, it is a journalist’s moral and professional 
credibility that equips them to cope with the challenges they are presented – as 
emphasised by the “tangled web” metaphor, also used by Willacy (2006a).  Clearly, 
professionalism provides a template with which to make sense of an otherwise chaotic 
picture of the world.  Indeed, these insights are supported by the literature in which 
journalism is criticised as incapable of dealing with substantive social and political 
issues, partly due to the demands of professionalism (McChesney 2004a), for if an 
issue is not readily understood through professionalism, or if relations of power obviate 
its appearance, it seldom becomes news.   
“You don’t throw your hands up and say it’s all too hard “, argues Sydney 
Morning Herald Foreign Editor Peter Kerr (2006), referring to the difficulties journalists 
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face in reconciling their objective ideals with the complexities and constraints of reality.  
In a war situation these may include, for example, conflicting reports or local conditions 
that defy easy comprehension.  It is the professional method that provides order.  Kerr 
seems to suggest, however that incomplete or potentially inaccurate accounts of reality 
are acceptable too.  Arguing, “you have to approach every issue on a case by case 
basis and you can only delve as far as you can given the time frame you have available 
and remembering…a deadline” (Kerr 2006) indicating an incomplete reality is 
acceptable to the professional method.  From this position, the liberal, external and 
objective reality that is its object has become subject to the demands of 
professionalism, rather than remaining a detached and objectified system.  This notion 
is reinforced by other discursive enunciations.  Wilson (2006a) asserts that “[the 
professional method] is a big part of what I see my challenge to be and what I do every 
day is to get it right, rather than set the world to right”.  As stated above, not only has 
reality become subject to professionalism, but the professional method itself has 
become focused on fulfilling its own requirements rather than facilitating the idealised 
role of journalism – the provision of public information allowing citizens to monitor the 
use of power (Siebert et al 1956).   
Finally, this conception, that the professional method of journalism is the correct 
and proper method for understanding the world is further reinforced by the universal 
applicability of its attendant values and rituals.  For Murdoch, those skills he learnt as a 
young reporter on the Age covering police stories apply just as well to a war situation as 
they do to covering metropolitan crime; “the same principles apply [sic] back then as 
they do when writing about the war in Iraq when you are there” (Murdoch 2006). Clearly 
then professionalism requires no modification of one’s method to fit local conditions, for 
example treating complex and complicated stories in anything other than a 
straightforward manner.  Moreover, the professional method is discursively reinforced 
as the appropriate method with which to achieve a credible and reliable representation 
of reality.  The discussion now moves to an analysis of the second major discursive 
strand that is identified in constituting professionalism: independence.  
 
 
 
 
143 
PART TWO 
6.4 INDEPENDENCE 
Independence is a central professional value and ethic of journalism, contributing to the 
overarching discourse of professional journalism.  Alongside objectivity, it is important to 
consider ‘independence’ as a necessary requirement of journalists after the late-
nineteenth century transition from politically partisan press to a professionalised mass 
market media system.  This discourse finds its expression most clearly stated in 
discussions of two significant and highly controversial aspects of the Iraq war with 
regard to media involvement – the Pentagon designed system of embedding journalists 
with military units (ostensibly aimed at providing close and safe coverage of American 
and British forces at war)26 and the activities of the military public affairs bureaucracy 
charged with providing the official media briefings to the assembled world media27 
based at Central Command (Centcom) in the Qatari capital, Doha.  Much criticism of 
media coverage of the Iraq invasion 2003 has focused specifically on the system of 
embedding and on the Doha media centre (Seib 2004; Schechter 2003; PEJ 2003).   
 
6.5 THE STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 
The attitudes of journalists toward their ability to assert their independence within a war 
context are at best ambivalent.  These attitudes echo, to a degree, the experience of 
journalists throughout the history of war journalism, which is also a history of 
manipulation and control of journalists by military authorities (Knightley 2004).  In the 
post-Vietnam era military controls over journalist’s activities have been strengthened. 
Journalists have been criticised for their willingness to be dominated by military interests 
(Kellner 1992).  However, journalists wield little power within the professional media-
military system to substantively assert their independence from official sources and 
power structures (Hallin 2000; Reese 2001; Bennett 2005), other than rejecting 
participation within that system wholesale.  As a result, although there is some 
differentiation of discursive statements (possibly explained by physical location), the 
journalistic independence observed here is a dynamic articulation, adapted to fit the 
                                                
26 For more detail see, Whitman, Department of Defense Media Support Plan, 2003. 
27 Referred to variously as media management, public affairs/relations and official perspectives 
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context in which a journalist finds him or herself.  This adaptation illustrates 
independence, in interview, as a discursive strategy which protects professional identity, 
as much as it is a literal fact of journalistic experience.  As discourse, ‘independence’ in 
this sense serves to offer the research the guarantee of journalists as literally 
independent, and to ignore those factors that may be operating to compromise 
independence, such as embedment with a military unit, or utter dependence on military 
PRs for information at Centcom.   
In this analysis the concept of ‘independence’, is enunciated in a variety of 
situations.  In this sense, the discourse becomes a defence mechanism for journalists, 
against the possibility of compromised professionalism.  Stating independence 
reinforces the professional identity.  During war journalists may indeed feel their 
freedom constrained by the military.  Their professional attitudes, however, are adapted 
to fit a new, dependent reality, rather than rejecting wholesale the practices and 
professional postures which are compromised by closeness and dependence on the 
military, such as was experienced in the experiment of embedding (Seib 2004).  
Conceptually, independence serves to legitimate journalist’s activities, rather than 
describe their lived reality of workaday journalism.  And although journalists are aware 
of their situational, or context specific sense of independence, their practice is not 
altered accordingly.  Professionalism persists in situations that are not amenable to its 
techniques, such as Central Command.  Professionalism here begins to overlook its 
own limitations.  
In discussing embedding in interview, the attitudes of journalists divide into three 
categories, although on balance most journalists offered their qualified support of the 
system.  The first group are those in support of the media system and who argue 
embedding allows improved access to important stories; the second, those who 
cautiously acknowledge the positive aspects of embedding, yet are conscious of its 
limitations; and those who conceive of embedding as entirely negative and dangerously 
compromising journalistic integrity.  This discursive variation is similar to that found by 
other studies of embedded journalists conducted after the war (Tumber and Palmer 
2004; Carlson and Katovsky 2003).      
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 The efforts of military public affairs personnel and the efforts of the military 
authorities to promote their point of view however, are considered by all journalists to be 
encroaching on their independence and require the firm enunciation of professional 
independence in response.  This is a crucial antagonistic articulatory practice (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985) which forms a coherent and clear ‘discursive outside’ against which to 
define journalistic identity.  Although some journalists questioned embedding as 
inappropriate and refused to cooperate, the interviewees are resigned to domination by 
the PR officials, be it in the form of media management or direct ‘spin’.  For these 
journalists the appropriate professional response is a redoubled effort in applying the 
professional paradigm, rather than some reconsideration of the purposefulness of 
cooperating with the military in their media and information strategies.   
 
6.5.1 EMBEDDING 
In this analysis ‘embedding’ is shown to exist within the discourse of independence as a 
concept (Foucault 1972) or nodal point/signifier (Laclau 2005) the meaning of which is 
unfixed – a floating signifier to which meaning is imparted through articulation.   Through 
articulation the location of this concept/nodal point within war journalism professionalism 
is established.  Although controversy has surrounded the issue of embedding with 
military forces, within the discourse independence is an important concept journalists 
use to articulate their professional identity, especially in the context of embedding.   
For those journalists who viewed the experiment as a positive development, 
embedding improved access to the military and revealed to audiences the, 
unambiguous “reality of the troops” (Campbell 2006).  Campbell (2006) is also 
dismissive of the novelty of embedding, arguing that it is “something that has been 
going on for as long as there have been journalists”.  In this view, a formalised system 
of embedding is something of a breakthrough in military-media relations that soured in 
the later years of Vietnam, when the military began blaming the media for falling public 
support (Hallin, 1986).  This relationship has remained fraught ever since.   
Kerr (2006) states that in Iraq the American military were, “quite open” and 
allowed journalists the freedom to report as they saw fit.   By comparison, the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF), with its reputation for secrecy, is described as “locking down 
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information, being incredibly protective and amazingly frustrating for any journalist who 
has anything to do with them” (Kerr 2006).  From the perspective of the Sydney Morning 
Herald (SMH), embedding permitted stories that would otherwise not have been told, 
such as Murdoch’s account of the use of incendiary weapons (white phosphorous) by 
US forces (SMH 22/03/03, 1; the Age 22/03/03, 1).  For Kerr such stories thereby 
illustrate the exercise of journalism’s watchdog role in relation to military power.  “Being 
embedded allowed that story to be told - in the scale of things, it might not be a massive 
story, but it’s one that would otherwise not be told”, argues Kerr (2006).  Likewise, Geoff 
Thompson’s story of trigger-happy American soldiers at checkpoints (AM 10/04/03) is 
cited by other journalists as evidence of the embedding system’s openness and 
efficacy. 
 Independence, in these articulations, is not jeopardised by closeness with the 
military.  Rather this intimacy ensures a more full sense of the reality of war.  For 
Campbell (2006), “there is nothing wrong with actually being in a military unit as long as 
you present it as a snapshot of the war, this is what these troops are seeing, this is a bit 
of a sniff of the reality of what’s happening for US troops on the ground”.   
 Lindsay Murdoch, embedded during the Iraq war with US Marines, found his 
experience frustrating at times (and gruelling physically), but dismisses criticism of 
embedding as “naïve and misguided” (2006).  Rather, embedding provided “great 
insight” into what was happening at “the spear if the invasion”.  Nonetheless, Murdoch 
himself acknowledged publicly the limitations imposed on his practice and his 
perspective (the Age, 05/03/03).  For these journalists an intimacy with military units 
merely enhanced the normative function of journalism; to provide true, first hand 
information about military operations and experiences.  Articulated so, embedding was 
of great benefit and was merely the specific context in which journalistic independence 
was enacted, rather than a constraining or restricting exercise.  Furthermore, there is 
little critical reflection concerning the potential substantive effects of the persistent and 
generally positive presentation of military perspectives.  In other studies the closeness 
of the military and the media has been criticised for militarising journalism.  This critique 
argues that the persistent representation of military perspectives and logic serves to 
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normalise militarism (Seib, 2004; Reese, 2004; Kellner, 1992).  This critique will be 
shown to have relevance in the Australian context (see Chapter Nine). 
 The supposed openness of the embedding system, which famously permitted 
any reporting other than that which jeopardised operational security (Whitman 2003), is 
contrasted with the treatment journalists received at Central Command.  Compared with 
the “complete farce” (Campbell 2006) at Doha, Murdoch describes his experience as 
relatively free.  “[Centcom] was all skewered towards propaganda – on the ground 
[embedded] there was no censorship” states Murdoch (2006), as long as he did not give 
away exact locations or details of troop movements.  Embedding is then articulated into 
the professional discourse and identity as a legitimate journalistic exercise. 
Furthermore, as the research will demonstrate, the embedding perspective nonetheless 
presents a naturalised, empathetic portrayal of US forces.  This is even the case in 
circumstances of military incompetence, such as those witnesses and reported by Geoff 
Thompson (see Chapter Nine).  
While supportive of embedding, these journalists, and others, were aware of the 
limited perspective that necessarily results from travelling with a military unit.  Such an 
arrangement is anathema to the individuated, independent and balanced liberal 
perspective.  Professionalism however, serves to articulate such access facilitating 
regimes as acceptable.  Indeed, individual responsibility is abdicated, in favour of 
journalists seeing themselves as part of a wider effort or bigger picture, represented by 
their organizations efforts as a whole.  Murdoch is clear that his perspective was limited 
by travelling with US forces, stating that while his unit would roll through villages and 
towns on their way to Baghdad, there was no contact with the local population and that 
his was an utterly military perspective; “sometimes we came under fire, we didn’t know 
who was friendly and who wasn’t - basically I never got real access to the Iraqis”.   
Nonetheless embedding is articulated as positive development, getting the soldier’s eye 
view of the war.  But the “problem with embedding is where it’s being used, where that 
snapshot picture is being used as the overall picture” (Campbell 2006), effectively laying 
blame for any problems with the embedding system with news organizations rather than 
with journalists themselves and their improper professionalism.  Indeed, as Cottle 
(2006) notes the genius of the embedding system was the apparent increase in 
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information available.  With the advent of embedding, crude forms of censorship gave 
way to a journalistic form awash in drama, detail and visual immediacy, but separated 
from issues of context and substantive meaning (Lewis and Brookes 2004; Cottle 2006; 
94-95).   
Embedment spans a middle ground between truly independent (so called 
‘unilateral’) reporting and the contrived settings of military briefings and should be used 
as “an adjunct to journalists attending military briefings” (Wilson 2006a).  Wilson, 
reporting independently from southern Iraq during the war, emphasises unilateral 
independence as a crucial aspect of professionalism and worries that embedding may 
become a replacement for independence.  For Wilson (2006a) embedding was 
“cheerleading for the Americans and British”.  Wilson saw the real story as “covering the 
people’s war and what impact it was having on the people” (Wilson 2006a).   
 Other articulations however demonstrate the concept/nodal point of embedding 
to not have completely solidified within the professional discourse.  Just as objectivity 
has been ‘emptied’ of meaning and rearticulated, so too has independence.  Thus, 
embedding carries with it the responsibilities of remaining independent (if possible) from 
those with whom a journalist travels.  Bormann (2006) warns that embedding must “be 
seen for what it is” which is “a very limiting perspective – like the soldier you are 
somewhat sanitised from the horror of what you are doing”.  Embedding offers only one 
aspect of a complicated picture of war.  As Bormann (2006) argues, privileging the 
perspective of the military is “the very nature of travelling with a military group – the 
weapons fire out, but like the soldiers, you don’t see the other end.  You don’t see the 
schools in ruins, you don’t see the hospitals hit by misdirected bombs”.   
 There is a fine balance, between privileging and naturalising military perspectives 
and the close insights that embedding provides.  Several journalists express and 
awareness of this.  Bormann (2006) cites the Geoff Thompson (embedded ABC 
journalist) story of civilian deaths at a nervous and poorly organised American 
checkpoint as an example of embedding’s value.  Positive aspects of the embed system 
are considered against the difficulties faced by journalists in remaining independent 
from and dispassionate about those they cover.  A fundamental contradiction exists, 
however, Bormann argues, between journalistic independence on one hand and the 
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building of trust relationships between soldiers and reporters on the other.  Unwittingly 
journalists become “seduced” (2006) by a situation where they are protected by soldiers 
during war.  This ambivalence towards embedding is repeated throughout the interviews 
with several journalists emphasising that embedding should be considered only one 
perspective on a wider war (Bormann, 2006; Campbell, 2006).  These journalists argue 
that problems arising from the institutionalisation of embedding, result from its editorial 
use, rather than from the exercise itself.  As the ABC’s Geoff Thompson (2006) argues, 
for example, “our [embedded] coverage was only one aspect of it…the ideal is to have 
someone everywhere…it’s only [problematic] when you pretend that it tells the whole 
picture.” 
 Embedding is also considered an entirely negative, restrictive development in 
media and military relations, but an innovation with obvious appeal for news 
organizations, the military and individual journalists alike.  In this conception, embedding 
journalists with military units is the last on a list of coverage priorities.  “I don’t agree with 
it and I wouldn’t do it…but I can see that it is part of the overall picture”, states Ian 
McPhedran (2006a), who reported from Baghdad during the war.  Although most of 
what journalists were shown by Iraqi minders is described as “propaganda” (McPhedran 
2006a), McPhedran argues he was able to report independently from Baghdad. Taking 
care not to antagonise the authorities, McPhedran constructed his professional identity 
against that of a compromised hack.  Ultimately, however, his contravention of the rules 
imposed by Iraqi authorities that governed his movements saw him expelled to Jordan 
until the Iraqi government fell.  However, in McPhedran’s conception a situation in which 
journalists, while under restrictions, may use their creativity, tenacity and guile to 
produce good journalism, still constitutes a qualified independence.  Embedded and 
under the direct control of the military the possibilities are, “obviously very limited” 
(McPhedran 2006a).  Embedding offers “no other perspective" (McPhedran 2006a) than 
that of the military.  And thus an independent journalist’s professional identity is made 
visible as constructed through articulation in contrast to embedding and the restrictions 
that embedding is held to engender.  As shown, the discursive object of embedding 
illustrates both the functioning of ‘good’ professionalism and also provides an ‘other’ of 
the constitutive outside (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) crucial to the formation of journalistic 
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identity.  As noted it is possible therefore for an individual journalist to remain fully within 
an independent identity, within the context of embedding as questions over their 
journalistic output are to be directed at the way in which their reporting is used in the 
context of wider coverage strategy.  Professionalism here is highly individualistic, rather 
than an important feature of the media system as a whole. 
 
6.5.2 CENTCOM 
In contrast to embedding, the statements and articulations surrounding media 
management strategies, here symbolised by the Doha media centre, Centcom, 
demonstrate how aspects of a discourse become fixed.  The analysis shows the 
information policy pursued at Central Command is constructed by journalists as the 
antithesis of professional journalism.  This policy is clearly identified as a coordinated 
strategic military PR exercise, against which journalists define themselves and their 
professionalism.  Again, following Laclau and Mouffe (1985) the military-media 
operations become ‘other’, beyond the frontier of professional identity.  As opposed to 
the ambivalence over embedding, all journalists interviewed denounced what they saw 
as official attempts to manipulate and obfuscate.  Indeed, given the normative tension 
that exists between the military and the media, this relationship forms an arena of 
legitimate antagonism, in which professional identities may be performed, what Hallin 
calls the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1986).  That such treatment by 
military authorities is inevitable in a war context is a common concern.  Here, although 
journalists are united in their opposition to military information strategy, there is a 
pervasive acceptance of military manipulation as an inevitable aspect of conducting 
journalism during war.  The unequal relationship between journalists and military 
authorities is taken for granted as a feature of the modern news system.  However, 
journalists enunciate a strategic response that maintains cooperation with the military.  
This response is concerned with “chipping away” and “dis-assembling” what military 
officials have to say.  For these journalists however, military public relations and 
strategic communications is all part of the reality of reporting military operations.  By 
their admission these journalists have little option but to professionally engage with 
these strategies.  These journalists can be seen, however, as operating from a set of 
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assumptions concerning war reporting that have already designated the position of 
journalism in relation to military power.  In this situation journalists are indignant at their 
treatment and aware of their limitations, yet continue in their engagement with military 
power nonetheless. 
 The military briefings at Centcom were variously called “a disgrace”, “a farce” and 
“counterproductive” (Willacy 2006a; Campbell 2006; Kerr 2006).  The military briefings 
delivered at Centcom were notoriously empty of useful information, deflecting of 
journalists inquiries and “metronomically on-message” (MacGregor in Tumber and 
Palmer 2004; 66) – an allusion to the White House-speak and coordinated international 
media strategy (Tumber and Palmer, 2004) that required spokespeople to reinforce and 
reiterate the ‘message of the day’ throughout the pre-invasion and conflict period.  
Similarly, alongside the obfuscatory tactics employed by the Coalition spokespeople, 
the design and organisation of the Coalition Media Centre was “as annoying and 
inconvenient as possible” (Massing 2003; 16). 
 In this context it is argued that there is no way discerning credible accounts of 
events from the unverified official pronouncements with which journalists were 
presented: 
     
I don’t think you have anything effectively, because you are at the whim of what you are 
being told and there is no way of verifying it, we know the nature of propaganda in war, 
that’s what it is, I don’t really think there’s any other word for it, because that is the 
correct characterisation, so when you are faced with unverified official accounts I think 
it’s not exactly going to be a journalistic peak (Harley 2006a).   
 
Indeed, the Centcom spokespeople were unable and unwilling to keep pace with 
the ‘real-time’ accounts and reports pouring forth from the hundreds of embedded 
journalists, adding to the frustration and sense of futility that characterised many 
journalists’ experiences at Centcom.  
While journalists recognise the media management which occurs in such settings 
and are frustrated by it, there is no alternative.  “These people’s job is to obstruct and to 
obfuscate and that’s what they did very successfully”, states McPhedran (2006a), who 
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argues the only sure strategic response is to completely disavow contact with, or 
protection from, military sources and report ‘unilaterally’.   
The difficulties in performing the normative role of the professional journalist are 
acknowledged in these circumstances.  The suggestion is made, that journalists do 
initiate a strategic response to the efforts of military officials to control information.  “I 
suppose in terms of what can be done, it’s the same as anything in a situation where 
journalists are being frozen out – you chip away as best you can”, argues Kerr (2006).  
That poor treatment by the military is inevitable is obvious from the comments of Harley 
(2006a), who states that, “ideally a place like that (Centcom) is supposed to give you a 
global overview, because in any conflict you are always in a compromised position 
anyway”.  Indeed, it is accepted that in war the military will manipulate and ‘spin’ 
information, and such procedures are characteristic of modern military operations 
(Knightley 2004).  Journalists however maintain a professional commitment to covering 
those authorities, not expecting to receive credible or useful information.  The 
information which is released is inevitably partial.  Professionalism demands that in 
such a situation it is necessary for journalists to “write as hard as possible” in order to 
“minimise their complicity” (Harley 2006a) yet it is acknowledged that “a bunch of 
journalists complaining about it (media management) is not significant enough impetus 
for change” (Kerr 2006).   
The question arises then as to why journalists persevere in such circumstances.  
Harley (2006a) argues, as do others, that securing independence from the military 
“depends on how good you are” as a professional.  Although military dominance of the 
media is seen by all as inevitable, Harley argues that through the application of 
professionalism that this dominance may be resisted.  Crucially, it is language that 
provides the possibility for journalists to assert their independence, and not physical 
location or choice of sources.  Harley (2006) argues, “it’s just part of the skill, to unravel 
the sanitising language” within locations such as Centcom.  However, while the 
discourse-theoretic position of this thesis grants agency to journalists to ‘state’ and 
‘articulate’ war and military operations with creativity and diversity, it also posits 
hegemonic discourses such as professionalism as exerting generative power, enabling 
‘militarised’ professionalism.  The following section provides a brief discussion of the 
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power of journalistic language use to defend the journalistic identity and assert 
independence.  
 
6.5.3 THE DEFENCE OF THE PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 
‘Independence’ is not simply a central dynamic in the relationship between the military 
and media.  Independence, as has been noted, is also a strategy of legitimation within 
the professional, liberal framework, which reinforces the professional identity of war 
journalists.  Crucially for journalists working in the complicated and controversial 
situations such as war, claims of independence and invocations of the professional 
discourse provide a defence against accusations of co-option by military or political 
powers.  In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) terms the military must remain beyond the 
‘discursive frontier’ of professionalism, as an ‘other’.  However, as this section makes 
clear, the chain of equivalential (professional) practices and norms can be expanded to 
include those professionally questionable aspects of war journalism, such as 
embedding.  Here then, the ultimate contingency and instability of professional 
categories and concepts and the capacity for inclusions and exclusions to be 
discursively enacted is made clear.  As such the claim of independence is an assertion 
of professionalism and an argument in defence of conventional professional practice.  
Independence, as a discursive concept, does not possess a rigid meaning, specifying 
fixed roles or relationships, but operates as an ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985; Laclau 2005) which is invoked by journalists in a range of situations as a defence 
mechanism against (possible) accusations of non-professionalism and thus, illegitimacy.  
In this sense, independence, like some notions of objectivity, can be understood as 
contextual.   
 Some of the journalists interviewed for this study were not embedded with 
military units nor stationed at military briefing centres, and considered their literal 
independence a symbol of their identity and credibility as professional journalists.  
“Unilateral” News Ltd journalist Peter Wilson, who famously survived capture by Iraqi 
forces28 stated, “escaping both the control of the American and Iraqi controlling systems 
and working unilaterally, working independently” (Wilson 2006a) to be his greatest 
                                                
28 See Wilson (2004) A long drive through a short war, South Yarra, Vic., Grant Hardie Books. 
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achievement.  Another unilateral, Mark Willacy (2006a), when reporting in Baghdad, 
“would rather get out and about on the ground” than attending American press briefings, 
the American viewpoint could be simply and easily gotten from other press agencies 
and news outlets.   
 These journalists claim they preserved their independence intact by staying un-
embedded and beyond the controls of military managers.  They also help to reinforce 
the notion that the deployment of certain concepts assists in the strategic defence of 
one’s own practice.  As the analysis will demonstrate, remaining professionally 
detached and independent was not necessarily sufficient to compete with the efforts of 
official military authorities.  However, invoking independence is a pragmatic, discursive 
defence against allegations of compromised professionalism.  In this sense discursive 
statements of independence become regulatory mechanisms, through which discursive 
coherence is maintained and normative professional roles pursued.  As such the 
concept of independence permits the continuation of normative professional roles and 
relations while at the same time preserving the journalistic ideal of literal independence.  
In this sense independence is both a discursive end in itself and a higher professional 
goal. 
 Murdoch, as stated above, quite openly discusses the limitations of being an 
embedded reporter.  “Being embedded was frustrating”, says Murdoch (2006), “in that I 
couldn’t see what was going on in the wider invasion…So that was very much a limiting 
factor”.  The issue of how much he could see and report on and the limitations 
embedding placed on his perspectives were discussed in The Age, 5 April, 2006, where 
he wrote, “I report the war only from the marine’s perspective” (The Age: Insight; 2003).  
Nonetheless, criticisms of embedding are dismissed as “naïve and misguided” 
(Murdoch 2006) given the positive aspects, such as close detailed coverage of military 
operations, that embedding provided.  The dangers of journalists becoming ‘too close’ 
to the military were real, claims Murdoch, and the jingoistic identification of some of the 
American networks with the soldiers is to be rejected.  Clearly for Murdoch, 
independence permits both the maintenance of idealised journalistic distance and a 
defence against accusations of militarisation. 
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 Although reporting as embedded may have been a difficult proposition, it is 
asserted that journalists limited their complicity with military interests by fostering their 
own independence.  With no barrier or separation between himself and the soldiers, 
Murdoch asserts that through the judicious use of language, a psychological, rather 
than literal ‘distance’ is maintained:   
  
When they were talking about “the enemy” I was talking about Iraqis.  I set myself apart 
from them (the Marines) in all my dealings.  Basically, when you go into that sort of a 
situation, you’ve got to set your boundaries and make sure your professionalism stays 
intact.  (Murdoch 2006) 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, even though the emphasis and focus of the embedded 
experience was squarely on the Coalition forces and their experiences, Murdoch 
considered his commitment to the ethic of independence strong enough to resist any 
familiarisation and sympathy with the soldiers.  He thus considers his reporting non-
militarised. 
 The use of language therefore has the power both to compromise and the power 
to sustain a journalist’s independence.  For Murdoch the use of certain language serves 
as a defence against his ‘closeness’ with the military.  Through the use of certain 
phrases, words and meanings embedded reporters can maintain psychological 
independence or independence of thought, whilst dependent on the military for safety, 
sustenance and information.  Journalists are aware of the power and discursive force of 
language to influence thought, understanding and realities.  Just as those close to the 
military assert their independence through language use (Harley 2006a; Murdoch 2006) 
so do the ‘unilaterals’ see language use as a crucial symbol of the compromised 
position of such journalists.  For Bormann (2006) and Willacy (2006a) the use of military 
language normalises the logic and horror of war.  Wilson (2006a) laments the corruption 
of journalism and the production of credible knowledge by the PR trained “anti-
journalists”. 
 The discourse of independence is then clearly enunciated as a centrally 
important and controversial aspect of professional war journalism.  The system of 
embedding journalists is cautiously accepted by most journalists as an addition to the 
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scope of wartime news coverage, however should be treated for what it is – a limited 
perspective, privileging the perspective of the (in this instance) American and British 
military.  Embedding is not considered with universal ambivalence however, with 
journalists both denouncing it as complicit with the military and others supporting the 
system as providing important new perspectives.  Importantly, all journalists use their 
position on embedding to illustrate their support for the doctrine of journalistic 
independence.  Those who either support embedding or were embedded themselves 
cite their independence as articulated through their non-identification with soldiers and 
their maintenance of distance and dispassion within the context of travelling with military 
units.  Conversely, those who consider embedding a problematic journalistic exercise 
see it as fostering closeness with the military both physically and cognitively that is 
unavoidably corrosive of journalistic independence and integrity.   
Similar attitudes are expressed towards the efforts of military and political 
authorities to manage the news.  Through official briefings, the adoption and mastery of 
journalistic practices and the use of a language of militarism, military strategic intent 
seeks to naturalise of the military point of view.  On this issue journalists are resolute – 
attempts to manipulate and co-opt the media should be resisted.  Curiously however, 
and with implications for professional journalism, no alternative or method of dealing 
with such management is advanced, aside from appeals to strive for the professional 
ideal of independence – an ideal so compromised by the unequal relationship between 
journalists and the military and political sources they cover. 
The limitations imposed on journalists reporting Centcom were similar to those 
experienced by embedded journalists.  Where embeds had only the military 
perspectives and activities to report on, those at Centcom were forced to make do with 
the official pronouncements of military spokespeople, with no way of verifying what they 
were told and effectively operating as conduits for military information.  Harley concedes 
the weak position of journalists, but argues that distance can be established and 
professional integrity maintained by “writing as hard as possible” (Harley 2006a) and not 
reproducing official perspectives and accounts.  Independence is still possible in such a 
context.  A journalist constructs stories by piecing them together using the information 
provided at Centcom and incorporates that with information from international sources 
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seeking to avoid the reproduction of strategic communications (Harley 2006a).  In this 
instance independence is expressed through the picking and sorting of information and 
its arrangement as news.  The avoidance of official perspectives relies then on the skill 
of the journalist involved, as Harley (2006a) argues, “it just depends how good you are”.  
The implication here is that a skilled journalist will make clear in reports the lack of 
credible information, the efforts of the military media managers and the artifice of the 
official view.     
 Several positions are visible with regards to the use of language by journalists.  
From the journalistic perspective, language is symbolic of their independence – they 
maintain themselves as correct in their professionalism through their use of language 
that separates them from the military.  From a discourse-theoretic perspective, through 
avoiding sanitising language and employing professional qualifiers, independence is 
created or made real.  This notion is consonant with the theoretic position of this thesis 
– through language use meaning is created.  Importantly the conditions in which 
language use takes place are understood by journalists and are a significant site of the 
pragmatic “daily battle” (Kerr, 2006) to maintain journalistic professionalism.  
 
PART THREE 
6.6 NEWS VALUES 
News values are central to the formation and the production of news.  For the purposes 
of the present analysis news values are held to include both the empirical categories of 
newsworthiness, such as those elaborated by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and those 
broader cultural values identified by writers such as Gans (1980).  A discourse 
concerning news values and newsworthiness is central to professionalism.  Through the 
implementation of news values and identification of newsworthiness professionalism is 
demonstrated, legitimated and reproduced.  As Gans (1980) argues no-one approaches 
any social phenomena from a value free perspective.  And as Tuchman (1978) has 
established, such values and practices are routinised into the norms of professional 
journalism. For journalists in Iraq, conceptions of how they should approach and 
negotiate their assignments provide further insight into the professional discourse and 
how it functions to produce news.  News values link with the other discursive concepts 
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of objectivity and independence to round out the professional identity of journalists who 
participated in this study and to illustrate the regulation that characterises the discourse 
of professionalism, protected through the correct use of news values. 
 News values constitute a central concern for journalists and guide their 
professional practice.  A ‘news value’, in so far as it can be isolated and defined, has 
been variously defined as a product of institutionalised news production (Tuchman 
1978) or resulting from a commitment to objectivity (Schudson 1978).  Gans (1980) 
describes conventionalised, mainstream news values as supportive of the status quo, 
originating in a complex interaction between dominant cultural values and myths and 
the institutional and professional contexts of news journalism (Galtung and Ruge 1965; 
Harcup and O’Neill 2001).  News values anchor and orient a journalist in relation to the 
reality they must analyse and from which they must produce ‘news’ that is coherent and 
meaningful for audiences.  As this section demonstrates such values are especially 
important during coverage of modern war when the sheer volume of information 
available can be overwhelming, the public mind is especially focused on the events and 
the military-political authorities are centrally concerned with the public reception of the 
war.  As previously recognised, in modern “information war” (Tumber and Webster 
2006) and fully mediatised conflict perception management is all-important (Louw 
2005).  In the context of limited war requiring democratic consent, globalised media 
organisations providing ‘real time’ reporting enable mechanisms of consent and 
cultivation of public opinion.  As Tumber and Webster (2006; 86) argue acute concern 
over public opinion ensures military and political authorities conduct, “careful 
management and rehearsal of information from and about the war, whilst at the same 
time making assiduous efforts to avoid the charge of censorship”. 
In the current section the discourse of newsworthiness is shown to illustrate the 
professional expertise and abilities of those journalists interviewed.  This discourse 
serves to regulate journalistic production, providing a ‘location’ within the discourse from 
which to speak (report).  That is, news values provide journalists with ways of speaking 
about war, as Foucault (1972) has described – professionally legitimate enunciative 
modalities.  For these journalists, embedded, unilateral or based at Centcom, the 
discursive strategies surrounding news values provide a countervailing, articulatory 
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power to that exerted by military authorities in managing representations of war. In their 
discussions of their experiences in Iraq, journalists state that their judgement of 
newsworthiness and their organisation of their experiences into news is a product of 
their professional skill.  The ability to apply professional skills and values to a chaotic 
and often confused working environment in order to produce coherent knowledge 
distinguishes journalists.   
The technical skills of journalism are supported by a discursively constructed 
moral identity.  Journalists are concerned to represent themselves as concerned and 
empathetic, intent on focusing on the ‘human’ story of the Iraq war.  For this study’s 
interviewees, this was inherently the most legitimate ‘angle’ from which to approach the 
conflict.  Although this moral concern may seem to contradict the ethos of professional 
detachment, journalists interviewed considered such a bearing as emphasising their 
professionalism, rather than undermining it.  News values illustrate professionalism less 
as a consistent, rational regime, but rather as a pragmatic legitimating strategy.   
 
6.7 THE STATEMENT OF NEWS VALUES 
Newsworthiness is most clearly enunciated through three discursive concepts (Foucault 
1972) or nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  As ‘concepts’ news values are 
identified here in keeping with the discourse-theoretic approach of this thesis, which 
differs fundamentally from the ‘content analysis’ of Galtung and Ruge (1965) or Harcup 
and O’Neill (2001). The most important discursive concept discussed below is that 
which establishes these journalists as moral professionals, rather than simply as 
technical experts.  The moral identity of the journalists in this study is evident in their 
preoccupation with the ‘people’s war’ and the ‘human story’.  
 The limitations and difficulties of reporting during war are also important 
discursive concepts articulated by professionalism and which contribute to the broader 
theme of news values.  War is a particular environment, with a range of dangers, 
restrictions and considerations that must be taken into account, such as particular forms 
of extreme violence and danger that are specific to the experience of war.  Again, 
through the negotiation and consideration of circumstances and local conditions 
journalists are able to ‘do their job’ as well as display and reinforce their 
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professionalism.  The notion that these journalists are possessed of expertise which 
they employ in producing credible and useful news is discursively expressed, 
constructing journalists as legitimate arbiters of social reality.     
 The last concept is the notion that a journalist may witness events and, 
employing their technical skills and experience, may judge the news value of what they 
have witnessed or otherwise become informed about.  Through emphasising journalist’s 
skill at “deciding what’s news” (Gans 1980), the legitimacy of their position of power to 
define social reality is sustained. ‘Judging’ the news may appear to contradict the earlier 
identified discourse of objectivity, which requires a neutral, fact based approach and 
posits a reality independent of individuals.  However, news judgement has objectivity to 
support it, providing journalistic guidelines for determining the news.  News judgement 
also illustrates the flexibility and malleability of the professional method, which is 
adaptive to a range of journalistic situations.  The discourse of objectivity imposes 
certain requirements on those aspects of reality which are selected to be produced into 
news and news values provide a means of selecting between different aspects of 
objective reality.  The exercise of judgement over the news is then both a demonstration 
of journalistic expertise and professionalism and also a demonstration of 
professionalism’s positive legitimation of aspects of social reality and rejection of others.   
In enunciating a discourse of newsworthiness journalists advance the 
professional identity, establishing themselves as expert, non-ideological and morally 
upright.  In practice these discursive strands are interwoven, rather than artificially 
separated as they are presently.  The separation of these discursive strands here 
serves to permit a close and clear examination of their constitution and how they 
combine to construct the larger discourse of professionalism.    
In stating their concern for the ‘people’s story’, journalists establish for 
themselves both a political and moral orientation from which to view events.  This 
orientation guides their coverage and the concerns of their journalism, effectively 
regulating influences on what becomes news.   Again the notion of professional 
impartiality, neutrality and detachment is flexible and pragmatic.  By considering a moral 
or humanitarian focus as appropriate and favourable, the more resolute commitments to 
objectivity, as stated above, seem less certain, as compassion necessarily requires a 
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privileging of the interests and perspectives of the victims of war over its prosecutors.  
But although objectivity is a concern for facts, journalists are free within this system to 
judge the news value of facts where they see fit, such as highlighting the human story.  
Rather than the objective facts of a story awaiting a journalist, a journalist turns 
objectivity onto the story, producing an account that accords with the tenets of 
professionalism.  Essentially, journalistic deployment of news values, rather than 
facilitating the objective representation of reality, brings reality into existence by ‘making 
real’ aspects of war and leaving others unilluminated.  That one takes a humanitarian 
angle to one’s reporting is based a moral judgement of news value, rather than reliant 
on objectivity.  From this perspective absolute objectivity and news values appear 
contradictory.  The professionalism observed by the research however, is flexible 
enough to permit journalist’s to make moral judgements about war, such as 
foregrounding the experiences of Iraqi civilians.  The employment of news values, in this 
sense adds further contingency and nuance to the professional discourse.  The central 
discursive concepts of morality and ‘the people’ are discussed below. 
 
6.7.1 MORALITY AND THE ‘PEOPLES STORY’ 
The concern for the human story is based on a desire to ‘tell the truth’ of civilian 
experience and is thus resonant of the wider liberal-professional concern with credibility, 
honesty and integrity.  It is a concern to make visible the truth of war through statements 
about war, although as will be clear it is also a largely de-politicised category of 
analysis.  The judgements a journalist makes about the story are centrally concerned, 
as has been noted, with the “reality of the situation” and a desire to understand “what’s 
really going on” (Campbell 2006).  This concern does not preclude however a privileging 
of perspectives, as Campbell (2006) argues the assumption of a ‘news perspective’ is 
“based on various principles”, including that “sympathy for the underdog is quite 
legitimate”.  This moral outlook extends to colour the news categorisation of events too, 
serving as a guide for news judgement.  Such a moral concern provides something akin 
to a journalistic template.  While not prejudging the news, a journalist is concerned with 
“which people are behaving in a way that is moral, that is consistent with international 
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law, which people are doing things that are counter-productive…” (Campbell 2006), 
rather than simply abandoning them to some ‘objective’ definition of news value.    
 Such concerns are both professionally and personally fulfilling for journalists.  
Peter Wilson considered his ‘unilateralism’ his most significant achievement of the Iraq 
War.  His escape from the “controlling systems” of both the American and Iraqi forces 
permitted his team to cover the “people’s war” (2006a) of southern Iraq.  For Wilson a 
focus on the effect on the conflict on the people of Iraq was the only acceptable moral 
and professional way of approaching the war.  Wilson even rejects the Baghdad ‘behind 
enemy lines’ perspective, which he criticises as “sort of sitting there in a hotel 
room…most of them [journalists in Baghdad] covering it [the war] off the 
internet…turning material around with a Baghdad dateline” (Wilson 2006a).  Rather he 
sought to make visible and real a neglected reality; the experiences of Iraqi civilians.  
Likewise “doing stories that involved human beings and Iraqis themselves” provided a 
deep professional satisfaction for Trevor Bormann (2006), who considered it “very 
gratifying to see how normal Iraqis were dealing with (the war) and what they thought 
about events”.  Willacy (2006a) was most proud of getting out and talking with “the 
people, normal Iraqis”.   
 What becomes news however is not simply contingent on a journalist’s 
conscience, but also pragmatically related to the circumstances a reporter finds him or 
herself in.  Journalists must use what is available to them, within a given period to 
produce news reports.  Each theatre of the war had differing limitations and degrees of 
danger for reporters.  In the period immediately following the fall of Baghdad journalists 
experienced a freedom and openness previously unknown.  This stands in contrast with 
the heavy restrictions placed on journalists by the Iraqi authorities especially, in their 
attempts to report on the experiences of the local civilians.  It also illustrates the extent 
to which journalists have the capacity to construct and produce news of their choosing 
and as a result of their moral compunction.  Wilson (2006a) describes Baghdad as 
being “wide open, it was paradise”.  Where previously getting honest and accurate 
representation of people’s attitudes was nearly impossible, after the fall of the Iraqi 
government, “there were so many (stories)…any idea you could have there were 
stories” (Wilson 2006a).  The fall of Baghdad permitted journalists the freedoms they 
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value to perform their craft as they saw fit, free from “being shadowed by and 
Information Ministry minder” (Willacy 2006a).  In this period it was possible to approach 
American soldiers for comment and stories and while Willacy found the American troops 
naturally open, talkative and honest after a short while they became increasingly 
apprehensive about being approached, even by press.  Willacy (2006a) was 
unconcerned as “it was one of those situations where you just look out your window and 
see what was happening”.  Similarly, Bormann (2006) talks of, “just going out each day, 
more or less just going onto the streets and getting our stories”.  
 A focus on the human side of the conflict then articulates a moral bearing as well 
as a concern for the democratic principles of journalism, encapsulated in the old clichés 
concerning the profession’s ‘watchdog’ role as a ‘Fourth Estate’ of government.  This 
ethic persists in the contemporary era as illustrated by the predisposition of journalists 
towards covering the ‘people’.  As the thesis will demonstrate, it is clear that the 
professional discourse legitimates the bringing into existence and making visible certain 
sanctioned aspects of war, civilian casualties and ‘iconic’ events for instance.  
Journalism has greater difficulty making visible potentially politically sensitive, 
unsanctioned accounts, such as critical analyses of the media management at Central 
Command or more robust considerations of the implications of embedding.  Criticisms 
of this kind exist firmly inside what Hallin (1986) has called the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. 
 Even Lindsay Murdoch, embedded with the US Marines was inclined towards 
covering the responses and attitudes to the war of the Iraqi civilians he encountered.  
Military regulations governing embedding forbade such interaction.  Nonetheless, a 
concern for ‘the people’ is enunciated, according his experiences as an embedded 
reporter (from the liberal perspective) a degree of legitimacy.  “Basically I never got real 
access to the Iraqis” laments Murdoch (2006), however the “sheer mechanics” of it 
restricted what he could do from within the embedded context.  From an embedded 
perspective Iraqi civilians become represented as potential combatants rather than 
potential sources of useful information.  “You’ve got to remember that most of the time, 
when we’re going through these villages, sometimes we came under fire, we didn’t 
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know who was friendly and who wasn’t”, says Murdoch (2006) both explaining the lack 
of contact and illustrating the divide that embedding imposed on journalists. 
 
6.7.2 CENTCOM, EMBEDDING AND BAGHDAD 
This section details how certain newsworthy ‘locations’ are articulated and legitimated 
as newsworthy.  These locations such as embedded or at Centcom, were strategically 
established as appealing to journalists sensibilities.  In effect they were pre-established 
as newsworthy by military public relations officials cognisant of professional journalism’s 
weakness and need for briefings, official sources, compelling coverage and a steady 
supply of material. 
 The situation at Central Command for Australian journalists was professionally 
trying.  Although they were generally disdainful of the entire operation, Australian 
journalists continued to report from Doha, experiencing great difficulty in countering the 
military efforts to control the flow of information and the media in turn.  The ‘tyranny of 
distance’ meant that the war was far away and Centcom military-media managers could 
easily control the release of information.  Harley (2006a) was forced to change his 
coverage from ‘breaking’ news stories, to “piecing together stories from a range of 
sources” – clearly stating the journalistic attempts to construct credible news in the 
context of the military’s power to control information.  Illustrating contempt for the media 
operations in Doha, this information is described as “fundamentally no different to any of 
the material you can get from Sydney, Tokyo or London” (Harley 2006a), a glaring 
contrast to Centcom’s promotion as central point for Iraq war information.  Notably 
however, the arrangements at Centcom were not seen as irredeemably flawed.  One 
journalist, New York magazine’s media critic Michael Wolff, challenged Brigadier 
General Brooks as to why journalists should bother coming to Centcom to report, “so 
useless and barren of information were his briefings” (Massing, 2003b).  As Wolff 
himself put it, reporting from Centcom was a Groundhog Day29 experience:   
 
“You woke up only to repeat the day before, and no matter what you did or said or 
thought, you were helpless to effect a change in the next day. So every day, everybody 
                                                
29 Referring to the film, starring Bill Murray, in which an egotistical weatherman is forced to relive one day, 
Groundhog Day, over and over again until he confronts his own ego and shortcomings.   
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asked the same questions about Basra and the supply lines and the whereabouts of the 
WMDs and Saddam, and got the same answers. They were war correspondents after all 
(or trying to be)” (Wolff 2003).  
 
Harley however takes a nuanced view.  Although disdainful of Wolff’s criticism, 
he is not entirely dismissive, arguing that Wolff through his challenge to the military 
authorities illustrated that there was still room available in which journalists could 
manoeuvre and meaningfully illuminate war.  “I suppose you could argue that because 
Michael got up and said that, it’s totally possible [to challenge authorities]…it’s a double 
edged sword, the officials may have regarded him with distain, but many journalists 
regarded him as a hero”, says Harley (2006a), enunciating the legitimacy of Centcom as 
a sphere of legitimate controversy.   
 In other theatres of war restrictions imposed by embedding or by bombing in 
Baghdad, meant pragmatism and newsworthiness made war real through what could be 
witnessed, while maintaining a degree of safety.  Embedded with US Marines, Lindsay 
Murdoch (2006) states newsworthiness as “just what I could see every day and what I 
could quickly get out, with the limitations I had”.  This was simply the reality of 
embedding for many correspondents to which professionalism was adapted (Carlson 
and Katovsky 2003).  Murdoch brought this reality into existence as the subject of at 
least one news dispatch:   
 
I can only report on the battles, the stuff-ups, the human tragedies that I see. I don’t 
have a broad view of how the war is unfolding.  My reporting is restricted to what the 
Marines I am with are doing…I want to be able to report more of this war.    (the Age, 
April 5, 2003) 
 
The reporting situation in Baghdad was also restricted, but rather by pragmatic 
concerns over safety and the avoidance of Iraqi officials.  In the early stages on the 
bombing campaign Iraqi Information Ministry minders sought to control the activities or 
foreign journalists, periodically searching hotel rooms for forbidden communications 
equipment and restricting their access to stories (Wilson 2006a).  News Ltd’s Baghdad 
reporter Ian McPhedran was eventually expelled from Iraq by the besieged government.  
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Until then McPhedran’s reporting strategy was similar to Murdoch’s straightforward 
approach, although it was also very much concerned with safety. “What you are trying 
to do it to stay alive and report what you’re seeing”, offered McPhedran (2006a), the 
dangers of war severely narrowing one’s range of options.  “Anyone who thinks you can 
just sit in Baghdad, in Iraq, during a war and do analytical, nice think pieces and nice 
pieces of analysis is not only a little bit naïve but probably a little bit stupid”, argues 
McPhedran (2006a), emphatically and emphasising the pragmatic nature of news 
production. 
 
6.7.3 JUDGEMENT 
The concept (Foucault 1972) or nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) of judgement is 
the final important component of the discourse of news values, identified in this study.  
This concept crystallises notions of the expertise and reliability of journalists to exercise 
professional judgement in deciding what to report.  Judgement in this sense is 
articulated in terms similar to those used to discuss objectivity.  That news is to be 
‘judged’ echoes the objective concern with fact, fairness and balance.  That is, through 
the application of professional expertise, that which is newsworthy, which exists 
independently from the journalist as part of ‘reality’, may be separated from that which is 
not.  In asserting the legitimacy of a liberal journalist to exercise judgement, these 
journalists reassert the importance of the professional, neutral and non-ideological 
approach.  The act of judging news however is obscured by a discourse of realism that 
presents journalists as mere conduits for reality, ‘as it is’.  In this sense the role of 
journalists in choosing what becomes news, in bringing war into existence for news 
audiences, is obscured.    
Wilson argues that rather than “develop an ideology either for or against the war, 
what journalists needed to be doing was giving people back home an accurate picture 
of what effect the war was having and the attitudes of the Iraqi people” (Wilson 2006a).  
This professionally dispassionate approach to war is supported by Campbell, who 
although not embedded, considered embedded ABC reporter Geoff Thompson’s story 
of civilian killings at an American checkpoint a symbolic triumph of news values over 
propaganda, military manipulation or censorship.  While the military were in Campbell’s 
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(2006) opinion “commendably open” the tragedy of Iraq reporting by embedded 
journalists was that individually so many were “behaving in such an irresponsible 
manner that they were not reporting what they should have been reporting and were 
reporting in ways that were quite wrong”.  For Campbell a concern for news values 
overrides other, more pragmatic considerations.  “You don’t care about how the 
military’s going to react [to unflattering coverage], if you are close to the source and the 
source doesn’t like it, well, you move on” (Campbell 2006).  Here, faults with journalism 
are clearly articulated as the improper internalisation of professionalism by individual 
journalists, rather than as representing deeper, systemic issues, such as journalist’s 
reliance on official sources and military protection.    
From the point of view of the Sydney Morning Herald having a reporter ‘on the 
ground’ covering events ensured the “impartial and balanced coverage and to bring an 
accurate account for readers of the Herald…rather than rely for example on the 
Washington Post or the New York Times” (Kerr 2006).  From Foreign Editor Peter Kerr’s 
perspective, as a foreign editor, there tends to be a daily ‘natural news lead’ that similar 
publications identify as the most important, beyond which an editor should be 
concerned with balance and comprehensiveness, as well as “telling a human tale” 
(2006).  Kerr concedes however that while believing in “inherent newsworthiness” it is 
clear that “in an event as big as war, there won’t always be that agreement and people 
make (news) judgements for a hugely complex range of reasons” (2006).   
News values therefore are subject to tension and ongoing negotiation as 
professional concerns for telling a sympathetic ‘people’s story’ and sensitivity for 
inherent newsworthiness appears to conflict with objectivity’s concern for neutrality.  As 
Wilson (2006a) states, although one may consciously assume a neutral perspective, 
moral and legal questions are ever-present during war.  “Obviously you are thinking 
about it [the legality of war] and trying to decide, is this right?  Should I be taking an 
aggressively critical position?”  Here, neutrality and moral conviction are in constant 
struggle, Wilson eventually basing his view that the war was not inherently illegitimate 
on his discussions with local Iraqis and likewise bemoaning the descent of Iraq into civil 
war as a result of a poorly handled occupation.  Importantly, his statements neatly 
illustrate the fragility of the professional discourse, its tensions unresolved and 
 
 
168 
incomplete fixity leaving discursive space available for alternative articulations of 
journalistic practice.   
This approach is reined in however by a professional commitment to deeper 
journalistic values, the moral conviction of a witness restrained by professionalism – 
such an analysis is also objective argues Wilson: 
 
“It is not based on me going there being pro-war or anti-war, it’s based on getting there 
and speaking to the people and hearing them say that…Its, yeah, not just “report the 
facts objectively”, but I think it’s still objective, in that you’re saying what you’re seeing.  
You know being objective doesn’t mean you’re just a tape recorder” (Wilson 2006a).   
 
This tension and difficulty in reconciling discursive concepts provides moments of 
contrast and space for journalists to explore alternative conceptions.  The tension 
between the identity of the moral witness to events and the professional need for 
objective fact is neatly illustrated by the now infamous episode in which American 
soldiers toppled a statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdos Square.  Around the 
world images of Iraqi men and American soldiers pulling down the statue were 
presented as symbolising the end of the Hussein government and the birth of liberty in 
Iraq (BBC 2003; Poole and Blair 2003).  Wilson (2006a) argues that such images play 
well as they can be produced as “iconic moments”.  Inevitably, and inaccurately, 
parallels were drawn between this and events such as the fall of Berlin Wall.  Crucially, 
such moments reveal the power of the discourse as it both inscribes events with 
meaning, but also produces a site of contest over meaning that can potentially be 
exploited by journalists seeking to re-conceptualise the production of news and 
introduce critical perspectives.  However, for professionals, such moments, “serve their 
purpose, that image sums up a broader truth that Saddam did fall, both his statue and 
his government” (Wilson 2006a).  However Wilson himself considered the episode as 
symbolic of American insensitivity and ignorance, rather than of Iraqi freedom, arguing 
“it was a microcosm of a lot of the problems…the Americans showed their insensitivity 
by the way they put an American flag on Saddam’s face, you know this is stupid.  
Showing the world this is what happens when America conquers Iraq.  And they got up 
and did it!” (Wilson 2006a).  Some of this sentiment is reflected in Wilson’s reporting at 
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the time, when he writes, “…celebrations in Iraq, epitomised by the toppling of the grand 
statue in central Baghdad, were marred by more looting and lawlessness and growing 
security concerns” (The Australian, 11 April, 2003).  The statue episode illustrated both 
American insensitivity and the media corps enthusiasm and weakness for ‘iconic’ 
imagery.  Furthermore, it illustrated well the needs of professionalism.  Through 
professional journalism, this event was inscribed into reality and generated meaning; in 
this case the symbolic end of the Iraqi regime, to which Wilson was able to attach a 
quiet warning about the potential for future civil unrest following the regime’s demise. 
Jonathan Harley was reticent about making non-objective issues news.  He states an 
unwillingness to deviate from the professional conception of neutrality.  Although the 
media operation at Centcom was highly controversial, Harley considered his news 
reports the wrong medium for covering the news management strategies of the 
Centcom officials, however newsworthy these may have been, given the context of the 
military’s media operations and the highly controversial political context of the Iraq war.  
Harley suggests that news consumers should seek a broad range of sources for their 
information, rather than simply rely on a broadcast bulletin.  “I think if people are going 
to be a lazy media consumer then they are going to get a lazy media product”, argues 
Harley (2006a), “the biggest priority is to be accurate and to be succinct and give people 
a quick hit”.  In Harley’s articulation news audiences are sufficiently sophisticated to 
understand the sub-text, contained within objective, neutral news coverage of Centcom 
news conferences.  “I am really wary of making the media the story and I think people 
are much more savvy and when they watch or read they actually incorporate into their 
understanding the way it (the news) is produced” (Harley 2006a) articulating the 
impossibility of making ‘sub-text’ explicit.  That is, explicitly articulating into news 
discourse the sorts of limitations, constraints and contingencies that affect his reporting 
and conditions of news production at Centcom.  As is clear within this professional 
scheme “the biggest accountability” is correctness (Harley, 2006a) rather than 
transparency. 
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6.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has contributed to this thesis’ stated aim.  The significant central 
discourses that constitute professionalism have been identified and elaborated an 
analytical process in keeping with the discourse-theoretical perspective discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four. This section has also begun to illustrate some of the 
influence this discourse has on the construction of war news.  This analysis has 
identified those concepts and discursive nodal points which crystallise within the central 
discourses of objectivity, independence and news values.  This section has examined 
the means by which these concepts become discursive strategies with which to perform 
professional war journalism.  This chapter has outlined professional journalism’s central 
epistemological, practical and moral concerns.  Tensions, ambivalence and 
contradictions within the discourse have been illustrated.  The commitment to 
professional norms that obscure these tensions has also been described.  It is argued 
that while central concepts exist around which the discourse crystallised, areas of 
discourse remain unfixed with respect to solidified meanings, or in tension.  This has 
been shown in several examples, such as those discursive statements and identities 
surrounding objectivity, or professionalism in the context of embedding.  Several 
journalists articulate a contextual notion of independence for example.  Others give 
support to operations such as embedding conditional on its use in wider coverage. 
Nonetheless, this chapter has argued that while this variation exists with regard to 
individual journalists’ discursive statements or enunciations, the notion of the legitimacy 
of professional journalistic epistemology, method and morality is emphasised within the 
discourse to the extent that, while able to accommodate a degree of variety, 
professionalism is sedimented as hegemonic.  And in a practical sense, professionalism 
allows journalists to overlook these contradictions and tensions and continue to report 
according to journalistic norms and conventions.  A significant consequence of this 
emphasis is the construction of a discursive framework in which certain forms and 
aspects of war coverage, such as reporting as an embed or from Centcom are accorded 
legitimacy and propriety, and the need for perspectives less dependent upon military 
sources receive less emphasis, leaving non-military dependent perspectives largely 
unarticulated.   
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The extent to which this general arrangement of statements, concepts and 
discourses can be understood as a self-legitimating, internally coherent framework, or 
system, has also been examined by this chapter.  This aspect of the analysis forms the 
basis which the following chapters build upon.  This chapter has also begun to suggest 
the consequences for public knowledge that are made visible by this form of analysis. 
That is, the analysis suggests that professionalism limits the possibilities for the 
production of journalistic knowledge and understanding, rather than expanding them.  
For example, critical perspectives, such as those generated either through embedding 
or through Central Command journalism, remain firmly within Hallin’s (1986) concept of 
a sphere of legitimate controversy.  The discourse clearly does this by legitimating 
certain perspectives and practices and marginalising and excluding alternatives.  Also 
shown has been the contingency with which journalistic decisions are made, both in the 
context of objectivity and neutral news values.   
Several points should be raised however.  The concepts established by the 
professional discourse, identified and discussed above, should be considered 
conceptual and strategic articulations of a larger whole; the overarching discourse of 
professionalism.  These concepts have been articulated in an interview setting and the 
three most prominent concepts of the professional discourse which arose have been 
isolated and analysed.  This general constellation of concepts has been organised in 
order to demonstrate how they may be understood as discursive framework.  This 
framework articulates the regularity and general organisation of professionalism as it is 
observed within the context of Australian war journalism.  The following chapter shifts 
the analytical focus from the ‘general arrangement’ (Foucault 1972) of discursive and 
focuses on the relations of power and discursive control that structure professional war 
journalism.  The following chapter begins to illustrate the extent to which professional 
journalism must be understood, not as a fixed system of discourse, but as dynamic, fluid 
and contingent, in the context of power. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN - PROFESSIONALISM AND POWER: IRAQ, 2003 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION – DISCOURSE AND POWER 
This chapter provides an analysis of how the power dynamics of ‘professionalisation’ 
result in specific forms of war journalism, and the effect these dynamics have on 
journalism production.  Here I argue that the ‘microphysical’ (Foucault 1981) dynamics 
of coercive, administrative and institutional journalistic power must be understood in the 
particular cultural-historic context and conditions that characterise professionalism and 
within which professionalism plays a central role in the governance of contemporary 
society.  The analysis proceeds from a basic level of individualised, journalistic power.  
Here, the matrix of the professional discourse established in the previous chapter 
provides an analytical framework for understanding journalistic power and provides a 
scheme through which much of the professional experience of war can be understood.  
This section seeks to make clear the power of the professional discourse in ‘producing’ 
(Foucault 1972) its object – the Iraq invasion – through journalism and for Australian 
audiences.  This analysis is sensitive, however, to the circulation of power, and its 
operation “from below” (Foucault 1980; 100).  In this conception then, the professional 
discourse does not directly and uniformly discipline journalists, but rather journalists are 
operative within a wider field of structured power relations.   
 This wider field is identified as the analysis briefly moves to discussing the 
institutional arrangements that administer journalists as employees of news 
organisations.  The extent to which these relationships impacted on the practice of war 
journalism is considered.  Lastly, this section attends to a contextualisation of the power 
relations immanent in contemporary war journalism as resulting from journalism’s 
location within hegemonic liberalism. 
 
7.2 OBJECTIVITY 
The following section sets out how various practices and norms that regulate war 
journalism can be analysed in terms of the preceding chapter’s analysis of discourse.  
As has been demonstrated, enunciations of objectivity by the journalists involved in this 
study reveal the often contradictory nature of these central discourse concepts – its 
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‘emptiness’ unites and encloses a variety of understandings.  As McPhedran (2006a) 
states (all emphasis added), “Without it [objectivity] we are lost – without that 
[objectivity] and facts, we are lost!  So I think that [objectivity] is a primary pillar, 
alongside factual information”.  Here objectivity is defined as “the ability to put you own 
prejudices to one side and to report what you see fairly, in a balanced way and 
objectively” (McPhedran 2006a).  Similarly, Murdoch (2006) states, “well, they 
[objectivity] are the values [of journalism], that’s what journalism is about.”  Campbell 
(2006) argues “objectivity is absolutely crucial”.  These enunciations of objectivity’s 
centrality are contrasted with those who question the relevance of objectivity.  As Harley 
(2006a) says, “[journalism] I think is about good story telling and making it accessible, 
taking people on a journey…We know that you are never going to, that there is never 
anything purely objective”.  Bormann (2006) agrees stating, “I think objectivity is a bit of 
a cliché in a way, people have this idea that there are two sides to every story and the 
truth lies somewhere in between and that’s objectivity, I don’t see it that way”.   
The inherent epistemological uncertainty or instability is identified at the centre of 
the discourse of objectivity30.  Importantly this contradiction reveals the most central 
discourse of professionalism as incomplete or as incompletely hegemonising the field.  
However, rather than producing a constitutive crisis in journalism, the contradiction is 
resolved in the practice of journalism – the central concept serving as a unifying ‘empty 
signifier’, permitting the enjoyment of the fantasy of professionalism (Žižek, 1989).  
Here, the contradiction of objectivity at the heart of professional journalism is overlooked 
and a pragmatic set of practices and norms that re-articulate a commitment to the 
liberal-democratic journalistic model are enunciated.  In other words while objectivity 
does not provide a fixed and solid foundation for journalistic practice and theory, 
journalists act as if it does, reconciling this contradiction of journalism in practice.  Here 
we can see clearly the discursive regulation of journalistic practice – both pragmatic and 
‘orthodox’ approaches towards objectivity resulting in the same practical outcomes.  
This power of professionalism prevents a radical reconsideration of the journalistic 
approach to war, even in the context of highly nuanced, situationally dependent and 
subjective understandings of these central professional values.  The articulation of 
                                                
30 As discussed in the previous chapter. 
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central discourses provides coherence to the practice of journalism.  As will be shown, 
individuated journalistic power is crucial in maintaining legitimacy of professional 
journalistic practice.   
Discourses surrounding the practical aspects of war journalism provide the 
discipline with cohesion not granted by the instability or emptiness of the central notion 
of objectivity.  Effectively, and in practice, journalists appeal to notions of 
professionalism – such as independence, authority and training – to legitimise their 
practice, in the absence of a formal or codified basis, namely a universally accepted and 
agreed upon central defining epistemology; objectivity.  Professionalism is in this sense 
‘haunted’ by objectivity.  As noted in the previous chapter, this internal contradiction at 
the heart of professionalism manifests itself in an ever more rigorous articulation of the 
central concepts within objectivity – the ability of journalists to represent ‘reality’ 
truthfully; their authority as legitimate and skilled news producers and the 
appropriateness of their ‘objective’ method of fact gathering, verification and 
independent neutrality.  These discursive concepts/nodal points within objectivity 
provide journalists with a degree of certainty with regards to their legitimacy and 
purpose – that is, the ideological fantasy of professionalism stabilises their otherwise 
unstable identity.   
Nevertheless, these concepts retain for professionalism the power to represent 
war. Professionalism anchors journalism within the cultural-historic condition of liberal 
democratic discourse and news institutional frameworks, and from this journalism 
derives public legitimacy.  As will be shown in the following chapters, this ‘power to 
represent’ necessarily produces war in accordance with specific, narrow professional 
concepts and needs.   
Briefly, it is clear from the analysis that the ‘power to represent’ articulated as 
objectivity both significantly influences the content of news messages and obscures the 
practical conditions of news production.  As News Ltd’s Rory Callinan (2006) states of 
his Centcom experience, much of the journalistic activity taking place there was 
redundant: 
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What they [News Ltd editors/managers] did initially was, they said to me you’ll do the 
write-off from Doha, the battle as it unfolds.  But what we found was that people in New 
York and journalists back in Australia, started to get briefings from politicians, like 
Downer [Alexander Downer, Australian Foreign Minister]– I can’t remember who the 
Defence Minister at the time was – they started to get briefings from Canberra that we 
weren’t getting, while we were in Doha, where theoretically there was a command HQ, 
so it just made it completely ridiculous. 
 
The restrictive and logistically dysfunctional arrangements at Centcom ensured 
journalist’s energies and attentions turned channelled towards whatever information 
was made available.  As Callinan additionally comments, in the absence of ‘hard 
information’ this was often toward favourable accounts of military activity: 
 
Yeah, you do trend to champion that sort of “Australian troops during war”.  That sort of 
parochial, Australian interest…I wrote a story about a marine, using a jaffle iron to cook 
food for the troops – so you do get a bit caught up in that (Callinan 2006). 
 
Furthermore, Callinan argues that such reporting styles are the automatic, irresistible 
outcome of a heavily restricted information environment.  Callinan argues his reporting 
never suffered however:  
 
I can see a point where you could get so desperate, and might start thinking, “should I 
go a bit soft on these guys and they might start looking after us”...It didn’t happen for me 
and I didn’t feel that it coloured in any way my reporting, but I could tell that you had to 
think about stuff and you had to think, “well, if I include that [negative military coverage] I 
have got bugger all chance of getting out of here [Centcom]” (Callinan 2006). 
 
The representative power exercised by journalists can function to obscure the 
restrictions they faced when reporting on the Iraq war, which contradict the liberal 
conception of press freedom.  As Callinan’s remarks demonstrate, journalists exert little 
countervailing power to that of military media managers.  And although Callinan 
articulates through objectivity he is able to maintain a professional bearing, the 
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compromises journalists make in these circumstances are made clear by Callinan’s 
admissions. 
The ‘power to represent’ is articulated as permitting the full expression of the 
‘objectivity’ of journalistic perspective, rather than potentially obscuring its restriction or 
encouraging journalists to compromise their professional ethics, as described by 
Callinan above.  Thompson argues during his experiences as an embedded journalist 
he was entirely free and unrestricted in what he could report:  
  
The thing is we could never see the whole battlefield, but we could see what was in front 
of us and the same rules of objectivity would apply to that…there wasn’t any intentional 
obfuscation of what we were allowed to do (Thompson 2006). 
 
As noted, ‘objectivity’ as the central epistemological foundation of professional 
journalism is unstable.  Professionalism, through invocations of the importance of 
professional practice can be understood as overlooking its own limitations and 
uncertainties.  Through exertions of the ‘power to represent’, objectivity functions as the 
productive concept through which a variety of circumstances and practices are 
produced as the normative and legitimate mode of journalism.  
 
7.3 INDEPENDENCE 
As illustrated in the previous chapter ‘independence’ is another of the central discourses 
that comprise professional journalism.  Similar to the analysis provided above, this 
section illustrates the extent to which military and political power dominates journalists 
through both informational and physical control.  The extent to which journalists possess 
and execute a counter veiling power is further examined.  This tension consolidates 
both the legitimacy of professionalism and the depth of the ‘fantasy’ that must exist for 
journalists to function in their normative socio-political roles, as the concept of 
independence becomes ever more important in the context of control. 
 The institution of embedding by the United States military constituted a form of 
literal, restrictive power over journalists and press agencies.  While embedding has 
been praised for the degree of openness and access to the military it provided (Carlson 
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and Katovsky 2003), it has elsewhere been criticised (Schechter 2003).  As stated in the 
Department of Defence embedding guidelines the strategic intent of the program, to 
promote an authentic, military focused perspective is clear:  
  
We need to tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the media with 
disinformation and distortion, as they most certainly will continue to do.  Our people in 
the field need to tell our story – only commanders can ensure that the media get to the 
story alongside the troops…These embedded media will live, work and travel as part of 
the units with which they are embedded to relate maximum, in-depth coverage of US 
forces in combat and related operations (Department of Defense Public Affairs Guidance 
on Embedded Media 2003).   
 
In the previous chapter, the support for embedding as a journalistic practice has been 
shown as ambivalent - supported by those journalists who participated in the program 
and criticised by those who did not.  Generally however, the administrative process by 
which journalists volunteer to enter into military units, and are subject to military control 
and protection, has become an acceptable and normalised facet of professional war 
journalism.  As the ABC’s Geoff Thompson (2006) argues technology, shifting cultural 
norms and commercial competition all demand participation:  
 
If you don’t have good access then people lose interest, they actually want to see from 
the ground up, people living their lives.  So you can see that that Iraq war and the 
embedded experience was like “Big Brother at War”, in many ways and that's all part of 
the phenomenon. 
 
Other journalists were opposed to embedding, enunciating common criticisms.  News 
Limited journalist Peter Wilson (2006) called the program “cheerleading” for American 
forces, while Willacy (2006) comments that embedding necessarily leads to journalists 
identifying with the military with whom they travelled:  
  
[W] hat we saw was the phenomenon of the embedded reporter and constantly referring 
to “we” and “us” in terms of the unit they were embedded with and that’s why I think with 
embedding there’s a great ethical dilemma there for journalists and why I refuse to do it.   
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Similarly the arrangements at Central Command have been heavily criticised for the 
informational control imposed upon journalists assigned there and can be literally 
understood as disciplinary institutional power.  Central Command however, represents a 
far less ambivalent object of professional discourse than does embedding.  Here the 
‘traditional’ or normative antagonisms, which are held to exist between military-political 
institutions and professional journalists, are performatively enacted.  The opposition to 
military PR reinforces the professional subjectivity within the liberal journalistic model, 
which, following Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical conceptions (1985; Laclau 2005) 
requires of an ‘other’ for its normative identity – that is, a journalist seeks to hold power 
to account through the engagement of professional skills and techniques.  The 
discourse concerning Centcom then permits journalists to demonstrate their 
‘independence’ from military and political power through antagonistic articulations and 
criticism of Centcom media management strategies. Through the production of ‘factually 
accurate’ information journalists define themselves against military power.   
 Unsurprisingly then, several journalists were strident in their criticisms of the 
restrictive high security atmosphere and the heavily restricted information regime 
established at Centcom and to which they were subjected.  As Callinan (2006) recounts:  
 
You would stay in a nice hotel out in the capital somewhere and then you sort of half an 
hour’s drive to get to the place and then you sort of hit this huge, like a fortress basically 
of security and you went through several gates.  And once you started going through 
that security apparatus, you suddenly realise that this is an intensely controlled 
environment.  The guys will either do a strip search of you or you had to walk through 
the X-ray machine that was like getting zapped…and the control just increased from that 
moment.   
 
Similarly, Harley (2006b) comments of the paucity of information available at Centcom 
that resulted from the information control exerted by military officials: 
 
Basically it’s [Centcom] frustrating because there’s so little to work with and basically 
often there’s just not a story to tell and you’re not bearing witness – I am the sort of 
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journalist that needs to see and feel things to kind of really tell it, and there’s just no 
narrative at Centcom…. I think it's such a peculiar environment, it’s such a hothouse for 
information and disinformation, and it’s that fabulous, perverse media circus at its most 
extreme and it’s most insane. 
 
Furthermore, according to Harley, who states clearly the idealised journalistic 
role and identity, in such circumstances, arrangements such as those at Centcom force 
journalists into an antagonistic relationship with military power.  Thus:  
 
I mean what’s really going on at Centcom is that there are two worlds – there is the 
media world and then there’s the operational world.  And you’re never really going to 
know what the operational world is – so part of your writing is always going to be about 
trying to dis-assemble the spin or the PR or the propaganda, call it what you will (Harley 
2006b).    
 
The direct control of embedded journalists and those assigned to Central Command 
respectively provides examples of the forms of disciplinary and repressive power that 
Foucault identified in his institutional analyses (1977; 1981).  In this direct sense, 
military power regulates and controls both the journalists themselves (through the 
‘guidelines’ and provisions of embedding and the Centcom security apparatus) and 
regulates the information they utilise to produce news.   
Following Foucault (1981) power is not merely dominatory, but also productive, 
circulating throughout the social world, rather than merely imposed or unilaterally 
deployed, as suggested by the journalistic descriptions of Central Command.  This 
‘disciplinary’ power produces a form of journalistic identity and practice, rather than 
merely prohibiting or controlling specific functions.  Through experience of these 
methods and systems of control a form of journalistic subjectivity is produced that 
insulates legitimacy and protects professionalism by providing space for its normative 
expression.  As disciplinary power circulates, journalist’s distributive role in the 
information ‘economy’ of war is overlooked.  Independence from control, articulated and 
enunciated, reinforces the professional identity and the legitimacy and normalisation of 
professional theory and practice.  Indeed, to continue after Foucault (1981), it is 
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possible to begin to understand professionalism as ‘self-discipline’, in so far as 
‘professional’ journalists who participate in these media exercises have internalised the 
logics and practices of administrative military power.   
 As Harley (2006a) has commented, Centcom represented a “frustrating” 
experience.  Callinan (2006) is more explicit: 
 
But when you got there it was, your sole point of contact was the military –“Australia’s 
got 5 F-18s and today they bombed three places and didn’t bomb somewhere because 
they might have killed civilians”, so I was dealing with a flow of military information… But 
what we found was that people in New York and journalists back in Australia started to 
get briefings from politicians…they started to get briefings from Canberra that we weren’t 
getting, while we were in Doha, where theoretically there was a command HQ, so it just 
made it completely ridiculous. 
 
In such circumstances then, the tight control of information is used to discipline or 
create “useful” (Foucault 1977; 211) journalists who must satisfy a professional need to 
produce information.  As Callinan (2006) recounts, information starved journalists are 
quick to use whatever information they are provided, serving as a useful conduit for 
military interests: 
 
They [the Australian military authorities] blocked all other international media, so all 
these international media were leaning over the fence and climbing over the fence to film 
down to get some sort of action.  So they gave us a reasonable briefing and said, “we’ve 
gone into combat, so we raced out and filed that.  And that was what we were supposed 
to do there – receive those briefings and then file straight away. 
 
Moreover, Callinan articulates a response to military control that was concerned 
primarily with military ‘operational’ issues rather than policy or political issues.  This 
tendency to focus on operational matters is directly encouraged by an information 
control regime that strategically controls and releases information. 
 In the previous chapter and above, professionalism is noted as serving to 
reconcile the antagonism between the military and the media, providing the means with 
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which to manage the relationship.  As shown above, rather than provide an incisive and 
critical representation of military media management, the relationship permits journalists 
to ‘perform’ their independence through “writing it hard” (Harley, 2006) or “where you 
don’t make what you’re seeing appear to be greater than what it is, pretending greater 
knowledge than you actually have” (Campbell 2006) and thus discharging their public, 
democratic responsibility while avoiding a substantive critique of the manner in which 
military authorities control, regulate and seek to construct public knowledge about the 
invasion. 
  
7.4 NEWS VALUES 
The notion that professionalism produces disciplined journalists is further elucidated by 
an analysis of the function of the discourse of news values and newsworthiness, which 
was identified and discussed in the previous chapter.  This analysis proceeds in three 
subsections.  Firstly, this section illustrates the extent to which journalists wield 
productive power in their representation of war.  Specifically, through professionalism 
the normative function of war journalism is reproduced.  Journalists serve as witnesses 
to wartime events and, at times operate as a public conscience and in doing so fulfil 
their liberal-democratic obligations as a ‘watchdog’ over official power.   
However, as noted similarly above, the discourse of news values also enacts 
control, regulation and exclusion in relation to journalistic production.  In this sense, the 
second part of the analysis begins to identify means by which military and political 
issues become separated from issues surrounding the ‘human’ or ‘dramatic’ aspects of 
war.  Moreover, these regulatory practices illustrate the extent to which professionalism, 
in the context of Central Command and embedding, is disciplinary and serves to 
legitimate, rather than interrogate, the exercise of official power.  
In this sense, and in the last section of this analysis, it is argued that 
newsworthiness, as part of a larger discursive formation of professionalism, further 
contributes to the production of ‘useful’ journalists, in so far as through the performance 
of professionalism, i.e. the selection of news items, the strategic goals of the military are 
enabled.   
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7.5 THE POWER TO REPRESENT 
The primary means by which journalists ‘produce’ war, as we have seen, is through 
their judgement and selection of aspects of war to become news and the authority with 
which they make these decisions – the ‘power to represent’.  In making these 
judgements, journalists have enunciated the centrality of the ‘human story’ as central.  
Both Bormann (2006) and Willacy (2006a) state, “going onto the streets” to get their 
stories as the most rewarding aspect of their work.  As Wilson (2006b) states: 
 
I wanted to cover the people’s war and write about how it is affecting the people on the 
ground, what do they think about it [sic], because like with any story, no matter how 
complicated or esoteric the issue if you can humanise it, then it’s going to reach your 
readers much more easily. 
 
Similarly, McPhedran (2006a) has argued,  
 
now given that most of what we were told or most of what we reported on was 
propaganda, we were able to get beyond that by going out and seeing for ourselves 
some of the things that were going on and talking to the local people. 
 
Lindsay Murdoch, as an embedded journalist, also articulated an awareness of the 
importance of the ‘human story’, even though he was largely prevented from covering it 
by the conditions of embedding.  
 
Well, that [reporting on civilians] was hard, I did, but not as often as I would have liked, 
because of the sheer mechanics of it - I don’t speak Arabic, nobody else in Iraq speaks 
English, nobody I saw spoke English.  The Americans had very few interpreters.  There 
were no interpreters in my unit… (Murdoch 2006) 
 
Furthermore, as a direct witness to war and equipped with the requisite skill and 
training, journalists are legitimated as the correct conduits through which information 
concerning war should travel.  Wilson (2006a) has argued such accounts of war should 
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be staunchly non-ideological.  Campbell (2006) and Thompson (2006) both commend 
the military for its openness in permitting embedded journalists and their avowed non-
censorship of journalist’s broadcasts and publications.   
 Here then, the ‘reality’ of war is communicated to audiences.  Through concepts 
such as ‘the people’ and ‘journalistic freedom’ the openness of war and the ability of 
journalists to convey the ‘truth’ of war experiences, in particular the truth of the civilian 
experience, is conveyed.  As shown in the previous chapter, a concern on the part of 
professional journalists is to show “what’s really going on” (Campbell 2006) during war.  
This notion of truth being made available is reinforced through the discursive 
enunciation of concepts of ‘reality’, ‘authority’ and ‘professional methods’ analysed in 
the previous chapter. 
 
7.6 CONTROL, REGULATION AND EXCLUSION 
Alongside demonstrating the role journalists play in presenting and indeed ‘producing’ 
knowledge through their position as powerful agents, the discourse of news values and 
newsworthiness also facilitates the separation of journalistic knowledge into discrete 
bodies of information.  On one hand the prominence of the ‘human story’ or the reality of 
embedded soldiers, articulates the centrality of liberal journalistic concerns.  The 
enactment of a moral identity of the journalist, or simply of a ‘witness’, however 
separates journalistic knowledge – leaving coverage of the operations and ‘action’ of 
war, disconnected from the impacts and effects of war on civilian populations.  The 
analysis also demonstrates that ‘power’ as conceived by Foucault (1977; 1981), is not 
oppressive, in so far as Central Command or embedding was a coercive operation in 
media management, but rather that in its very openness – its invitation to the world 
media to attend the infamously Hollywood-designed press centre, and to embed with 
the military, ‘to facilitate telling American stories’ – power retains the disciplinary 
capacity to produce meaning consonant with its strategic intent.   
 An example of this separation of journalistic knowledge is provided by ABC 
journalist Geoff Thompson’s experiences as an embedded journalist.  While travelling 
with US forces Thompson witnessed the shooting of Iraqi civilians by young, nervous 
American soldiers manning a checkpoint.  This episode has been referred to by several 
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journalists as signifying the utility of embedding and the willingness of American forces 
to subject themselves to journalistic scrutiny (Campbell 2006; Harley 2006b).  From a 
normative liberal position, this episode31 provides the legitimate grounds for strong 
criticism and analysis of American military performance, in light of international rules of 
war such as those enunciated in the Geneva and Hague conventions.  In this 
representation however, the circumstances and events that took place are described, 
before the episode is ultimately characterised as a “clearly tragic incident” (AM, 
10/04/03).  Indeed, rather than suggest any possibility of American culpability for this 
crime, its occurrence is explained away as a consequence of the inherent dangers and 
confusions of war, not as an entirely preventable result of military incompetence or 
potentially a war crime: 
 
Linda Mottram:  Are you suggesting that these soldiers are trying to cover up for a tragic 
mistake? 
Geoff Thompson:  No, I think what’s happened is that they got very excited and I think 
that they were very anxious, they were very…basically they were trying to keep the 
civilian vehicles away (AM, 10/04/03).   
 
That journalists were able to cover these events at all is considered un-problematically 
as evidence for the progressive media-military relationship instituted through 
embedding.  Nonetheless, such events are characterised as mistakes, which serves to 
elide responsibility and accountability.  As noted in the literature (Reese 2004; Seib 
2004; PEJ 2003) and by journalists involved in this study, living, travelling and surviving 
alongside soldiers almost irresistibly leads to journalistic identification and empathy with 
the military.  This problematic aspect of embedding can be reconsidered.  The system 
of embedding, which disavowed ‘management’ in favour of openness and absence of 
censorship, nonetheless functions in a disciplinary manner. It permits journalists to fulfil 
their normative role and function as professionals, yet conditions and disciplines them 
all the same. 
                                                
31 The killing of civilians by American soldiers, their reaction and the coverage that this event received is the subject 
of further analyses in subsequent chapters.   
 
 
185 
 Similarly, Centcom was promoted by military officials, not as a heavily controlled 
information environment, but as a ‘media centre’ where up-to-date information and high-
level official military briefings would take place.  As General Tommy Franks remarked,  
 
This platform is not a platform for propaganda, this is a platform for truth and so what I 
will do is I’ll try to provide you the best balance I can and that is what I have asked that 
our people here do (AM, 25/03/03). 
 
The consensus among journalists was that, on the contrary, Centcom represented the 
worst of military control and management.  Control was exerted not only through 
strategically staged and executed press conferences and the strategic release of 
information, but also through the physical control of journalists and their subjection to 
military authority.  In relation to ‘independence’ – rather than producing substantive 
critique of military-media relations, the apparatus of control permits the construction of a 
professional identity in opposition to control; that is, an independent, professional 
journalist who fights control and asserts independence.  Likewise, in relation to news 
values, or what becomes news, the criticism is not that the controlling, propaganda 
element of military operations is treated sincerely by journalists and this strategic intent 
is functional – rather in disciplining and controlling journalists in such ways, they are 
aware of control, yet become ‘docile’ and ‘useful’ (Foucault 1977) in turn.  
 
7.7 ‘USEFUL’ JOURNALISTS 
As noted, Callinan and other journalists found Centcom to be a heavily controlled and 
restrictive environment.  Callinan (2006) has remarked, “It [Centcom] was a very 
frustrating experience”, “horrific” and “ridiculous”.  However, rather than simply 
reproducing the military perspective and information that was released in press 
conferences, journalists recognised their professional responsibilities to press military 
sources for more detail and to glean information from obstinate military spokespeople, 
performing their normative professional role.  As Callinan (2006) comments:  
 
The Australians [military authorities] put up this immense blocking mechanism or 
defence to try and stop you doing it.  But if anything it made people angrier and keener 
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to get around it. But having said that it was a very effective defence… Whenever you’re 
put in those circumstances you always think, “it’s my job to get around this stuff, it’s all 
part of the business” 
 
 However, rather than producing a critique of the Centcom military-media 
management strategies to which journalists were subject, the control and restrictions on 
information led to journalistic ‘hunger’ for details about military operations.  Such control 
ensured those details released would be immediately published, advancing the 
Australian military’s interests.  As Callinan (2006) has observed of an early press 
conference given by the Australian military, the tight information control led directly to 
the reporting of any information concerning the military – ensuring the military’s priority 
messages were well covered. 
 Rather than making the ongoing and systemic media management a central 
aspect of ‘the Centcom story’ however, criticisms of media policy are relegated to the 
Media section of News Ltd publications, discreetly separated from the main news 
sections, and featuring other frustrated journalists as sources32.  This reporting provides 
a clear example of the effect on war journalism of firm control and strategic release of 
military information.  Callinan’s Centcom reporting was demonstrably sympathetic 
towards military interests, including profile pieces on the Australian military commander, 
Maurie McNairn (The Australian, 31/03/03; 14), favourable stories covering both the 
Australian SAS (The Australian, 21/03/03; World; 5; The Australian, 24/03/03; World; 3) 
and Navy diver contingents (The Australian, 26/03/03, World; 5) and an Australian Army 
bombardier critical of anti-war stance of Australian opposition leader, Simon Crean 
(Weekend  Australian, 05/04/03, World; 2).  As Callinan comments in retrospect, the 
“parochial Australian interest” is both picked up by Australian news organisations and 
the result of information restrictions which allow journalists little material with which to 
work. 
 A similar pattern is discernible within the coverage of the Iraq war, from ‘behind 
enemy lines’ – from those journalists stationed in Baghdad.  Wilson, for example, is 
content to record the drama of the aftermath of the American shelling of the Palestine-
                                                
32 See ‘On the outside – How truth is caught in the crossfire as journalists fight the military spin’, The Australian, 
Media Section, 03/04/03, 1.   
 
 
187 
Meridien Hotel, housing the world’s press corps, rather than to make the American 
contravention of the laws of war subject to any detailed criticism.  Wilson writes that “the 
balcony was hit by what the Americans later admitted was a blast from one of their 
tanks” (The Australian, 09/04/03, World; 1).  Rather than cover this event which resulted 
in the death of the Ukrainian cameraman Taras Protsyuk as a significant and important 
example of either American incompetence or military strategy, the drama of the event is 
emphasised, with Wilson writing, 
 
We threw on our bullet-proof vests and ran upstairs one flight to see shocked journalists 
running up and down the corridor screaming for a doctor.  I ran up another flight to the 
15th floor and there was the same scene of bedlam; journalists bellowing and Iraqi men 
crying and yelling there was no doctor.   
 I bolted back to our room to grab my homemade first-aid kit then raced back to room 1
 503 (The Australian, 09/04/03, World; 1).   
Subsequently Wilson’s reporting turned to triumphal accounts of American 
militarism (The Australian, 10/04/03, World; 1); the dissolution of the Iraqi state (The 
Australian, 10/04/03, World; 2); the celebration of liberated Iraqis (The Australian, 
10/04/03, World; 1) and emerging problems of insecurity in Baghdad (The Australian; 
11/04/03, World; 1).  As Wilson himself commented, professionalism demands drama;   
[the emphasis on the dramatic] is not necessarily an inherently bad thing, you need the 
drama to get people to read the story, you need some aspect – it’s the basic challenge 
of journalism to make often uninteresting things interesting.  And present it in a way that 
people will actually read it.  It’s no use being worthy, but no one reads your stories 
(Wilson 2006b).   
Considering these brief examples, a more clear conception of the circulation of 
power within war journalism is possible.  As is established at the beginning of this 
section, the normative, professional role of journalism is enabled through the 
contemporary organisation and regulation of war journalism; through embedding with 
military units, journalists are permitted closer to soldiers than any press corps in recent 
history and their interviews and eyewitness accounts are published relatively free from 
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draconian censorship and control.  Locations such as Central Command provide a 
legitimate forum for military briefings, accounts and statements.  The media 
management ‘contest’ between journalists and the military enable journalists to 
discharge their liberal-democratic obligations through the performance of holding 
military ‘power’ to account.  However, this power, granted journalists in their social role 
as legitimate, skilled witnesses, is one current of circulating power.  Indeed, as noted, 
the overt ‘control’ exercised by military officials, such as the controls relating to 
embedding and to Centcom have become naturalised through professionalism as “all 
just part of the job” (Harley 2006a).  Further, new journalistic regimes and technologies, 
such as embedding and satellite communications have been emphasised as offering 
better opportunities for more dramatic, closer, more real and more instantaneous news 
production. In this conception technology and access have improved journalism to the 
extent that its ‘high modern’ values and qualities (Hallin 1992) are evermore perfected, 
overlooking however the shortcomings of professionalism and its frequent exploitation 
by military and political power.  As this section has argued, it is within this new regime of 
war journalism that both professional identities are able to be realised and enacted, yet 
at the same time, ‘docile’ and ‘useful’ (Foucault, 1977) journalists are produced.  These 
ideas are further explored in the following sections that briefly examine professionalism 
in the context of news institutional arrangements and relations of power. 
PART TWO – THE CONTEXT OF POWER 
7.8 INSTITUTIONS 
This section provides a discussion of the context of power relations in which journalists 
are located.  While journalists possess the ‘power to represent’ reality this is tempered, 
moderated and constrained by the institutional and administrative needs of their 
organisation.  Although an element of coercive power exists in which journalists are 
forced into certain roles, it is administrative power which exerts the most forceful 
influence on journalists.  Professionalism is crucially central to the exercise of 
administrative power, which is exercised through institutional processes rather than 
 
 
189 
direct command.  Within the institutional context of power relations two strands of power 
are discernible from a brief analysis of the discourse. 
 Firstly, there is the direct control of news organisations over their employees. 
Forms of this control include the decisions made by editors and other news managers 
over the deployment and dispersion of news gathering resources and importantly the 
extent to which these organisational authority figures provide direction to those 
correspondents ‘on the ground’.  That is – the extent to which journalists are ‘managed’ 
rather than autonomous.  This form of institutional power, the power to direct and 
control, can be understood as coercive power.  These moments however, of power 
intervening directly in journalists practice, are contrasted in the discourse with the 
‘freedom’ journalists enjoyed from having to conform to an institutionally prescribed 
mode of reporting.  Ultimately, as will be shown, coercive and direct power exerted by 
news managers is an expression of the administrative power in which the interests of 
news organisations are embodied and to which journalists are professionally reconciled 
through discursive articulation.  This second strand of institutional power is only visible 
within this discourse as administrative power which circulates through the various levels 
of authority within news organisations, is administered and arranged bureaucratically 
and is inculcated through habituation and training to news organisational norms and 
values, in processes described by media sociologists (Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980; 
Reese 1997; Soloski 1997).  In other words, central to this form of disciplinary power is 
the institutional internalisation and normalisation of journalistic professionalism.  The 
clearest examples of the functioning of this form of power are drawn from the decisions 
made and directives issued by senior editorial figures within the news organisations 
included in this study.  
7.9 COERCION 
The following short examples provide an insight into the operation of explicit, coercive 
institutional power.  Mark Willacy, reporting from Baghdad for the ABC in the period 
immediately pre and post-invasion, and Rory Callinan, reporting from Centcom for News 
Ltd, tell of being explicitly directed to cover certain aspects of the war, against their 
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personal, professional news judgement.  In both cases the pursuit of these stories 
resulted in “redundant” (Willacy 2006b) coverage that was characterised by 
parochialism and in the case of the ABC, pursued in an interest to compete with 
commercial news competitors.   
 As Willacy recounts he was explicitly directed to leave Baghdad during the 
invasion period to report on Australian naval manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf. Willacy 
(2006a) comments:  
 To me that was the most boring bloody story I covered in the whole time.  And I’ll tell you 
 why, because they [the Australian Navy] were sitting on a billiard flat sea, with their 
 thumbs up their arse and their minds in neutral. 
Coverage produced by this trip is anodyne, telling of the Coalition naval forces literally 
‘parked’ in the Persian Gulf: 
 Mark Willacy:  From the air, the waters off Iraq look like a giant parking lot for Coalition 
 warships.  Cruising slowly up and down the coast are US, British, Australian and even 
 Polish navy vessels.   
 David McCourt:  I have been in the Navy over 25 years and I’ve never seen such a 
 collection of ships in a small patch of water and from, you know, from the perspective of 
 a professional officer it’s just amazing (AM; 31/03/03).   
This episode brought Willacy into direct confrontation with his (unidentified) editors in 
Australia as his autonomous news judgement conflicted with organisational needs, 
creating lasting professional animosity. As Willacy (2006b) adds:  
 I tried to argue it very hard and I lost because I sometimes feel that the person who 
 made this call is too busy chasing Channel 9, who had been on the boat a week earlier.  
 In my opinion that makes the story redundant anyway, because it had been done.  And 
 that put a bit of tension in the relationship, and sometimes you argue a story so 
 vigorously with someone that it creates tension in the relationship that lasts and in this 
 case it did.   
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 Ultimately however, Willacy was forced to make the trip into the Gulf and to 
report on naval activities.  In similar circumstances Callinan was made to remain at 
Central Command in Doha while more newsworthy events were considered to be taking 
place elsewhere.  The little information available through military briefings at Centcom 
was considered to be almost useless, yet Callinan was required by his employer, News 
Ltd, to remain at Centcom, maintaining the organisation’s war coverage strategy.  
Callinan recounts:  
 I was constantly on the phone to News Ltd, saying I need to get out of here, this is 
 ridiculous – the briefings are happening overseas, they’re not happening here.  The 
 people who are here, you get very little access to them, it would be much better if we 
 were on the ground, seeing what Australians are doing and they would just be going, 
 “No, this is the situation…” (Callinan 2006) 
 Again, similar to Willacy’s reporting, Callinan was thus constrained by the 
organisational needs and intent of his employer, in contradiction of his autonomous, 
professional judgement.  As Callinan makes clear, this contradiction, of institutional 
needs overriding journalists is not so much an intentional, conspiratorial policy to favour 
coverage of Australian or Coalition forces, but rather a consequence of the functionalist 
administration of journalistic resources.  That is, contradiction results from the 
deployment of journalists to pre-conceived news locations or towards fulfilment of 
organisational coverage strategy.  Individual journalists must yield to organisational 
needs.  
 As has been noted, in the context of little hard information being made available 
to reporters, Callinan’s reporting tended to focus on the exploits of Australian “diggers at 
war”33.  As Callinan (2006) reflects: 
That’s something I look back on over the stuff I did and think, “Oh, you know, probably 
 might [sic] have used a few less adjectives in some of the stuff.  But it is a problem, 
 especially when you haven’t done it [covered the military] before and I don’t think any of 
 the journalists that turned up from Australia had done it before. 
                                                
33 Colloquial Australian term for enlisted soldier or infantryman.  See Tranter and Donoghue (2007). 
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 This tendency towards favourable and sympathetic coverage of military forces – 
the normalisation of militarism (Kellner, 1992) – is not necessarily the product of direct 
and explicit organisational policy.  As Callinan (among others) notes, never was 
pressure applied to cover the war from a certain political or ideological perspective.  
Rather, for Callinan, the imbalance of coverage towards Australian forces and the focus 
of significant news resources on Centcom, for example, resulted directly from attempts 
to ‘administer’’ war journalism, as was Willacy’s experience.  Miscalculations and poor 
judgements on the part of Australia based editors resulted from journalistic/editorial 
professionalism incapable of adequately understanding, processing and organising the 
sheer volume of Iraq war news:  
You’ve got people who were the foreign editors, who were just being bombarded with so 
 much information and they were having to make decisions really quickly that was putting 
 them under immense pressure…People talk of all these conspiracies with Fox and 
 [Rupert] Murdoch and the rest of it – just in terms of the logistical nightmare of receiving 
 copy from us over there, to try and spin it or direct you to cover a certain angle was just 
 not feasible. I think it was the case that they weren’t set up logistically to handle rapid 
 copy coming in like that (Callinan 2006). 
 Clearly then it is possible to understand the coercive power of news 
organisations, rather than a separate category of power to administrative, disciplinary 
power, but rather as a crude expression of the administration of journalism by 
organisations and news managers (editors).  It is to analysis of this less immediately 
visible form of power that this section now turns. 
7.10 ADMINISTRATION  
Administrative power in this context is understood as the decision-making power that 
‘governs’ (Burchell et al 1991) the production of news and the reproduction of the 
professional norms and values.  In a ‘foreign/war news’ context this administration is 
conducted at a distance – the reporters and journalists ‘on the ground’ being both 
physically and, often communicatively separated from the editors and managers to 
whom they are answerable.  In the case of the Iraq invasion the separation was of many 
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thousands of kilometres and subject to the vagaries of war-time communications.  This 
distance notwithstanding, it is clear that professionalism serves to regulate and 
administer war journalism.  In this context professionalism provides the institutional and 
professional logic that ensures that the appropriate news is produced and that recourse 
to management by command (as experienced by Willacy) is largely unnecessary, 
although at times it is employed to achieve specific strategic aims.  As has been shown, 
little formal direction is provided to ‘autonomous/independent’ journalists beyond 
occasionally instructing the fulfilment of organisational news strategy.  What is clear 
however is that professionalism is a primary factor in the maintenance and reproduction 
of institutional discipline in relation to the production of war news.   
 In the first instance, the ability of news organisations to disperse their news 
gathering resources (journalists and associated technological infrastructure) effectively 
is directly contingent on journalistic professionalism.  Crucial for editors and associated 
planning and management staff is the ability of journalists to in produce high quality, 
consistent and reliable news information often at a great distance and generally with a 
minimum of instruction or direction (Tuchman 1978).  In other words, central to the news 
organisations proper function is the professional reproduction of its news value system 
and organisational ethos.  As Michael Carey, an executive producer with the ABC’s 
news and current affairs programming comments, in relation to ensuring quality news 
‘feeds’ from war correspondents,   
 
[a]lot of it is just “suck it and see”, you get people who you rely on, people you think are 
 good…They [ABC war journalists] are all very professional, they are all experienced 
 foreign reporters, who hopefully don’t get snowed that easily and understand what their 
 role is and what our role is (Carey 2007).   
This perspective is echoed by other editors, for whom professionalism is a primary 
consideration when considering who should be sent to cover conflict.  Here the 
journalist who has most fully internalised professional and institutional norms is 
considered the strongest candidate for prestigious overseas assignments.  Michael 
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Gawenda, the editor of the Fairfax broadsheet the Age during the study period and the 
most senior journalist interviewed for this project offers:  
 [Y]ou [an editor] make the decision on the basis of, especially in a dangerous situation, 
 who has the experience, who is likely to be able to cope with the difficulties that the 
 foreign correspondent in that particular situation is going to confront…but really you’re 
 looking for someone who’s experienced, who’s done this sort of thing before and as far 
 as possible will be able to look after themselves.  And someone who is a terrific reporter.  
 And knows the story… (Gawenda 2008).   
As Peter Kerr, the Sydney Morning Herald foreign editor in 2003 comments:  
 [A]t the Herald we pretty much leave it up to the people we trust in the field, because 
 those people are there because we trust them and for the most part they are the most 
 experienced journalists (Kerr 2007).   
From an editorial or production perspective, professionalism is that quality of journalistic 
ability and character on which an organisation can rely to reproduce a given news 
organisational perspective.  The professional journalist is one who can take care of 
themselves, who can operate autonomously and can reliably produce news that 
accords with the institutional norms and values of their organisation.  In effect, the 
professional is one who has internalised the institutional needs to the point where they 
are fully normalised, journalistic professional needs.  It is important to note however, 
that this internalisation is at times incomplete, as evidenced by Willacy’s confrontation 
with an ABC news producer described above.        
 As noted in Chapter Six, for the maintenance of journalistic identity the ability to 
report independently and autonomously is central.  Many journalists interviewed for this 
project emphasised the lack of pressure placed on them to report the war from a certain 
perspective or to ‘spin’ what they were reporting.  Obviously interference from editors 
and more senior colleagues or instructions to report in a prescribed manner must be 
considered a challenge to a journalist’s individual professionalism.  Journalistic 
alignment with organisational needs and values through professionalism then obviates 
the potential identity crisis that may arise for journalists having to reconcile the 
institutional demands for conformity with their individual, independent identity.    
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 Ian McPhedran, reporting from Baghdad for News Ltd and in daily contact with 
Australia, states he received no pressure to ‘spin’ his reporting; “they left that [daily 
reporting] entirely in my hands because they understood that in a situation like that it’s 
very difficult for them to second guess what’s actually going on”  (McPhedran 2006b).  
Thompson notes that he was able to resist pressure from producers in Australia to 
provide live, ‘stand-up’ updates for ABC television news, as it would have produced 
“facile television” (Thompson 2006), in his opinion.  As Jonathan Harley argues, the 
ABC’s concern was not so much for the public perception of the news product but the 
political context in which their coverage of the Iraq was to be seen.  Indeed, in the 
immediate post-combat phase of the Iraq war the office of the Australian Federal 
Minister of Communications, Richard Alston laid several formal complaints against the 
ABC for bias in its coverage of the Iraq war.  Harley argues that in this context the 
political pressure brought to bear on the ABC has been intimidating:   
 
Australian journalists and editors and producers are increasingly sensitive to how the 
 ABC’s coverage is perceived.  There is increasing pressure on the ABC to, pull its 
 punches, to put it frankly…How does that impact a journalist’s coverage of war?  I just 
 think is an assault.  It has had the effect of undermining the courage and confidence of 
 ABC news and current affairs.  I really, really think that that has been both the intention 
 and the effect (Harley 2006b).   
 
By contrast, Campbell comments that overt pressure from the military to present 
news and information in sympathetic ways, to moderate criticism or to reproduce 
military ‘spin’ is rejected out of hand by professionalism.  He states: 
  
I think it’s like any other story, you don’t care about how the military’s going to react to 
 what it is that you are reporting, if they don’t like it they can lump it.  I don’t think anyone 
 who reported war was concerned how the military would react to it as long as your story 
 stands up to scrutiny, then its fine – if people don’t like it that’s their problem (Campbell 
 2006). 
It is a matter of professional pride however that journalists operating ‘on the 
ground’ were able to provide to their editors and producers ‘good copy’ that satisfies 
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with the institutional needs and concerns.  That is, they produced journalism that was 
already organisationally ‘aligned’ without having to be directed.  As Wilson comments; 
 …you know I would have written a business report [about Iraq] if I could have, trying to 
 get all different sections of the paper.  That one you were talking about, John Feder’s 
 [Wilson’s photographer] technology - that was for the Media section, tailored to various 
 holes in the Australian that can be filled.  I always want to get as much in the paper as 
 possible.  The way to do that is to understand your paper and its range of interests and 
 hit as many sections as you can (Wilson 2006b).   
 Thus, a final crucial function of the professional journalist, from both an 
institutional and individual point of view, is the ability of a war journalist to reliably 
provide useful news that contributes to news organisational efficiency, productivity and, 
ultimately, competitiveness.  Willacy was ‘ordered’ to chase the ABC’s commercial rivals 
and Thompson successfully resisted the requests for what he considered to be 
unimportant, shallow yet dramatic live-updates from the battlefield.  Nevertheless, both 
Thompson and Michael Gawenda of the Age have commented on the importance of 
keeping up with innovations in technology and coverage formats, such as live battlefield 
broadcasts and embedded reporting, in order to protect or enhance news organisational 
impact or relevance.  Indeed, such innovations protect journalism’s commodity value in 
the context of ‘new’ digital media.  In relation to embedding Gawenda (2008) states; “the 
audience demand it [embedding].  And these days the technology demands it”.  
Thompson (2006) has argued that in the era of ‘YouTube’, non-conventional reporting 
and digital publishing, ‘access’ is evermore a war journalist’s most significant concern.  
Michael Carey, an ABC Radio National executive producer, (2007) states: 
[Competition with commercial stations] becomes a consideration when you think we are 
 lagging behind other people’s coverage.  The ABC justifies itself as the premier 
 electronic news organisation in the country [Australia].  If people are finding they get 
 their information more quickly somewhere else then they probably will. 
It is possible therefore to understand the institutional context of war journalism 
one in which professionalism is relied upon to ensure the reliability and efficiency of 
news production at a distance.  Power, identified by Foucault (1977; 1981), circulates 
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and is productive.  Journalists also possess power, to act within the context provided by 
their news organisation and importantly to resist the coercive attempts by military 
authorities to directly intervene in the production of information.  Institutional power, as 
shown, disciplines journalists and ensures their normalised professional function.  Here 
professionalism operates in a number of ways.  News managers apply professional 
considerations in reaching decisions over news-gathering resources and editorial 
decisions as to what is published and what is not.  Professionalism also serves to align 
journalists to the needs of their organisations, ensuring their reliability and efficiency in 
producing news, while permitting the maintenance of the individualised, professional 
identity.  In this way, professionalism obscures any differences that may exist and it 
becomes the degree to which journalist’s subjectivity and autonomy is maintained and 
one’s ‘usefulness’ to the news organisational strategy overlooked.   
 The other form of administrative power that is presently of relevance is the more 
purely bureaucratic power that circulates within news organisations, and serves to 
select what is eventually ‘made’ news.  This is the administrative power that organises 
and arranges news in accordance with institutional needs, norms and interests.  The 
following brief analysis of the processes and practices undertaken by senior editors in 
their selection of Iraq war news reveals the organising role played by professionalism.  
The weakness and contingency of this system is also illustrated.  As both Michael 
Gawenda (the Age) and Peter Kerr (SMH) describe the allocation of resources as a 
bureaucratic process and value motivated judgement, in which their newspapers sought 
to maximise the return on their limited investment in coverage.  Kerr (2007) describes 
this process in purely professional terms;  
 ...in terms of goals and aims it was to cover the war as comprehensively as possible and 
 in as balanced a fashion as possible, drawing on all sources of information that were 
 available and anticipating the places that reporters and photographers would have to be, 
 while also guaranteeing the safety of those reporters and photographers. 
As Gawenda (2008) states, similar concerns guided decisions at the Age: 
 We were limited as to how much we could afford to do…The second thing was what 
 other resources could we use – we have access to the Guardian, to the Daily Telegraph, 
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 to the New York Times, and Washington Post, among other things and we wanted to 
 make sure that we used these resources as well as we could within an Australian 
 context. 
These decisions, and those directly concerning the production of the newspapers – 
which news to include and exclude, page layouts, photographs, for example, were 
made in consultation among the senior editorial and managerial staff, typically the 
editor, deputy editor, foreign editor, photographic editor, and, in the case of the SMH the 
Iraq news editor (Kerr 2007; Gawenda 2008).  Kerr points out that in order for the 
proper functioning of a newspaper during an intense news period, such as the brief, 
controversial and spectacular Iraq war, systematised organisational efficiency is of 
utmost importance: 
  
[O]nce you’ve got a system in place, there is a system in any newspaper or and media 
 organisation, particularly now that you’re getting more information from wires than you 
 would have, you’re getting more information from people in the field because they have 
 got access to satellite phones and that sort of technology…the filtering process is much 
 the same with any project, but it might be a bit more sophisticated, in terms of what you 
 pick, any particular gatekeeper, whether it is someone monitoring an agency wire, or 
 photographs or someone monitoring reporters in the field, every particular gatekeeper 
 who’s the liaison point person, has to make decisions on the run…(Kerr 2007).   
 
As noted in literature, news production is a rationalised system of which tends to 
generate standardised, reliable and predictable news, making the efficient and reliable 
provision of public knowledge possible (Tuchman 1978).  In the context of the Iraq war, 
as a short term, intense and heavily covered conflict, the role of news decision makers 
is crucial to understanding the ultimate production of news.  Michael Gawenda, the 
Age’s editor during the study period, comments that his opinion, or judgment, was final.  
Furthermore, editorial disagreements were minimised due to collegial commitments to 
professionalism.  Gawenda comments that as the editor of the Age he would make 
interventions into the news process “all the time” (2008), whereas Kerr emphasises the 
team based approach to decision making at the Herald:  
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So the structure of the team or teams that were in place in Sydney to cover it was fairly 
 sophisticated in terms of having the general run of the way that the news desk gathers 
 and breaking those pages up into ‘pod’ editors, an editor for a package.  We might have 
 someone in charge of a page or two pages or four pages.  Information gathering 
 happens as it happens on any news paper anywhere – you gather all your information 
 as early and as best you can and then you sit down with it in editorial conference say, 
 “ok we’ve got this, this and this, you would have heard on radio that this and this, we 
 have reports from London and Washington, we’ve got this person on the ground here, 
 and we consider that – the photographic editor would run through.  We had greater than 
 usual access to photographs I think, so that would be a morning meeting and then 
 another early afternoon meeting… (Kerr 2007). 
This highly systematised and orderly administration of news production was considered 
necessary in dealing effectively with the volume of information available to newspaper 
editors.  Here it is possible to discern the administrative workings of professional 
editorial and managerial power in the organisation of Iraq war news.  This orderly and 
highly rationalised professionalism, for the most part produced news that accorded with 
institutional norms; “we did pretty damn well” (Gawenda 2008); “I was very proud of the 
reporting…there’s an immediacy that you can get out of radio, and as I said I think we 
did that really well…” (Carey 2007).      
 Nonetheless, such systems, exercising significant generative and productive 
power with regards to information and accounts of war, are fragile.  Just as moments 
such as conflict between journalists and editors expose the artifice and contingency of 
independent professionalism, so to do mistakes and errors in reporting or news 
presentation reveal the shortcomings of the professional administration system.  They 
reveal the fantasy that must operate within this system in order for it to function 
smoothly.  The story of American soldier Private Jessica Lynch and her heavily 
propagandised ‘rescue’ (Gallagher 2007) by American Special Forces is, in this context, 
exemplary.  As Michael Gawenda concedes, the Age was incautious and overcredulous 
in its reporting of this story.  Importantly however, emphasis is placed upon relying on 
other people’s reporting rather than on critically assessing the news value and credibility 
of stories as they are processed.  The fault lies not with the sincere efforts of 
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institutionalised professionalism, but rather with the journalists supplying them with 
inaccurate information:  
 
 There were some stories where I think we should have been more sceptical than we 
 were.  There was the story of that young woman, the American – Private Lynch – which 
 we swallowed at first and ran.  I think looking back it was probably an improbable story 
 and we should have said “hang on, this is …”  But it’s hard at the time, you make a 
 decision, you’re on the spot you’re relying on other people’s reporting, you haven’t got 
 your own reporter there that you can ask, “well, can you confirm this, is this true”.  So 
 there were several stories like that, looking back I think we could have been more 
 sceptical about (Gawenda 2008). 
Michael Gawenda goes on to directly attribute the misrepresentation of this episode, 
and the significant propaganda success it delivered the American political-military 
authorities, to the reporter ‘on the ground’ (in this case John Burns, the New York Times 
Baghdad bureau chief), on whom the Age relied: 
 It’s very frustrating when you’re running copy from journalists – and I think John Burns is 
 a terrific reporter and has reported on Iraq really well, nevertheless, I could never speak 
 to John Burns…and it was impossible for him, he wasn’t going to talk to some editor in 
 Australia regularly about his coverage.  So that’s a huge frustration, you’re running this 
 copy but you can’t talk to the reporter.  And you can’t say, “what about this?  Why this?” 
 You know? (Gawenda, 2008) 
The Jessica Lynch episode provides a clear example of the shortcomings or breakdown 
of the professional administrative system of news production (other episodes include 
the misreporting of the fall of Basra).  Furthermore, rather than this episode illustrating a 
systemic weakness, the weakness is individualised; the legitimacy of the news 
institution is preserved and the criticism directed elsewhere.  This is evidenced by 
Gawenda’s statement of the difficulty of collecting accurate reports and relying on 
external reporters  
 Finally, stories and episodes such as this also illustrate the extent to which the 
professional administration of war news serves to privilege the dramatic and spectacular 
as it assesses coverage.  Several examples have been provided of news organisations 
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actively pursuing a coverage style which favours dramatic and exciting news items, 
such as Willacy’s deployment to the Persian Gulf and Thompson’s encouragement to 
provide ‘live updates’.  In several other instances journalists and editors enunciate an 
institutional preference for spectacular and dramatic coverage.  Callinan, it has already 
been noted, commented that his reporting tended towards the coverage of heroic 
Australian military operations and the associated military personalities because that was 
what was published: 
 
The other issue is that the newspapers did pick that sort of stuff [military profiles and 
 features] up and you might have been filing something that was much less like that one 
 day and it’s not getting a run, and the next day you file it and it gets a run…(Callinan 
 2006). 
 Similarly, as Wilson argues, material that communicates to audiences in easily 
digestible and accessible ways is inherently attractive to news organisations, leading to 
a surfeit of exciting, dramatic, amusing and otherwise compelling reporting.  As noted, a 
notorious event during the ‘fall of Baghdad’ was the toppling by American forces of a 
statue of Saddam Hussein.  Initially this event was reported as the spontaneous actions 
of jubilant, liberated Iraqis (BBC 2003).  As was reported in the Australian: 
 The Baghdad night rang with cheers and chants as the Iraqi capital celebrated the end 
 of a tyrant...The crowds revelled in the cool evening, destroying statues and portraits of 
 Saddam in a repeat of the scene that followed the fall of dictatorships from Romania and 
 the Soviet Union to the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos… 
In Al-Firdos Square, east of the Tigris river crowds were atop a huge iron statue of 
 Hussein, which had been toppled from a crane mounted on a US tank recovery vehicle 
 (Australian, 10/04/03; World; 1). 
As Wilson comments, episodes like this appeal directly to institutional needs for 
dramatic images and accounts of events and are quickly reproduced for consumption: 
 
[I]t was an iconic moment and icons tell stories and people [editorial staff] wanted a 
 moment that symbolised what was going on, like the fall of the [Berlin] wall, the images 
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 we see of people swinging sledgehammers at the wall, were not the first images of the 
 wall being destroyed – the wall had been breached elsewhere.  But that’s what we see, 
 as the fall of the wall (Wilson 2006a). 
 This preference for spectacle over analysis must be understood primarily as 
dependent on the institutional needs of news organisations and the willingness of 
professionals to cater to these needs.  As has been shown, the bureaucratic process of 
news production both requires and produces events as news in reliable, easily 
processed and comprehended forms and avoids the ambiguous, complex or nuanced 
(McChesney 2003).  As Wilson clearly states:  
 
…images and events – they sum things up, it’s not just the visually driven nature of the 
 media.  It was an event - the war ended at 3 37pm.  They also serve their purposes.  
 That image sums up a broader truth, that Saddam did fall, both his statue and his 
 government…Which is not necessarily an inherently bad thing, you need the drama to 
 get people to read the story, you need some aspect – it’s the basic challenge of 
 journalism to make often uninteresting things interesting.  And present it in a way that 
 people will actually read it.  It’s no use being worthy, but no one reads your stories 
 (Wilson 2006b).   
As has been shown, this preference is explained as symptomatic of the 
difficulties and realities of reporting war (Gawenda 2008), the product of technological 
developments (Thompson 2006; Wilson 2006a) or the unreliability of a individual 
journalist (Gawenda 2008) rather than explaining drama and spectacle as necessarily 
an organisational need, given commercial competitive pressure to provide the most 
attractive and appealing news product.  The preference for the dramatic and 
spectacular demonstrates on one hand the weakness of the professional system, yet 
also illustrates the productive power of professionalism within news institutions to 
produce and characterise war.  Significant problems with bureaucratic approaches to 
war are seen by news professionals as individuated, differential, yet ultimately minor 
problems within war journalism, rather than as symptoms of professionalism, as aspects 
of the systemic whole.            
 Having provided a brief account of the institutional context of professionalism and 
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the power news organisations exert in the production of war news, the analysis now 
moves to how professional journalism operates within the broader contemporary socio-
cultural context which has been describe previously.  In keeping with the critical intent of 
this thesis, through this final aspect of the analysis it is possible to understand the 
embeddedness and functionality of professionalism within the era of neo-liberal 
globalisation.  Here the contemporary ‘conditions of existence’ of journalism are 
described.           
 As has been argued, the central discourses of objectivity, independence and 
news judgement provide professional journalism with its public legitimacy and its claim 
as a privileged site of public information.  Although the notion of objectivity is somewhat 
unfixed, it has been shown that this discourse nonetheless denotes an approach to the 
world and a particular treatment of information as factual or non-factual and thus 
beyond the legitimate attention of journalists.  Centrally, objectivity holds ‘reality’ and 
information derived from it as tangible and directly available to diligent and correctly 
skilled individuals.  Similarly, a discourse of independence enacts a view of professional 
journalists as providing an unabridged account of reality, not beholden to power and, in 
journalistic cliché, ‘without fear or favour’.  In this sense the independence of a journalist 
is fundamentally bound to the liberal ideal of individual liberty and their ability to 
apprehend the world as rational, autonomous agents.  Both liberalism and its 
hegemonic successor, neo-liberalism, are predicated on the inherent rationality of 
individuals and their ability to make sense of the material world and self-maximise their 
individual interests through apprehending materiality ‘as it is’.  In particular, neo-
liberalism holds that the ability of individuals to objectively self-maximise economic 
opportunity and efficiency (through the mechanism of a ‘market’) results in an increase 
in the aggregated level of wealth, well-being and beneficial social organisation (Harvey 
2005).  Similarly, objectivity in journalism holds the through the application of reason 
and rationality and the individualised capacity for thought and decision making an 
account of social and political reality ‘as it is’ is produced.  Indeed, it is for this inherently 
conservative stance that professional journalism has been criticised (McChesney 
2004b).  Liberal journalism, as a product of individualised inquiry, is normatively 
engaged in the provision of individually consumed information, in keeping with the neo-
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liberal value system focused on individualised concerns and in accordance with ‘market’ 
based preference and demand.  Within this scheme it is easy to characterise the 
shortcomings of war journalism, such as misreporting, as the result of individual failings 
and of incompletely internalised professionalism (as several interviewees have done), 
rather than expressing systemic weaknesses.       
 Similarly, through professionalism the impression of neutral, disinterested 
observer is cultivated and demonstrated through the well-coordinated and managed 
antagonism with the military.  As argued however, the discourse of independence 
obscures the normalisation of the military perspective and of militarism generally.  
Indeed, the routinisation of war reporting obscures both the extent to which journalists 
lack independence (such as those based either at Centcom or embedded) and that they 
serve military strategic intent in the war information system – that is, providing an 
information service for military and political authorities, while simultaneously producing a 
reliable, easily consumed war product for audiences.     
 The discourse of news values and newsworthiness in this sense also helps to 
locate professional journalism within contemporary formations of hegemonic neo-
liberalism by articulating what is legitimate and illegitimate in terms of public information.  
News values, along with the routinisation of war reporting through independent 
coverage, serve to separate the dramatic/spectacular, the human and the operational 
aspects of war, making the wholeness of ‘war as policy’ unclear, yet producing for 
consumption a compelling product to be ‘enjoyed’ by Western audiences.  In 
constructing the war product – as noted in the comments by editors and journalists 
above – news organisations attempt to extract maximum value from their investment in 
war through reporting resources, allocations and deployments.  Through the efficient, 
productive dispersion of news-gathering resources and the use of technology, through 
strategic planning and through exercise of professional judgement a quality news 
‘product’ may be created.  Commercial considerations, such as competition in the news 
market, are central in such calculations.  At times these logics outweigh a cautious 
approach to news-gathering, with the rush to compete with other organisations leading 
to mis-representations in reporting as has been shown was the case with the Jessica 
Lynch story.   
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7.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated several aspects of power in relation to professional war 
journalism.  It has been argued professionalism possesses significant power in 
constructing war news. This chapter has employed the matrix of discursive concepts 
outlined in chapter six to demonstrate the operation of this form of power.  Specifically, 
journalists, through the professional discourse, are producers of knowledge and are 
empowered to ‘produce’ the Iraq war for their audiences. Through professionalism 
journalists construct themselves as operating within the norms of liberal journalism.  
Through objectivity, independence and news values, journalists are able to demonstrate 
and perform their professionalism and reinforce their identities as legitimate.  
Professionalism, however, also enables journalists to ‘overlook’ the extent to which their 
normative role is compromised through their treatment of certain aspects of reality as 
news, their division and categorisation of war and their antagonistic, yet dependent 
relationships with sources.  In the case of Iraq this is most often a dependence on the 
military-political authorities.  Indeed, while providing journalists a normative professional 
identity, the professional discourse can thus be understood as disciplinary as it serves 
to produce ‘docile’ journalists who are functional within the strategic intent of the military 
and political authorities.  In this sense journalists are reproductive of hegemonic value 
systems.  The discourse of professionalism, it has been argued, accords with the 
contemporary neo-liberal cultural, economic and political conditions.    
 This chapter has also contextualised professionalism within the relations of 
power that characterise the institutional arrangement of journalism.  Here, the extent to 
which journalists are coerced by their employers, to report in certain ways and from 
certain locations has been analysed.  While this chapter found that on occasion 
journalists are ‘ordered’ to perform certain journalistic tasks, the most significant form of 
disciplinary institutional power exerted was through professional institutionalisation.  In 
this sense, professionalism is defined by the extent to which journalists reproduce and 
reinforce news organisational perspectives and values as internalised, self-discipline.   
 By definition then, a professional journalist is receptive to the forces of 
disciplinary, administrative power.  Again, a journalist is considered professional based 
on his or her ability to provide news coverage that is consonant with organisational 
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news values and news strategy.           
 In these senses, it is possible to understand professionalism as powerfully 
productive of the professional identity, which ensures the pursuit of the normative goals 
of liberal journalism, yet obscures the compromised position and relations that 
characterise war journalism.  Furthermore, professionalism, both on an individualised 
basis, and within news institutions, by definition produces journalists who are ‘useful’ 
both within news organisations and within the wider military strategies engaged in by 
military and political authorities.          
 In turn, these features of the professional discourse should be considered as 
functional within the broader cultural-economic conditions of neo-liberalism, in which 
professionalism ‘performs’ a normative role for journalists while obscuring and 
‘overlooking’ its complicity within commercial and military processes that aim to produce 
war as a spectacular and compelling consumer product. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - DISCOURSE AND THE LEGITIMATION OF NEWS COVERAGE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As shown in the previous chapter, professionalism plays a powerful role in shaping 
journalists conceptions about themselves and their occupation, their orientation towards 
their work and their understanding of the correctness of their method.  That is, 
professionalism makes journalists ‘useful’ (Foucault 1977).  Importantly, the discourse 
legitimates the disparate activities of journalistic and editorial practice.  This chapter 
continues to analyse interview data and incorporates an analysis of news production in 
order to understand how the professional discourse constructs and legitimates 
contingent forms of news coverage of war.  The thesis has previously traced the 
emergence, contemporary conditions and general formation of the professional 
discourse.  The analysis now seeks to reveal the operation of the professional discourse 
and to illustrate how professionalism constructs journalistic knowledge in practice.  This 
chapter argues that professionalism exerts and maintains dominance and control over 
journalism, in processes of hegemonic meaning and identity construction, while 
simultaneously obscuring the processes of tangible, material meaning production that 
characterise news journalism.  Here a conceptual model is proposed, drawn from this 
thesis’ discourse-analytic perspective, which analyses the discourse in four separate 
coverage forms of Iraq war journalism; the ‘people’s story’, the journalist as a ‘witness’ 
to war; the journalism of Central Command and lastly, embedded journalism.  In 
interrogating these aspects of war journalism, this chapter seeks to illustrate the 
hegemony of professionalism, to understand how it is expressed and reproduced and to 
understand its impact on knowledge of war 
Tuchman used the notion of a “news net” (1978) - a system of values, routines, 
practices and resources that journalists deploy to ‘catch’ news in a routinised manner to 
describe the practicalities of daily news gathering.  Expanding on this notion, I 
conceptualise professionalism as discourse and a system of regularities beyond values, 
ideologies or material resources.  This makes viewing professionalism as legitimating 
and prescribing certain modes of understanding war possible, through which journalistic 
professionalism itself is reinforced.  Here, the discourse enunciates and articulates 
certain aspects of reality to be of public interest and de-legitimates that which falls 
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beyond its scope.  It does so however, not from an ideological intent to deceive through 
the production of ‘false consciousness’ (see Chapter Four) within its audience, or 
unselfconscious ideological reproduction, but rather resulting from contingencies of the 
professional discourse and its ongoing resonance within Western democratic liberalism. 
Professional journalism is concerned with its own discursive needs; authority and 
establishing and maintaining credibility.  In effect the discourse serves to produce and 
reproduce journalistic control and power to define the practice and discipline of 
journalism, and thus knowledge about the world.  As this chapter demonstrates much of 
what is made visible in war is reliant on established modes of understanding that 
reiterate and reinforce cultural norms and values of militarism and provide a dramatic, 
vivid representation of conflict, consistent with a notion of war as a consumer product.  
Further, the regulation of journalism through professionalism produces generally 
supportive and sympathetic representations of militarism consistent with the broader 
political, military and commercial hegemony of Western power.  As this thesis 
recognises however, following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), hegemonic meanings are 
contested, and while in the journalism of the Iraq invasion moments of dissent can be 
identified, the power relations that govern journalist’s behaviour prevent the more 
widespread enunciation of counter-hegemonic statements about war.   
 
8.2 LEGITIMATING COVERAGE 
Firstly this chapter attends to the legitimacy afforded certain forms of coverage by 
professionalism.  As has been noted previously, the concept of newsworthiness is 
central to professionalism.  Journalists emphasise that their expertise and moral bearing 
legitimates them as ‘agenda setters’ (McCombs and Shaw 1972).  Here, 
newsworthiness encapsulates the conception of certain events, beats, locations and 
subjects as newsworthy and the exclusion of competing ‘stories’ as uninteresting, 
irrelevant or illegitimate.  Importantly, through a specific dispersion of both physical and 
cognitive resources of news making (Tuchman 1978), in accordance with discursive 
needs, certain aspects of the Iraq war are ‘made real’ for news audiences by ‘ordering’ 
(Foucault 1994) into specific categories of coverage, while others remain unordered, 
unilluminated and in effect, invisible.   
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Within this definition of appropriate news, three notions are central.  Firstly, that 
the coverage of the ‘people’s war’ and the human story of Iraq is the most legitimate 
story to cover during the war.  Secondly, that journalists should ‘bear witness’ to 
important events, by implication acting as the world’s moral watchdog during times of 
war and conflict and acts as a conduit for this ‘reality’ to be transmitted to audiences.  
Lastly, the geography and space of war and the distribution of news gathering 
resources within it (the ‘news net’) creates news locations, from which news emanates, 
leaving voids and non-news locations and literally ‘unreal’ aspects of war.   
 
8.3 THE PEOPLE’S STORY 
The ‘people’s war’ is a resonant image and construction that is naturalised by the same 
moral concern and bearing that supports humanitarian intervention in conflicts in 
defence of universal human rights.  As identified in the previous chapter, ‘the people’ is 
a crucial, central concept in liberal political theory and discourse, in which moral and 
political authority is invested in the collectivity, rather than in other interests and 
institutions, such as ‘the state’, or private interests (Siebert et al 1956).  In war, as 
conceived by liberal, professional journalism, primacy is accorded to interests and 
experiences of civilians over the interests of other actors in the conflict. This concern is 
a common theme in the interview discourse and establishes civilians as a central 
legitimate feature of the Iraq story.   
Conversely, the concern for civilians establishes journalists as independent from 
state and military power, as a means of expressing their identity.  Importantly, this 
concern for and statement of professionalism legitimates a problematic approach to war 
coverage and it highlights an immanent contradiction within professional journalism.  
Professionalism, reliant on truthful, factual representations taken from foreign, 
dangerous and challenging environments, slips easily into using established 
stereotypes and well-worn clichés when covering civilian stories, rather than providing 
insightful, thoughtful and often difficult representations.  The power of professionalism, 
as identified in the previous chapter, is such that representations pass un-interrogated 
into print and broadcast, normalising clichéd, superficial reporting.  This is considered 
problematic.  As noted in the previous chapter, journalist’s are ‘trusted’ to produce high 
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quality information, and professionalism provides the assurance on which this trust 
relies.   
Reporting from Baghdad, News Limited’s Ian McPhedran (2006b) considered 
telling a human story “the obvious choice” in conveying the reality of wartime.  
Considering a strategic overview or broader coverage of the US invasion unworkable 
given the difficulties and limitations in reporting from Baghdad, McPhedran discusses 
keeping his reporting personal, providing a relevant perspective where there are “not 
too many options” (2006b).  Clearly, given the security environment in Baghdad, broad 
coverage choices were determined by circumstances and expediency (availability of 
sources, safety considerations).  Within this calculation however, a moral outlook that 
attends to the experiences of the Iraqi ‘people’ is stated in interview discourse as a 
centrally important aspect of a journalist’s approach.  A journalist should monitor the 
effect of war on civilians before, during and after the coalition invasion, acting as a 
witness to events.  The ‘people’ are constructed as the most genuine, authentic voices 
to be represented during the war.   
Peter Wilson, travelling independently in southern Iraq, focused his reporting for 
News Limited specifically and purposefully on the ‘people’s war’.  Both he and 
McPhedran state ‘the people’ provide the most legitimate sources of the ‘true war 
experience’.  Wilson’s intent is pragmatic (he talks of “adding-value” to news reporting 
by doing something the wire services and larger organisations were not) as well as 
being morally motivated to illuminate the experiences of Iraqi civilians.  Rather than 
casting ‘ideological’ judgements about the correctness, or otherwise, of the war, 
Wilson’s focus is on remaining resolutely professional through assiduous cultivation of 
the independent journalistic archetype of a morally driven, courageous and ideologically 
neutral identity.   
 Of seventeen stories by Ian McPhedran published in The Australian and the 
Weekend Australian between 20 March and 15 April, 2003, five deal directly with the 
experiences of Iraqi civilians and their attitudes and experiences during war.  The 
remaining articles focused variously on McPhedran’s personal experiences, the Iraq 
government, the US and Australian military and other issues, including McPhedran’s 
expulsion from Baghdad.  Similarly, reporting for the ABC’s AM and PM radio shows 
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Mark Willacy made nineteen broadcasts concerning Iraq in the same period, only three 
of which were directly including or covering what may be termed ‘people’s stories’, 
primarily events concerning the relief of Um Qasr, the strategically important southern 
Iraqi port city.  By comparison, thirteen broadcasts focused primarily on military issues, 
either Coalition or Iraqi – subject matter that while not illegitimate, has been de-
emphasised in favour of civilian coverage.  It is argued ‘the people’ feature more 
prominently discursively than literally; pointing to the importance of this category for the 
professional identity.   
 Peter Wilson, asserting the explicit intention to report on the war’s impact on Iraqi 
civilians, was arguably best placed to do so, travelling independently through Southern 
Iraq and with the services of both a photographer and an interpreter.  Of the thirty-one 
stories he published in the Australian and the Weekend Australian during the period of 
major combat operations and invasion, twelve focused on Iraqi civilians, either quoting 
locals directly, or featuring them prominently in his stories as a result of his commitment 
and his circumstances.  Other areas covered included the military strategies and 
specific events of both the Iraqi and Coalition forces, and Wilson’s own personal 
experiences, including his arrest by Iraqi authorities and transportation to Baghdad.  
The ‘people’s’ story comprised the largest subsection of his reporting. 
 This humanitarian focus in reporting receives powerful discursive expression.  
The moral dimension of revealing the human story is bound to the notion of ‘bearing 
witness’, a central aspect of professionalism, implying journalism’s truth function.  As 
noted, discursively, ‘truth’ is constructed as flowing from ‘the people’.  The civilian 
experiences and efforts to cope with war thus provide then the most true and morally 
legitimate perspective on war, rather than the perspectives of either military or civilian 
authorities.  The ‘people’ is a powerful discursive ‘concept’ (Foucault 1972) or ‘empty 
signifier’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) of pure, democratic, human morality and 
authenticity, powerfully deployed as inherently legitimate within the liberal, professional 
model.  Furthermore, a wide variety of journalism may be legitimated through invoking a 
commitment to the ‘people’s story’.  As has been noted elsewhere, those journalists 
who conceived of their professional obligation to focus on the civilian experience were 
concerned to tell the story of the war “as it really is”, as opposed to the managed 
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relationship that was in place between the military and the media, either embedded or at 
Central Command’s Media Centre (Centcom).   
 Problems emerge however, when a closer investigation of news discourse is 
made into the sort of truth-meanings that are created through these journalists and their 
moral concern for the ‘people’ as the most legitimate journalistic subject.  McPhedran’s 
reporting, for example, uses a narrative, descriptive style that is something of a 
departure from the normative, often terse ‘hard news’ writing style: 
 
 [E]xplosions could be heard on the outskirts of the city and at 9.08pm a large building 
 just across the river, close to one of the city’s seven bridges across the Tigris was hit by 
 a cruise missile.  The faint whirr of its propulsion system was followed by the loud roar of 
 the blast from its 500kg warhead.  The building, known as the Palace of the End, houses 
 one of Saddam’s most notorious torture facilities.  It was immediately engulfed in flames 
 as a large plume of black smoke drifted across the perfectly still Tigris and reflected the 
 entire scene (Weekend Australian, 22/03/03: 4) 
 
Although such writing offers a colourful description of the drama of war, a similar 
approach to the experiences of Iraqis tends towards stereotypical characterisations; a 
fatalistic population putting “their fate in the hands of God” (The Australian, 20/03/03: 1).   
 
 The people remain remarkably calm and although some have built or renovated 
 underground shelters, most have put their fates in the hands of their God; simply 
 gathering in their homes and hoping for the best. 
 “Inshallah, we will survive”, one man said.  Many are reluctant to enter government 
 shelters, built mainly for chemical and nuclear attack, because the US bombed a civilian 
 shelter in 1991 killing 408 people, most women and children.   
 They realise diplomacy has had its last chance and that the US-led invasion will not 
 waiver. 
 “Bush wants to kill us all”, said one street vendor as he looked skywards.  (Australian, 
 20/03/03; World; 1)  
 
Although a narrative reporting style does offer the possibility of insights into the nuance 
and subtlety of Iraqi public opinion and local reaction and this report does mention the 
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Gulf War atrocity of a civilian shelter being bombed by the Coalition, McPhedran is 
content to describe the reaction of Iraqis to their circumstances as simply as is possible.  
This reporting relies largely on caricature.  Here the ‘reality’ of war is reduced to rather 
simplistic local assertions of Iraqi defiance or despair.  This tendency is legitimated by 
appeals to the difficulties in reporting on war (McPhedran 2006a). 
 “Futility is the dominant emotion in Baghdad these days…you can’t help 
wondering:  What’s the point?” writes McPhedran (The Australian, 21/03/03: 1) of Iraqi 
attitudes.  He describes defiant young militiamen, women and older Iraqis using the 
same terms and context, describing them as invoking both Saddam Hussein and God in 
proud defence of their city (The Australian, 26/03/03: 1), angrily denouncing American 
imperialism and mourning their dead with despair.  A typical scene illustrates this 
succinctly, mobilising many Western stereotypes concerning Middle Eastern fatalism, 
passion, religious irrationality and inherently violent culture: 
  
Faris Asheed Ismail lost his cousin, a father of four, in the attack.  “Only God can help us 
 respond to this,” he says wiping tears from his cheeks.  
 Sadness and bewilderment quickly gave way to anger.  Some ran to join the chanting 
 mobs of Fedayeen militia baying for the blood of those responsible for this tragedy.  
One young man held up a severed hand, shaping its fingers into a grotesque victory 
 sign.  “See Mister – this hand will crush the Americans and the British,” said Sami Walid 
 as a group gathered around him. (The Australian 28/03/03: 3) 
 
Lurid descriptions of Saddam Hussein, his government and policies reinforce the 
‘otherness’ (Said, 1997) with which Iraq and Iraqis are characterised.  For McPhedran, 
Iraqi public buildings are “palace lairs” (The Australian, 22/02/02: 4), Iraqi government 
spokespeople are deluded and ridiculous (The Australian, 27/03/03: 3; Weekend 
Australian, 29/03/03: 3) - and the civilian militia a ‘dad’s army’.  “Unlike the British 
comedy series, in which Mainwaring’s doddery band of aged warriors make the locals 
shudder at the thought of the thin grey line, these guys mean business.  “Who do you 
think you are kidding, Mr Bush?” could be their theme song” (The Australian, 1/04/03: 
1).   
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 Although McPhedran agrees in interview that a sarcastic attitude towards Iraq 
runs contrary to the ethos of objective impartiality and detachment, it is argued that 
given the situation as a journalist in Baghdad, such characterisations are impossible to 
avoid34.  “You do sort of fall into that, given the sort of people that you’re dealing with 
and the propaganda that they are trying to peddle…this is not a Sunday school picnic.  
This is a dictator and he’s brutal and that’s the way it is.  And I don’t think that’s 
propaganda, I think that’s accurate” (McPhedran 2006b).  
 Reality then becomes easily digestible and simplified as complex issues 
and events are articulated in culturally resonant language and easily understood ways 
of speaking about war.  The tropes used by McPhedran are readily understood by 
Australian audiences habituated into understanding Iraq through a persistent frame of 
evil despotism, backwardness and fanaticism, established in popular Gulf War (1991) 
discourses (Kellner 1992; Taylor 1998) and which persistently characterise Western 
coverage of the Middle East generally (Said 2003; 1997).  In McPhedran’s professional 
conception, what he could witness constituted his reality and simplistic caricatures filled 
in for substantive understandings and insight concerning the condition of Iraqi society, 
reinforcing established stereotypes.  In this sense the journalistic moral interest in the 
“people’s war” and “bearing witness” to real events loses its power when what is 
witnessed is re-communicated using established stereotypes and persistent orientalism 
(Said 2003).  Nowhere in this thesis’ survey of Australian news material are comparable 
lurid descriptions of Western authorities or forces found.   
 The process of representing the ‘human story’ of Iraq is a complex process 
through which professionalism, with its concern for truth and reality, guides the reporter.  
However, the question remains, can professionalism, with its interest in revealing Iraqi 
anger, misery or joy actually explain the experiences of war, beyond the dramatic and 
often violent representations?  As evidenced above, what is witnessed as ‘real’ is highly 
dependent on the interpretation and representation of a given journalist.  For both 
Willacy and Wilson the professional model continues to hold the key for a ‘truthful’ and 
‘real’ understanding.  Again the human angle is considered the most legitimate.  
                                                
34 Willacy by comparison argues the Iraqi leadership ought to be treated with seriousness and respect given their 
power and ruthlessness. 
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Although being in Iraq necessitated reporting official pronouncements, Willacy (2006b) 
argues, “I wanted to tell the story of the ordinary people…I want to get out and talk to 
real Iraqis”.  Likewise Wilson’s personal goal was to convey some truth about the Iraqi 
experience, “like with any story no matter how complicated or esoteric the issue, if you 
humanise it then it’s going to reach your readers much more easily” (Wilson 2006b).  
Thus the ‘people’s story’ is enunciated as a legitimate, ethical and practical means of 
reporting the ‘reality’ of war. 
 Difficulties remain however, as evidenced by McPhedran’s journalism, in 
conveying this reality, whatever one’s intention.  Does a detached and impartial 
reporting style, as demanded by the professional model, reveal the truth of experience?  
For Willacy it can, when applied in the correct manner – being well prepared and well 
connected for one’s assignment.  “You’ve got to have the background in the culture, I 
had a little bit of a background in Arabic, having been to Iraq a couple of times before 
the war had helped me,” argues Willacy (2006b).  Similarly, Wilson was able to hire an 
Arabic fluent Lebanese/Canadian interpreter, Stuart Innes, allowing him to communicate 
freely with Iraqis.  For both journalists the difficulties in reporting the ‘people’s story’ 
paled in comparison to the restrictive, stultifying and single perspective assignment at 
either Centcom or as embedded with American military units.  Several of Wilson’s 
stories featured Iraqis as the primary sources and focus.  Being equipped with an 
interpreter meant Wilson had the potential to go beyond crude caricatures and attempt 
to reveal Iraqi concerns more deeply.  A typical passage:   
  
“America has promised us food, democracy medicine, water, everything”, said a 38-
 year-old father of four.  “So far we have nothing.” 
 Three men were brave enough yesterday to go to the British military command on the 
 edge of town to report the names and addresses of Ba’ath party loyalists.  “At night the 
 party members come out and give each other support and threaten the rest of us,” said 
 one of them.  “They are armed with guns and grenades and none of them have been 
 caught yet.”  (The Australian, 28/03/03:  1) 
 
A degree of appreciation for the subtlety of the Iraqi situation is clear in Wilson’s writing, 
which is explained in part by his freedom as a ‘unilateral’ journalist and his being 
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accompanied by an Arabic speaking interpreter.  Nonetheless, Wilson (2006b) 
concedes the limitations of applying the practices of objective journalism to the 
complexities and confusions of war afflicted his reporting.  “By definition,” he argues, 
“you’re going to give [only] a bit of the picture; you’re going to give what you see.  That’ll 
be limited to where you are and the people you come across.  You’ve got to 
acknowledge that it is not going to be an overall, universal objective picture, but you can 
do that objectively, if you are determined to write what you see” (Wilson 2006b).  This 
enunciation of professionalism illustrates well the contradiction at the heart of journalism 
and the extent to which professionalism tries to obscure it.  Here, objectivity is 
articulated as meaning the honesty of subjective experience, rather than an objective 
description of independent reality.  Yet, the liberal ideal, that truthful representation and 
an independent reality can be apprehended is maintained.  Wilson (2006b) is at once 
both sceptical of the abilities of objective journalism, yet unable to discount it entirely as 
doing so leaves a yawning epistemological hole that no other professional model can 
fill. 
 Tensions exist between the competing values of professional detachment and of 
humanistic compassion and empathy.  Although committed to professionalism Willacy 
considers sympathy with “ordinary Iraqis” who were no different from people anywhere, 
except, “the difference was they were under the gun and they also had their president 
who could knock on the door in the middle of the night and drag them out…I felt that 
these people had been through a lot and were about to go through a lot more” (Willacy 
2006b).  Thus a concern for ‘the people’ is enunciated as a central concern.  In his 
broadcasts for ABC radio however, Willacy made little of the ‘people’s story’, only three 
of his stories during the invasion period directly covered the conditions in Iraq for 
civilians.  Rather, the majority of Willacy’s radio reports concerned the conduct of the 
military campaign generally, pronouncements of both the Iraqi and Coalition authorities 
and his own varied observations and experiences.   
Thus, there is a disconnection between these reporter’s interview representations 
of their own work and an independent interpretation of what was actually produced and 
published, or in some cases, broadcast.  Such an inconsistency merely illustrates 
further the power of discourse to construct for journalists a set of ideals, professional 
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values and an identity seemingly consonant with professional norms, yet in practical 
reality quite unrelated.  Rather, the professional discourse serves as a legitimating 
scheme for a variety of representative practices.  Within this interpretation, discourse 
has produced both an idealised version and journalism’s practical realities.   
8.4 JOURNALISTS AS ‘WITNESS’ 
This section examines the extent to which the articulation and identity of a journalist as 
a witness to events serves to further legitimate certain aspects of wartime reality.  As 
emphasised by Willacy’s reporting above, the discourse of objectivity demands fairness 
and even-handedness towards sources, effectively rendering non-objective reporting 
illegitimate and transgressive (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003).  This approach has been 
criticised for its favouring of official, institutional and powerful social actors.  This 
tendency of the professional journalist has been identified and is a primary criticism of 
the professional model (McChesney 2004a).  Willacy’s reporting of the so-called ‘Basra 
up-rising’ provides a good example.  Early in the invasion of Iraq, an anti-government 
rising of the predominantly Shi’a Muslim population of Basra was a widely anticipated 
event both by the media and the military.  This anticipation of an uprising led to 
misreporting and incorrect accounts of Shi’a rebellion.  Confusion, the so-called ‘fog of 
war’, at times hangs over the battlefield, clouding judgements and making 
communications difficult.  Nevertheless, there is also a tendency for reporters, 
especially in the context of rolling, high volume news and saturation coverage, with its 
demands for a constantly updated news stream, to report events that are improperly 
confirmed and reports that are poorly substantiated or corroborated, and often 
speculative (Cottle 2006; 93).  Willacy’s reporting of the ‘Basra rising’ was just this: 
 Now we’ve heard that only about one thousand so-called Iraqi irregular troops were 
 holding out in Basra…now it appears the general population has turned on those 
 irregular soldiers.  Those irregulars have responded with mortars against the protesters 
 and now we’re hearing that the British forces are shelling the Iraqi troops to try and 
 protect the civilians who are rising up.  (AM, 26/03/03). 
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Similar accounts were published widely (BBC 26/03/03; CNN 26/03/03).  The “Basra 
uprising” is, however, widely understood not to have taken place.  Rather, this episode 
illustrates the operation of the echo-chamber and amplifier effect whereby news 
agencies report and amplify each other’s reports, a weakness in professional journalism 
gainfully exploited by the US government in the lead up to the Iraq invasion (Mooney 
2004).  In such situations news becomes a circularity of quote and counter-quote 
among news agencies, no longer rooted in a tangible reality, but a semi-fictionalised 
and speculative exercise. The credibility of news accounts however, and believability, 
stems from is construction and presentation in professional news discourse, with the 
journalist-witness as its central figure.  Although this issue was not discussed with 
Willacy in interview, Callinan provides insight into the ease with which the echo-
chamber effect can occur.  As Callinan (2006) states: 
 And that [the fall of Basra] was one the one thing I think they [News Ltd editors] did get 
 wrong.  But I think it was the case that they weren’t set up logistically to handle rapid 
 copy coming in like that.  It might have been they couldn’t change the story in time.  I 
 don’t think there was any great conspiracy, but I think they might have seen it one the 
 wire services that, “hey Basra’s fallen” [sic] but that was completely false and I was quite 
 annoyed 
In Callinan’s account, this failure of the journalistic process resulted from the normal 
editorial system being overloaded by the volume of Iraq war material.  However it is also 
possible to understand the system being overwhelmed due, in part, to its own norms.  
As Callinan (2006) remarked, the competitive pressures of the news business lead to 
“foreign editors who were being bombarded with so much information and they were 
having to make decisions really quickly that was [sic] putting them under immense 
pressure” which ultimately led to the publication of inaccurate reports.  Here the 
misreporting of Basra is understood, not as representing the ‘fog of war’ and the inability 
of journalists and editors to keep on top of complex events, but as representing a 
contradiction and tension in journalism production between the demands of accuracy 
and competition. 
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 Crucial to credibility is the journalist’s claim on privileged access to the 
knowledge they are imparting, most commonly understood as the journalist’s role as 
‘witness’ to events, to the “reality on the ground” (Campbell 2006).  This notion is central 
to the professional conceptions and discourse of all journalists interviewed who 
variously asserted to report only, “that which you know to be true” (Thompson 2006) 
and, “just to write what you see” (Wilson 2006b). McPhedran (2006a) argues, “but you 
have to be very careful that you are actually seeing what you purport to be seeing, and 
what they (authorities) purport you are seeing, you have to take a very, very critical eye 
to what you are being shown and what you’re hearing”.  Such statements enunciate a 
difficult epistemological position for journalists confronting newsworthy reality; they must 
faithfully record independent ‘reality’, and only those ‘truthful’ aspects and they must be 
careful and critical in their doing so. By contrast, the consequences and conditions of 
their judging newsworthiness, their understandings of truthfulness and their critical 
energies are overlooked as contributing to reality’s construction.     
 The act of professional witness produces news-reality for news consumers.  
Journalist’s experiences are able to become the story, its quality and value are 
contingent on their professionalism.  Indeed this aspect of news production makes clear 
a central theoretical point.  Social meanings, our lived reality, do not exist outside of 
discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  In this case, the events of war, as a material 
social reality, do not come into existence outside of professional journalistic discourse 
for the consumers of war news.  Other examples of this contingency include those ABC 
journalists (Willacy and Bormann especially) who had been in Iraq and were removed 
as the invasion began due to security concerns.  Similarly, McPhedran was deported 
from Iraq to Jordan for contravention of reporting regulations, and the Centcom 
journalists chafed under the restrictions and limited access to information that was 
emblematic of the Centcom experience.  Nonetheless, professionalism, and its claims 
on authority and the legitimate right of journalists to report, comment and speculate as 
witnesses and commentators, exerts a powerful influence.  The result can be at times 
alarming, when the norms of professionalism and its concern for truth, honesty and 
accuracy are held as central.  Examples of speculative and inaccurate reporting abound 
in wartime; the Basra ‘uprising’ being just one, the contrived story of Private Jessica 
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Lynch’s and her rescue another.  Embedding has come under specific attack for 
heralding a new era of up-close war journalism that, while rich in detail, is poor in 
substantive knowledge of the reality of war (Cottle 2006; Reese 2004; Seib 2004).  
Criticisms of embedding focus on the limited perspective, military control (Johnson and 
Fahmy 2005; 303) and journalistic form that presents confusion, disorientation, fast 
moving and poorly understood events simply and often stereotypically, as news (Seib 
2004; 55; PEJ 2003).  As shown however, embedding has been articulated as 
possessing retains professional legitimacy, as it facilitates the primary journalistic task 
of witnessing.             
 Willacy’s circumstances provide another illustration of the conflicts and inherent 
tensions within the professional scheme.  As this episode makes clear, the interests of 
professional independence and institutional dictates are at time contradictory.  These 
contradictions are overlooked however and find remarkably uncomplicated expression 
in news.  Rather than reporting non-newsworthy events, professionalism legitimates 
other sources of news and information as newsworthy, at times contrary to an individual 
journalist’s news sense.  Contradictions can result in mundane events and occurrences 
being articulated as news.  This demonstrates the extent to which the power relations 
within news organisations may determine the production of news and how 
professionalism in journalism overlooks these contradictions.     
 At the height of the Iraq invasion, in late March and early April 2003, Mark 
Willacy was sent by the ABC into the Persian Gulf to report on the activities of 
Australian minesweeping and support vessels, an assignment he calls, “…the most 
boring bloody [sic] story I covered the whole time” (Willacy 2006b).  For Willacy the 
professional role had been inverted, having been sent to cover a non-story, while, “I 
could hardly wait to get back into Iraq to do some more reporting, which I did because 
that’s where the story was…I was on the bloody Kanimbla [sic], the Americans were 
trying to secure Baghdad and that was when the seeds of the insurgency were planted, 
during that period” (Willacy 2006b).  As previously noted, according to Willacy (2006b), 
the producer who sent him into the Gulf was, “too busy chasing Channel 9, who had 
been on the boat a week earlier”.  Willacy’s dispatches were accordingly anodyne; 
“From the air, the waters off Iraq look like a giant parking lot for Coalition warships.  
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Cruising slowly up and down the coast are US, British, Australian, and even Polish navy 
vessels...” (2006b).           
 This situation and that of mis-reporting the Basra-uprising are explained by the 
understanding of the discourse presented by this thesis.  The naturalised liberal 
democratic ideal of accessing knowledge and witnessing events so to be able to convey 
the truth of their meaning is clearly evident in Willacy’s remarks, “I don’t think I was 
going to win a Walkley35 award for sitting on the Kanimbla eating duck a l’orange in the 
Ward Room” – by implication a Walkley could have been won, and indeed was won, by 
getting closer to the story (Willacy 2006b).  Here ideals collide with the pragmatic 
journalistic needs and requirements of keeping up with the competition (rival networks), 
providing parochial coverage that an Australian audience will find appealing and being 
subject to institutional directives, rather than fulfilling the normative professional role.  
Thus the limits of journalistic power are illustrated as individual professionalism conflicts 
with the organisational requirements and priorities of news institutions.  In this instance 
the authority and credibility of a journalist is leveraged by news organisations to achieve 
credibility and legitimacy for a professional performance intended not to further public 
understandings, but to ensure competition with commercial rivals is maintained.  
 As shown, established forms and practices, such as the radio interview and 
feature broadcast further encourage, if not wholly require, journalists to project 
themselves as engaging with important events, conveying valuable information and 
providing a useful service to the public as informed witnesses.  These news forms 
demand that information of events and issues that journalists may know or care little 
about must be reported and that journalists should strike an authoritative tone and 
speculate, or alternatively portray non-news as important and newsworthy.  In this 
sense, redundant reporting, such as Willacy’s from the Kanimbla, gives an example of 
non-news being articulated, through professionalism into public information.  Further, 
this episode demonstrates clearly the extent to which news values and substance are 
compromised by the pursuit of commercial imperatives, such as seeking to replicate 
                                                
35 The Walkley Awards are the Australian media industry’s annual awards for excellence in journalism, 
administered by the Walkley Foundation. 
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and follow a competitor’s news agenda.  This section now moves to as discussion of the 
legitimation of the news locations of Centcom and embedding. 
8.5 CENTRAL COMMAND 
The journalism produced from the Central Command Media Centre, provides deep 
insight into the contradictions and paradoxes of professionalism.  This heavily controlled 
and regulated media environment at first appears would seem repellent to 
professionalism.  Yet this pseudo-event (Molotch and Lester 1974) par excellence 
managed to garner significant credibility and legitimacy from the global media, who 
attended in great numbers36.  Central Command was also the site of contested and 
competing discourses and of divergences between public news discourse and the lived 
experience of journalists.  These aspects of the Centcom experience are evidenced by 
the representations offered in the interview discourse and demonstrate clearly the 
difficulties journalists face when contemplating critical articulations that challenge either 
the dominance of American military perspectives, or more subtly, the of discipline 
professionalism and professional conduct.  However, as with the above example, 
professionalism ensures established news forms and conventions are adhered to. By 
critically interpreting the journalism of Central Command is it possible to perceive the 
extent to which journalists become themselves subject to administration, both through 
physical and informational control exerted by military officials (as stated in the 
embedding guidelines, see Whitman 2002), and through their adherence to constricting 
professional discourse.  At Centcom, for example, competing discourses were evident, 
such as operational discourses of daily military successes, the larger narrative of 
American righteousness and the ‘media story’ of journalist’s frustrating experiences at 
Central Command.  The efforts of media managers and military public relations officials 
to control information and to assert and articulate a strategically crafted version of reality 
was however largely effective.  Although journalists complained about access to 
information they did complain not about the quality information itself or the strategic 
purposes for which it was intended. The broader activity of favourably structuring 
                                                
36 Approximately 700 foreign media personnel attended Centcom during the combat operations phase of the Iraq 
war, 2003 (Wolff, 2003).   
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representations of war for the consumption of the (largely) Western public went largely 
unexamined by Australian journalists.  On occasion Centcom information strategies 
were called into question.  However, the competing discourses of the ‘media story’, 
which detailed the frustrations and exploitation of the media corps, and the ‘operational 
story’, which detailed the prosecution of war were kept entirely separate.  Again this 
provides an example of professional journalism privileging given understandings (that 
war can be understood and known through the prism of Centcom) and relegating 
potentially critical or unconventional perspectives (the treatment of media and the 
managerial structuring of reality) to the margins. Professional practices enforce an 
artificial segregation of information into discreet typologies, rather than drawing on the 
Centcom experience as a whole or journalist’s subjective experiences.  Centcom 
provides insight into the administration and control of information (journalism) by military 
power yet shows how this is done in a manner appealing to professional journalism – 
through press conferences, information releases and stage-managed briefings.  
Although this produces a disciplined and ‘useful’ journalism, journalists are not rendered 
completely powerless. Through the articulation of an antagonistic discourse, space can 
be created in which to cultivate an opposed journalistic identity.  While this thesis 
identifies the conditions of this possibility, it is argued that professionalism, as a 
hegemonic discourse restrains the emergence of a truly counter-hegemonic journalistic 
identity.          
 American media critic Michael Wolff (Wolff 2003b) notoriously introduced a 
critical perspective into the Centcom reporting discourse by asking the briefing general 
what purpose reporting from Centcom held when there was so little of any value being 
divulged.  As Wolff writes; 
 Everybody here was having the same perfectly Groundhog Day experience…The purest 
form of reporting: armies were moved, weapons deployed, kill counts tabulated. Nothing 
postmodern about a war reporter. Events needed to be confirmed and recorded. But behind this 
stripped-down facade, invisible to the public, was a secret, very pleasant theatre of the absurd. 
The question, it turned out, spoke powerfully to people who think this whole thing (not just the 
news conference, but, in some sense the entire war) is phoney, a set-up, a fabrication in which 
just about everything is in service to unseen purposes and agendas…But it seemed to speak 
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even more dramatically to people who think the whole thing is real, pure, linear, uncomplicated, 
elemental. For the former I'd addressed something like the existential issue of our own 
purposelessness, but for the latter, I seem to have, heretically, raised the very issue of meaning 
itself (Wolff 2003 )… 
The ABC’s Jonathan Harley perceived these stage-managed qualities of the 
media centre clearly, however a sense of the ‘theatre of the absurd’ was not articulated 
into his reporting.  Centcom was divided into two realms; the media ‘world’ of daily 
briefings and press conferences and the operational ‘world’ which remained largely 
unknown to the assembled press, other than as represented by the media managers 
and military PRs.  Rather than question and investigate the tension between the ‘official 
line’ and the self-reflexive understanding of Centcom that Wolff introduces, Harley 
conceives of the professional role to “dis-assemble” [sic], or interpret for the audience 
the information presented by military officials.  This role is articulated as fulfilling the 
traditional Fourth Estate role of the press as a monitor of power.  However, the Fourth 
Estate role is enacted without substantially questioning the forms of knowledge and the 
journalistic and military discourses emanating from Centcom.  Essentially, the role of the 
journalist is to establish the flow of information, rather than to question the processes 
and motivations of information production.  In this scheme the ‘hard news’ aspects of 
Centcom are kept separate from the media story, or the information management 
aspects of the operations.  A typical report combined commentary and sound bites from 
official sources as the following illustrates: 
 Jonathan Harley:  Nearly three days after launching the assault on Iraq, the Commander 
of Coalition forces began his media offensive. 
 Tommy Franks:  Let me begin by saying this will be a campaign unlike any other in 
history.  A campaign characterised by shock, by surprise, by flexibility, by the employment of 
precise munitions on a scale never before seen, and by the application of overwhelming force. 
 Jonathan Harley:  General Tommy Franks’ armoured columns are systematically 
sweeping across the breadth and depth of the country.  But his troops’ widening net has not yet 
revealed any weapons of mass destruction.   
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 Tommy Franks:  One would expect that weapons of mass destruction would be perhaps 
found in certain parts of the country, and that is work that lies in front of us, rather than work that 
we have already accomplished.   
 Jonathan Harley:  As for whether Saddam Hussein is dead or alive? 
 Tommy Franks:  Actually I have no idea where he is right now.  I suppose, I suppose 
we’ll know in the days ahead, and that’s the best answer I can give you.   
 Jonathan Harley:  the 50-minute press conference included grainy black and white video 
material of air strikes, on what was described as Iraqi positions, as well as fuzzy aerial photos, 
supposedly showing lines of 700 Iraqi soldiers who’ve deserted their military equipment, and are 
waiting for Coalition forces to arrive and there were photos of a tugboat with floating mines, just 
off the coast of Iraq, some of the 139 mine so far intercepted under Australian command.  None 
of the presented material could be verified. It was a tightly managed media event, with the 
message that Iraqis should welcome the invading forces.  (AM, 23/03/03)   
Here Harley enunciates his awareness of the news conference as a “media event”, 
employing light irony to compare a media campaign to a military one.  This report does 
not draw critical attention to Central Command itself, as Wolff does, nor is Harley willing 
to counter Franks’ account of the war so far (notably journalists interviewed praised the 
efforts of others to ask critical questions at Centcom).  And, although Harley draws 
audience attention to the public relations aspect of wartime briefings, which audiences 
have largely come to expect (Harley, 2006a), these are not dwelt upon and are 
relegated to secondary importance when compared with the official military version of 
events.  This is professional journalism par excellence, where Harley is seen to be 
assiduously avoiding controversy or sensitive, critical perspectives, yet at the same time 
remains detached from the military version of events through the use of qualifiers, such 
as “described as” and “none of the presented material could be verified” (Harley 2006b).  
Indeed, as Harley argues his professional role is not to ‘make the media the story’ or to 
draw attention to the stage management.  Rather the journalist’s role is to report the 
war, aware of information management, but not to question the artifice in-depth.  “The 
media story is always part of the story, the military presentation is always part of it, but 
it’s never, well, it’s rarely the story”, argues Harley (2006b) justifying this approach and 
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enunciating a differential logic (Laclau 2005) which maintains the discursive distinction 
between legitimate news and marginal narratives.  Through differential logic 
professionalism is maintained and conventional professional practice is articulated as 
normal and correct. 
As Harley (2006b) argues, “when you’re in Centcom and you’re reporting from 
military spin central…you have to work it into your copy, but you can’t just make it your 
copy because it just becomes repetitive…”.  Such an orientation towards one’s material 
however ensures journalists will treat information as events and news releases, rather 
as contextual, processual or part of broader news management strategy.  Centcom 
reporting then can easily be understood as encouraging the established modes of 
professional journalism; characterised by a reliance on official sources (as there are 
literally no others) and poor efforts to contextualise information, rather to simplify it and 
present it as episodic or associated with specific events.  In this interpretation, a 
journalist’s concern for not being repetitive in their reporting can lead to their practices 
being easily exploited by sophisticated strategic communications.  For Harley, reporting 
of the reality of military operations, although operating with highly controlled and limited 
information, out-weighed the importance of conveying an understanding of the 
limitations and controversies surrounding the system of knowledge production at 
Centcom.           
 Centcom is enunciated as a legitimate and credible news location, a node of 
newsworthiness.  For Harley (2006b) it was, “simply part of the coverage”, a location 
articulated as consequential by military authorities, and thus also by the media.  Another 
reporter, assigned to Centcom, News Ltd’s Rory Callinan described Centcom as a 
challenging working environment.  This was especially so for ‘under the radar’ print 
journalists, not looking to make a big impact at news conferences or other public 
forums, in order to protect their source relationships, and not required to ‘be seen’ as 
are television journalists.  Indeed Callinan is effusive in interview concerning the control 
and secrecy surrounding Centcom operations, calling it “horrific theatre” (2006).  “Once 
you started going through that security apparatus, you suddenly realise that this is an 
intensely controlled environment…and the control just increased from that moment” 
(Callinan 2006).           
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 Although Centcom was designed and promoted as the central briefing location 
for the war correspondents (and thus its status as a main focus point) it did not function 
as such.  Callinan, echoing Wolff (2003b), describes the absurdity of travelling into the 
Qatari desert to cover the war when journalists in other international capitals were 
receiving clearer, more specific information and briefings; “But what we found was that 
people in New York and journalists back in Australia started to get briefings from 
politicians…they started to get briefings from Canberra that we weren’t getting, while we 
were in Doha, where theoretically there was a command HQ, so it was just completely 
ridiculous” (Callinan 2006).          
 For Callinan, the activities at Centcom were clearly a pseudo-event, designed 
and enacted solely for the purposes of military-administration strategic communication 
(Molotch and Lester 1974).  Yet journalists stubbornly persisted with their credulous 
reports from Centcom of the early military operations.  It is a novel facet of the 
experience of war journalists that they are entirely aware of the restrictions and strategic 
intent of such military public relations exercises, yet willing continue to participate in 
them nonetheless.  The liberal ideal of journalism is invoked in order to shelter 
journalism from its obvious complicity in a wider strategic communications exercise.  
This is a clear example of what Pedelty (1995; 172) identified as “self-conscious non-
reflexivity” that obfuscates rather than reveals the workings of contemporary power, or 
as this thesis reconceptualises this notion, as ideological fantasy (Žižek 1989).  It is a 
central argument of this thesis that professionalism encourages only superficial 
engagement with powerful sources, and relies on the liberal ideals of journalism for its 
legitimacy.  In the context of hegemonic professionalism a radical reconsideration of its 
normative values is unlikely.  In this sense professionalism exerts considerable 
regulatory power over the discipline and over the potential for the development of 
substantive critiques.  A paradox of the professional experience however, is that rather 
than such experiences illustrating to journalists the shortcomings of the professional 
model, such encounters with the military establish antagonistic (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985) relations through which journalistic identity is reinforced.  The military and its 
control of information is radically ‘othered’ as anathema to professionalism, providing 
the ‘constitutive outside’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) against which journalistic identity 
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may be defined.  In this sense, the more a journalist encounters immovable military, the 
more professional that journalist becomes.      
 Callinan’s reporting (published in The Australian and Weekend Australian) over 
the same period exclusively dealt with military operations, especially focused on 
Australian activities.  Much of this coverage is celebratory of Coalition efforts (especially 
Australian) and is reproductive of many of the mainstream discourses about Iraq and 
the correctness of war.  Notably, while Callinan articulated a distain for the artificial and 
limited perspective at Centcom, this did not restrain him from directly and explicitly 
reproducing military perspectives and arguments, including several breathless articles 
on WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) and the exploits of Australian military service 
personnel.  An early piece profiled the Australian Special Forces in celebratory fashion; 
“…[the Special Forces are] likely to be on standby to rescue any Australian pilots who 
crash or are shot down in the war on Iraq…their key job is long-range surveillance and 
reconnaissance – hunting out mobile missile sites and hidden chemical and biological 
weapons that Saddam Hussein might try to use against coalition forces.” (The 
Australian, 21/03/03: 5).  Although he was conscious of the heavily restricted and 
controlled environment at Centcom, this seemed to have little influence on Callinan’s 
reporting or altering of perspective.  Rather, a stubborn persistence in adhering to the 
conventions of professional journalism is evident.  All articles published by Callinan 
between 20 March and 3 April directly relate to military (primarily Australian) activity and 
personalities, using predominantly military sources (other sources include an Australian 
academic and the New York Times) and representing events and activities in an 
uncomplicated, straight-forward manner, but one which nonetheless foregrounds the 
perspective and experience of Australian military personnel ‘in action’.  The following is 
typical:   
 An Australian pilot has described flying combat missions in the flak-torn skies above Iraq 
 as “hours of boredom with moments of stark terror”. 
 Flight-Lieutenant Grant or “Tails” as his fellow pilots call him has been riding shotgun in 
 his F/A-18 fighter-bomber for tanker and early-warning aircraft as well as bombing 
 targets.  (The Australian, 27/03/03: 2) 
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This model is broken somewhat with the publication of an article entitled “On the 
Outside:  How truth is caught in the crossfire as journalists fight the military spin” (The 
Australian, 03/04/03: B.1).  Here the frustrations of journalists in dealing with the military 
authorities are detailed.  With this article the possibility for a more critical understanding 
of the Centcom experience emerges.  Such articles and stories powerfully reproduce 
the professional discourse.  Here, the ‘fight for truth’ is enunciated as a central 
journalistic concern and the simplistic, archetypal image of the dogged, independent 
journalist is invoked.  “So extreme was the Australian level of operational security that 
informal sporting matches involving coalition soldiers were kept secret…Such 
censorship appears greatly at odds with the treatment Australia’s coalition media 
counterparts are getting from their forces” (The Australian, 03/04/03: B.1).  Here, then is 
an expression of journalistic disquiet at the management and restrictions in place at 
Centcom and a public cultivation of the professional journalistic persona.  And the 
media has thus become the story – something generally discouraged by 
professionalism (Harley 2006b; Wilson 2006b).  The ‘media story’, however, is relegated 
from a news story to a ‘feature’ section – in this case The Australian’s weekly ‘Media’ 
section – as Callinan (2006) describes, “the perfect forum” for such stories.  This 
segregation however serves at once to de-emphasise the importance of press 
frustrations and represent the ‘media operations’ at Centcom as incidental to the larger, 
more important and credible military operations. Importantly however, the inclusion of 
such stories, away from the main news pages permits the continued enactment of the 
professional “strategic ritual” (Tuchman 1978) – on one hand allowing journalists to 
demonstrate their ‘power’ of independent thought as well as the degree to which they 
are constrained by power – such as the productive power of the military and the news 
organisational power that requires restrained, ‘responsible’ coverage.  Accordingly, 
Callinan’s story expresses frustration at the taciturn Australian military, rather than 
criticism at the Centcom arrangements themselves.  Similarly, Wilson talks of aiming his 
reporting at filling various ‘news holes’ in The Australian - one being the media story.  
Murdoch, embedded for the Sydney Morning Herald and Age, published his meditation 
on the media at war (Dispatches from the front, 05/04/03) in the Age’s ‘Insight’ section, 
well away from the front pages.  The power of the story of media management and the 
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manipulation of information is here de-legitimated in relation to the operational details of 
the coalition invasion.  The story is placed structurally outside the main body of 
information about the war, parcelled off into a realm of secondary knowledge, an 
adjunct to the strategic representations promoted by military authorities.   
 That journalism, according to professionalism represents reality to its audience, 
yet necessarily also produces that reality is a contradiction central to this thesis’ 
argument.  This section has identified the tendency of journalism to produce favourable 
accounts of military activity within the context of information control.  That these 
accounts are largely disengaged from the complexity of social (wartime) reality and 
reliant on the simplicity of easily identified and understood characters and narratives is 
clear.  The thesis has rejected the objectivitist pretensions of professionalism arguing 
that professionalism ‘makes’ these elements of war ‘real’.  Central to this argument is 
the conception of realism as a central problematic aspect of professionalism.  Simply, 
professional journalism derives much legitimacy from its realism.  As this thesis makes 
clear, ‘reality’ is fundamentally contingent.  Instead of providing a rich and nuanced 
understanding of Centcom and, more broadly of war, professionalism limits the depth of 
understanding through the articulation of a narrow, professionally legitimate reality.  
And, in these circumstances, both war and journalism, based upon inherently 
imbalanced source relations (such as those between the media corps and the US 
military) and moulded to fit commercial and military requirements, take on radically 
altered social meanings, yet remain representations of ‘fact’.  Journalism here is less 
concerned with external, independent ‘reality’ (in contradiction of journalism’s own 
tenets), than with the production of an acceptable journalistic product.  War, with an 
emphasis on operational detail and strategy, becomes primarily technical and 
entertainment and news journalism the product through which it is delivered. 
8.6 EMBEDDED 
‘Embedded’ serves as another central news location within the Iraq war discourse and 
experience.  This section examines how the professional discourse legitimates this 
controversial feature of contemporary war coverage.  An analysis of ‘embedded’ 
discourse further illustrates the means by which professionalism makes aspects of war 
 
 
231 
both visible and legitimate as news products.  Embedding as a media practice and 
military policy has been both heavily criticised as favouring and normalising the coalition 
military perspective (Reese 2004; Seib 2004) and defended as permitting media 
access, allowing journalists ‘up close and personal’ with soldiers in a manner not seen 
since Vietnam (Thompson 2006).  Previous models of military-media interaction, such 
as those employed during the Falkland’s war or the 1991 Gulf War (Tumber and 
Morrison 1988; Kellner 1992) describe the extent to which journalists were excluded 
from a close up military experience.  In relation to the Falkland War and Gulf War 
systems of media control, embedding is celebrated.  Many of the journalists in this study 
offered qualified support for the practice of embedding and many offered criticism (see 
chapter six) based largely on differing perceptions of the degree of journalistic freedom 
and independence afforded by embedding.  Important in the present context is how 
embedding and embedded journalists produced and legitimated knowledge and how 
embedding is constructed as a normative news site, articulated into professionalism.  
The process of embedding with military forces is represented as consistent with 
professionalism. The account of war produced through embedding is unproblematic for 
professionalism.  Indeed, embedding is articulated as offering the potential full 
realisation of journalism’s promise, access to the true reality of war.  Furthermore, the 
extent to which an analysis of embedding and journalistic responses to it can usefully 
contribute to understandings of professionalism and hegemonic practices is also a 
consideration of this section.        
 Embedding, with the opportunity to ride with the US military, the ostensibly 
unrestricted reporting environment and “on the record” communications (Whitman 2003) 
seemed a vast improvement on previous military-media relationships to many 
journalists.  This innovation seemed to symbolise something of a rapprochement 
between the military and the media.  However, as noted in Chapter Two, for several 
authors the willingness of journalists to cooperate with the Department of Defense in 
embedding is indicative of the symbiotic relationship that exists between the media and 
the military Tumber and Palmer, 2003; PEJ, 2003; Reese, 2004).  The criticism that the 
system of embedding has been designed with military strategic interests and 
journalism’s commercial sensibilities in mind is cogent.  From this perspective the 
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strategic intent of the Defense Department to co-opt the media has been clearly 
identified.  Nonetheless, journalists involved in this study saw many positive aspects to 
embedding and repeatedly caution that problems with embedding arise from its use, 
rather than from the activity of travelling with and being protected by military forces. 
 “Access is always good…” argues Thompson (2006), indicating the news value 
embedding held for audiences.  Murdoch too states that embedding was a positive 
exercise, providing “insight” for Age and Herald readers, offering them a close and 
detailed view of, “Americans operating in a war situation” (Murdoch 2006).  Obvious 
then is a desire and need for a physical closeness with a given ‘reality’ in order to 
produce credible news, or else run the dangers of reporting at a distance, as occurred in 
Kuwait and Doha.  ‘Access’ is professionally equivalent to gathering ‘facts’ and to 
‘witnessing’ events – through embedding journalists were provided a privileged insight 
into the conduct of war.  Through the use of advanced technologies this otherwise 
invisible reality could be easily and quickly broadcast or otherwise reproduced for 
consumption.  Although Thompson and Murdoch, for example, are aware of the 
dangers for objectivity threatened by single perspective reporting, access trumps other 
professional concerns, as ‘reality’ is a journalist’s primary object.      
 Thompson (2006) argues regardless of the limited perspective embedding still 
offers a professionally “valid” mode of witness.  Indeed as shown above (chapter eight) 
it is through professionalism that embedding retains its validity.  Embedding is made 
legitimate through its articulation into an equivalential relationship (Laclau 2005) with 
professionalism.  In these favourable enunciations, embedding is subsumed within 
professionalism as simply another facet of equivalential professional practice articulated 
as legitimate.  The criticism of embedding however, is not that the persistent telling of a 
story from a given perspective and reproducing assumptions relating to military action 
(the bravery and determination of soldiers, the threat posed by the Iraqis, the essential 
humanity of warriors) somehow produces an inaccurate account of independent ‘reality’.  
Rather, it is that embedding fundamentally structures knowledge produced by 
journalism in accordance with military perspectives and logic.  Such criticisms do not 
identify problems with embedding but with imperfectly enacted individualised 
professionalism.           
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 Much embedded reporting has been criticised for naturalising militarism and the 
logic of war, identifying too closely with and offering insubstantial accounts of military 
operations, eliding the deeper truths of war (Reese 2004), and offering a preponderance 
of dramatic, de-contextualised coverage.  Journalists however have articulated 
embedding into the professional scheme, arguing that they were able to remain 
independent and objective within the context of embedding37.  Often such professional 
detachment is ensured through such simple, yet weak, provisions as “them and us” 
distinctions in reports (Murdoch 2006).  Objectivity is, then, unproblematically applied to 
profoundly non-objective situations, and journalists persist in their avowedly neutral, 
detached and balanced reporting of events.  And although the contrived setting of a 
journalist travelling with military forces is established through political and administrative 
power, the operation of professional norms obscures these realities.  The embedding 
guidelines, for example, spell out specifically authorised and unauthorised journalistic 
activities to which journalists must adhere (Whitman 2003).     
                                                
37This approach contrasts with that taken by other journalists, uninvolved in this study, but useful for the 
purposes of comparison.  Jules Crittenden of the Boston Globe infamously went over to the ‘dark side’ by 
assisting American soldiers in targeting enemy soldiers during fire fights (Crittenden 2003).  He 
unrepentantly declared, “…screw them!” (Crittenden 2003), to those who criticised his lack of detachment.  
For Crittenden criticisms have no merit when made by those who were not there, who haven’t 
experienced what he has and been forced to react in life threatening situations, as he was.  For 
Crittenden becoming part of the action is inevitable and remaining detached impossible.  Rolling Stone 
magazine reporter Evan Wright usefully explores the complexities of the professional task of remaining 
objective and detached.  He rejects any search for ‘truth’ within the context of war reporting, and prefers 
to turn to “imagination and interpretation rather than discourses of realism” (Whitlock 2006; 151).  Wright 
discards any pretence to objectivity, instead practicing an ethnographic style of reporting, pursuing 
understanding over ‘truth’.  A passage from Wright’s memoir is illustrative,  
 Get some! is the unofficial Marine Corps cheer.  It’s shouted when a brother marine is struggling to beat his 
personal best in a fitness run.  It punctuates stories told at night about getting laid in whorehouses in Thailand and 
Australia.  It’s the cry of exhilaration after firing a burst from a .50-caliber machine gun.  Get some! expresses, in two 
simple words, the excitement, the fear, the feelings of power, and the erotic-tinged thrill that come from confronting 
the extreme physical and emotional challenges posed by death, which is, of course, what war is all about.  Nearly 
every Marine I’ve met is hoping this war with Iraq will be his chance to get some. (Wright, 2004; 2) 
  
 
 
234 
 The reporters interviewed for this study assert that nothing was adjusted and 
their professionalism was un-problematically transferred to their embedded reality – an 
important aspect of embedding’s appeal.  The same frames of reference, the same 
approaches to practice were employed as embeds as would had they been reporting, “a 
triple murder, a bad car crash or a major crime – the same principles apply then as they 
do when reporting about the war in Iraq when you’re there” (Murdoch 2006), extending 
the equivalential logic (Laclau 2005) of professionalism into embedding, through an 
articulation of the professional legitimacy of embedding.  Where Wright (2004) and 
others adapted their methods to fit the circumstances and jettisoning any notion of 
objectivity, the journalists interviewed in this study persist in their pursuit of objectivity, 
overlooking the limitations of doing so.  Much of what Thompson and Murdoch 
produced, while for dissimilar media (Thompson for ABC TV and radio and Murdoch for 
Fairfax newspapers), was surprisingly similar in its professionalism.   
 Of twenty-five articles Lindsay Murdoch published while embedded for the 
Sydney Morning Herald and Age, the majority were concerned specifically with various 
aspects of military operations.  The attitudes and experiences of military figures feature 
and such reports typically include a description of latest movements, account of military 
engagements and the reactions or reflections of soldiers (see the Age, 22/03/03: 1; the 
Age, 03/04/03: 1).  Thompson’s broadcasts for ABC radio were similarly focused, with 
accounts of his own observations and of military operations predominating (see AM, 
PM, The World Today, 2003).  Murdoch does introduce elements of the ‘ethnographic 
style’ into his reports and attempts to express ‘what it is like’ for US soldiers during war.  
A typical passage:  
 The hit-and-run sorties have slowed the push of the 20000 strong 1st Marine Division, 
 which on Tuesday was bogged down for 24 hours in a storm that turned day into night.   
 “It’s unbelievable…you can’t see your hand in front of you, “said First Sergeant Mike 
 Sator.  “Now I know what hell is like.”  
 The marines could do nothing but sit in their vehicles until the storm lifted yesterday 
 morning.  The sand had rendered their night vision equipment, one of their biggest 
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 advantages over the Iraqis, virtually useless.  It also had halted most strikes by US 
 helicopters and jets (SMH, 27/03/03: 1) 
Much of the promise of this approach however, is lost in the construction of marines as 
characters in the story of war.  Although Iraqi’s remain an amorphous, unknown and ill-
defined other, American soldiers are humanised through the logic of the ‘up close’ 
embedded experience.  Here soldiers are humanised, persistently identified by name 
and rank and their experiences and hardships described in detail, in accordance with 
the accepted methods of identifying soldiers as stated in the embedding guidelines 
(Whitman 2003).  Here, however, to remain ‘objective within the context of embedding’ 
becomes problematic.  Murdoch contextualises his reports with easy, emotive and 
uncomplicated allusions to America’s other famous TV war, Vietnam, inviting readers to 
sympathise with the soldier’s hardships, whose predecessors were popularly 
understood to have been abandoned by the press, politicians and public (Hallin 1986).  
In doing so the ‘real’ experiences of war are through these persistently sympathetic 
representations, re-articulated and restated within the complex constellation of Vietnam 
memories and meanings.  References to this conflict are readily comprehended by 
Western audiences, given Vietnam’s prominent position within Western popular culture, 
both as a military and political waste, and as a gritty, hard-fought war in which common 
soldiers suffered immensely. 
 The units, using light armoured vehicles and rocket propelled grenades, hit the leading 
 forces and retreat copying methods used against the Americans in Vietnam 30 years 
 ago.   
 US claims that the Iraqi military is using civilians to lure Americans to their deaths have 
 also rekindled Vietnam memories. (SMH, 27/03/03:  1) 
And although allusions to Vietnam can be construed as mild warnings over the wisdom 
and integrity of American war policy, no attempt however is made to draw parallels 
between the saturation bombing of Baghdad with that of North Vietnam, or to compare 
the terror war brought to civilian populations in both Iraq and Vietnam.  Rather, readers 
are drawn to identify with the soldiers who talk about their families back home, their 
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fears of being in Iraq and their basic humanity, expressed through their uncomplicated 
worldviews (the Age, 29/03/03: 7).  Murdoch’s reporting, with its casual Vietnam 
references and detail of daily military life, rather than providing unique insight, merely 
reproduces understandings of military operations and cultural myths, if not of American 
military righteousness, then certainly of the dignity and courage of the US servicemen.  
Although this criticism of embedding has been similarly made elsewhere (Reese 2004; 
Seib 2004; Schechter 2003; Bernhard 2003), this analysis reveals it as relevant in the 
Australian context.  Of greater concern however is the persistence of such reporting 
modes and the likelihood that embedding will become a structural aspect of war 
journalism, given the experiment’s perceived successes in Iraq (Lewis and Brookes, 
2004) and its successful articulation into the hegemonic discourse of professional 
journalism.           
 Thompson adopts a more inquiring position in relation to the soldiers he travels 
with and towards the war he is part of.  His pursuit of professionalism, however, aids the 
wider process of naturalising the American perspective and war aims.  This results from 
the persistence a persistent American perspective featuring humanised American 
subjects.             
 The subject matter of Thompson’s reports is split between his own observations 
of Iraq and accounts of military action and operations, often featuring a military figure as 
an interview subject (see AM, PM, The World Today, 2003).  Thompson’s embedded 
reporting is interesting too, for his illustration of the uncertainty that surrounds military 
operations and his ability to reveal the thoughts and motivations of the soldiers he 
travels with, in this regard Thompson’s reporting makes a valuable contribution.  As 
Thompson (2006) argues, “it was probably not since Vietnam that an Australian 
audience had been up close and personal with American grunts fighting a war”.  A 
typical example of this follows: 
 Geoff Thompson:  Lance Corporal, is that the first action you’ve seen? 
 Trent Boheme:  Ah, yeah.  That’s the first one [sic] I’ve seen since I’ve been here.  We 
 had a scare yesterday, but we, you know, didn’t actually get reports from anything 
 getting fired. 
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 Geoff Thompson:  What’s it feel like to be seeing that for the first time, and to realise I 
 guess for the first time that you’re really in a war? 
 Trent Boheme:  I like it.  I mean it’s a rush. It’s nothing I’ve ever felt before.  It’s good.  I 
 mean, hoping this is all over soon, but I’m getting joy while it’s here. 
 Geoff Thompson:  So you believe in this war? 
 Trent Boheme:  I don’t really know what to say.  I don’t know what to say about that.  I 
 mean, Saddam’s got to get taken down, yeah, you know.  After seeing the way, you 
 know, driving through this country and seeing the way people are living, it’s sad, it’s 
 pathetic.  I mean, Saddam’s got to go, but I don’t know how.   
 Geoff Thompson:  But there’s [sic] a lot of poor countries in the world. 
 Trent Boheme:  You know not every leader of the poor country, you know, is trying to kill 
 the whole world.  This guy is.  (AM¸ 28/03/03) 
Aspects of this reporting did offer genuine insight.  Clearly Thompson is able to illustrate 
the extent of soldiers’ understanding of their role in the war and the war’s purpose.  For 
example, Thompson illustrates the naivety of US servicemen well, asking whether or not 
they ‘believe’’ in the war they are fighting.  This is a genuine contribution of intelligent 
journalism to the public understanding of war.  However the thesis also shows that 
embedding serves to offer sympathetic and empathetic accounts of soldier’s 
experiences.  Thompson is also aware of the limitations imposed by the circumstances 
of embedding.  He concedes that while offering an interesting view of war, embedded 
journalists are, “only seeing the American invasion from that one perspective, but that is 
still a valid thing to witness…in essence I never shifted my basic principles which I base 
my journalism on, which is objectivity and only reporting what you know to be true, and 
if its anything more than what you know to be true, allowing that to be clear” (Thompson 
2006).  As shown previously, the concept of objectivity is not rigidly fixed within the 
discourse and can be adapted to a journalist’s circumstances, legitimating their 
approach or perspective and allowing journalists great flexibility.  Nonetheless a major 
criticism persists that embedding naturalises and thus legitimates American military 
perspectives, providing rich detail and narrow focus, but offering little substantive 
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understanding of war.  In doing so, embedding elides much of the meaning and 
significance of armed conflict.  For Thompson (and as the above example 
demonstrates), simply putting American soldiers on record was a significant news story 
and was sufficient to justify participation in embedding.  “I knew that it was interesting 
and newsworthy in itself.  Even the angle of the American war machine and the way 
these guys…certainly at the lower ranks level, have a pretty simple idea of what they 
are doing – ‘we’re gonna [sic] kill shit, and this is fun’ – basically”, he argues (Thompson 
2006).  For Thompson such coverage is not problematic, in and of itself, but he is 
concerned over the generalised trend in saturation war coverage towards easy, 
uncomplicated representations and highly dramatic, fast paced footage.  The modern, 
“age of reality TV” (Thompson, 2006) demands much more from a journalist in terms of 
access, as digital and internet technologies have made amateur media production 
simple, cheap and easy.  “These days because of the YouTube phenomenon…you 
either live or die by your access” (Thompson 2006).  It is argued here that the instant 
and intimate nature of modern communications technologies have collapsed the time 
and space that buffered journalists and their work in the past.  As Thompson has 
identified, the journalistic imperative is to pursue ‘the story’ more closely, and often 
more dangerously, while concentrating on dramatic and exciting footage or coverage, 
often focused on personalities (especially soldiers) in the absence of substantive news 
detail.  Technology changes expectations of war journalism – from TV and film 
coverage of Vietnam to live footage of the Gulf war to live, unedited broadcasts by 
embedded journalists – so that developments such as embedding are expected and 
experienced by news audiences as novel ‘war products’.  Cottle (2006; 94) identifies 
this tendency in the media arguing that the ‘public view’ of the reality and horror of war 
is replaced by the spectacle and thin immediacy of ‘reality-TV’ viewing and war as 
literally another media product.  It should be noted that although embedding is a site of 
tension for journalists, this is resolved through professionalism.    
 The reality (offered by technology) of war coverage is articulated into the ongoing 
professional discourse and practice through equivalential logic (Laclau 2005).   “If you 
don’t have good access, then people lose interest…the Iraq war and the embedded 
experience was like “Big Brother at War”, in many ways that’s all part of the 
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phenomenon,” offers Thompson (2006), alluding to the popular TV show in which 
contestant’s lives are filmed and subjected to minute scrutiny, for entertainment 
purposes.  While Thompson concedes that such a journalistic orientation may indeed 
lead to trivialised coverage of war, it also has the potential to be very “powerful” 
(Thompson 2006) in that it provides as close and detailed a view of conflict, providing 
audiences with their preferred trivial and exciting coverage.     
 Thompson hailed the openness of the military in permitting embedded reporters. 
He emphasises his relative freedom and ability to ‘hitchhike’ with various arms of the 
military as evidence of being able to report freely and objectively.  His reports often 
featured interviews or commentary with the soldiers he had at hand, some of which 
provided genuine insight, as described above.  Typically however, such reports 
revealed little beyond the specifics of Thompson’s experiences; his accounts of 
travelling through the desert (AM, 24/03/03), speculation concerning possible Iraqi 
casualties (AM, 28/03/03), attitudes and reactions gleaned from soldiers around him 
(AM, 31/03/03) and imprecise accounts of coalition troop movements (AM, 02/04/03) 
are typical and characteristic of the narrow perspective of embedded journalism 
generally.           
 On the other hand, the openness in reporting military affairs, allowed Thompson 
to report revealing events to which he was witness, hailed by interviewees as 
symbolising the positive aspects of embedding.  In two reports Thompson documents 
the accidental killing of Iraqi civilians by American soldiers and the confusion and 
nervousness that characterises their operations (AM, 10/04/03).  These were important 
stories, drawing attention to the inexperience and incompetence of the American forces, 
but also revealing contradictory accounts of the fire-fight by various soldiers:  
 Well, they still maintain they were being fired on.  I’ve interviewed all of the marines who 
 were involved in the incident tonight.  They’re all saying they saw green and white fire 
 and why they say that is [sic] green and white tracer fire is what comes from AK-47s 
 which is what they say is used here, so that’s likely to be enemy fire. 
 I never saw green and white tracer fire.  Michael Cox, our ABC cameraman here, never 
 saw green and white tracer fire. 
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 Now just talking to the CO, of the place these guys came from, he watched it from a 
 distance.  He said the only tracers he saw were the same colour as the ones coming the 
 other way (AM, 10/04/03).   
In this episode American soldiers are not only reported to have killed several civilians, 
but also in the confusion to have opened fire on each other.  Thompson states that from 
a military perspective, while these events were sensitive, “there wasn’t any intentional 
obfuscation of what we were allowed to do – there was nervousness at certain point 
when we witnessed a shooting of civilians, but from a command point of view they were 
actually quite open about what happened and they allowed it to be investigated” 
(Thompson 2006).  In exposing military error the openness of embedding (Whitman 
2003) was thus realised and the normative function of journalism performed.  
Thompson’s reports, however, also demonstrate great professional detachment and 
restraint.  Thompson was unwilling to delve deeper into the potential emotional 
aftermath of civilian killing, or the issue of poorly trained, heavily armed American 
soldiers over-reacting to their circumstances.  Rather, soldiers make comment and the 
issue is left, this ‘event’ contained and parcelled within the short radio report.  These 
soldiers are humanised too, with the simplicity of their outlook and the naivety of their 
understandings emphasised, while the impact and traumatising effect of civilian killing 
on the local population is completely avoided and the criminality of their actions 
unmentioned.   
 Geoff Thompson:  And how do you feel now?  You’ve almost certainly just killed 
 someone.  How does it feel? 
 Private Paine:  Well, it hasn’t really hit me yet.  I’ll just have to wait it out and pray on it. 
 Geoff Thompson:  Is that the first experience like that you’ve gone through? 
 Private Paine:  Yes, it was. 
 Geoff Thompson:  And how did it feel? 
 Private Paine:  It was a rush.  It’s like everything just slows down and you think really 
 clearly.  You are completely focussed on the situation at hand (AM, 10/04/03). 
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With limited broadcast time there is only enough space for a brief and superficial 
treatment of events, relying on an existing mode of enunciating war, which understands 
such events as ‘tragedies’, rather than crimes or major errors indicative of deeper 
military-systemic faults.  In theoretical terms, episodes such as these are articulated 
within differential logic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005), in which they are kept 
discursively separate from other events and processes, preventing the emergence of a 
broader understanding of the ‘wholeness’ of war.  The following chapter examines this 
episode in greater detail. 
 It is possible therefore to understand embedding as a highly visible war reporting 
innovation and as representing the convergence of professional media and military 
interests.  On one hand the media is accorded respectful treatment and privileged with 
close access to the military as it conducts its war, ensuring compelling coverage.  On 
the other hand the military and political authorities conducting the war are afforded the 
opportunity to more clearly and persistently articulate their perspective and also adopt a 
high moral position with regards to accusations of censorship and crude propaganda.  
Co-operation with the military is rationalised in terms of access and closeness to the 
‘reality’ of war and professionalism is expanded to include innovative coverage forms.  
For journalists concerned with bearing witness to events and producing truthful 
representations of factual reality, embedding offers a professionally acceptable exit from 
the straight-jacket treatment by the military in previous conflicts.  The structural 
relationships of embedding however, when combined with a professional journalistic 
scheme, serve to make military perspectives, operations and logic privileged narratives 
within modern war reporting.  Crucially, although embedding is articulated as enabling 
professionalism, professionalism, as noted, remains firmly within military power 
strategies.         
 Paradoxically, the problems with embedding (the predominance of American 
military perspectives) (Thompson 2006; Harley 2006b; Wilson 2006) are overlooked 
through a reiteration of a commitment to the realism upon which professionalism is 
founded.  Although embedding is professionally highly problematic, it offers access to 
the ‘reality’ of war the attractiveness of which, both to news professionals and to 
audiences, cannot be disregarded.  Thompson makes the point clearly - when 
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commenting on the above analysed episode – that the emphasis on military 
perspectives is a secondary consideration compared to value of ‘insight’ gained through 
access and clear, truthful representations of events and the value of journalist’s acting a 
witnesses to potential crimes.  As Thompson argues, “it’s embedded reporting that got a 
soldier shooting a guy half dead on the floor in Karbala or somewhere…we filmed 
young grunts shooting up a car full of civilians.  Yes, it does privilege their perspective 
but it doesn’t make them immune from criticism or surveillance” (Thompson 2006).  
Again the normative professional discourse is asserted in defence of journalistic 
practice and obfuscates criticism.  As this analysis has made clear, the presence of 
journalists at civilian killings may provide surveillance of military excesses, however 
professionalism also serves to characterise such events in empathetic and sympathetic 
ways. In this conception, problematic issues surrounding embedding are for journalists 
technical (relating to how embedding is used) rather than a structural aspect of the 
system.  In this sense, embedding is only problematic when engaged in un-
professionally rather than structurally inclined towards the normalisation of war and 
militarism. 
 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
The analysis provided by this chapter has begun to illustrate the extent and the effect of 
professionalism on war news production.  As the hegemonic model, professionalism 
powerfully produces war discourse, legitimating certain aspects of conflict and leaving 
others, through its discursive enunciations or silences, invisible.  And in this chapter this 
professional effect has been identified and analysed.  Through statements, articulations 
and antagonistic relations journalists are identified as embodying the normative liberal 
journalistic ideals; that is, as being qualified, credible and independent sources of 
knowledge.  An analysis of news and professional discourse reveals however, the 
extent to which professionalism, as a discourse employed to analyse war and conflict is 
uncritical towards the pre-existing cultural tropes it employs and its reliance on the 
military for its information, access and protection.  Professionalism, with its focus on the 
idealised liberal norms of journalism, is insensitive to such weaknesses and uncritical 
towards its own central place in the discursive ‘production’ of war.  Rather, 
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professionalism enunciates and articulates the credibility that journalism requires to 
sustain its public legitimacy.           
 This chapter has shown that professionalism, as an organising and regulatory 
principle, establishes what elements of social reality are legitimate for journalistic 
inquiry, and what can legitimately be produced as knowledge of this reality.  
Professionalism produces knowledge about war, which reinforces the correctness of 
war journalism, in a process of discursive reproduction.  In doing so this process limits 
understandings of war beyond established, resonant and commercially viable 
journalistic forms.  Professionalism can be further analysed as being generally passive, 
if not explicitly supportive, towards US/allied military interests, concerns and 
perspectives – of militarism, in short.  This analysis has also illustrated the extent to 
which professionalism obfuscates the convergence of military and media interests and it 
has described the extent to which professionalism is both consonant with and obscuring 
of journalism’s commercial strategic intent. 
This chapter attended to four main areas in its analysis of professional news 
discourse, demonstrating how discourse serves to articulate and legitimate central 
professional norms.  The professional discourse also obscures the material processes 
and limitations experienced by reporters, presenting highly contingent news accounts as 
objective ‘reality’.  The analysis provided here illustrates the disjuncture between news 
discourse in the public record and the lived experiences, practices and considerations of 
war journalists.          
 As a ‘witness’ to events a war journalists is literally producing reality as he or she 
reports on occurrences, especially as they actively prioritise aspects of reality for 
journalistic emphasis, such as the ‘people’s story’.  Again the credibility and reliability of 
these accounts requires professional legitimacy.  This analysis however has shown the 
potential for inaccurate or misleading reporting being represented as news.  Simply, 
professionalism allows journalists and news organisations great freedom in producing 
occurrences as news in accordance with their priorities, rather than according to an 
objective measure of news value – again a process that professionalism obscures. 
 Besides illustrating the extent to which journalists wield regulatory power in 
relation to knowledge production, this section has also demonstrated journalist’s 
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subjection to regulation and administrative power.  This has primarily been shown 
through an analysis of journalist’s experiences at both Centcom and as embedded.  
Importantly, the control and regulation by military forces, while an affront to the 
journalistic identity, cannot be directly addressed by professionalism.  Professionalism 
derives its legitimacy from the pretence of independence and freedom to report without 
‘fear or favour’.  Reliance on military PR or protection contradicts this central tenet of the 
discourse, permitting a degree of exploitation by military authorities, as journalists 
obscure their dependence on the military in favour of access to ‘the military story’.  The 
analysis of the reporting of News Ltd’s Rory Callinan reveals this aspect of 
professionalism particularly clearly.       
 Embedding also offered an uncommon closeness and access for the media to 
the military and symbolised reconciliation between normatively opposed interests.  
Indeed, the military/political authorities provide the most significant ‘other’ against which 
professional identities are articulated.  Those interests antagonistic to professionalism 
provide the ‘constitutive outside’ which professional identity and subjectivity requires 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005).  For journalists, embedding offered access to 
the military and the possibility for forms of coverage not possible since the Vietnam era, 
making embedding an attractive exercise from both an individual and a 
commercial/organisational perspective.  Embedded journalism provided much by way of 
‘up close and personal’ war journalism.  Nonetheless, embedding largely realised the 
US Department of Defense’s strategic intention of normalising military perspectives 
(Whitman 2003) and enabling a sympathetic approach by journalists towards the troops 
with whom they travelled.  Professionalism provides the subject position (Foucault 1972; 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) which is legitimately within the military system.  Through the 
logic of equivalence (Laclau 2005) embedding is articulated, is ‘made’ equivalent with 
professionalism - that is to say professionalism is a legitimating discourse incorporating 
innovations in journalism practice within it.  As also noted however, embedding was 
conducive to descriptive and realist representations of war which simplified, rather than 
revealed war’s complexity.  Although on occasion embedded reporters were able to 
offer genuine insight, embedding also illustrated the consonance of military and 
commercial interests.  For news organisations embedding offered the style of coverage 
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that has come to be expected in the media ‘market’ – as Thompson (2006) observes, 
Iraq, 2003 was ‘Big Brother at war’, alluding to the close, detailed and dramatic 
coverage afforded by embedding.  The military enthusiastically supported such 
coverage.  This thesis now aims to build on this argument.  In the following chapter the 
focus of the analysis remains on the relationship between the discourse and the news 
product of Iraq war journalism.  However, where this chapter focused on the coverage 
styles produced, the following section seeks to analysis more fully the articulation of 
‘meaning’, and the extent to which professionalism fixes certain modes of understanding 
war, as it makes war ‘real’.  
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CHAPTER NINE - THE PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE AND THE GENERATION OF 
MEANING 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the discussion in Chapter Eight, in this section the generation meaning 
through the professional discourse is analysed.  The analysis continues to investigate 
how professionalism influences the production of news.  The concepts and discursive 
features with which news events and locations are interpreted and ‘made real’ for news 
audiences are explored and analysed.  Forms of discursive inclusions and exclusions 
continue to be identified and examined. Through this analysis it is possible to further 
illustrate professionalism as a hegemonic discourse within journalism that actively and 
purposefully produces news in a manner consistent with and reinforcing of 
professionalism, rather than achieving the realisation of professionalism’s normative 
goals, that is, revealing the ‘truth’ of social reality.  Here professionalism continues to 
function as a legitimating discourse rather than as a critical or analytical one.   
This chapter builds on the previous analysis, maintaining a Foucauldian interest 
in the power of discourse to make visible certain aspects of war, and leave others 
invisible or non-existent.  This is the power of journalism to ‘make war real’.  The 
analysis also continues to include concepts drawn from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse 
theory in order to demonstrate the active process of the hegemonic discursive 
articulation.  
The analysis proceeds thematically, again demonstrating how discursive 
articulations and enunciations affect a variety of Iraq war reporting positions, 
perspectives and identities.  Firstly, the discussion presents an analysis of meanings 
generated by professional war journalism, which are analysed in terms of the following 
categories; the institutional pressure and influences on journalists; the journalists as 
becoming the ‘stars’, or main narrative character in their own reporting; and the 
tendency towards parochial and overly patriotic war coverage.  In these terms the 
analysis illustrates the significant role of professionalism in producing public knowledge 
of the Iraq invasion.   
Finally, the analysis turns briefly again to the news sites of Centcom and 
‘embedding’, in order to demonstrate the extent to which professionalism advances 
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military perspectives and generates meaning that inculcates a normalisation of 
militarism through its ostensibly ‘professional’, independent and objective coverage of 
war.  However, not only does closeness with the military inculcate military perspectives 
and values into journalism, but through exposure and empathetic coverage of military 
personnel, the military is individualised and humanised through professionalism.  This 
reportage results in the parallel process to the militarisation of journalism - the 
journalisation of the military and the consequent legitimation of war.   
 
9.2 INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 
Both Mark Willacy (ABC Radio) and Jonathan Harley (ABC Radio) discuss the 
necessary professional tactic of maintaining circumspection in their reports and 
protecting “editorial standards” (Willacy, 2006b) of the organisations they work for.  By 
restraining their own opinions or perspectives within the meanings that they produced 
as journalists these standards were upheld.  Although avoiding controversial, critical or 
unpopular positions is a professional concern, in the post-September 11 period era 
there is a powerful political element to this professional circumspection.  In Australia this 
has especially been the case with the public broadcasting corporation, the ABC (see 
Chapter Five), which was subjected to political complaints from the then Australian 
Federal Broadcasting Minister, for its perceived anti-war bias.  Willacy describes having 
to find a more subtle method of reporting on the American arrogance and ignorance 
witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, so as not to arouse the ire 
of hostile politicians in Canberra who had actively supported the Iraq invasion.  “That 
sort of optimism,” he writes of an interviewed Marine38, “is easily bred behind the 
insulation of an armoured vehicle…but that sort of insulated thinking will not go down 
well with the supposedly liberated Iraqi people” (AM, 15/04/03).  Although to a 
                                                
38Mark Willacy:  Standing on top of his armoured vehicle watching the protest is a Marines petty officer. 
US Marine:  It’s great that they (Iraqi civilians) can come out here and do what they’re doing.  Because under the 
old regime if they’d tried anything like this they would have been shot. 
Willacy:  Are you worried though that if you are forced to stay a few months or even longer that things could turn 
against you?  That any support you have for removing Saddam Hussein could dissipate, could go? 
Marine:  I think the longer we stay and more they find out that we are here to help and we’re not hostile towards 
them, the better it will go for us in the long run. 
Willacy:  That sort of optimism is easily bred behind the insulation of an armoured vehicle mounted with heavy 
machine guns and grenade launchers, but that sort of insulated thinking will not go down well with the supposedly 
liberated Iraqi people. 
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perceptive listener the implication of this passage is clear, the extent of journalists’ 
critical capacity is limited.  Here the political issues surrounding the ABC provide 
context39: 
  
 Richard Alston [former federal communications minister] would have been apoplectic 
 and to be honest I probably would have been found guilty of breeching editorial 
 standards [had a more direct, confrontational approach been taken]…but that comment 
 was not picked up by his bunch of little helpers poring over every comment (Willacy 
 2006b).   
 
As Harley comments also: 
 
 You certainly don’t want stridency.  Clearly the tone is really important. I’ll remind you t
 hat Richard Alston’s office waged a major assault on the ABC’s coverage of the war...Do 
 you feel a bit restrained?  Yeah (Harley 2006b). 
 
Clearly then, a professional concern to avoid ‘flak’ (Herman and Chomsky 1988) acts to 
blunt the observations and analyses these reporters can potentially make public.  There 
is a difficulty, in so far as objectivity demands an unengaged, unmotivated position vis a 
vis that which is being reported.  As Harley states, ‘tone’ is of central importance when 
constructing accounts of war.  This restraining, disciplinary (Foucault 1977) aspect of 
professionalism is argued to prevent journalists “overcooking” (Harley 2006b) ‘the story’.  
However, this restraint also limits the abilities of reporters to offer more incisive, direct 
and thoughtful analysis.  Indeed, that journalists are restraining themselves for political 
reasons is not made clear.  This does not produce false accounts of events or reality 
however.  Rather, the tendency of professionalism and the restraint practiced by public 
news organisations is too elide potential deeper meanings and realities in favour of 
often simplified, brief descriptions and definitions.  It is these representations which 
produce the ‘reality’ of war.  A clear example of this tendency is found in Willacy’s 
                                                
39 See Chapter Three.  For more information on Alston’s campaign against the ABC: Posetti ( 2001) and  
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/28/1053801448210.html 
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account of a fire fight he witnessed soon after returning to Baghdad, following the 
American seizure of the city.  In interview this episode is retold with almost comic relish:  
  
 You’ve read the transcript, there was one guy standing tall like John Wayne with a pistol 
 unloading across the river.  Now if the source of the fire was that serious, I don’t think 
 you’d be standing up there with a pistol.  The way they [American soldiers] responded 
 was patchy and funny in a lot of ways.  The Americans stopped after a while and they 
 realised that maybe whoever they were firing on could have left in the first two minutes 
 of the engagement, but they were too busy pouring thousands of rounds across the river 
 (Willacy 2006b).   
 
When reported for the AM radio show however, the episode is treated with an objective 
credulity and seriousness, and articulated within the confines of the professional 
discourse; the perception of reality experienced by Willacy is disciplined (Foucault 1977) 
by professionalism: 
  
 It didn’t stay quiet for long; just minutes after we checked into our hotel on the Tigris 
 River a battle broke out right next door. 
 Well, you can hear the marines firing from down below us.  They’ve just moved into 
 some scrubland near the Tigris River.  They’ve moved their APCs from below our hotel 
 window towards the river.  They’ve dismounted out of the APC and are against defence 
 [sic] facing over to the western side of the river.  They’re directing small arms fire over 
 there as well as heavy machine gunfire (AM, 14/04/03).   
 
Although the objective ‘fact’ of the marine’s engagement is communicated, a more 
illustrative articulation of the event is suppressed. The effect being the event is 
accorded legitimacy as a military operation, as a battle, part of a wider effort to suppress 
Iraqi military forces, rather than cowboy-style, testosterone fuelled overkill, indicative of 
a wider military attitude – credibly characterised as ‘gung-ho’ and with grave 
implications for any planned occupation of Iraq40.   
                                                
40 See Evan Wright’s Generation Kill for an account of the Iraq invasion which does not shy away from illustrative, 
ethnographic reporting style and which does not moderate the accounts of brutality, chauvinism and bloodthirstiness 
among American soldiers.   
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 The effect of political and institutional pressure, articulated as discursive needs, 
clearly restrains journalism.  Here, the discourse of professionalism demands 
moderation within journalistic articulations so as to avoid criticism – in this case 
politically motivated attacks by the authorities that initiated Australian involvement in 
Iraq.  The following section demonstrates how the discourse serves to construct the war 
journalist as the central character in the wartime narrative.   
 
9.3 JOURNALIST AS ‘STAR’ 
Peter Wilson (News Ltd) was perhaps the best placed Australian journalist in Iraq to 
provide insightful, broad coverage.  He was personally committed to covering the 
‘people’s war’ (Wilson 2006a), travelled with an accompanying photographer and 
translator, operating ‘unilaterally’.  Wilson’s reporting is more complex and nuanced 
than that of, for example, Ian McPhedran, who was confined to Baghdad.  Wilson offers 
insight into a wider range of issues pertaining to professionalism.  Like other journalists, 
Wilson has argued in favour of a ‘realist’ professional method in which the rational, 
empirically trained professional records reality and transmits this unadulterated account 
to the public.  Although the impossibility of literal objectivity in reporting is 
acknowledged, this notion maintains a commitment to ideological neutrality and fact 
based witnessing, recording and observation that obviates ‘bias’.  Furthermore, this 
approach actively reproduces the journalistic archetype of the independent reporter. 
As Wilson (2006b) argues, “You’ve got to acknowledge that it is not going to be 
an overall, universal objective picture, but you can do that objectively, if you are 
determined just to write what you see”.  This appears an acceptable approach to 
covering war.  The effect of this orientation is to naturalise war and the war experience, 
through the breakdown of war into episodes, or series of events, each reported and 
described largely in isolation.  Here it is possible to discern the logic of difference 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 2005) at work within news discourse.  This logic 
serves to conceptualise war as disconnected events rather than as an ongoing political 
and military process.  In difference, the ‘human story’ becomes separated from the 
military-political policy of war, as has been noted (see Chapter Six).  This episodic 
treatment of war further breaks down equivalences which may exist between policy 
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matters and operational details and the lived experience of war.  Episodic treatment fails 
to provide a unified meaning and connections between the human cost of war and 
political decision-making and administration.  Rather, as war becomes a narrated, 
journalistic adventure, difference replaces equivalence with separate events and 
episodes of war, narrated by a journalist, who becomes the central, archetypal 
(Whitlock, 2006) figure in the ‘war story’.  This ‘objective’ approach de-contextualises 
the war, the political context falling away, leaving a journalist’s journey as the central 
focus and permitting the rise of the journalist (in this case Wilson) as the central 
character, or ‘star’ on whom the narrative focuses, and to do so within professionalism.  
The soldiers and civilians encountered along the way provide colour and interest to 
what is otherwise Wilson’s war and is disconnected from historical and political 
contexts.  The professional task here has become less the fulfilment of normative 
aspirations of professionalism (the enhancement of knowledge and understanding) but 
the maintenance of a credible journalistic performance.  Whitlock (2006; 134) writes this 
tendency in journalism, “nurtures personalising narratives that have the potential to 
mask or distract from more systematic and critical representations of the military and 
political domains in the conduct of war”. 
 Early in the invasion a news style that tries to illustrate the conditions and include 
local detail is employed.  However, while this writing style attempts to capture ‘the 
peoples war’ and fulfil Wilson’s basic reporting aim, stories of this period are persistently 
infused with a sense of exotic adventure in which he, as the writer, plays the main role 
and is the source of the newsworthy detail: 
  
 Southern Iraq is not just a scary, dangerous place right now.  It is downright spooky. 
 Sandstorms have turned the sky murky, orange backdrop as British troops, hungry 
 peasants and determined loyalists of Saddam Hussein’s regime eye each other off 
 nervously. 
 Raging oil fires light up the gloom in places, throwing up fast-rising plumes of black 
 smoke to mark the vandalism of the Iraqi soldiers who set fire to them. 
 And by night the danger rises as the thump of artillery from battlefields to the north is 
 joined by gunfire and occasional mortars from Saddam diehards mounting guerrilla 
 attacks on British troops (The Australian: World, 28/03/03; 8). 
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Rather than news, the above lead constructs a composite image of southern Iraq in 
which the journalist’s experiences are news.  Although the truth or falseness of 
representations is beside the point with regards to this thesis stated interest, such 
imagery is formed from an utterly subjective impression of what it is “like” in Iraq.  This 
subjectivity, masked by professionalism, serves a number of purposes.  Such a 
description provides a superficial and subjective context of drama, tension, excitement 
and adventure.  As Whitlock (2006) suggests, a context more fully referent to the wider 
military and political circumstances of war is avoided in serialised reporting.  On one 
hand this serves to provide a context in which ‘war’ as an idea is naturalised as a series 
of events or experiences and is not understood as the outcome of political processes.  
On the other hand, such a context also provides a compelling scene in which the main 
characters of ‘the story’, in this case journalists, play their archetypal roles in the war 
drama.  
 This dramatised adventurism is further evident as Wilson becomes a more 
central character in his own story.  Although the early period reporting is by no means 
void of such tendencies (“At 3.30pm on Wednesday, local time, photographer John 
Feder, Arabic translator Stewart Innes and I slipped across the border from Kuwait by 
tailing a US military convoy…” The Australian: World, 28/03/03: 8) it is later, after being 
arrested and transported to Baghdad that Wilson’s reporting becomes almost solely the 
narrative of his own experiences, rather than the reporting of external events and 
issues, although it should be noted that Wilson personal experiences and external 
events did indeed overlap (Wilson was, for example, on the scene when the Palestine 
Hotel was shelled by American forces, administering first aid to the injured journalists)41.  
Nonetheless, other of Wilson’s experiences made the newspaper also as news; they 
had become an “ordeal…endured behind enemy lines” (The Australian: World, 
07/04/03; 11) and the story of his arrest by Iraqi authorities was reproduced in a 3000 
word feature.  For Wilson however, the activities of the media are only enunciated as 
becoming relevant news when, “[they tell] people a broader truth, if it shows them what 
                                                
41 A major controversy of the Iraq war in which an American tank shelled the hotel housing the majority of the 
world press corps.  For an account of this episode see Wilson, P (2004) A long drive through a short war, South 
Yarra, Vic., Grant Hardie Books.  
 
 
253 
it’s like and what’s going on there then it’s worthwhile…if it is just about, “hey, I went 
there and did this, then it’s not worth it” (Wilson 2006b).  Here professionalism 
proscribes the inclusion of subjective experiences as newsworthy in accordance with 
the broad conventions of objective journalism.  In this context the professional scheme 
comes evermore to the fore as techniques are applied to disguise the contingent, 
subjective and incomplete accounts of war in a discourse of witnessed events, verbatim 
interviews and factual accounts.  Indeed, employing this thesis’ discourse-theoretic 
conceptions, it possible to usefully understand Wilson’s articulations as making 
‘equivalent’ (Laclau 2005) his own experiences and uniting his narrative with the 
discourse of newsworthiness, under the central journalistic signifier, ‘truth’.   
 
9.4 PAROCHIALISM 
Parochialism is a clear tendency amongst the Australian news agencies and is a 
prominent meaning generated within a professional approach to covering war.  Although 
visible throughout the news generated from Iraq, parochialism is most clearly evident in 
news coverage of Australian forces.  Although cultural proximity may be a commonly 
accepted news value (Harcup and O’Neil 2001; Galtung and Ruge 1965), the tendency 
in this form of overtly nationalistic and militaristic reporting is towards overtly patriotic, 
uncritical and disproportionate coverage.  Parochial coverage tends to be descriptive 
and uncritical, compounding the generalised tendency to normalise war and militarism 
described throughout this thesis.  Indeed, a characteristically Australian journalism style 
is visible within the Iraq war discourse, especially in that pertaining to Australian military 
personnel.  This style may be described as slightly irreverent towards figures of military 
or political power and characterised by a forthright approach to language use.  This 
rhetoric can be interpreted as echoing the Australian folk-mythology associated with 
Australian enlisted soldiers, known colloquially as ‘diggers’, who’s ‘larrikinism’, 
mateship, but ultimate conservatism is popularly held to embody the idealised 
Australian character (Tranter and Donoghue 2007). 
 Several journalists participated in parochial reporting, ranging from potentially 
inconsequential coverage of Australian naval activities, as discussed above (Willacy, 
2006b), celebratory and disproportionate accounts of Australian navy divers (The 
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Australian, 31/03/03; 2), comedy stories concerning the US navy’s use of dolphins for 
mine detection work (The Australian, 31/03/03; 12) and patriotic profile pieces focused 
on Australian units (The Australian, 21/03/03; 5).  Much of this style of reporting has 
been condemned as “gratuitous” (Willacy, 2006b) and “disproportionately large” (Harley, 
2006b).  News Ltd’s Rory Callinan (2006) concedes candidly however, “I think that 
(romanticising the military) is definitely a problem…I look back over the stuff I did and 
think, “Oh, you know, probably should have used a few less adjectives in some of the 
stuff”.   
 Callinan’s writing stands out as the most consistently patriotic.  The activities of 
Australian soldiers were his primary reporting concerns, even though he was sent to 
Iraq without instruction to specifically cover “Australians at war”.  The exploits of 
Australian soldiers are celebrated in several articles.  The following passage, 
demonstrating the tendency of reporters to mythologise war and its participants is 
illustrative.  This news report is ostensibly devoid of news-information aside from 
articulating Australian soldiers into the national sporting, anti-colonial identity (Tranter 
and Donoghue 2006): 
 
 Well before the invasion of Iraq began, Australian troops had already gained a reputation 
 as victors on the sporting field. 
 Australian troops dominated an informal sporting competition being held among the 
 coalition forces based at Doha in Qatar, according to a British military spokesman. 
 The comments were made as it was revealed last night that British and Australian 
 military officials were considering giving a joint press conference.  
 “I told them we will do it (hold the joint press conference) but only provided they don’t 
 bring any sporting equipment”, Group Captain Alan Lockwood said (The Australian, 
 22/03/03: 7).   
 
Other journalists reported similarly.  The cumulative effect is a tendency within the 
Australian press corps towards uncritically patriotic reporting, providing much space to 
military perspectives and interests.  Importantly too, passages such as this serve to 
articulate the Australian war experience into the national hegemonic discourse and 
mythology surrounding Australians at war.  Essentially this myth – a central feature of 
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the hegemonic Australian national culture and character – presents Australian soldiers 
as irreverent, egalitarian and less deferential towards traditional forms of authority and 
order than their UK or US counterparts (the myth of larrikinism), but nonetheless brave, 
tenacious and taciturn soldiers (Tranter and Donoghue 2007).   
 Callinan offers that the general tendency to champion the “Australian troops 
during war” is most likely a result of journalists being “caught up in” the experience of 
reporting of war, as he concedes he was (Callinan 2006).  Nonetheless, the point is also 
made that newspapers “pick that sort of stuff up” (Callinan, 2006) and journalists will 
naturally reproduce what makes it into the paper, tending to reflect institutional or 
editorial news values and needs.  In this sense, parochial reporting is a consequence of 
professionalism, rather than assertive Australian nationalism.  Indeed, journalists 
interviewed for this study repeatedly emphasise their purposeful and intentional 
avoidance of the ideological boosterism associated with Fox News.   
 Although a central mainstream news value of cultural proximity and ‘relevance’ 
(Harcup and O’Neill 2001) may operate, generating Australian stories for Australian 
audiences, much of this coverage was disproportionate and “gratuitous” (Willacy 
2006b).  Others have argued that the information lock-down attempted by the Australian 
military had the effect of magnifying that information that was released making coverage 
of Australian stories disproportionate (Harley 2006b).  As noted, Willacy produced a 
series of articles concerning the HMAS Kanimbla and the operations of the US Coast 
Guard (AM, 31/03/03; AM, 01/04/03; AM, 03/04/03), which he called, “the most boring 
bloody story I covered the whole time” (Willacy 2006b).  Likewise, virtually all Callinan’s 
reports focused activities of the Australian forces, primarily the Australian SAS and the 
RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force), including pilot profiles (The Australian: Local, 
27/03/03: 2) and commanding officer profiles (The Australian: World, 31/03/03: 14).  
Wilson too produced a series covering the activities of Australian navy divers he 
encountered while pursuing the ‘people’s story’ in southern Iraq.  In this series the 
Australian divers’ intent to stay in Iraq, their assistance distributing food aid and, 
perhaps most curiously, their disdain for the utility of American mine-clearing dolphins 
formed the central news qualities.  As Wilson writes:  
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The US Navy’s mine-clearing dolphins have been the surprise media stars of the Iraq 
 war, but they have not exactly won over Australian divers working alongside them. 
The polite way to express their scepticism about the mine-clearing skills of the dolphins 
 is to question their reliability and cost efficiency, but there is another way to put it. 
“Flipper’s f**ked, mate,” was how one diver saw things yesterday (The Australian: World, 
31/03/03: 12).   
 
These sections have shown the extent to which professionalism leads to certain specific 
coverage forms and styles which directly affect the meanings that are produced 
concerning war.  Here parochial coverage has been shown to result from both 
professional needs and values and from the closeness that exists between journalists 
and military personnel.  ‘Access’ has been shown not to yield neutral news-information, 
but a normalised, military-oriented account of war.  In the following section this analysis 
is continued, turning specifically to the coverage of Centcom and ‘embedded’ journalists 
to understand how professionalism generates specific meanings concerning these 
significant news locations and coverage forms. 
 
9.5 THE MILITARISATION OF JOURNALISM 
As discussed above there exists a general tendency amongst war journalists to 
naturalise and normalise war in the process of reporting it.  Professionalism, I have 
argued, plays a significant role in constructing these accounts of war.  Reliable and 
culturally resonant images are conjured, often eliding meaning or reproducing 
stereotypical understandings.  Through de-contextualised, journalist-centric reporting 
styles and a tendency toward parochial, patriotic stories and features, coverage of war 
leads to opacity, rather than to clarity.  As shown, the reality produced through 
professionalism is highly contingent.  The journalism produced from Centcom and by 
embedded journalists is similarly problematic.  Here the limitations of professionalism 
are exposed and exploited by systems of media control.  Nonetheless professionalism 
is maintained, effectively reproducing those strategic meanings pursued and promoted 
by media managers and press officers and continuing to limit understanding of war 
rather than enhance it.   
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 Centcom has been both described as a “professionally challenging” (Harley 
2006b) place to work and as “horrific” (Callinan 2006).  As noted in Chapter Eight 
Centcom directly confronted normative journalistic values.  The heavily regulated 
environment, scores of media managers and Hollywood design lent Centcom a surreal 
media compound aesthetic. Journalists found the work environment contrary to their 
values of openness, accountability and verification, despite US military attempts to 
present the centre as a useful, normatively legitimate media centre.  As Harley (2006b) 
states, “there’s just no narrative at Centcom”, alluding to the story-less nature of the 
centre, isolated as it was in the Qatari desert and providing a platform for American 
generals to pronounce on the invasion’s progress.  Those stories told were reported 
according to military interests and priorities.  That is, without instituting formal 
censorship, journalist’s articulations from Centcom were carefully managed to remain 
within military hegemony.   
Although the Centcom experience was antagonistic towards professionalism, and 
ran contrary to much that professionalism values, little attempt was made by journalists 
to expose and interrogate this aspect of the coalition war and media strategy.  Rather, 
coverage of the invasion from Centcom continued in its ostensibly neutral, objective 
approach to news events.  In this sense coverage was characterised by articulations 
that demonstrated journalistic professionalism yet remained within the hegemony of 
military normalisation.  Professionalism in this sense is unable to address that which 
manipulates it.  Indeed, journalists attempt to retain their credibility by arguing that 
through diligent and committed professionalism ‘the story’ can still be told.  As a 
consequence of this continued adherence to professionalism much Centcom reporting 
was either blow-by-blow accounts of coalition military advances and operational matters 
or profile and feature pieces on Australian soldiers.  That is, given the context of control, 
professionalism becomes concerned with articulating uncritical and at times, favourable 
accounts of military action.  As this interpretation of Centcom journalism argues, this 
disciplining of journalism was achieved even as journalists were consciously seeking to 
avoid the use of strategically crafted language and messages, as were reproduced 
during the first Gulf War.  As Bormann (2006) states:  
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I went through that during the Gulf War where we started seeing this stuff creeping into 
 journalistic language, and I just thought that in 2003 as it was then, we should be a bit 
 too clever…certainly too smart to fall into those traps 
 
Many of Harley’s radio broadcasts consisted of accounts of coalition military 
developments, contextualised by comment from military officials, were they available.  
Harley’s reporting was representative of sober, serious news reporting and 
demonstrates an awareness of the problems Bormann identified.  However, even while 
this reporting may have shrunk from the overt patriotism of other Australian journalists, 
his reports are nonetheless essentially conservative and reproductive of the military 
perspective, articulating accounts of Centcom from within the hegemony of US military 
logic: 
 
 Jonathan Harley:  It was another disciplined public performance by general Tommy 
 Franks in the face of growing scepticism about Operation Iraqi freedom and a mounting 
 propaganda war with Iraq.  But he promised to speak the truth from his Hollywood 
 designed platform at Central Command. 
 
 Tommy Franks:  This platform is not a platform for propaganda, this is a platform for 
 truth and so what I will do is I’ll try to provide you the best balance I can and that is what 
 I have asked our people here to do. 
 
 Jonathan Harley:  The war in Iraq is being fought on many fronts and by both sides (AM, 
 25/03/03).   
 
Although Harley was willing to occasionally allude to coalition propaganda tactics and 
the use of public relations techniques, the wider issues of the military media strategy 
and the structural control exerted by the military remained unaddressed.  Indeed, within 
news reports the awareness of crude propaganda techniques is articulated, however 
the professional discourse restrains journalists, preventing them from assuming overly 
antagonistic positions.  For Harley, his awareness of the coalition information control 
and manipulation remained implicit in reports, and although the opportunity for more 
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critical perspectives arose, such alternative perspectives were subordinated to an 
‘objective’ reporting style that obviates such tendencies, making them incidental to the 
reporting of military information.  Professionalism asserts itself here over journalistic 
awareness of manipulation, both restraining journalists and normalising military-media 
arrangements.  As Harley (2006b) states, journalists are fully aware of the media 
management strategies that military power enacts and clearly understand the 
compromised position of journalists within these strategies: 
 
Look, the first casualty of war is truth.  We know that.  We know what the exercise is.  
We know its about PR and propaganda.  So do you feel sullied by that?  Yeah, a little bit.  
But you’re part of it as well, and I think you present it for what it is…I can’t any journalist 
in 2003 going to that experience and not being aware of that exercise. 
 
However, as Harley adds, the role of journalism is nonetheless to report on military 
pronouncements and moderate critical perspectives: 
 
I think you’ve got to keep [a] perspective on it [military communications strategy].  When 
you’re in Centcom and you’re reporting from military spin central…you always have to 
work that into your copy, but you just can’t make that your copy, because it becomes 
repetitive (Harley, 2006b). 
 
Thus, not only does professionalism restrain journalists, but it also offers the rationale 
for restraint.  In effect, professionalism encourages journalists to be aware of the forms 
of control and propaganda that beset them, but, as ideological fantasy, professionalism 
articulates an awareness of journalism’s contradictions, yet ensures journalists 
participate in military strategy nonetheless.   
 Similarly, Callinan was acutely aware of the control and strategic, hegemonic 
intent that was enacted at Centcom. He was also soon aware of the redundancy of the 
limited Centcom perspective, when political sources were giving more detailed 
information in Canberra, London and Washington, than was available in Doha.  
Furthermore, efforts to cover the Australian military’s activities were continually 
hampered by the draconian information controls, resulting in a “completely ridiculous” 
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(Callinan 2006) situation.  Nonetheless, the majority of Callinan’s reporting focusing on 
the activities and profiles of Australian personnel and a mode of coverage concerned 
with battlefield information, military activities and official comments prevailed.  The 
‘otherness’ of military authorities and their being ‘outside’ (Laclau 2004) the normative 
journalistic identity has elsewhere been articulated so as to provide a stable 
professional identity (see Chapter Eight).  Critical and reflexive attempts to understand 
Centcom beyond the details of military operations are almost completely absent, and 
can be understood as discursively impossible in the context of a clear awareness of 
military strategic intent.  Indeed, the strain placed on professionalism does not result in 
antagonistic journalistic articulations which challenge the position of military and political 
power, but in ever more circumspect journalism.  As Callinan (2006) frankly concedes, “I 
suppose you reach a point where you don’t want to (report critically)…I can see a point 
where you might get so desperate and might start thinking, “should I go a bit soft on 
these guys and they might start looking after us, or maybe take us to the next level” 
(Callinan 2006).   
 The effect of the professional discourse is a reporting style and approach that is 
willing to concede to military authorities the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and the power to 
control the news narrative.  Furthermore it reports their pronouncements and activities 
with a minimum of criticism, interest or vigour.  A typical example of Callinan’s reads 
both as a military PR release and an ‘adventure story for boys’: 
  
Fourteen Hornets have been deployed to the region in what is the largest Australian air 
 force contingent to go to war since Vietnam, according to the Defence Force.   
 Wing Commander Steve, whose full name cannot be published for security reasons, 
 said the Australians had undertaken defensive air missions protecting “high value 
 assets” like airborne early warning and control aircraft. 
 The Hornets, which have a top speed of Mach 1.75, are equipped with air-to-surface 
 missiles, laser guided and conventional bombs and are armed with a 20mm nose 
 mounted cannon for ground and airborne targets. 
 Wing Commander Steve said the pilots might stay in the air up to eight hours at a time 
 depending on the missions, but remained alert due to the adrenaline rush (The 
 Australian: World; 21/03/03: 1). 
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The media were put at an immediate disadvantage by the total control over both 
information and journalist’s access to it, as was Centcom’s intended function.  Here 
journalists were completely unable to compare official pronouncements with some 
independently verifiable reality or range of sources.  An information ‘bubble’ was inflated 
according to the needs of military and political power, in which journalists remained 
trapped.  However, rather than precipitating a radical reassessment of their professional 
role, journalists were content to maintain their conventional position as conduits for 
official information.  For Harley the monitoring of language used by military sources was 
a central task, in order that the more egregious misuses of language – a consideration 
clear in journalist’s minds, given the experiences of the Gulf War.  Reproducing US 
accounts of Iraqi militia groups as “terrorist death squads” (AM, 07/04/03), would not 
“fly” (Harley, 2006b) or enter into public discourse as concepts made real by journalism, 
for example.  As noted, however, professionalism also restrained Harley from pursuing 
his awareness of Centcom’s propaganda function more explicitly.  As shown Callinan’s 
generally strongly patriotic and supportive reporting of the Australian military operations 
was of considerably stronger tenor than that of Harley.  However, both journalists are 
strikingly similar in their avoidance of critical perspectives on the activities at Centcom, 
remaining within the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin, 1986), safely reporting on 
military operations, press conferences and, in Callinan’s case, rich patriotism.  Both 
reporters acknowledge the manipulation and control to which they were subject.  The 
journalistic commitment to professional practice restrains their ability to substantially 
criticise this area of the military campaign as doing so would necessarily entail the 
assumption of an opinion or perspective, proscribed by professionalism.  As shown, in 
the absence of substantive material and access to sources the tendency is towards 
parochial coverage of military personnel and operations. 
 
9.6 THE JOURNALISATION OF THE MILITARY 
In this section the character of embedded journalism produced by Australian journalists 
is assessed.  It is argued that the embedded perspective, legitimated through 
professionalism, not only incorporates journalism into military operations, but journalises 
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the military.  This means producing journalism that humanises and individualises 
soldiers so as to produce knowledge of war that overlooks and distances the audience 
from the political and military processes of war administration and strategy. 
Embedding with military units held similar appeal for journalists as Centcom.  
Unprecedented access was to be gained by those journalists and news organisations 
willing to agree to the Department of Defense Media Support Plan (Whitman 2003), 
which outlined the relationship between embedded journalists and their military hosts.  
The system of widespread embedding represented a degree of sophistication on the 
part of American military-media managers.  Rather than indulge in crude forms of 
censorship and overt control (such as characterised previous conflicts), censorship 
became unnecessary as the professional media’s own predilections for drama, visual 
spectacle and immediacy limited the potential for critical embedded perspectives (Cottle 
2006; 95).  
 The description of embedding as a novel military-media exercise is to some 
extent spurious.  The media and press corps have long travelled with soldiers and 
reported war from military perspectives, and examples abound in the history of media-
military interaction (Knightley 2004).  Nonetheless, the embedding program instituted 
during the Iraq war, 2003, is notable for its official sanction and very large scale; some 
600 journalists embedding for the duration of the three week invasion and conquest of 
Iraq (Carlson and Katovsky 2003; ix).  For journalists their continued credibility and 
legitimacy as reporters would stem from their ability to continue to report 
‘professionally’, that is freely, openly and on the record, without official interference 
(Carlson and Katovsky 2003: ix).  Embedding has attracted strong criticism for 
encouraging partial, cheerleader journalists, reproductive of a discourse of American 
military righteousness (Seib 2004; Reese 2004; Schechter 2003).  Such explicit 
cheerleaderism was not evident in the reporting of Australian embedded reporters.  
And, although the journalists interviewed for this study insist that embedding must be 
considered in the context of the ‘bigger picture’ or the wider coverage operations of a 
given news organisation, embedded reporting should be understood as strongly 
contributing to the normalisation of military perspectives, fundamentally altering public 
understanding’s of war.   
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 As noted, journalists interviewed for this study assert that their professionalism 
remained intact during embedding.  “The short answer is that I didn’t adjust anything 
(about my practice) – I just went in there as an objective professional journalist”, says 
Thompson (2006).  Similarly, Murdoch (2006) argues that the same principles and 
practices apply to embedded journalism as do to any other form.  Essentially, for these 
journalists professionalism is transposed into the embedded context unchanged, thus 
producing ‘embedded’ as an un-problematic news location, like any other, and 
amenable to professional reporting techniques.  The professional model in the context 
of embedding however, offers a limited perspective and one that, through the pursuit of 
professional norms, articulates the journalisation of the military.   
 Enunciating embedding as legitimate, Murdoch (2006) and Thompson (2006) 
both argue the exercise was free from overt control over what could be reported, 
beyond particularly sensitive operational details.  Embedding is articulated here as both 
a positive development, permitting the all important access a journalist requires, and as 
consistent with professionalism.  Evidence of this apparent openness is provided by 
Thompson’s ability to report on the killing of civilians (AM, 10/04/03) and Murdoch’s 
reporting of the use of napalm by US forces (Sydney Morning Herald, 22/03/03: 1).    
 The ABC’s Geoff Thompson considered his role as an embedded reporter in light 
of the “reality TV” phenomena and the so-called “YouTube” generation of internet 
communications and veneer of increased authenticity lent by ‘unedited’ coverage.  The 
traditional skills of journalism, verification, analysis and contextualisation are ever more 
important for Thompson in the modern era of instant global communications, as a 
means of distinguishing journalism from other forms of communication.  “These days, 
increasingly, having worthy generic shots and worthy interviews and subjects doesn’t 
really cut it anymore…you either live or die by your access”, argues Thompson (2006).  
And, journalist’s expertise continues to play an important role in making sense of ‘reality’ 
for audiences; “I think it’s really easy to underestimate the filtering process…taking 
white noise and turning it into something actually intelligible and interesting and 
illuminating” (2006).  Murdoch emphasises the freedom that embedding permitted, 
stating, “…on the ground there was no censorship, I could quote anybody that said 
anything, there was only one strict rule…but if you abided by that, you could file 
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whatever you like [sic] (Murdoch 2006).  Professionalism thus persists in its relevance to 
the embedding context for these journalists.  Indeed, in the complicated and confused 
context of war and real-time communications, the journalist’s role as arbiter of news and 
understanding is maintained.  As this section details, the persistent representations of 
the embedded experience concentrate on the operational and narrative aspects of the 
invasion rather than dwelling on substantive issues war’s impact on either soldiers or 
civilians.  Furthermore, within this study, the embedded reporter’s abilities to engage 
with critical perspectives were thrown into particular relief by their presence at notable 
military controversies, such as the checkpoint killings of Iraqi civilians by US military 
reported by Geoff Thompson.   
 Lindsay Murdoch’s (embedded for Fairfax Ltd) reporting most clearly illustrates 
the attempts by embedded reporters to protect their identity by adhering strictly to the 
prescriptions of professionalism.  As Murdoch has stated his reporting focused simply 
on what he could see, that which was evident before him, reiterating the realist 
perspective at the heart of the professional discourse.  An important consequence of 
this approach is the unavoidable focus of such a reporting style on the Coalition 
activities operations and perspectives and for which the experiment of embedding has 
been heavily criticised (Tumber 2004; Reese 2004; Seib 2004; PEJ 2003).  Murdoch’s 
reporting is almost exclusively concerned with military operations and detail.  The 
following account of military activities from early in the invasion is typical: 
  
The Iraqi gunners fired first, soon after US President George Bush had announced the 
 attack on Saddam Hussein was underway.   
 It was a fatal mistake. 
 The Iraqi artillery unit, preparing for the American invasion, tested the range by firing 
 registering shots at a spot where the American tanks were likely to cross from Kuwait. 
 American radar picked up the incoming shells and pinpointed their source. 
 Within hours, the Iraqi gunners and their Russian-made 112-millimetre howitzers were 
 destroyed, as the Americans unleashed an artillery barrage that shook the ground and lit 
 up the night sky with orange flashes. 
 “Dead bodies are everywhere,” an American officer reported by radio (the Age, 22/03/03: 
 1). 
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According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) report, embedded 
journalism had “all the virtues and vices of reporting only what you could see” (PEJ 
2003; 1), providing little analysis, a narrow range or sources and the avoidance of 
graphic material in favour of the dramatic, an analysis supported by the current 
examples.  Centrally, critics argue that embedding led reporters to identify with soldiers, 
encouraging uncritical reporting that failed to contextualise the complexity of war.  
Rarely, if ever, were audiences reminded that the discovery of torture facilities and 
mass graves and the use of unconventional tactics by Iraqi forces did not justify the 
invasion (Seib 2004; 60-61). Australian embedded reporting must be seen in this 
context.   
 An interpretation of Murdoch’s reporting reveals little interpretation or discussion 
of war, beyond its description and it’s articulation into a dramatic narrative.  This 
analysis supports the PEJ’s findings.  As such, this coverage tended to limit description 
to operational matters.  His reports are leavened with significant amounts of ‘colour’, 
and those discussions of war entered into were concerned primarily with tactics, often 
including American justification for certain actions.  As such, this embedded reporting 
must be seen within the context both of professional norms.  It should also be 
understood as a discourse producing military normalisation, naturalising military 
perspectives and maintaining the hegemony of military logics.  For example: 
 
 Further south, a four and a half hour gun battle broke out at the strategic port city of Um 
 Qasr, one day after US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the allies had won 
 control of the city. 
 Tanks and aircraft attacked targets where at least 120 Republican guards were dug in at 
 Iraq’s only deepwater port.   
 After two air strikes by British harrier jets, each dropping one 500-pound bomb, some 
 Iraqis could be seen waving white flags and surrendering. 
 Referring to the air strikes, Captain Rick Crevier, commander of Fox Company of the 2nd 
 Battalion, 1st US Marine Regiment, said: “It made sense for us to do this.  Rather than  
 send men in there, we’re just going to destroy it” (the Age, 24/03/03: 3). 
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Such normalisation and legitimation of the American/coalition experience is not only a 
key criticism of embedding – the experience, and thus coverage, is structured to favour 
the American perspective (PEJ 2003; 9), but also of the professional conception of 
journalism.  In Murdoch’s case this meant the facts, “just what I could see every day, 
just what I could see and what I could quickly get out…” (Murdoch 2006).     
 
Geoff Thompson’s (ABC Radio) reporting was also less inclined towards normalising 
American military logic, although through less celebratory coverage.  Here, however, a 
concern for clearly enunciating one’s professionalism leads to a more deeply inquisitive 
reporting style than Murdoch’s.  Ultimately however, Thompson’s reports are similarly 
weakly empathetic towards the soldiers and avoid a deeper and more inquiring position, 
in favour of pursuing correct professional practice.  In this sense the very ‘quality’ of 
Thompson’s professionalism obviates the expression of deeper understandings beyond 
superficial accounts of military activity.  In such accounts articulating the individualised 
soldiers experiences - the ‘reality of the troops’ into the discourse effectively journalises 
the military.  By privileging and making visible military experiences and perspectives 
professional journalism actively supports the strategic intent of the military 
communications policy (Department of Defense 2003).  
 Beyond describing the embedded experience, as Murdoch’s reporting did, 
Thompson is concerned to convey something of the nature of the American forces with 
whom he travels.  As previously noted, with regards to the American military, Thompson 
considered embedding to offer the best coverage opportunities since Vietnam of the 
“American war machine” (Thompson 2006b).  An interest in being ‘up close and 
personal’ with soldiers is evident from Thompson’s earliest embedded reports.  And 
embedding is justified in these terms – focusing on the narrow experiences of 
individuals or small groups of soldiers.  
For Thompson, through embedding the ‘objective truth’ of military life, in the form 
of first person interviews, is accurately represented: 
 
 Geoff Thompson:  Lance Corporal Timothy Galuga is just 21-years old.  How do you feel 
 about what’s likely to happen in the next 48 hours? 
 
 
267 
  
 Timothy Galuga:  I’ll see what happens, I’m ready to go.  I’ve been ready to go, we’ve all 
 been ready to go, just waiting for the ok to do our job and take it from there. 
  
 Geoff Thompson:  Any concerns about the unknown? 
  
 Timothy Galuga:  Ah, no.  You know, fear of the unknown is normal, everyone has fear 
 about that, but once you get used to the surroundings, you know, everybody will be 
 alright.  That’s what marines do; we help each other out because we’re all a big 
 brotherhood here.  You know, if somebody is lost out there, we pull them back in.  We 
 make sure everyone is alright you know.  We’ll be fine (AM, 20/03/03).   
 
This interest in the soldiers themselves goes beyond Murdoch’s concern over hardships 
and operational detail and attempts to explore the innocence, ignorance and 
inexperience that were manifest among American soldiers.  As Thompson (2006) 
argues: 
  
 But I knew that [interviewing naïve American soldiers] was interesting and newsworthy.  
 But you don’t need to grill Americans for them to say things and couch things in a way 
 that was interesting.  I wasn’t goading them or anything; you didn’t need to do that.   
  
This reporting strategy served Thompson well, permitting many broadcasts in which the 
complexities, or lack thereof, of American attitudes were demonstrated: 
  
 Geoff Thompson:  Within hours of going to church, Lance Corporal Charles Robertson is 
 receiving orders to kill people he has never met and whose bodies he will probably never 
 see. 
  
 Charles Robertson:  Well, you have to definitely know that, believe that you’re doing the 
 right thing out here and pray a lot and get peace from God that you’re doing the right 
 thing ‘cause if you don’t think you’re doing the right thing and then you go to church and 
 you worship and then you’re killing somebody, then. You know, it’s something that 
 causes a big conflict. 
 
 
268 
 But, it’s different to think about it ‘cause, you know, usually you think about going to 
 church in your nice clothes on a Sunday morning at home and going back and eating 
 dinner with family .  But out here you go to church and then three hours later you’re 
 sending rounds down, raining shit on people. 
 So, it’s different.  There’s not an emotional, it’s not much of an emotional conflict for me 
 because like I said, I think I’m doing the right thing out here.  (AM, 31/03/03). 
 
Such reporting is professionally accomplished.  Verbatim interviews convey ‘realism’, 
while the reporter remains aloof, allowing the ‘facts’ of the interviewees responses 
‘speak for themselves’.  Importantly for professionalism, verbatim interviews offer 
audiences direct access to ‘reality as it is’ and they offer an ostensibly unadulterated 
account of newsworthy information, in this case insight into the thoughts and feelings of 
American soldiers.  From this perspective, embedding has been celebrated as allowing 
a close and detailed understanding of military activity (Thompson 2006; Murdoch 2006; 
Campbell 2006).  However, while this is achieved, this closeness to military operations 
and personnel, and a keenness to report ‘up close and personal’ must also be 
considered not only to systematically privilege coalition military perspective, but to 
normalise, humanise and empathise with the subjectivities and experiences of 
(American) soldiers.  Professionalism here, in its attempts to describe the war 
experience honestly and to offer new insight, also serves to humanise and empathise 
with the war effort, without a deeper consideration of the consequences of such a 
posture.  As similarly noted by Reese (2004; 250) coverage of war in this manner 
integrates the, “logic of military conflict into society, making it difficult to separate out the 
merits of the larger policy which became hopelessly woven into the larger story”.   
 As noted and discussed above, Thompson witnessed and reported on the killing 
of civilians by American soldiers.  The treatment of this issue usefully encapsulates this 
criticism of embedding and professionalism and demonstrates clearly how the 
relationship established between soldiers and embedded journalists may impact the 
reporting of war.  In reporting the 10 April killings, Thompson (AM, 10.04.03) contradicts 
the soldiers accounts of the fire-fight, stating clearly that, “they’re all saying that they 
saw green and white tracer fire [that] comes from AK-47s, so that’s likely to be enemy 
fire.  I never saw green and white tracer fire.  Michael Cox, our ABC cameraman here, 
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never saw green and white tracer fire.”  However, having established the poor 
judgement of the military unit, Thompson goes on to excuse the incompetence that his 
interlocutor suggests; 
 
 Geoff Thompson:  I think what’s happened is that they got very excited and I think that 
 they were very anxious...basically they were trying to keep civilian vehicles away. 
 They did warn the vehicle, they said, “back, back, back” but you must remember it is 
 dark.  The vehicles have got headlights coming up the back of the vehicle [sic]. 
  
 Linda Mottram:  So, you’re talking about highly trained American marines who are in a 
 state of nervousness and excitement, who seen unable to determine what exactly is 
 coming at them and who are even made more jumpy by civilian headlights from cars in a 
 suburb, hardly an unsurprising encounter? 
  
 Geoff Thompson:  That’s right.  They have their, I mean I think their operational 
 procedures are to keep civilian vehicles away. 
 There’s an assumption that civilians will know what this means, that they will know what 
 it means when a marine waves them down in the other direction.   
 Clearly, this incident, this clearly tragic incident has proven that’s not the case (AM; 
 10/04/03). 
 
This episode is one that has been often referred to by Australian journalists as 
representing the capabilities of embedded journalists to report the realities of war free 
from censorship.  This story has been celebrated as evidence of the permission granted 
to more critical perspectives by the American military (Campbell 2006; Kerr 2006; 
Gawenda 2008).  Indeed, Thompson (2006) argues that, “we filmed young grunts 
shooting up a car full of civilians.  Yes, it [embedding] does privilege their perspective, 
but it doesn’t make them immune from criticism or surveillance”.  Critics, however, have 
pointed to the dangers of embedded journalists becoming socialised into military life and 
establishing relationships with soldiers beyond the impartiality demanded by 
professionalism (Tumber 2004: 202-203).  Reese identifies this as the “militarisation of 
journalism” where a relationship develops between soldiers and journalists and a 
naturalised logic of military operations and culture imposes itself, “working against 
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alternative frameworks of interpretation” (Reese 2004: 250).  Thompson himself admits 
to feelings of compassion and empathy for the soldiers involved in the shootings: 
  
I felt sorry for the young grunts…I felt sorry for them – I’ve been in those situations 
 before, where it all gets blurred and everyone gets very excited and the blood’s flowing 
 and rumour and misjudgement bubble to the surface very quickly.  Coming off that battle 
 high they couldn’t with any sort of sober perspective actually look at what happened, so 
 yeah, I felt sorry for them…” (Thompson 2006).   
 
It is possible then to get a sense of deeper questions going unanswered, as journalists 
report on the factual occurrence of events such as these, yet explain away the very real 
and violent deaths of civilians through statements of ‘excitement’ or ‘misjudgement’ on 
the part of the soldiers.  Indeed, this episode is articulated in news discourse as ‘clearly 
tragic’ rather than militarily incompetent.  Here the soldier’s incompetence and the 
horrors of multiple civilian killings are elided, replaced with rationalisation and 
humanisation of the soldier’s action.  Such representations, rather than posing deeper 
questions about the preparedness of the American military, the degree of care taken by 
the invading forces or the wider implications of violence on civil society, normalises the 
extreme violence of military operations.   
 Thus, embedding, while holding out a promise of close, open and ‘never before 
seen’ coverage of Americans at war, rather generated a reporting style that offered 
limited deeper understandings of war.  Embedding appealed directly to professionalism, 
couched as it was in professional discourse, offering new possibilities to earnest war 
journalists.  Rather however, as many critics have observed, embedding freed military 
authorities from accusations of “crude censorship” (Cottle 2006: 95) by offering greater 
access to information than previously, yet in a context that was favourable to the 
strategic intent of military communication planners.  As has also been noted, embedded 
journalists provided a war narrative that offered little in the way of contextualised 
understandings of war’s meaning (Lewis and Brookes 2004).  The evidence provided by 
the present study supports this argument.  As shown above, embeds, while close to the 
gritty details of military life tended to normalise war and provide sympathetic portrayals 
of the soldiers with whom they travelled.  And although genuine insight is offered by 
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some embedded reporting, the individual perspectives of soldiers are articulated into 
mainstream public knowledge and ‘journalised’ through empathetic and compassionate 
coverage.  Such a tendency must be understood in the context of the professional 
discourse.  Although embedding offered apparent openness to journalists and offered 
them the professional freedom they enunciate as centrally important, professionalism 
ensured that the more complex issues of context, significance, the possible outcomes 
and ramifications of invasion were avoided.  Importantly, critical perspectives were 
avoided in favour of the ‘objectivity’ of military facts and events, progress and 
infrastructure, drama and personalities. 
 
9.7 CONCLUSION 
Building on the arguments established in the previous chapters, this section has 
demonstrated how meaning is enunciated in mainstream news from Iraq, how 
professionalism serves to legitimate the construction of these meanings and how these 
may be understood as functional within wider military strategy.   
 Professionalism creates a distinctly conventional understanding of war.  A 
‘behind the lines’ perspective, or ‘people’s story’ is considered valuable and useful.  So 
too are the new and inherently newsworthy locations and experiences made possible by 
the construction of Centcom and the military embed system.  Indeed, all these modes of 
understanding the war, and the meanings attached to them are held to be creative of 
knowledge.  However, as this analysis finds, rather than expanding substantive 
knowledge about the Iraq war experience, professionalism at once obscures its own 
contingencies, such as the control and discipline exerted upon journalists by their 
employers.  Professionalism generates meanings that while productive of information, 
limit rather than enhance substantive knowledge.  By placing the reporter at the centre 
of a new serial, war becomes a personalised narrative in which a ‘star’ journalist is the 
central character.  Although this form of journalism may impart noteworthy detail, war 
itself becomes disconnected from wider (political) processes only to be understood as a 
series of dramatic, subjective events.   
 Professionalism enunciates a journalism that is unnecessarily patriotic, uncritical 
and disproportionate.  Although the Australian component of the Coalition forces was 
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comparatively small, coverage concerning Australian activities, both military and 
mundane was persistent and widespread.  Journalists are aware of the dangers of 
being ‘caught up in’ the excitement and fervour of war however they nonetheless 
reproduce such excitement and adventure as ‘news’.  On one hand this is due to the 
professional demands of mainstream news organisations, either “picking that sort of 
stuff up” (Callinan 2006) or attempting to keep up with the competition, as Willacy’s 
experiences make clear.  Indeed, Australian angles are a professional’s comparative 
advantage in a media saturated environment.  The effect however, as evidenced by the 
analysis, is a continued predilection for uncritical journalism that both naturalises and 
trivialises the war experience, while celebrating the Australian military contribution.   
 Such normalisation of militarism is further evident in and a distinct feature of, the 
reporting both from Centcom and from embedded journalists.  Both of these locations of 
news confront journalists with a range of difficulties and constraints.  However, rather 
than present critical perspectives, professionalism enunciates meanings that elide any 
deeper understanding of war beyond the personalities, experiences and operational 
details that characterise both forms.  Although they were aware of the constraints 
placed on their reporting at Centcom (and indeed of the propaganda function of both the 
military press centre and the media corps), journalists opted to treat the operation as 
legitimate and the news produced as credible.  In effect a ‘straw man’ of access and 
crude propaganda is critiqued within the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1986). 
This enables the expression and articulation of normative, professional identities, while 
deeper issues such as the systematic manipulation of information, the conditions of 
journalism production or the relationship between the military and the media goes 
unexamined for fear of appearing biased or unprofessional.   
 In the case of embedding, an arrangement of protection and control of journalists 
by the military, the exercise was treated as any other assignment – journalists 
remaining “self-consciously un-reflexive” (Pedelty 1995) towards broader implications of 
presenting humanised, naturalised and often sympathetic accounts of (primarily) 
American militarism.  Rather, the ‘fantasy’ (Žižek, 1989) of professionalism is 
emphasised – reporting is based explicitly on witnessed events, and distance is 
established through the use of superficial language designed to keep the media and the 
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military separate (such as distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’).  Such rationally enacted 
and purposefully enunciated professionalism overlooks the persistence and power of 
providing the military perspective so clearly, repetitively and empathetically.   
Other scholars have identified how embedding inculcates a militarisation of 
journalism through the immersion of journalists in military environments under the 
protection of military personnel.  This chapter has identified a corollary to this process.  
In so far as journalists become militarised, soldiers are also articulated into news 
discourse as individuals, and humanised through the expression of their perspectives, 
fears and thoughts.  In this way the military is successfully journalised by professional 
journalism and this process realises the military strategic intent, expressed in the 
guidelines to the embedding program (Whitman 2003).  
Indeed, although journalists are concerned to maintain a clear distance between 
themselves and those they cover.  However, the personalised and humanised reporting 
of soldiers and military activities undermines any separation.  The obvious danger here 
and one realised in the coverage of the Iraq war, is that as journalists bond and begin to 
identify (“I felt sorry for them”) with soldiers.  In these circumstances the professional 
scheme and its goals are displaced by a journalistic form that while asserting its 
professionalism serves to rationalise and normalise the deadly horrors of war.    
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CHAPTER TEN – CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
The purpose of the thesis has been to present an argument concerning the influence of 
journalistic professionalism on Australian news journalism during the invasion of Iraq, 
2003.  In doing so the thesis has addressed and answered the research questions and 
made a timely, original contribution to the field of war journalism studies.  The thesis has 
identified space within the existing literature which demonstrates the utility of employing 
discourse theoretic concepts and analytical strategies in the analysis of news 
production.  The thesis has also outlined its understanding of these discursive concepts 
and strategies and it has deployed them in its analysis of Iraq War journalism.  Through 
this analytic strategy the effect of the professional discourse on the production of war 
journalism has been demonstrated and examined.  The analysis has yielded new insight 
into both professionalism and war journalism.  Professional war journalism, rather than 
achieving of the normative aims of liberal journalism, serves the discursive needs of 
both journalists and news institutions, legitimating and justifying their practice.  
Furthermore, the discourse of professionalism ensures journalists ‘overlook’ the role 
they play in, on one hand producing a palatable ‘war product’ for consumers of war 
news, and on the other, contributing to military and political strategies of normalizing, 
legitimating and ultimately supporting the logics of contemporary war.   
 
10.2 METHODOLOGY           
This thesis has demonstrated the utility of the discourse analytical perspective in the 
study of journalism, providing constructive critical direction to the field.  In this thesis I 
have combined a variety of analytical perspectives and strategies.  I have drawn on in-
depth interview material, an analysis of news text and an analysis of the institutional-
bureaucratic context of news production in constructing and articulating my argument.  
This range of analytic approaches to professional journalism, placed within historic and 
contemporary contexts, has facilitated an analysis of greater depth and complexity than 
one solely reliant on one or other aspect of news production.  Importantly, these 
methodological considerations have been made with reference to the existing literature 
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concerning both the ‘ideology’ of professionalism and contemporary war journalism.  As 
the thesis is concerned with the manner in which war is ‘made real’ for audiences 
through the statement and articulation of discourse, a methodological approach which 
produces a discursive account of war and makes this accessible to the researcher, such 
as that employed in this study, is considered appropriate.  The thesis’ method is 
purposefully critical and has reflexively constructed a critical account of Australian war 
journalism in order to identify limitations within contemporary professional practices and 
identities.   
 
10.3 THEORETICAL ORIENTATION        
Theoretically, this study has demonstrated the utility of employing discourse theoretic 
concepts and analytic strategies to contemporary war journalism.  This contribution has 
developed space and direction for critical scholarship of journalism.  In particular, I have 
demonstrated how critical energies have exhausted ‘ideology’ as a useful analytical 
concept for journalism studies.  I have shown that critical progress can be made through 
the employment of theoretical concepts drawn from contemporary discourse theory, 
which theoretically privilege the process of making and articulating ‘meanings’ over the 
structural imposition of ideology.  Having provided a brief genealogy of the critical 
concept of ideology, I have carefully explicated my understanding and use of discourse 
theory.  Drawing on Foucault’s discourse and social theory I have shown the existence 
and the general formation of the professional discourse as both emerging historically 
and within contemporary Australian journalism.  Furthermore, I have shown how 
sensitivity for the relations of power and the conditions of the professional discourse’s 
employment or articulation plays a significant role in the production of war news.  
Specifically, I have shown how the discourse serves news institutional power, rather 
than facilitating the fulfilment of normative journalistic functions, such as the provision of 
neutral, independently newsworthy information.  The discourse both produces ‘useful’ 
journalists, while permitting the maintenance of an independent and objective identity.  
This analysis has been augmented by the inclusion of concepts drawn from the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), whose expanded notion of the discursive 
and means by which discourse is circulated has permitted the conceptualisation of news 
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professionalism both as hegemonic within the discursive field of journalism and 
consonant with contemporary forms of administrative, political and military hegemony.   
 
10.4 THE THESIS IN CONTEXT 
Both the methodological and theoretical approaches of this thesis are justified with 
reference to the existing literature in the field of journalism and communication studies.  
I have located this study at the nexus of three traditions within media analysis in order to 
demonstrate the critical progress that can be made through the combination of 
sociological, cultural and institutional foci.  The use of discourse theory in media 
analysis has illustrated a means by which the other perspectives can be united, as 
discourse theory, with its pre-occupation with the generation and circulation of meaning 
necessarily draws on sociology, cultural studies and political economy in identifying the 
location and effects of discursive articulations.  Specifically, I have shown how within 
these older traditions of media analysis, criticism reliant on the concept of ‘ideology’ has 
predominated.  Ideology critique relied on monolithic conceptions of power.  By contrast, 
the theoretic approach employed here has illustrated the consonance of discursive 
needs of journalists with military-political and administrative power, rather than 
domination by ideology.  Furthermore, seldom has discourse analysis been applied 
within the field of war journalism studies and this thesis has purposefully and 
constructively illustrated the utility of this theoretical approach to the study of the 
generation and circulation of news-meanings during war and conflict.    
 
10.5 EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS 
Empirically, this thesis has drawn on a wide range of material in order to both answer 
the thesis’ research questions and to clearly illustrate the development, organisation 
and operation of the professional discourse within contemporary journalism.  The 
empirical observations were presented in five chapters, which employed this thesis’ 
stated methodological and theoretical approach in order to elucidate the emergence, 
structure and operation of the professional discourse in war news journalism.   
 In Chapter Five the thesis presented an account of the historical emergence of 
emergence of the professional discourse within Anglo-journalism and its establishment 
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as a hegemonic discourse within journalism.  This account demonstrated the 
emergence of professionalism, as a specific set of journalistic practices and ethics, in 
the late-nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries to be largely a product of commercial 
needs and interests, which sought mass appeal and audiences for newspapers.  
Professionalism, however, also appealed to the scientific, positivist orthodoxies of the 
era, which optimistically held that the truth and reality of human experience may be laid 
bare through the application of scientific, objective methods of observation.  By the mid-
twentieth century professionalism prevailed as the hegemonic discourse within 
mainstream news journalism.  This was, as Hallin (1992) has characterised, 
journalism’s high modern period.  This chapter then provided an account of the 
professional method, detailing its central positive pre-occupation with ‘facticity’ and its 
disavowal of non-objective approaches to reporting news and demonstrated how 
professionalism has become sedimented as an occupational ‘ideology’42.  The 
professional ideology, as professionalism came to be characterised, has been widely 
criticised as encouraging status quo, inherently conservative news representations, 
unable to move its social and political analysis beyond the ‘balance’ of competing, often 
unequally powerful views.  Chapter Five then placed professionalism in its 
contemporary context, in the age of post-modernity and neo-liberal globalisation.  Here I 
argued that professional journalism, facing challenges from cultural, social and 
economic changes, remains founded on nineteenth century professional ethics and 
values.  Professionalism, hamstrung by these outdated commitments, is unable to 
adequately address the complexity and multi-perspectival nature of the modern era.  
Moral, social and cultural norms and absolutes have all been called into question by the 
socio-economic and philosophic changes of the later-twentieth century. This section 
also provided an examination of the contemporary Australian news media relevant to 
this thesis.  I briefly examined the challenges faced by contemporary Australian 
journalism, such as corporate domination of the media sector and government hostility 
to public broadcasting.  These are particularly Australian expressions of global trends. 
In this context, contemporary forms of administrative, political and military power resist 
                                                
42 Here ideology is used, as it is in Chapter Five, as a descriptive term which is borrowed from the literature of this 
period.  As shown this thesis rearticulates ideology critique through discourse theory. 
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simplistic, objective analyses. The employment of sophisticated and impenetrable 
information and communications strategies during conflict and war highlights these 
difficulties for journalists and highlights journalists’ position of structural weakness in 
relation to military authority.  Furthermore, as has been shown, professionalism in 
journalism is incapable of resisting the turn towards the spectacular and dramatic.  In 
the context of war, lifestyle and tabloid features, such as military profiles and parochial 
reporting have been successfully integrated into war journalistic forms.  Indeed, in the 
globalised era, news journalism has been criticised for offering highly commercialised 
high-tech, 24/7 ‘news products’ rather than adhering to its normative values of insightful, 
critical news and analysis.  These criticisms have guided this thesis’ analysis of 
contemporary Australian war journalism.  Notwithstanding these criticisms however, the 
discourse of professionalism protects journalists from potential criticisms as they invoke 
the hegemonic identity of independent, objective and moral journalists to defend and 
justify their practice. 
 In Chapter Six the existence and general formation of the professional discourse, 
as observed through in-depth interviews with Australian journalists and editors was 
demonstrated and examined.  This was done in accordance with the thesis’ stated 
methodological aims of problematising professionalism and providing an alternative 
account of war to that observed in news reports.  I was able to show the discursive 
formation of professionalism, as enacted during the Iraq invasion, was comprised three 
major discourses: objectivity, independence and newsworthiness (news values).  Within 
these discourses, concepts and strategies (Foucault 1972) and nodal points (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985) were identified which serve to organise and regulate what may or 
may not be included within professional journalistic output and from which the 
journalistic identity is constructed.  For example, this section demonstrated the 
importance of the concept of ‘reality’ in reinforcing the empiricist, positivist approach 
journalists undertake in reporting and transmitting ‘truthful’ news.  Likewise, a moral 
commitment to reporting and illuminating the ‘people’s story’ during war demonstrates 
the importance of an emotional, empathetic approach to covering war and its 
substantive effects.  Concepts and articulatory strategies such as these clearly illustrate 
professionalism as a positive inclusionary regime, seeking to bring journalistic practices 
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and forms within its legitimating, discursive bounds.  However, as this section has 
demonstrated also, the discourse privileges certain aspects of war news coverage, such 
as Central Command and embedding, as legitimate, normalised news locations, in 
which normative professionalism can be un-problematically exercised.  In this sense the 
professional discourse is invoked to justify contingent, circumstantial journalistic practice 
and to reinforce an image of journalistic independence in the face of widespread military 
control and information management.  Furthermore, the discourse is shown to operate 
as an exclusionary regime which is used to de-legitimate aspects of wartime reality and 
coverage so as to establish an ‘other’ against which the professional identity is defined 
and legitimated.  The de-legitimation of non-professional, Iraqi and counter-hegemonic 
perspectives (such as ‘alternative’ readings of certain events – the Firdos Square statue 
destruction for example) provides the most clear examples of this process.  Chapter Six 
demonstrates professionalism both as sedimented as a hegemonic journalistic form and 
also as a discursive ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1980) which controls, organises and 
regulates the production of Iraq War news.  
 In Chapter Seven the analysis moved from a description of the professional 
discourse to an account of its operation.  This analysis attended to the individual 
enactment of professionalism and to its operation both within the context of news 
institutions and within the wider field of military and political power.  Initially the power 
journalists possess to produce war news was examined.  I argue journalists, deploying 
the professional discourse, wield considerable power in making war ‘real’ for news 
audiences.  This ‘power to represent’ however, is also the power to exclude and control 
what becomes news of war, and this power has also been illustrated, for example the 
exclusion of defining civilian casualties as anything other than a “clearly tragic incident” 
(AM, 10/04/03).  Indeed, this section makes clear that not only does professionalism 
exclude potential news-meanings, but also that in realising their power and expressing 
their professional identity journalists tend to function as ‘useful’ within military and 
administrative strategy.   
 Chapter Seven goes on to demonstrate how journalist’s agency and autonomy is 
limited by their location within news institutions.  However, I have shown that the 
discourse provides the means by which this disciplinary power is overlooked by 
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individual journalists. Although coercive power may be an affront to journalistic identity 
yet it is rationalised by professionalism.  Furthermore, administrative power is identified 
as that form of power which exists as already within professionalism.  That is, 
professionalism implies a commitment and ability to reproduce news institutional norms, 
and the most highly regarded journalists are those who have most completely 
internalised this commitment, thus overcoming the tension between individual and 
institution autonomy and power.  This commitment results in attractive, saleable and 
spectacular coverage that is articulated in easily processed and comprehended forms 
and which avoids complexity and nuance yet fulfils news institutional requirements.  It is 
a feature of administrative power that it permits the pursuit and realisation of 
autonomous professional identity, yet obscures the compromises and relations of 
subordination that characterise war journalism, such as those that exist between the 
media and military authorities.  This chapter concludes by arguing administrative power, 
produces ‘useful and ‘docile’ journalists.  The high value news coverage that news 
institutions pursue necessarily entails journalistic forms which are useful within the 
strategic intent of military and political authorities – such as normalising military logic 
and providing humanising coverage of soldiers and military operations through ‘up close 
and personal’ reporting.  In conclusion, Chapter Seven argues that professionalism is 
consonant with the broader cultural and economic conditions of neo-liberalism which 
individuate human responsibility and agency, obscuring the role played by 
professionalism in reproducing these larger systemic hegemonies.  
 The final chapters of analysis dealt directly with the production of Iraq War news 
in order to demonstrate explicitly how the professional discourse serves to produce or 
make the Iraq War ‘real’ within news discourse.  Chapter Eight was concerned with 
illustrating how the discourse legitimates certain aspects of war coverage while Chapter 
Nine has analysed the news-meanings and effects which were produced through the 
discourse.  In Chapter Eight the discourse has been shown to privilege and legitimate 
certain contingent aspects of war-reality, such as the ‘people’s story’ and the centrality 
and importance of journalist’s authority as witnesses to produce accounts of war for 
news audiences.  The analysis has shown that although many representations of Iraqi 
civilians relied heavily of cultural stereotypes and bald chauvinism, and that the witness-
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authority of journalists yielded many inaccurate and unreliable news accounts, these 
representations were justified with reference to professionalism.  The discourse was 
demonstrated as centrally important in maintaining and reinforcing journalistic legitimacy 
and authority in these circumstances.  It is through professionalism that the archetypal 
journalistic identity is maintained and reproduced.  This analysis clearly shows the 
strategic, legitimating function of professionalism.  This is especially evident in the 
analysis of Centcom and embedding.  Here the discourse is shown to be crucial in 
justifying and normalising the participation of journalists and media organisations in 
media-information strategies enacted by Western military-political power.  As the 
analysis has argued the discourse of professionalism provides journalists with the 
capacity to ‘overlook’ their involvement and functionality within military communications 
strategy. 
 Chapter Nine analysed the professional production of news-meaning during war.  
In this section it was shown how the operation of institutional controls restrain 
journalistic meanings within relatively narrow, conservative and, importantly, 
unprovocative limits.  The analysis also showed how alternative potential meanings are 
subordinated to professional definitions.  This analysis illustrates that war is ever more 
portrayed as a dramatised spectacle, disconnected from wider issues of military and 
political policy.  This effect of professionalism is most notably illustrated by the 
emergence during war of the journalist as the ‘star’ or ‘celebrity’ within his or her own 
narrative.   
 This chapter also demonstrates the professional pre-disposition, as a result of 
journalist’s subordination by military power, for military-centric and disproportionately 
patriotic and parochial coverage.  As I have shown, such a predilection amongst 
journalists naturalises and trivialises war while humanising individual soldiers and 
celebrating Australian militarism. 
 Lastly, Chapter Nine has demonstrated how professionalism ensures journalists 
can report from controversial locations, such as Centcom and embedded journalism, 
both maintaining their legitimacy yet avoiding controversy or substantive criticisms of 
military policy and operations. Professionalism permits the ‘performance’ of 
independence and criticism, such as identifying the crude propaganda strategies 
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employed by military authorities, yet avoids substantive issues such as interrogating 
military policy or exploring the relationship between the media and the military, for 
example. For several interviewees, their role was effectively limited to policing language 
use, determined as they were to avoid the pitfalls of previous wars.  In this sense 
professional discourse inculcates the ‘militarisation of journalistic consciousness’ 
(Kellner 1992; Reese 2004) in which, while egregious misuse of language is prevented, 
military policy, operations and logics are normalised within news discourse.  In relation 
to embedded journalism, professionalism provides both the rationale and justification for 
cooperation with military authorities.  Contemporary technologies, audience 
expectations and competition between news organisations are argued to ‘demand’ 
participation in such programs.  Indeed, embedding is held to yield important insights 
into war, according to this study’s interviewees.  Professionalism however, is invoked to 
protect against accusations of pro-Western bias or ‘cheerleader’ journalism.  Through 
professional practices and ethics, journalists argue, remaining independent of and 
critical towards those military units with which they travel is entirely possible.  However, 
as Chapter Nine demonstrates, a commitment to professionalism means journalists, 
while aware of their subordination to military power, overlook both their rationalisation of 
military logics and operations and empathise with and humanise individual soldiers.  In 
this sense professionalism enacts the ‘journalisation’ of the military, presenting a 
sanitised, sympathetic representation of militarism, yet doing so from a superficially 
professional position.  
 
10.6 THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN WAR JOURNALISM 
Journalism therefore, is not dominated by monolithic ideology and nor should 
professionalism be understood as an ideology to which journalists are committed.  
Rather, as this thesis has shown, professionalism in journalism should be understood 
as a pragmatic arrangement of discourses, concepts and strategies which facilitate the 
production of journalism’s object, news.  In this thesis I have shown professionalism to 
have emerged from specific historic, cultural and economic conditions.  In this process 
professionalism’s utility in producing a standardised, saleable news-commodity is 
central.  As I have argued, this aspect of professionalism has been exploited to the 
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extent that the commodification of journalism has outweighed other considerations, 
such as public service.  Professionalism is thus the central operational ethic within news 
institutions and among news professionals.  In this sense professionalism not only 
facilitates the bureaucratic and rational organisation and dispersal of news-producing 
resources, but has also become the measure of the extent to which journalists have 
internalised the norms, values and practices of a given news institution.   
 Professionalism therefore provides coherence and purpose to journalistic 
activities.  Professionalism is both a frame work of intelligibility and a ‘horizon of 
possibility’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  Journalism’s task, in general terms, is to make 
sense of a chaotic and complex reality for news audiences.  In performing this function, 
professionalism appeals to scientific discourse and notion of public service and 
democratic/liberal freedoms to justify and legitimate its practice, ethics and the 
privileged social position of journalists as producers of knowledge. 
 However, as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1980) professionalism also excludes 
and de-legitimises potential aspects of news reality and does so, this thesis shows, with 
self-serving expediency rather than with reference to external, objective norms.  Indeed, 
exclusions are justified by reference to journalistic norms, which professionalism itself 
defines.  In this sense professionalism provides journalism with a legitimate defence 
over accusations of improper execution of its normative role – what Tuchman (1978) 
has called the ‘strategic ritual’ of objectivity.   
 Professionalism is clearly also productive.  Through its operation it not only 
excludes certain aspects of reality from its purview, but provides legitimacy for that 
which is included.  The contingent, pragmatic and situational needs of professional 
journalism are legitimated and justified through the discourse, yet overlooked also.  As 
this thesis has demonstrated professionalism is invoked as justifying the activities of the 
journalistic ‘witness’ and the production of the morally concerned ‘people’s story’ of the 
Iraq War.  The professional discourse crucially legitimates controversial journalistic 
activities too, such as coverage of military affairs and operations through press 
conferences (Central Command) and through embedding.  As I have argued such news 
locations are articulated as professional journalistic ‘needs’ and pragmatically 
legitimated through articulations of journalistic independence and neutrality.  As this 
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thesis has demonstrated such journalistic forms usefully function within military-political 
strategy and as such the needs of professional journalism are held to be consonant with 
the needs of military-political power.   
 The thesis has made clear that professionalism is a contingent, pragmatic 
discourse which is hegemonic within journalism and as such professionalism wields the 
power to define the activity of journalism itself.  The discourse regulates how a 
legitimate professional identity must be constructed, as certain journalistic norms and 
values are sanctioned and others are disavowed.  The discourse both includes and 
excludes certain activities, methods and identities, yet makes this selectivity opaque, 
through articulations of professionalism.  Consequently, this analysis of professional war 
journalism, rather than providing an objective view of complex political, military and 
social affairs, demonstrates the constraint of journalism within the regime of 
professionalism.  Indeed, the hegemony of professionalism within journalism ensures 
journalism’s object – independent reality, and in this case, war-reality, is produced in 
accordance with discursive needs rather than through fidelity to this external, positive 
reality.  It is in this sense that the professional discourse ‘makes war real’. 
 It is also a central argument of this thesis that a commitment to professionalism 
and its internalisation as the central hegemonic discourse within journalism prevents 
any critical re-consideration of journalism’s socio-political function by journalists 
themselves.  As I have made clear, this is not journalism’s ‘ideological effect’ (Hall 1977) 
in which journalists unknowingly reproduce the dominant cultural ideologies of an age, 
but rather the operation of the ‘ideological fantasy’ of professionalism.  Following Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985), this thesis has conceived of the discursive as coextensive with the 
social.  Thus, no meanings or identities are available from a position outside discursive 
constructions and articulations and thus all meaning is always already ideological 
(Laclau 1990; Žižek, 1989) and that ideology no longer implies its opposite, truth.  
Rather, the failure to recognise the radical contingency of meaning and identity, and of 
the discourses through which they are articulated, has been conceptualised as 
‘ideological fantasy’.  Professionalism, this thesis has demonstrated, is a discourse that 
carefully restrains critical self-reflection and provides the conceptual means with which 
to ‘overlook’ journalism’s limitations.  It is in this sense that professionalism in 
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journalism, as a hegemonic discourse which is operative within wider conditions of 
socio-political hegemony, can be characterised as a ‘fantasy’ which fails to recognise its 
own contingency and is consequently unable to address its own shortcomings, which 
the thesis has examined. 
 There exist therefore several implications for professional journalism.  As has 
been stated, this thesis has conceived theoretically of meaning and identity as radically 
contingent, yet in the context of professionalism sedimented into hegemonic discourse. 
As shown, professionalism powerfully produces both journalistic identities and news 
meanings.  The thesis has shown hegemonic professionalism to be historically, 
economically and culturally produced, as well as reinforced by the institutional and 
structural power relationships that characterise contemporary war journalism, such as a 
reliance on military protection and information.  
 An investigation of the conditions in which such forms of counter-hegemonic 
journalism may be possible, and a study of those counter-hegemonic articulations that 
were visible during the Iraq War would be constructive future research and would build 
purposefully on the findings of the present study.  Such research, building on the 
present findings may provide direction for journalism’s future development outside of the 
professionalism.    
 
10.7 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
In producing this thesis I have contributed to the field of journalism/communication 
studies in several constructive ways.  Firstly, the thesis has identified the need for 
theoretical and methodological development.  The thesis examined the useful 
contributions made by media sociologists, cultural theorists and political economists and 
demonstrated clearly how contemporary discourse theory may be used to enhance the 
critiques provided by these perspectives.  In particular, the thesis illustrated the utility of 
discourse theory in moving criticism of journalism and the media beyond problematic 
ideology critique.  The thesis has also demonstrated how the discourse perspective 
permits understanding the role of journalists during wartime beyond the paradigm of 
dominance, in which journalists are considered hopelessly exploited and controlled by 
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military and political power.  Rather I have shown the coincidence of professional 
journalistic and military-political strategic interests.  
 Secondly, the thesis has contributed meaningfully to the methodology of the 
study of journalism in general, and of war journalism in particular.  My study has sought 
discursive forms and articulations, produced in in-depth interviews, and cross-examined 
this material with reference to war news production, located in news articles and 
transcripts produced by those news professionals who participated.  This material has 
been purposefully located within both historic and contemporary cultural and economic 
contexts.  In this regard, and with the aim of understanding the emergence, form and 
operation of the professional discourse in contemporary war journalism, the 
methodology is held to be innovative. 
Thirdly, the study of discursive practices and their influence on the production of 
journalism is held to be innovative within the field of journalism studies and particularly 
in regards to studies of war journalism.  Where previous studies have emphasised the 
ideological nature of professionalism, this study has critiqued this perspective and offers 
a novel means for both understanding journalism and a contingent set of articulatory 
practices and provided the basis for future productive examinations which privilege the 
capacity of journalists and news organisations to apprehend, produce and articulate 
journalism outside of the strictures of professionalism.  The thesis emphasises the 
importance of reflexivity within the activity of making news ‘real’ for audiences and 
incorporating these reflections within the news making process. 
 Lastly this thesis has answered the research questions which were formulated to 
guide the investigation of the operation of professionalism in journalism.  In answering 
these questions the thesis has provided a timely empirical examination of Australian war 
journalism as observed during the Iraq War, 2003.  The interview data from which these 
observations were drawn is provided as appendices.   
To these ends this thesis represents a useful contribution to knowledge. 
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APPENDIX I - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT  
IAN MCPHEDRAN (NEWS LIMITED) 
17 MAY 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  What I wanted to ask you, what I wanted to start by asking you was what 
were you most proud of or what do you think you achieved best during you your time in 
Iraq and your reporting from there? 
 
Ian McPhedran:  The obvious thing is that it rounded the picture out for everyone, to 
have people on the ground from the enemy side, or the other side, if you like, of a war is 
quite important.  Otherwise you get just the one perspective, now given that most of 
what we were told or most of what we reported on was propaganda, we were able to get 
beyond that by going out and seeing for ourselves some of the things that were going 
on and talking to the local people.  That provided a very important perspective on the 
coverage for the readers back here… 
 
GD: Sure, sure.  How possible was it to get round the controls that the Ministry of 
Information would but on? 
 
IMc: Well, it was quite difficult and ultimately led to my demise in being thrown out of 
the country.  But you know there is always ways and means of doing things if you are 
prepared to take a few chances and stuff, but the media people at the ministry of 
information did provide us with quite good access with bus trips out to events, but you 
could never be sure who it was you were talking to once you got there.  But if you 
scouted around the edges of that and did your own thing to a certain extent and got 
around with your own car and driver, then you could pick up a few things and get a bit of 
a picture. 
 
GD: And it was possible to get your own car and get a bit of freedom then? 
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IMc: It wasn’t really that possible once the bombing started, because it became a little 
bit dangerous.  It was increasingly difficult um, but you know, we managed and in the 
end we got round and did a few things. 
 
Pause while Respondent takes another call. 
 
IMc:  So, where were we?  Yeah, it was ok to get around on your own a little bit, but [it] 
became increasingly difficult and because obviously the drivers were at home with their 
families as the bombing became more intensive. 
 
GD: Yeah, sure, listen I’ll get back to your experiences in Baghdad and thereabouts in 
a minute, but I wanted to talk about professional journalism, in a more sort of wider 
sense [sic].  What do you consider a professional journalist to be? 
 
IMc: Someone who reports the news without fear or favour. 
 
GD: And presumably you consider yourself a professional journalist? 
 
IMc: Yes. 
 
GD: How central are the values, the traditional, the values which have traditionally 
identified journalism to your practice? 
 
IMc: Very very central, I mean without that we are lost, without that, and facts we are 
lost.  So I think that is a primary pillar, alongside factual information. 
 
GD: And how would you define objectivity? 
 
IMc: Well, the ability to put your own prejudices to one side and to report what you see 
fairly, in a balanced way and objectively. 
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GD: And in the context of war, it’s a fairly unique set of circumstances, totally different 
from reporting the day to day affairs of a government or events.  How relevant or 
possible is objectivity during war? 
 
IMc: Its challenging because as the situation deteriorates and you become a captive 
of either the military on either side or the political elites on either side.  It becomes 
increasingly difficult.  The embedded journalists working with the American military 
units, their objectivity was obviously hampered by what they were seeing and what they 
were shown.  The same with us on the other side, except we were able to scout around 
the edges, as I said earlier. 
 
GD:  Sure, so your experiences in Iraq would have confronted these values, your 
professional values? 
 
IMc: Well, I suppose, it’s not something you think about when you’re sitting under four 
hundred cruise missiles and bombs every night, mate.  It doesn’t really, [sic] your 
conscience is not really thinking “oh my God, am I being objective?”  What you are 
trying to do is to stay alive …and report what you are seeing. 
 
GD:  That’s the thing though, from accounts that I have read from journalists is 
Baghdad for example, being confined to a hotel for example or being under the 
guidance or control of the ministry of information and being restricted in what they can 
do.  It does limit the possibilities. 
 
IMc: It does, it does.  But you know at that point it becomes a matter of doing what 
you can.  And you can find information away from the propaganda or the party line if 
you are prepared to take a certain amount of risks as well.  But it does become 
increasingly difficult as things degenerate. 
 
GD: I mean, in that context what become the most important stories and the most sort 
of important sources to be using, that sort of thing? 
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IMc: Its always primary sources.  In my view it is the human element.  Obviously we 
can talk about buildings being bombed, telephone exchanges being destroyed, but the 
real stories are the collateral damage the children, the families being caught up in this 
war and the stories in the hospitals and of the victims and so on.  But you have to be 
very careful that you are actually seeing what you purport to be seeing, and what they 
purport you are seeing, you have to take a very, very critical eye to what you are being 
shown and what you’re hearing.  But I think the human story is the obvious story when 
there is any sort of conflict. 
 
GD:  You mentioned embedding before I know you were operating independently, but 
what is, or what was your attitude to that exercise? 
 
IMc: Well, I don’t agree with it, I wouldn’t do it.  But I can see that it is part of the 
overall picture.  Obviously if you are offered the opportunity to do that and you have the 
resources, then you would do it.  But obviously if you weren’t able to do it all then 
embedding would be the last thing you would do….in my view. 
 
GD: So you are of the opinion that it privileges the military perspective? 
 
IMc: Well, it’s the only perspective there is, there’s no other perspective.  You’re 
seeing what they are seeing down the sight of a gun or a tank and you know each 
element of military operations sees only a tiny, wafer thin fraction of the overall picture.  
So if you are stuck in a particular situation, living under a tank or whatever then it’s 
obviously very limited. 
 
GD: How much contact did you have with your superiors, with your editors, back, in 
Australia? 
 
IMc: I had a satellite phone contact, several times a day.   
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GD: And was there direction coming from them in terms of what to cover? 
 
IMc: No, they left that entirely in my hands because they understood that in a situation 
like that it’s very difficult for them to second guess what’s actually going on 
 
GD:  And they were happy with the style and scope of your reporting? 
 
IMc: I think so, I presume so, I didn’t get sacked so I think they were happy.   
 
GD: Well, it got reprinted all over Australia, I have been going through reams and 
reams of your stuff – there’s certainly lots of it. 
 
IMc: It got a good run around the place and that’s fine.  I think the stories were quite 
strong. 
 
GD: We were talking a little before about objectivity and we were talking about what 
that means and the definition of that.  Impartiality is a big aspect of that.   How difficult is 
that to sustain, that sense of impartiality when you’ve got civilian deaths and a war, the 
legality of which is in question in dispute to begin with? 
 
IMc: Well, I think you have to maintain impartiality as much as you can, some people 
become tied up on one particular perspective, but I tried to maintain my impartiality and 
just report what I was seeing and not making any judgements about the rights or wrongs 
of what I was seeing and just reporting what I was seeing.  You know those sorts of 
commentaries are for others in other locations at other times but when you are on the 
daily round of a situation like that there is enough to keep you busy just covering the 
news and reporting what you are seeing without getting too tied up in sort of moral 
questions or whatever, so I think that was a secondary issue in terms my coverage, I 
just tried to do a reporting job, a very basic reporting job. 
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GD: Fair enough, yeah.  And were you reflecting on how your stories, your news 
would be received back in Australia? 
 
IMc: Not particularly, no.  I wasn’t really reflecting on anything really, just trying to 
make sure I was, I had something to eat and wasn’t hit by a bomb.  I just filed the 
stories and what happened to them after that it was a matter for the editors. 
 
GD: Did you have at all a chance while you were in Baghdad.  I’m not sure if you were 
able to watch CNN or anything like that, but did you get much of a chance to see what 
else was happening from Centcom or from other parts of Iraq? 
 
IMc: No, no, once the war began we didn’t have any coverage on anything at all, it all 
died they pulled the plug on everything.  We only had what we were told by our own 
organisations.  If you had the technology you could do streaming through the internet, 
but I didn’t have that technology.   
 
GD: Presumably, you were aware obviously, perhaps in retrospect, of what was going 
on in other parts of the Gulf, for example in Centcom? 
 
IMc: I became aware of that quite early because one or our reporters who’d been 
there arrived in Baghdad soon after the liberation of Baghdad and was able to explain to 
us exactly what happened – the sort of appalling treatment the journos [sic] got down 
there. 
 
GD: Was that Rory Callinan? 
 
IMc: Yes 
 
GD: What’s your opinion or how would you describe the goings on at Centcom, the 
strategies employed. 
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IMc: It would have come as no surprise to me because I have been dealing with 
defence forces for a long time and these people’s job is to obstruct and obfuscate and 
that’s what they did very successfully. 
 
GD: How is it possible for journalists to combat, um, or try to uncover in those sorts of 
circumstances. 
 
IMc: Well you then have to do what Peter Wilson and John Feder did.  I don’t know if 
you have talked to Peter, but he escaped from that controlling situation by driving off 
into the desert and then getting captured and almost killed, so to get around it you have 
to put yourself at fairly high risk.  It’s not very good, but that’s the only option you’ve got 
when you’re being messed around by these people. 
 
GD: I plan to talk to Peter soon.  But you also had a bit of a close escape so to speak. 
 
IMc: Yeah, I did.  I was obviously removed from Baghdad on day ten or eleven of the 
war by the Ministry of Information, expelled from the country, so I had to drive out 
through the war to Jordan.  An experience I wouldn’t want to repeat. 
 
GD: Why was it exactly that you were thrown out? 
 
IMc: Because I did something outside the rules of even though I thought I had been 
granted permission to do it.  In other words there was a face saving issue when one of 
the other officers caught me outside the compound without a guide and I explained that 
I had permission from one of his underlings, but that wasn’t of course good enough.  I 
the Iraqi hierarchy scheme of things, he made a loud song and dance and from that 
point on I was basically doomed because I didn’t want to be locked up in jail as the 
Americans were coming through the front gates. 
 
GD: So were you given a choice to leave or be locked up? 
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IMc: Basically, yeah. 
 
GD: Um, how were you able to maintain reporting from Amman? 
 
IMc: I just did reporting round the edges from there.  The story was in Baghdad and in 
Iraq and I was out of the picture for the ten days I was in Amman, I just did a little bit of 
commentary and a little bit of feature writing but I couldn’t do any daily reporting 
because there was absolutely nothing happening there.  I was just the most frustrated 
person on the planet, until I managed to get back in ten days later. 
 
GD: During for example, war when you are talking about bombs falling on people’s 
heads and being ushered around by ministry of information people or the many great 
limitations on what you can do.  My impression from a lot of the reporting of Iraq was 
that it was extremely descriptive rather than being in anyway analytical or providing any 
context to what was going on, is that something you think is bound to happen during 
war? 
 
IMc: Yeah, I think so.  You have to read the stories from the embedded people, you 
have to read the stories from the free range people, you have to read the stories from 
the behind the enemy lines people – like me – once you’ve read all those stories you 
might get a better picture of what’s going on, but remember, the propaganda feed from 
the Coalition side, the Americans and the Australians, was also pretty strong.  There’s a 
lot of bullshit going on during a war and you’ve got to try and build the picture from as 
many reports as you can possibly absorb  But anyone who thinks you can just sit in 
Baghdad, in Iraq, during a war and do analytical, nice think pieces and nice pieces of 
analysis is not only a little bit naïve, but probably a little bit stupid. 
 
GD: Were there stories then that were not pursued, that were newsworthy or should 
have been spent more time on? 
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IMc: Oh, I’m sure, but there is only a certain amount you can do.  While something 
interesting is going on one level, when a bomb blows up a building and blows up a 
whole bunch of people that’s an interesting story and it kind of takes precedence.  I am 
sure there were things that were missed, particularly in the aftermath, but there’s only a 
certain amount you can do and it’s just total chaos in a situation like that – it’s quite 
extraordinary. 
 
GD: Just a couple of things to end on – I know you were working for a newspaper, but 
the demand for ongoing news were perhaps not so great as for the TV people. 
 
IMc: Well, there were no TV people there from Australia, so I had the added problem 
of having phone calls coming from radio stations and TV shows all round Australia 
trying to take advantage of our presence there and I tried to be cooperative with those 
people as much as I could on the radio or the 7.30 Report or whatever it was, but at the 
end of the day, your primary job is to work for your organisation, so you’re a bit limited in 
what you can do, but they pulled all their people out so they can’t then be expecting us 
to act as their correspondents there. 
 
GD: Would you do it again? 
 
IMc: Yes, I would.  It was a great story, I mean it’s a tragic situation, any war, but from 
a journalist’s point of view, a reporter’s point of view, it doesn’t really get any better than 
that.  You’ve only got to wake up in the morning and there it is, or hope you wake up in 
the morning. 
 
GD: Listen, I will end it there, thank you.  
 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX II - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT  
TREVOR BORMANN (ABC)  
15 JUNE 2006 
 
 
Giles Dodson:  What I wanted to start off by asking was, just more generally than your 
specific experiences of reporting and producing from Iraq and the region – perhaps you 
can tell me what it is you are most proud of, or your most important or valuable 
achievement of your time reporting from that region during the war? 
 
Trevor Bormann:  I think the satisfaction in doing stories that involved human beings 
and Iraqis themselves, rather than the usual big picture coverage or geopolitical stuff, 
because we were in Baghdad and a very good situation to cover events on the ground, 
it was gratifying just to see how normal Iraqis were dealing with it and what they thought 
of the events. 
 
GD: Was that the invasion period? 
 
TB: Well, we were there for several weeks before the fall of the regime, and during 
that time it was very difficult to get a clear insight into what people felt and they were 
thinking about in terms of the impending start of hostilities, because under the regime 
we were fairly restricted in terms of who we spoke to.  There was always a minder with 
us and people in the street, people that you did meet, citizens of Iraq were very 
reluctant to, I suspect, to exhibit their true feelings about the situation, but once 
hostilities began and the regime fell they were much more open and forthcoming about 
how they saw things. 
 
GD: And what was the change did you notice? 
 
TB: Look, generally extraordinary relief that the regime had fallen, but it took many 
weeks for, it took several weeks for, after being conditioned and living under the regime 
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for so many years, they were quite weary about you know, feeling that they had been 
liberated – for weeks and in some cases months afterwards, but generally relief that the 
regime had come to an end, but it took quite a while, but also great consternation that 
war was here and infrastructure was destroyed and lives had been lost, but the general 
feeling was, at least in the early stages was that it may be a worthwhile price to pay. 
 
GD: Just to talk about, I will try to come back to your experiences and the ABC’s 
reporting from Iraq, but more generally in a broader sense thinking about journalism, 
what in your opinion, constitutes or what is a professional journalist?  How does a 
professional journalist define oneself? 
 
TB: I guess someone who has a high sense of morality, a high, developed sense of 
value judgement, someone who prides themselves in their own integrity, someone who 
has a quest to be reasonably objective, but also one who can make observations and 
judgements and is not afraid to be subjective at times, on the basis of your experience. 
 
GD: Do you think that those are sort of more important, that sort of moral, vision is 
more important than an adherence to any sort of formal rules or established practices of 
journalism? 
 
TB: I suppose what I mean by morality is more my morality rather than what I 
perceive others to be [sic].  By moral I mean being true to myself, and to the integrity of 
my profession, you know trying to be reasonably balanced while at the same time not 
frightened to offer my opinion in an analysis and interpretation of things. 
 
GD: How central is objectivity to that practice of journalism? 
 
TB: I think objectivity is a bit of a cliché in a way, people have this idea that there are 
two sides to every story and the truth lies somewhere in between and that’s objectivity, I 
don’t see it that way.  I think objectivity is being true to your own observations, I think it 
an organisation makes the commitment to put you in that situation, and if you are 
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prepared to take the risk I don’t think you should be, I mean, I think you’ve got to add 
value to that and I think you are quite entitled to make opinions on that, on your 
observations and think you have to be fairly fearless in that. 
 
GD: Presumably in a war situation these, the attempts to do that come under fairly 
strong challenge, I would have thought it must be difficult to maintain, to keep those 
values relevant or possible during war. 
 
TB: Yeah, that’s right.  It was open slather, in the days during and after the war there 
wern’t those pressures there.  There wasn’t any organised military briefing for example, 
so the attempt by the military or by anyone else to spin the story was something that we 
didn’t encounter, because we were just going out each day, more or less just going onto 
the streets and getting our stories.   
 
GD: And just reporting what you saw? 
 
TB That’s right.  That’s what was gratifying about the situation we were in, as 
opposed to a situation of a journalist in Doha, reporting the briefings or someone 
embedded for example with the military, there were different pressures that existed for 
those people, but in my situation it was reporting in its purest form I guess. 
 
GD: What is your attitude towards the experiment that was embedding, that was 
considered so successful by some and so parlous by others? 
 
TB: Well, I think it has a role but it should be seen for what it is.  It is an insight to 
what’s happening at a particular place at a particular time, so it’s one view and I don’t 
think you should rely too heavily on that because it is very limited.  I have a bit of 
problem quite frankly with the concept of it.  Because I think I saw other people doing it, 
not in our organization so much, but a lot of the American embeds, the reporters were 
quite seduced by the idea of being with the military and after a while they looked like 
soldiers and they spoke like soldiers and they would say things like, “we’re doing this 
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and we are doing that”.  And you had to say who’s we?  Are you part of the military or 
are you and objective independent journalist travelling with these guys? 
 
GD: Well, how can that be mitigated, do you think, that sort of seductive aspect of it? 
 
TB: Well I think it’s very difficult because after a while you establish relationships with 
the people that you travel with, these are momentous times, you establish trust and 
relations with the soldiers themselves and I think you know of a conscious level the 
journalist might try and be objective, I think unwittingly you are seduced by the whole 
situation and its difficult to distance yourself and I can’t think of a way to mitigate from it.  
I think the other problem with embedding is the very nature of travelling with a military 
group – the weapons fire out, but like the soldiers, you don’t see the other end.  You 
don’t see the schools in ruins, you don’t see the hospitals hit in misdirected bombs.  And 
like the soldiers you are somewhat sanitised from the true horror of what you are doing, 
so it’s a limiting perspective I think. 
 
GD: It seems to me, talking about notions of objectivity, it seems also absurd to speak 
in one breath about being embedded, and at the same time maintaining some sort of 
objectivity, even though you can argue you are reporting just on what you see, its taking 
the larger equation half of it has been removed, exactly that ability to see the effects of 
what’s happening. 
 
TB: I think so, and in the case of soldiers it’s deliberate.  Because if they are exposed 
to the horrors that would harm morale.  It’s like an arcade game to them – the gleaming 
weapons fire out but you don’t see the other end.  Having said that, there are occasions 
where it works the other way.  Geoff Thompson, who was our embedded person, shot 
an extraordinary story with Michael Cox the cameraman on a checkpoint. 
 
GD: Indeed, yeah. 
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TB: You’re familiar with that obviously.  It certainly didn’t make the military look very 
good.  It saw them panicking, and it saw them involved in a very tragic, a very tragic 
mistake indeed.  So it can be, it can offer different insights it depends on the situation. 
 
GD: Indeed, do you think the formalised arrangements of embedding where people 
applied to be admitted to certain military units and various organizations were given 
their quota of journalists allowed in, is that not just a formalisation of a relationship that 
has gone ever since journalists went to war. 
 
TB: Look I think so.  The Australian media was very much an afterthought of that 
process.  Obviously the American networks and the Brits, because they were more 
engaged militarily they got what might be described as the most exciting embeds, the 
ABC got the transport support group, which is hardly an elite fighting force, but having 
said that, they witnessed some reasonable activity. 
 
GD: What I was trying to get at was that relationship between the military and the 
media is very difficult to have it in any other way.  For example, looking at footage from 
Vietnam, and you have the journalists who apparently much more free in their 
movements, but still controlled of under the protection of the military.  Do you think there 
is any way past that? 
 
TB: No I don’t, because what the military say is that you can’t go out there on your 
own because it’s too dangerous, so you have to be with us because we are here to 
protect you.  Well, that’s true but they are also there to restrict what you are doing, 
especially in a war in a desert.  There’s not much latitude to roam around by yourself, 
it’s too dangerous, so they do have you over a barrel in a sense. 
 
GD: Another aspect of the coverage on the conflict I wanted to talk about was down at 
Centcom and I know you weren’t reporting from there yourself, but I am sure you have 
an opinion about what was going on down there.  How plausible do you think it is to talk 
 
 
322 
about objectivity, balance and fairness and this sort of thing given the situation, where 
some people have described it as being spoon-fed? 
 
TB: Yeah, well, I think you know once upon a time the public affairs people from the 
military who did the briefings were people medically unfit for the infantry and that was 
the job they fell into.  Now they are highly skilled public affairs people, who I think are 
probably more talented than many of the journalists, by what we saw there.  They are 
very skilful communicators and they are very good at the spin.  Now I think it works for 
them on quite a sophisticated level and quite a subliminal level.  It’s all about language 
and I think now, if we want to talk about the information war, I think language is as 
potent as bombs and bullets and missiles.  And I think it’s a language that the media 
can embrace and it comes out of those briefings.  I was part of the briefing process 
during the Gulf War and the military would talk about “target rich environments” which 
meant they had plenty of things to shoot at, and when the bomb missed and hit a school 
they would talk about “collateral damage”.  These are quite sexy, clinical terms that 
describe something very horrible. 
 
GD: And also capture the public’s imaginations with something exotic from the 
military. 
 
TB: Well, journalists can’t resist these phrases, because it sounds impressive, it 
makes them sound as though they have an intimacy with the military 
 
GD: Indeed. 
 
TB: And it self-perpetuates, because when the military hears this kind of talk, well this 
is a journalist who knows his military stuff, it’s a cycle. 
 
GD: It becomes symbiotic. 
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TB: Yeah, but when it becomes a mainstream part of journalistic language everyone 
is sanitised, or gets a sense that it’s not as horrible as it is, and these very seductive 
terms become part of our mainstream language.  At the ABC there was an issue with 
calling it the War on Terror, because it... 
 
GD: Naturalises that term? 
 
TB: Lets face it there’s a war in Iraq, there’s a war in Afghanistan, there’s a campaign 
on terror and that takes many forms, but it’s a rhetorical term.  It’s like the war on drugs, 
that’s not a real term either.  So it’s a term that everyone loves. 
 
GD: How can journalists avoid being seduced?  Presumably if you want to be, 
perhaps if you’re not such a reflective journalist or a thoughtful journalist perhaps, then 
it’s very easy to reproduce this sort of language, but presumably there are plenty of 
people out there who try to avoid this sort of stuff.  How is it possible is it for journalists 
who want to, to avoid the privileging of the official line and the use of that sort of 
language? 
 
TB: I think it’s quite easy to do – you avoid using the “War on Terror”, you might call it 
the “so-called War on Terror”, because it is a phenomenon, the phrase itself is a 
phenomenon. 
 
GD: It’s a policy title or something like that. 
 
TB: Exactly right.  You are just very selective about how you characterise the 
situation, what’s happening in Iraq now it’s an insurgency.  We don’t call them terrorists, 
even though in a strict dictionary definition it fits into that.  We just a little more critical I 
think and little more careful of the language we use when we characterise things.   
 
GD: And that’s a particular conscious of that at the ABC, when you are briefing 
journalists of putting together a show, that sort of thing. 
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TB: Yeah, we are because I went though that during the Gulf War where we started 
seeing this stuff creep into journalistic language, and I just thought that in 2003 as it was 
then, we should be a bit too clever and in 2006 we are certainly too smart to fall into 
those kind of traps. 
 
GD: Another aspect of all this, or sort of dovetailing with this discussion – there is the 
famous episode of Michael Wolff from the New York Magazine, getting up and asking 
the question, “what are we doing?  Why are we here?  This is absurd and ridiculous that 
we are not getting any information while we have this million dollar press briefing centre” 
Is it possible do you think for journalists to pursue alternative lines of questioning and 
take alternative viewpoints? 
 
TB: Well I suspect not there, where there is little chance of corroborating what they 
have to say.  But I think what you do, you can build up a bit of a picture by the various 
forms of reporting.  So you have the briefings, that is one source, you’ve got maybe an 
embed, that’s another source, in the case of the ABC we were in Baghdad.  We were 
there, we could offer first hand reporting, mind you we knew what was happening a few 
blocks around where we were, and to the various parts where we went but it was very 
difficult to build up a big picture because of the security issues, but I think out of all 
those different situations the journalists find themselves in hopefully you get a fairly we 
rounded picture from all that. 
 
GD: Sure, given the ABC has a lot to do with television and imagery, there’s another 
debate going on, especially about the use of TV and the use pictures from the embeds 
and picture of bombs falling in Baghdad in the evenings, of a fantastic image, but almost 
de-contextualised with very little informative quality about it – a gun firing in the desert 
or a bomb dropping on a building in Baghdad, how possible is it to maintain that visual 
aspect but have it based in some informational value.  Do you think? 
 
TB: Well, I think... 
 
 
325 
 
GD: It’s thrilling to watch that sort of television, but at the same time it tells you very 
little. 
 
TB: Well, yes and no perhaps.  It is so commonplace now that it is daily life in 
Baghdad, and because of that you probably don’t see so much of it.  When you do see 
it it’s wrapped around other elements of the story.  The last time I saw it was a couple of 
days ago when Bush turned up in Baghdad to meet the new prime minister.  So there 
was a situation where the story was about Bush’s visit, so we got a bit of an insight into 
the new Iraqi government and the new prime minister, but it was wrapped around this 
imagery of two more car-bombs in Baghdad, another day in Baghdad.  Look, it’s very 
difficult but that is life and reality in Baghdad so I think it’s still worthy to use that stuff 
but it is often in the context of another element or level to the story. 
 
GD: You were talking about Bush arriving and sort of being able to tack on stories to 
that, his presence, perhaps not so much in the context of war whilst it was occurring but 
in terms of the immediate post-war situation in Iraq.  There is a criticism of journalism 
being too heavily event based, needing a hook to peg a story on, how restrictive, or do 
you think that is a valid criticism and if so how restrictive is it and what can be done to 
avoid it. 
 
TB: Look its probably valid, and the reason that I guess your choice is limited, is that 
it is dangerous for foreign media to be travelling so that material tends to come in from 
Iraqi cameramen who freelance to get that.  I know certainly in my experience there we 
did two different things, what we would do is a wrap up or an “around the grounds” as 
we used to call it of the big picture in Iraq and we would be told by Sydney, emailed a 
list of other elements to the story that we should incorporate into our main story, but we 
would also make sure we include an element that we actually shot ourselves a vignette, 
and that was the main obligation and the main story in the seven o’clock news.  But 
after we met that commitment we would go off and do little human stories, little vignettes 
and what some might call good news stories, we did a piece on the Iraqi soccer team 
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back together after being systematically abused by Uday and Saddam for years and 
years and years, and we did rebuilding stories as well, so on the spectrum of negative 
to positive there was a mix there. 
 
GD: You mentioned before being sort of advised from the ABC in Sydney, as to sort 
of not what to do but given direction.  How conscious were you during the war were you 
as to how the ABC’s coverage was being received in Australia, especially given the 
context of the then Broadcasting Minister’s quite savage attacks on the ABC about their 
coverage.  How conscious were you of the way that stuff was being received in 
Australia? 
 
TB: Not very conscious to be honest, we were just too busy for reflection at that 
stage.  I guess it was an assumption on my part that the ABC would be criticised just as 
they were during the Gulf War, it seems to be an expectation now that in times of war 
politicians become very jingoistic and some sections of the community become very 
jingoistic and an easy target is the ABC.  We just assume that happens I suppose. 
 
GD: And that doesn’t have any influence that concern, not concern - that knowledge 
that criticism will be coming. 
 
TB: Well, no it’s nothing that really permeates to you either directly or indirectly.  You 
just have a pretty good sense of what judgements you should be making on the ground 
and what stories are interesting and what aren’t.  What are proper and what aren’t, but it 
really doesn’t colour the kind of stories you do or the approach you take. 
 
GD: I will just wind it up here, but what was it that defined newsworthiness for you 
once you were covering stories out of Baghdad – was it the human aspect? 
 
TB: Yeah, because of our special place there and the circumstances in which we 
were there, we saw our role and our main job as getting stories from the ground, 
specific little vignettes of how Iraqis were dealing with this, so we would go into the 
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suburbs to get stories.  We had fixers who were hearing about things happening, so 
although for a while we did string together the big picture stories based on information 
that was fed from Sydney a lot of our time was spent on the more, happening on the 
ground stories. 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX III - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
JONATHAN HARLEY (ABC) 
15 JUNE 2006 
 
 
Giles Dodson: I thought I might just ask you, given that you were based at 
Centcom – is that correct, from my understanding? 
 
Jonathan Harley: Yeah, that’s right. 
 
GD: What was it that you were most sort of proud of, or what did you think you can 
consider your most valuable achievement, in reporting from Central command? 
 
JH: Not missing a deadline.  Feeding the beast.  Well, look, that’s right, when you are 
doing a gig like that it’s about, you know, staying up right and producing, you know, your 
job there is to produce; reams and reams and reams of audio material that will piece 
together the impossible.  A combination of the little that you know and the most likely.  
Sorry I am not being very coherent here, I’ll just focus for a moment.  The problem 
about a situation like that is that you know so little.  The actual war, in that case, was 
1000 kms away.  So there is an extraordinary tyranny of distance and ideally a place 
like that is supposed to give you the global overview, because in any conflict you are 
always in a compromised position anyway, so you might be with one unit and it might be 
calm and peaceful and happy chappies, and over the hill the there might be... 
 
GD: A bloodbath? 
 
JH: A full on, as you say, a bloodbath going on.  So any position in a conflict is 
compromised, but the problem with a place like Central Command is that you have, you 
just…I don’t think you have anything effectively, because you’re at the whim of what you 
are being told and there is no way of verifying it, we know the nature of war.  We know 
the nature of propaganda in war, that’s what it is, I really don’t think there is any other 
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word for it, because that is the correct characterisation, so…when you are faced with 
unverified official accounts I think it’s not exactly going to be a journalistic peak. 
 
GD: No.  How did you manage to sift through the information that you were given to 
try and piece together something which was a credible news item?   
 
JH: What you are doing is extrapolating from a number of various sources. So you 
have the official interpretation, but you also have all the other material that is coming in 
from the other areas of conflict.  So have in TV terms obviously you’ve got the BBC, 
CNN as your two mainstays and you’ve got less reputable sources like Fox and all the 
other networks as well, and Al Jazeera and a huge number of satellite sources, and the 
wire sources like AAP, AFP etc.  So you can distil all of that, and you do in that sense 
have a lot of global material to sift through, but it’s fundamentally no different to any of 
the material you can get in Sydney or Tokyo or London.   
 
GD: What you are adding to that is the information you are getting from the Central 
Command briefings?  
 
JH: That’s exactly right, but I wouldn’t describe that as information. 
 
GD: Ha ha. 
 
JH: Well, you know. 
 
GD: No, I understand what you mean. 
 
JH: You know that’s their account on it – what you are getting is effectively their 
grabs, to punctuate and to glue together a story. 
 
GD: Is that, is dealing with that, something called an official briefing, but not actually 
providing much in the way of information, is that an affront to journalistic sensibilities, or 
 
 
330 
is it just something that journalists must deal with in the modern era, so to speak, just 
part of journalism? 
 
JH: I think the answer to both those questions if yes.  It is an affront, and it should be 
an affront, and the day it seems normal and acceptable is the day you really need to 
move on.  But equally it is something that you need to deal with and something that you 
need to dis-assemble and interpret. 
 
GD: It seems to me, and I watched quite a lot of the stuff on TV coming out of Central 
Command, and the same can be said for many different of those official type briefings, 
you know, even press briefings from Canberra are probably on a similar scale, or the 
White House, that sort of thing – then you see things like the film made about Al 
Jazeera, the film ‘Control Room’.  And it showed you the behind the scenes information 
being put out, the Al Jazeera and all the other journalists talking in the back rooms with 
these press officers, in that big building.  Now that’s not really made clear in the 
mainstream news that this is going on, it seems to me the picture you get is of General 
Whoever, standing in front of the, on that podium, telling you like it is, and all the 
journalists trying to ask questions, yet there is this whole other level of activity going on 
which is not made clear. 
 
JH: Yeah, but I think that can be said of journalism generally – there’s a process and 
with journalism you are distilling a story, and I don’t think you want to …. 
 
GD: Should that process not be made transparent though… 
 
JH: Well, I think it is and its horses for courses, if you go through the whole process 
of doing the story, then there goes your bulletin, I mean a bulletin is really distilled 
accounts.  That’s one form of storytelling and I think if people are going to be a lazy 
media consumer, then they are going to get a lazy media product, and what I mean by 
that is that if you complain that the six o’clock news doesn’t give you that transparency 
and accountability, it’s pretty easy to go and get something.  The biggest priority is to be 
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accurate and to be succinct and give people a quick hit, but the problem is you can’t - 
that’s the biggest accountability, its correctness.  You know, fundamentally that’s the 
calling and you can go and watch ‘Control Room’ or whatever or go to the Web and 
read a whole lot of other stuff, so I am really wary of making the media the story, 
because it’s not always the story.  It’s part of the story, and I think people are much 
more savvy not and when they watch or read they actually incorporate into their 
understanding the way. 
 
GD: Whatever they’re watching has come to be on their television. 
 
JH: I just think people have a much more sophisticated understanding of the way the 
media works now and the ways those in authority work with the media and work to 
manage the media, so I am not sure that your nightly bulletin is the place to do that…but 
the 7.30 Report – you’ve got room on the 7.30 Report to if you’ve got 7 or 8 or 10 
minute you can work that into you story. 
 
GD: You were talking about correctness as being a central value, what are the other 
central values do you think that define a professional journalist, or what is a professional 
journalist? 
 
JH: Well, accuracy, truthfulness, integrity and what I mean by that particularly is the 
trust that you build with you build with your audience, also the trust that you build with 
your sources, ultimately I think that is the only currency that you’ve got as a journalist, in 
terms of getting stories, that ability to work with people and bring them into your 
confidence 
 
GD: Your credibility? 
 
JH: And not to expose them.  But I also think it’s about good storytelling and making 
it accessible, taking people on a journey.  So it’s a combination of values and skills. 
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GD: How important is that thing people call objectivity? 
 
JH: Oh, look I regard that as something always to be aspired to but never achieved. 
You know, objectivity is almost like enlightenment.  We know now that you’re never 
going to; there is never anything purely objective.  I also think that there is a discipline in 
seeing things both ways. 
 
GD: Is that a change throughout journalism do you think, that more sophisticated 
understanding of goals and the practice. 
 
JH: Yeah, absolutely, and its most perverse it manifests itself as an abandonment of 
that aspiration and value of objectivity in its most perverse form becomes something like 
Fox News, where it’s just thrown out the window.   
 
GD: How did you experiences in Iraq, or not in Iraq but in the Gulf confront those 
values.  Accuracy, and honesty and integrity and the aspiration towards objectivity? 
 
JH: Well, trying to be as upfront with folks about what’s going on, about the reliability 
of what you are getting and I think that’s a real balancing act, trying to find some 
authority in what you say, but not pretending.  But I think you can write that in, I really 
do.  I think in those situations you really want to write it as hard as you possibly can.  
And you want to really push the envelope and really try to minimise your complicity.   
 
GD: How able are journalists like yourself, in that situation, to not so much subvert, 
but not be seduced by the official military perspective?  The use of the language, the 
images in particular. 
 
JH: It just depends how good you are. 
 
GD: I beg your pardon? 
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JH: It just depends how good you are.  I just think that’s is just part of the skill, to 
unravel the language, the sanitising language, but look, it’s got to be said that, you know 
that in the wake of the war the Federal government absolutely pulled no punches and 
really tried to discredit our coverage. 
 
GD: I was speaking earlier with Trevor Bormann and I asked him that question, I said 
how conscious were the ABC or individual journalists about the way in which their 
coverage would be received in Australia – was there any thought given. 
 
JH: At a political level? 
 
GD: Yeah, at a political level, but, both political and publicly. 
 
JH: Look I just think you’re always got that in your head, your writing for an audience. 
 
GD: Was it a foregone conclusion that the ABC would have complaints brought 
against it? 
 
JH: Oh look, you always get complaints about anything and think that’s a particular, I 
think that’s a particularly great thing about the ABC – because people do fell a real 
ownership of it therefore they quite rightly want to express how they feel about stories 
and coverage and think that is a really good thing and it part of the accountability of a 
public broadcaster.  And in a war that is always going to be more heightened, because 
the stakes and the emotions are always more heightened in a time of conflict.  But no, I 
don’t think anyone foresaw the Federal government’s assault that was orchestrated out 
of Richard Alston’s office.   
 
GD: Going back to Central Command, there is, I suppose, what you might call an 
infamous episode of, I think it was Michael Wolff of the New York magazine who got up 
and asked the question, you know, “what are we doing here?  Why do we bother with 
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doing this?”  I mean how possible is it for journalists to pursue alternative lines of 
questioning, or actually ask those sorts of questions? 
 
JH: Well, I suppose you could argue that because Michael got up and said that, it’s 
totally possible. 
 
GD: But was he not removed or told he wouldn’t have any more questions or 
something. 
 
JH: No…well, you know, he certainly wasn’t removed. 
 
GD: Or treated with utter distain? 
 
JH: Well, it’s a double edged sword, the officials might have regarded him with 
distain, but many journalists regarded him as a hero.  You know, you’re not going to 
please all the people all the time.  You know, certainly there was and is a pattern of 
them asking journalists who they think are going to give them a soft ride and removing 
those who don’t…the biggest sort of hierarchy that made it more difficult was that the 
big networks would get a front row seat, the American networks would get the front row 
seats, there was this very clear hierarchy, which had the ABC way back in the 25th row 
or whatever, so there its always harder to get your question through the forest of 
hands… 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX IV - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
LINDSAY MURDOCH (SMH) 
19 MAY 2006 
 
 
Giles Dodson: Basically my research project is looking at the professional values 
of journalists who spent time in Iraq and the news product that was a result of that, so I 
have been interviewing people from the ABC and from News and a few people from the 
SMH as well, and I have got to you, so what I might begin by asking you was what was 
it that you were most proud of or what was your most valuable achievement in your time 
in Iraq, spent reporting in Iraq? 
 
Lindsay Murdoch: Surviving. 
 
GD: Please go on. 
 
LM: In a way being embedded was frustrating, in that I couldn’t see what was going 
on in the wider invasion and I was seeing what was going on directly in the battalion that 
I was in.  So that was very much the limiting factor, but that said I was basically in a 
position.  I saw a lot but a little, if you like.  Alot in that the battalion I was with was pretty 
much at the head of the spear of the invasion, because what it was doing was setting up 
protection for the units that were basically at the front, and then we’d leapfrog another 
battalion and set up protection again, so I did see pretty much what was going on at the 
front of the invasion, but and also I was, you know the nature of embedding you see, or 
you’re living, I was living with marines, eating with them, travelling with them, digging my 
own foxhole with them, so you become quite close.  I was able to see how the 
Americans operate in a war situation. 
 
GD: Do you think, in terms of the value of that, do you think it was a valuable exercise 
to go through? 
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LM: Look, yeah, people have criticised the embedding but it’s a naïve and misguided 
view, because embedding was very very helpful to the Age and the Herald, because it 
gave one insight into what was happening.  Not, you wouldn’t.if you only had one 
person covering the war, and only one source. 
 
GD: You wouldn’t do it. 
 
LM: You would not embed.  But as part of a package, as part of overall coverage, it’s 
very very valuable it gives you a great insight into what’s happening at the spear of the 
invasion and you can’t get, we had somebody in Doha – Tom Allard and basically he 
was so frustrated because he was just getting fed propaganda, really.  But I think you’ll 
find he was very very frustrated by the lack of information that the commanders, that the 
commanders were giving out.  And, it was all skewered towards propaganda.  On the 
ground there was no censorship, I could quote anybody that said anything, there was 
only one strict rule and that was in your copy, when you file it you could not give an 
exact location, but if you abided by that, you could file whatever you like. 
 
GD: Were you able to talk to civilians at all? 
 
LM: Well, that was hard.  I did, but not as often as I would have liked, because of the 
sheer mechanics of it - I don’t speak Arabic, nobody else in Iraq speaks English, nobody 
I saw spoke English.  The Americans had very few interpreters, no interpreters were in 
my unit. 
 
GD: So you’re hamstrung then. 
 
LM: Its very difficult – we’d go into a village or go into a town and roll through, or 
maybe we’d be set up on the edge of a town and there was some contact, but you’ve 
got to remember that most of the time, when we’re going through these towns and 
villages, sometimes we came under fire, we didn’t know who was friendly and who 
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wasn’t, well to the Americans, not to me, but it was basically I never got I never got real 
access to the Iraqis, it was hard, all visual. 
 
GD: Yeah, I understand. 
 
LM: But when we got to - coming across the desert - when we got to pretty far the tip 
of the spear, with the division I was with the people the Iraqis looked a bit shell shocked, 
they were staring, but when we got to Baghdad I actually jumped from one unit to 
another to get into the centre of Baghdad, things had changed by then, people were 
coming out and throwing their hands in the air, completely thrilled to see the Americans 
and that’s all faded away now I think, but that’s what it was like then. 
 
GD: In terms of being embedded, a lot of the criticisms that were made, was that it 
favours the military perspective, there is a sort of logic of the military way of doing things 
come through, patriotism especially of the Americans – the sense of “our boys” our “our 
troops” comes through – what do you think can be done to mitigate that or what did you 
do to minimise the potential for that to go on? 
 
LM: That’s, that’s certainly true, particularly of US television and networks like Fox, 
that jumped on the patriotism thing.  Fox is Rupert Murdoch’s channel and they really 
went for it, you’d see some of the footage. 
 
GD: I remember it well. 
 
LM: They were pushing that.  From my perspective point of view, I had boundaries 
that I set, for instance when they were talking about the enemy I always spoke about 
the Iraqis.  I never, I set myself apart from them, in all my dealings.  Basically when you 
go into that sort of situation, you’ve got to set your boundaries and make sure that your 
professionalism stays intact.  And, what you’re writing basically all the emphasis is on 
the Americans, because that’s who I am with, because that’s the only way it can be.  So 
whatever they are saying, whatever they’re doing, the way that they are going about the 
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war, that’s all I saw and that’s all I reported.  But I don’t have any qualms about saying 
that it is embedding, and that means that you’re reporting is going to. 
 
GD: Be heavily focused on the Americans? 
 
LM: Be all about the Americans, basically. 
 
GD: I remember reading a long article of yours and I believe Geoff Thompson 
touched on the same stuff, he was also embedded. 
 
LM: We caught up with him.  He was further back and somehow got up to the unit 
where I was. 
 
GD: Yeah, both of you from memory, in at least one piece each made quite clear that 
limitation of your reporting. 
 
LM: That what? 
 
GD: That limitation, you spelt it out quite clearly. 
 
LM: I did, yeah. 
 
GD: You know, this is what I am doing and these are the limitations of it, how 
important was it for you to actually get that out to, to be published for the public to 
understand the position that you were in. 
 
LM: Oh, that was an important piece at the time because there was a lot of criticism 
and discussion about embedding.  In my view people like, what’s his name, Wilson, 
from the Australian. 
 
GD: Peter Wilson, yeah. 
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LM: [Paul] McGeough…had some snide remarks at some points, no not snide 
remarks but a little bit of faint criticism of embedding, but um, that’s um, you know, they 
had different roles in the war, they did it tough, but so did I.  I was out there as it was 
happening, living it as a soldier.  I’m 50 – lost a stone and a half.  I got no favours from 
the marines, I’ve got to pull my own weight, they do nothing for you, they don’t carry 
your bags, you’ve got to dig your own foxhole every night, sometimes you move 3 or 4 
times in a night after digging your hole, you have to keep your machinery operating, in 
dust storms, keep it charged. 
 
GD: How difficult was that? 
 
LM: It was one of the biggest nightmares.  Quite often the laptop wouldn’t work 
because it was full of sand.  The main thing was to keep the sat-phones charged.  I had 
two sat-phones, one buggered up straight away. I relied on this old Nera sat-phone.  
Whenever you stopped, you had to try and use that time to get your phone charged or 
to file, one of the other biggest problems was, one of the major problems was there was 
an absolute ban on any light at night, so I couldn’t sit anywhere and write a story, or 
write some notes or go and get something to eat – as soon as nightfall fell, I was 
trapped absolutely trapped, I couldn’t do anything. 
 
GD: Did that actually affect what you could file? 
 
LM: Absolutely, I could only hear what was going on the radio.  See the Americans, 
they’ve all got night-vision goggles, we’d be going through places and they’d be talking 
of things they’d seen and I couldn’t see a bloody thing.  And I had to wait til morning to 
get some copy and to work out what was going on, what was happening and to file a 
story.  But inevitably, just on dawn, just as I was trying to grab something to eat or 
something, we’d be off again.  Sitting in the back of a Humvee, couldn’t do a thing.  And 
all this time I am weighed down by a bloody chemical suit, gas mask at the ready, and 
quite often they’d go “gas, gas, gas” and you’d have to sit there for hours with a gas 
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mask on, feeling like shit because I am claustrophobic.  And um, then um couldn’t file 
copy, deadlines rushing past, couldn’t even get a call out.  We sat in one sandstorm for 
a day and a half.  We couldn’t get outside, just sitting upright in a Humvee.  
 
GD: Jesus. 
 
LM: So it was physically it was tough, and as I said I got no help from the marines 
because they had their own job to do.  They gave me space here and there; they were 
conducting a war, so there weren’t any briefings.  Basically what I was writing was, no 
one was telling me what was going on. 
 
GD: No no no, just what you could see 
 
LM: What I was doing was I was writing I was picking up from the radio and by 
earwigging really. 
 
GD: Listen just to talk a little more generally about journalism, rather than your 
specific experiences in Iraq, although it all touches on the same thing.  You were talking 
about trying to maintain your professionalism, what is it do you think that defines a 
professional journalist.  Or, what is a professional journalist? 
 
LM: What is a professional journalist?  Well, getting a story that is fair balanced and 
accurate.  That’s always been my criteria, and getting it first.  You know, writing stories 
about things that are going to interest people and hopefully reveal things that people 
don’t want revealed, and hopefully the world will be better for it.  That’s the bottom line. 
 
GD: How central are the values which are sort of traditionally symbolised by the idea 
of objectivity.  You know, fairness, impartiality, balance and truthfulness, to your 
practice? 
 
LM: I don’t really understand what you mean? 
 
 
341 
 
GD: Well, how central are those values to you practice? 
 
LM: Well, they are the values.  That’s what journalism is about.   
 
GD: Objectivity? 
 
LM: Absolutely, well that’s all part of it. 
 
GD: How possible then, or how relevant is that in the context of war do you think? 
 
LM: The same goes, if you’re writing a story about war, I don’t think there’s [any 
difference].  The same principles apply to writing a story in Australia – the same 
principles apply when I was writing a story thirty years ago, writing police stories for the 
Melbourne Age.  It might be a triple murder, it might be a bad car crash, or a it could be 
a major crime – the same principles apply back then as they do when writing about the 
war in Iraq when you’re there.  It’s the same thing, you somebody is doing bad things to 
other people, you’re there, you report what you see and what you can get and you do it 
fair balanced and accurate, they’re the three criteria I have always based it on, and 
getting it first.   
 
GD: Yeah, right. 
 
LM: And I don’t think there is any difference.  And I have been a correspondent for a 
long time, I was for a decade, in South East Asia and I have always maintained it’s just 
an extension of reporting in Australia, there’s no difference, the principles aren’t any 
different and that includes war.   
 
GD: What was it that defined what was newsworthy for while you were in Iraq, or was 
it simply what you could see? 
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LM: Just what I could see every day, just what I could see and what I could quickly 
get out, with the limitations that I had. 
 
GD: So there was very little, choice in terms of the choice of sources and the angles 
you could use on reporting what you could see in a sense. 
 
LM: Yeah, that’s exactly right, that’s the limitations of being embedded.  You don’t 
have a lot of sources.   My sources were the marines, and a very small part of that, of 
the whole bulk of the attacking force.  So I am just reporting what I could see in my 
vision, that’s all.  That’s all, that’s why I come back to the point about embedding, it’s 
only, it can be only a part of the coverage. 
 
GD: Something you were probably not experiencing directly whilst the war was under 
way, but a lot has been said, at the time especially, and you talked about it before with 
Tom Allard in Centcom, but how would you describe the ‘news management’ or the 
attempts of the Coalition officials to spin the war? 
 
LM: Um. 
 
GD: Because that wouldn’t have affected your coverage? 
 
LM: I wasn’t getting any spin.   
 
GD: No. 
 
LM: Where I was on the ground and no one was spinning it, there were no spin 
doctors, these were soldiers.  It was what was happening up front, raw.  When we were 
going into it we spent a long time in Kuwait getting equipment and you know, getting 
ready, and there wasn’t a lot of spin there either, they were just getting us ready to be 
able to go into units.  I never really saw any of that.  At one point, I’ll tell you an 
interesting little story though. 
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GD: Ok. 
 
LM: We got onto a [sic], as I said were pretty much the head of the spear, the 
attacking force, and we’re going down this road and the Lieutenant in charge of my unit  
didn’t mind if I sat in on his briefings, but that was a little difficult because I was 
travelling in a Humvee.  But whenever my captain went over to have a briefing, I‘d try to 
go, then I’d get a bit of a broader view of what was going on.  Like he’d say, “oh look 
there’s a problem down in this town, there’s a fight down there”, or “the Republican 
Guard are basically running away everywhere”, so I’d get that sort of stuff.  We went 
down and got onto one of the major freeways, a lot of the travel in the desert was along 
the freeways, and I basically knew where we were and we just sat there for a long time, 
and the lieutenant made a beeline for me and he said, “hey Lindsay, look, this is 
highway”, I forget the name, I think it was highway 1 or 3, he said “we’re going straight 
down there into Baghdad, you can report that”. 
 
GD: Oh yeah? 
 
LM: And I said, “report that?”  I thought, “hang on”, this is all about location we have 
had it drummed into us we couldn’t report the location where we were, so I was 
suspicious of that and never reported it, and subsequently, the word came back, the 
order came out and we turned around and hightailed it straight down the highway, took 
a big exit and straight up another road, another freeway. 
 
GD: Yeah. 
 
LM: Now, I don’t know, but I suspect the word went out, “tell the media, they can say 
we’re going straight down Highway One”.  So the Iraqis would be waiting there, when in 
fact, they were happy for the word to get out.  But then we came back and charged in 
another direction.  So I suspect they tried to use the media for their own purposes at 
that point, but I never, I don’t know for sure, but I never fell for it, because I didn’t want 
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to be used, but that was pretty interesting for the Americans, and the Australians would 
probably do the same thing, you know if it benefits them they will use the media. 
 
GD: And, presumably there is many pitfalls for the unwary, presumably a lot of 
journalists are taken for a ride? 
 
LM: Well, I don’t know how many did on that occasion, there weren’t many journalists 
around at my location, well there were but we weren’t talking to each other, we were in 
our own little units. 
 
GD: But for example, when you get to Baghdad, I am not sure where you were, but 
when the events took place, for example the toppling of that statue, in the Firdos 
Square, also the attack on the Palestine Hotel where a lot of the journalists were 
staying, with the statue there seemed a lot of credulity among the press to begin with 
and only a few days later do you get the long shots of the very few people actually 
gathered around, and the Americans yanking everything down – do you think credulity 
of the press is an issue or a problem? 
 
LM: Well, I wasn’t.. 
 
GD: Not specifically you, but just in general terms a willingness to believe the official 
sources? 
 
LM: Not from the Australians.  I think all that patriotism and that was kicking in with 
the Americans, but the Australian journalists, the ones who are sent into a situation like 
that usually have a lot of mileage and don’t fall for traps.  We’re brought up with a keen 
sense of cynicism I suppose, that’s the nature of Australian journalism, because all the 
politicians insist on lying to us all the time.  Not lying, but trying not to tell us the whole 
truth. 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX V - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
PETER WILSON (NEWS LIMITED) 
19 MAY 2006 
 
Giles Dodson: What I wanted to begin by asking was, to start by asking you was, 
what was it that you were most proud of, or what did feel was your greatest 
achievement, I suppose from your time spent in Iraq, during the war? 
 
Peter Wilson:  Getting out, basically escaping both the control of the American and 
Iraqi controlling systems and working unilaterally, working independently. 
 
GD: I was reading a little of your book last night, and following also what you had 
written for the various publications – how easy did you find it do that? 
 
PW: Very very hard, I mean that was the hard thing.  There were thousands of 
journalists, literally thousands of journalists covered the conflict and I think it’s estimated 
that about a hundred managed to get into the country and travel unilaterally, most, I 
forget the numbers now, there were 2000 registered with the Americans in Kuwait trying 
to get over the border and, the figures are in that book somewhere, something like 150 
got across the border but most turned around and went back when they realised how 
dangerous it was, so there was not all that many who actually got in.  You could get into 
the north, because Saddam never controlled it, but it was the south I was interested in, 
covering the people’s war, you know, what impact it was really having on the people.   
 
GD: Right, that’s where the story was in your mind? 
 
PW: Yeah, exactly, I refused to be embedded.  There is a role for it, but I didn’t think 
my role was to cover the soldier’s war, it was to cover the people’s war. 
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GD: Why do you take that perspective or hold that point of view?  Is that to do with 
your values as a journalist, what you think is most important or does it come from a 
personal perspective? 
 
PW: Yeah, because, there was, yeah, it’s my values as a journalist, I am not 
particularly anti-war and I didn’t cover that war being against it or for it.  I really was, I 
could see the complexities of it, I didn’t think it was my position or my job to develop an 
ideology either for or against the war, but what I thought journalists needed to be doing 
was giving people back home an accurate picture of what effect the war was having and 
the attitudes of the Iraqi people.  One of the things that really shocked me was, how few 
of the journalists who got into the country actually bothered to take translators with 
them, to talk to people.  It’s like, why are you there?  If you are not there to talk to the 
people, you know, why not stay home?  Or just watch TV, if you’re just there to look at 
it, instead of trying to understand local attitudes. 
 
GD: Did you ask any of those people, you must have run into a lot of other journalists 
while you were there. 
 
PW: I got frustrated after a while, in the week or so we were in the south before going 
into Basra – increasing numbers, when you come across foreign journalists, because 
we’re all scurrying around like rats, trying to not stay in one place for too long and you’d 
come across them, exchange information and scurry off again.  And increasingly they 
were trying to use my translator.  To try and get him to go and ask some Iraqi people 
what their names were or what was going on or what they thought about what was 
happening, the invasion and so on, and I allowed that to happen for a couple of days, 
and then eventually I just got pissed off with it and said, “If it wasn’t important enough 
for you to bring someone, bugger off”.  Because your time was limited and he wasn’t 
there to help every English TV channel or whatever. 
 
GD: Just to talk a little more generally about journalism rather than your experiences 
in Iraq which have just touched on a lot of the things I would like to talk about.  What in 
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your opinion makes a professional journalist – what is a professional journalist in your 
opinion? 
 
PW: A professional journalist is someone, a professional reporter, and you know 
there’s and important distinction to be made, opinion writers and analysts are also 
professional journalists with different roles.  A professional reporter is someone who not 
just has the skills, because a lot of people have the skills, but has the attitude that this is 
not about me telling the world my unique wisdom and about how I understand 
everything, it’s about me just trying to understand what’s going on, as objectively as 
possible and communicate that without imposing my views on it. 
 
GD: So the next question is exactly that, how central are the values symbolised by 
objectivity to your understanding to your own job and to your own practice? 
 
PW: Absolutely.  Absolutely central – it’s a big part of what I see my challenge to be 
and what I do every day is get it right rather than set the world to rights myself.  I used 
to be an industrial relations reporter for a long time in Australia and I would get very 
frustrated when, in particular, would ask for comment pieces on every story – and my 
view was The Australian why should the reader be labouring with my opinion, who cares 
what my opinion is?  You know, I am much more comfortable doing and analysis piece 
– what does this latest development in the story mean, but opinion pieces and comment 
pieces are not really what I think reporters are for. 
 
GD: Then do you think in day to day reporting, and in reporting from Iraq, there is a 
place for analysis within the objective scheme? 
 
PW: Yes, exactly. Analysis which is intended to elucidate and educate one step 
further, adding value by telling people what you think, what the news event means and 
what it will lead to, rather than going, “wow, I think this is terrible”.  You know, you can’t 
be absolutely value – it’s not about being value free, if you were covering Germany in 
1939, hopefully you would have given Hitler a bit of a whack. 
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GD: Well that’s what I was going to say, in the instance of the Iraq war – you’ve got 
an objective journalist, so to speak, weighing up both sides, every side of each story, or 
the many sides of a story, trying to be as balanced and as impartial as possible, could 
potentially end up on one side with the Iraqi propagandists view and on the other side 
with the American official line from Centcom and really be no closer to anything of any 
value? 
 
PW: Well, that’s right, you are not there just as a tape recorder, but hopefully you will 
be putting them in context – that’s also objective to say “the Americans, despite 
overwhelming evidence that villages had been destroyed, insisted yesterday that there 
had been no damage.”  You know, there are ways of expressing the truth, while, or what 
you believe to be the truth…which is very different from expressing your opinion, which 
is, “the Americans, who are always liars…” 
 
GD: I agree.  How did your experiences in Iraq, driving around there, in the battlefield 
or even before, trying to get across the border, that sort of thing and then subsequently 
being arrested and taken to Baghdad I mean how did those experiences confront your 
professional values, of objectivity and trying to get to the story? 
 
PW: They really actually strengthened them, I came away thinking, “yeah, it does 
matter, it was worth it”.  You know we had an absolutely horrible time, and all three of us 
have been affected in different ways.  But yeah I certainly came away thinking it was 
worth it, it mattered.  I didn’t want to fit in the, cover the war like most of the people in 
Baghdad had to, which is sort of sitting there in a hotel, you couldn’t go out without Iraqi 
minders, most of them were covering it off the Internet, sitting there with computers and 
turning material around with a Baghdad dateline, and I didn’t want to be driving around 
cheerleading for the British or American soldiers and only seeing what they let you see 
and if you were embedded you didn’t have a translator and couldn’t go off and talk to 
the locals.  And so trying to just tell it straight and cover the people’s war was I think at 
 
 
349 
the end of the experience that decision was validated in my mind, and it was worth the 
effort. 
 
GD: And what influenced you in terms of the sorts of stories you would do, or the 
sorts of choices that you made when reporting the war.  The sorts of stories and the 
sources and the angles all that sort of thing, was that driven by your interest to tell the 
human side of the tale completely. 
 
PW: Exactly, the Australian angles, the human angles, but also you know as a foreign 
correspondent I came to it from a, I came to it as a foreign correspondent, where some 
people were there, went as defence reporters.  Tony Walker from the Financial Review, 
was there as a sort of political/security reporter, he covered it by, not going anywhere 
near the country, but by going to countries around it and speaking to military officials 
and doing analysis, so the way you do your job depends your background and your 
approach.  I’ve been a foreign correspondent for thirteen years, in Tokyo, Washington 
and now London and what the mentality that that gives you is that you’ve got to try and 
play instead of one instrument you’ve got to play the whole orchestra, you know the jack 
of all trade and the master of none – a finance story one day, a sports story the next 
afternoon, a magazine piece on a musician the next day, politics in the afternoon.  I 
think if I was trying to characterise the collection of stories in Iraq it was trying to do a 
broad a range as possible.  In Umm Qasr I did a couple of light stories about, the 
Americans had trained a dolphin, a dolphin to detect mines, and someone sent me an 
email saying the story was the funniest newspaper story he’d ever read, reckons he 
burst out laughing on a Melbourne tram, reading the story about the Australian soldier 
saying “Fuck off Flipper!  I’m not trusting my life to a bloody big fish”.  So you know it 
was pretty mixed up, but you’re right most of it was either looking for an Australian angle 
or people.  I was trained on the Melbourne Sun.  Which was actually called the 
Melbourne Sun News Pictorial and I have got a big awareness of the importance of 
photographs, so our stories were very heavily photographically driven.  You know the 
impact of interviewing somebody and here’s his face, or a story about a family fleeing 
Basra and here they are. 
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GD: You were very lucky to be travelling with John Feder the photographer, yeah? 
 
PW: Exactly. 
 
GD: That came about more or less unexpectedly didn’t it? 
 
PW: I was expecting to be in Baghdad on my own and John was supposed to be in 
Doha with Ian McPhedran, but with problems getting visas it all got swapped around 
and I ended up doing exactly what I wanted to do, which was be in the battlefield, and 
have a photographer and have a translator, um and I was very very keen to work with 
John, often reporter photographer teams don’t…you know they do their own thing [sic].  
A lot of reporters, especially broadsheet trained reporters are not that big on photos, 
where as we really, it’s been the best working relationship I have ever had…and I had 
never met John before, but we’d work stuff out together…if we interview this guy, can 
we get a photo of his family, let’s go to his home.  It was unusually photographically 
driven.  There is one story that really epitomises that – it was basically just a series of 
photos, what we call headshots of buildings, we were driving back from the hospital one 
day in Baghdad, after the fall of Saddam and we drove and we were racing to get back 
to our hotel before curfew and we drove past this enormous building, office building, 
absolutely pristine and it was surrounded by American soldiers and of course it was the 
oil ministry and we just said “Fuck!” because it was such an amazing contrast to 
everything around us, but we couldn’t stop because we had to beat the curfew, but I 
said to John, “Look what we’ll do tomorrow is get a photo of that and drive around 
Baghdad and get photos of all the shattered buildings. 
 
GD: And contrast it? 
 
PW: Exactly, just dress it up as a contrast and the Hobart Mercury was the paper that 
swallowed that vision totally and their front page was exactly what we thought it should 
be, which was sort of eight photos of buildings with a strip across them saying burned, 
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so it says “Education Ministry – burned”, “Hospital – demolished”, “School – looted” and 
then in the middle sits this one pristine building and it says “Protected” – the headline is 
can you tell the difference between these buildings.  So you know I thought that was a 
powerful piece of journalism, but it was photography.  Photography with captions.   
 
GD: To talk a little bit about, sort of on that theme, given that the war was the most 
controversial conflict, you know in 50 years, perhaps so to speak, in a generation 
anyway, when the invasion began, the legality of the war was unresolved, then you’ve 
got instances like you just described, fairly illustrative, examples, but there are 
arguments for and against the reasons why Americans bomb the things they do, but the 
legitimacy of the war, was that something that was a concern of yours whilst you were 
there, doing reporting on the spot? 
 
PW: Yes.  Like I say I didn’t think my view was before the war decide if I was for it of 
against it and then see everything through that prism, obviously you are thinking about it 
and trying to decide, “is this right?”  “Should I be taking an aggressively critical 
position?”  The view that I came to was shaped by what I found talking to Iraqi people, 
which was that, it could have worked, it wasn’t inherently illegitimate, that the war if it 
had been done properly, if the occupation had been handled professionally and properly 
it could have been worth it – go in get Saddam and get out again, you know, set the 
place up so it could run, support it and get out while providing full support for the Iraqis, 
would’ve been exactly what most Iraqi people wanted.  It would have been perfectly 
legitimate.  The problem was and I found that by talking to Iraqis in those early days 
while the war was still going on, I was saying what do you think about this and their 
attitude was, they did have an open mind, their attitude was, “well, you say you have 
come as liberators not as invaders, well if that is true then that is great, get rid of him 
and bugger off”.  They had an open mind, and watched and waited and you could see 
that open mind closing, which was heartbreaking because we blew it.  We made all 
these promises.  We said stay at home and we dropped pamphlets and radio 
broadcasts saying, stay out of the way, we are not coming to fight you we are coming to 
save you, stay out of the way and we will provide law and order, food, water, electricity 
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we will look after you and within days, we made it clear that we broke those promises 
that the Iraqis took as evidence that we were lying, that we were coming as invaders 
and to get the oil.   
 
GD: And did that, obviously that happened towards the end of the conflict, once 
Baghdad had fallen – did that change the angle of stories?  Did that, once Baghdad had 
been taken, did that mean that there was a whole bunch of different things to focus on? 
 
PW: It was huge, there was no break, because suddenly you had the looting, you talk 
to people about things they couldn’t talk about before.  You could talk to people who 
had been too scared to say anything in the past.  Like all the coverage from foreign 
journalists in Baghdad before the war, they couldn’t interview people without a minder 
being present.  So you know, it had been very hard to get honest, accurate 
representations of what people were saying, whereas now, bang!  Saddam was gone 
and the city was wide open, it was paradise, there were so many [stories.  Any idea you 
could have there were stories.  Like one that I did that I wish I had put even more time 
on was the story going into the Iraqi foreign ministry and sorting through paper that were 
all lying around.  I wish I had found something related to the Australian Wheat Board. 
 
GD: Absolutely.  A letter from Alexander Downer, or something like that. 
 
PW: Absolutely.  And there were lots of documents there but you only had so much 
time because the city was being looted and fighting was going on and you’d say, “Fuck, 
what are the Americans doing?”  What do the people think about this and what does this 
mean for the future of the occupation.  It was a very, it certainly wasn’t as if the war was 
over the moment that statue came down. 
 
GD: Just to bring it back to experiences of war and how various people reported on 
the war, what’s your opinion of, obviously I understand it, but just to spell it out, what’s 
your opinion of the embedding process and the embedding exercise? 
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PW: I think its fine as an adjunct to journalists attending briefings.  It should be seen in 
that light, you know it’s better than journalists just going to military briefings in Doha, but 
it is in no way as good as or a replacement for journalists travelling independently and 
so while, on one hand I think there is a role for it as that sort of adjunct, my great 
concern and the reason I am very very down on the embedding system is that the 
intention is to use it as a replacement. 
 
GD: Yeah, right.  And you would have experienced it yourself, given the insecurity for 
journalists out there running around like you were. 
 
PW: Oh yeah, and there have been academic studies here where - at the University of 
Cardiff they interviewed embedded journalists and one of their conclusions was that it 
made it more dangerous.  That fact that they are protecting the journalists in their care 
led the Americans to be more… 
 
GD: Blasé or gung ho? 
 
PW: Yeah and you’re either with us or against us.  I think in a way it probably goes to 
the particular culture of the American military where, like the marines, that whole thing 
about the band of brothers, we don’t leave our dead on the field, and it’s us versus the 
world, which is very different from the British culture, you tell the British understood that 
everyone around them was still a human being.  Where as to the Americans everyone 
else is an alien and you’re either an American or a potential enemy and the press, as 
one by-product of this embedding system, we found ourselves very much on the wrong 
side of that divide and their attitude was we will feed and protect and essentially die for 
these journalists that we’ve got in our tanks but anyone else, out there – “fuck you, you 
are a potential enemy”.  You know, they killed more journalists during the war than 
Saddam did. 
 
GD: Yeah, indeed, indeed.  That leads into again, the American – the Coalition, 
Australia was there as well – the attempts to manage the news, which we saw through 
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partly the embedding process but also at Central Command down at Doha, quite 
notoriously a difficult place to get information out of, I mean how – one question is how 
does that confront your ability to do your job as a professional journalist, having that 
obfuscatory machine coming at you all the time and two is there any way for the press 
to get around it at all? 
 
PW: Well I think it, and not just in this context, in politics as well, I think it’s the biggest 
threat to journalists today.  As journalists we tend to get obsessed with other things, 
like… 
 
GD: Freedom of speech? 
 
PW: Yeah, legal threats and owners getting too big and cross media regulations and 
stuff, when sure they are important issues but I think the absolute biggest threat is that 
at the moment is one, PR is the enemy of journalism, and two, they are winning 
because they are getting bigger and stronger and richer than us.  You know I am a Nazi 
on this point, I believe journalists who become PR people shouldn’t be allowed back – I 
don’t think it’s just another branch of journalism.  I think its anti-journalism.   
 
GD: What can be done? 
 
PW: Well, not much. 
 
GD: Also in the context of a war like Iraq. 
 
PW: Well, more resources, the only way, both in a war like Iraq and elsewhere I think 
two things:  One, the industry has to recognise that danger and governments and 
militaries are pouring enormous amounts of resources and managing to lure away 
highly skilled journalists to work against us, so we can’t give up, you can’t surrender in 
the face of that you’ve got to put more resources in.  And secondly, professionally I wish 
journalists attach more opprobrium to going to work in PR and you know, this is not a 
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popular opinion, I have a lot of friends who work in PR.  But you know, in Canberra 
particularly I resent the ease with which people go and work for governments and then 
go back to the press.  I think if you are going to go and work for a political party against 
the press then other journalists within the profession should say, “well ok, you’ve 
doubled your salary, and you’ve got new contacts or whatever, we can’t stop that, but 
we can see you as no longer a journalist”.  So you know - you can’t come back.  Phillip 
Morris tobacco company has offered to triple your salary to go and work for them for a 
couple of years, well, fine, you go, but just be aware that not too many of us are going to 
be looking to employ you when you want to come back. 
 
GD: What I wanted to ask you to finish off was, was there any concern over how the 
news that was being generated from all the different people stationed in and around Iraq 
was being perceived back in Australia? 
 
PW: Was being perceived by who? 
 
GD: By anyone, by the public or the government, especially given the experience of 
the ABC, who were criticised quite heavily by, I think it was the broadcasting minister, 
for their coverage of the war, was that a concern at all for people working for News 
Limited? 
 
PW: I am not really sure what you mean – were we trying to make a point in our 
coverage? Or trying to appear? 
 
GD: Was there any concern over your coverage, was there concern over how that 
was being received back in Australia.  Because I’ve spoken to another journalist, and he 
said, “look, mate, there’s no time to think about that sort of stuff when you’re driving 
around in the desert”. 
 
PW: Well the only concern is, you’d see something and you’d feel passionately about 
it and you’d think “Fuck!  You know”.  The point I’d made before, we’d broken our 
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promise of food and electricity to these people, this is really bad, people back home 
should know this.  So you would try very hard to get that point across that “hey listen, 
there are potential problems here and this occupation could be a lot harder than 
everyone hopes, because people are getting pissed off, they’ve decided we are here for 
the oil, because we’re fucking them around, this matters this matters [sic].  It’s very 
hard, and in a way, you’re trying to influence your readers or make a point to your 
readers. 
 
GD: But also maintaining that degree of detachment that objectivity demands of you 
as a journalist, yeah? 
 
PW: Yeah, but that can also be you know, quite an objective analysis – that you know, 
it’s not based on me going there being pro-war or anti-war, it’s based on getting there 
and listening to people speak and hearing them say that and going, “Fuck!”  That means 
the way we blithely just ignored these warnings and that there are children and families 
without water in Iraq it’s going to have a really long term impact, by treating them badly 
in these first couple of weeks we could be building a huge problem, which is exactly 
what was happening, we are turning public opinion against ourselves here.  This is a 
bad issue, a bad strategy what happening right now.  Its, yeah, it’s not just report the 
facts objectively, but I think it’s still objective, in that you’re saying what you’re seeing, 
you know being objective doesn’t mean you’re just a tape recorder. 
 
GD: Listen just to finish off, I know you’re busy and probably got others things to do, 
but just wanted to ask you a couple of questions. 
 
GD: One was the toppling of the statue of Saddam and the second was the shooting 
by the tank of the Palestine Hotel, I wanted to know what was your take on all that and 
with the coverage, especially of the statue, when subsequently people saw the staged 
look of what was going – any ideas as to why it was covered the way it was? 
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PW: Well, it was a lovely, it was a microcosm of a lot of the problems, toppling that 
statue, they way the Americans showed their insensitivity by the way they at one point 
got up and put an American flag on Saddam’s face.  You know, this is stupid.  It wasn’t 
supposed to be an American invasion, showing the world, hey this is what happens 
when America conquers Iraq. And then they got up and did it.  The grunts driving the big 
truck got up and did it, and someone said, hold on, pull that flag down.  Ok, so having 
shown their true attitude to it someone got up and pulled it down.  All the questions 
about was it a rent a crowd mob, well I think the truth is probably somewhere in the 
middle – a lot of the people were very working class people from, that area, but I am 
sure there were also people in the crowd who were brought in. 
 
GD: Why do you think it played the way it did in the media, I mean initially it was you 
know, “Iraqis topple hated symbol of Saddam Hussein” then a few days later you had 
these questions coming out, yet at the time journalists seemed almost too willing to, 
they needed or wanted those images, you know? 
 
PW: Well exactly, as you said it was an iconic moment and icons tell stories and 
people wanted a moment that symbolised what was going on, like the fall of the (Berlin) 
wall, the images we see of people swinging sledgehammers at the wall, were not the 
first images of the wall being destroyed.  The wall had been breached elsewhere.  But 
that’s what we see, as the fall of the wall. 
 
GD: It seems like a weakness in journalism, a desire for those sorts of images also. 
 
PW: Yeah, images and events.  There needs to be events they sum things up, it’s not 
just the visually driven nature of the media, you know.  It was an event, the war ended 
at 3.37pm – boom.  They also serve their purposes.  That image sums up a broader 
truth, that Saddam did fall, both his statue and his government.  So yeah they are never 
perfect, but I wouldn’t be totally down on the use of them.  On the Palestine Hotel, I 
write about this quite a bit in the book, because a lot of people think it was, a lot of 
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journalists still think it was a deliberate attempt by the Americans to intimidate the press 
the press who were not with them, whereas I don’t – I think it was... 
 
GD: Sheer incompetence? 
 
PW: Exactly, it was typical of what was happening to Iraqis all across the country.  We 
just got a taste of what killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.  It was you know some 19yr 
old grunt with loud music pumping through his head who saw something and just went 
bang!  You know if they went in there, not knowing that, and not caring that the single 
biggest building, the tallest building in Iraq was packed with foreign journalists, and 
therefore the just fucking shoot it.  What chance did the average the Iraqi family, driving 
in a family a car, that might or might not be a terrorist vehicle, have?  You know?  It was 
just trigger happy, fucking bang bang bang, oh there’s a glint of light on that balcony, 
bam, hit it.  And the way they then lied about it, putting up this amazing barrage of lies, 
a rocket propelled grenade, or sniper fire came from that balcony and that’s why we 
shot it.  “Oh, yeah, well from that distance it’s impossible”.  “Oh, it was a sniper spotter; 
we thought there was someone up there with binoculars guiding snipers”.  If there was 
one building in Iraq where there were not snipers or Iraqis working, it was that one, 
because every room had journalists in it.  And the way they just spun it out, once again 
it come back to that issue about the skills that they have, the American military have 
developed in press manipulation, they realise that if you can, they just rushed out an 
initial lie, because they have learnt that if you can respond to a story for the first news 
cycle or two, it just goes away and when the truth comes out later on it doesn’t matter.  
If you can stand up some lie straight away – they were making defences and answers in 
Doha within minutes, when how could they know what happened, they couldn’t!  It was 
just a random – a tank just turned around and fired.  And generals were standing up in 
Doha saying, well it was because…blah blah blah…It’s so obviously, so blatantly 
obviously making it up [sic] 
 
GD: Again that seems a weakness of journalism, in that it is susceptible to those sorts 
of manipulations. 
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PW: Well that’s it!  This is the problem.  The anti-journalists have realised that they 
have worked out their strategy based on traditions and habits of journalists.  That one, 
we will publish a response, from the accused and two as time goes on the story loses 
significance, and a correction published three weeks later does not address the initial 
thing.  And they’ve learned that by hiring journalists, by having very good journalists 
working for them. 
 
GD: Would you advocate some change to way in which journalists do their job, or the 
way in which reporting is done? 
 
PW: No just doing it better, with more resources, being aware of those dangers.  We 
have to keep giving a response, you can’t do anything about the fact that when the true 
story emerges a month later it doesn’t undo to damage caused by the lies at the time, 
you can’t do anything about that.  But all we can do is be more sceptical, more accurate, 
more probing and that means more resources and better journalists, more better trained 
[sic], better resourced journalists because the people we are up against are bloody well 
resourced as well and nowadays, the depressing thing is bloody well skilled.  That’s 
where top journalists tend to see their career paths going.  Journalism has become a 
young man’s, a young person’s profession, because it’s so hard and the hours are so 
rigorous and uncomfortable stuff – I’ll do that for 15 years and then I’ll grow up and get a 
real job, working nine to five as a PR person.  There are not many journalists still 
practicing at the age of fifty – or even forty.  If you compare between the ages of twenty 
five and forty there’s a huge drop off and between forty to fifty it’s almost minimal and if 
you’re not Paul Kelly and editing a newspaper, you’ve generally moved on… 
THE END 
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APPENDIX VI - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
MARK WILLACY 
2 JULY 2006 
 
Giles Dodson: I thought might begin by asking you what was it that you were most 
proud of or what do you think your greatest achievement was in reporting from Iraq in 
2003? 
 
Mark Willacy: A very good question.  I think the ability to get out and about and 
talk to people, normal Iraqis.  It was difficult before the war with Saddam’s Information 
Ministry goons shadowing you everywhere.  But I had a tiny bit of Arabic, which you 
know, you roughly communicate with people without your minder knowing.  After the 
war it was good you could get out and truly talk to people and find out what their 
aspirations were.  I think the stories I am most proud of are the stories of ordinary 
people.  It’s hard to say, because I won a Walkley for the coverage, but the coverage 
was so broad I think I submitted three reports and one was about before the war when 
Saddam’s people were on the PR offensive and trying to convinced the world they didn’t 
have weapons of mass destruction and they took us to this plant and we had a look 
around, it was a bit of a joke and then during the war and after the war when I went out 
to Abu Ghraib pretty much before anyone and saw these cemeteries and all these 
people had come out to find their relatives and there was just mass hysteria there.  
They were digging with their bare hands, that was a good story and one I was proud of.  
Also there was one story I remember about the Americans, they denied throughout the 
war that they ever used cluster bombs on any population centres and we went to a 
neighbourhood in Baghdad where they were embedded in people’s gardens and on 
people’s rooves.  There were kids with their stomachs torn open.  So you know I was 
fairly proud of those sorts of stories, but it’s hard to pin one particular issue down. 
 
GD: Yeah, sure.  Did you find that like after the war or post-regime did you find it 
easier to do your reporting?  Did you find that the Americans were open and 
forthcoming with information, that sort of thing? 
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MW: Yes and no.  It was easier in that you were not shadowed by and Information 
Ministry minder and a regime that was totalitarian in its nature.  It was more difficult in 
that you had to be very very careful about your own safety.  The one good thing about 
Saddam’s regime was that foreign journalists were…when you’re in a dictatorship like 
that your safety was assured, although there was an Iranian journalist who was hanged 
there a few years ago.  But yeah, the safety issue was one we had to watch out for.  
One extremely close call we had was with the US where they nearly shot us, dragged 
us out of the car. 
 
GD: Yeah, I remember reading an account of yours of that, or perhaps it was a 
broadcast transcript or something, but year, that was a close call. 
 
MW: The Americans in the immediate post-war period were very open, you could walk 
up to them and I remember running into an American soldier down along the Tigris and 
he said, “Come and see what we’ve found”.  And he took us to this house and it was 
just stacked with rocket propelled grenades and launchers and AK 47s and millions of 
rounds.  They’d obviously just stashed it.  So yeah, they were really open, it was only 
after, when I went back a few months later it was a bit more formalised, and you had to 
have press credentials everywhere you wanted to go. 
 
GD: Did you find with the safety issues there were things you would like to be 
covering that you weren’t covering because, you were concerned about being harmed? 
 
MW: No, it was more to do with the way you approached it.  You were very cautious 
you didn’t scream about in a car, you’d put TV stickers on your car, and we had a white 
flag in the car too, if you approached a nervous looking checkpoint you’d wave the flag 
and drive slowly, you’d even hop out of the car 100 meters down the road so they could 
see you were a Western journalist.  But there were cases of people being shot, Iraqis 
generally, for tailing a convoy too closey.  Geoff Thompson did a very good story about 
that when he was with a convoy when that happened.   
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GD: Listen, more generally, you know about journalism, what in your opinion is a 
professional journalist? 
 
MW: Is a professional journalist? 
 
GD:  Yeah, or what are the characteristics of a professional journalist? 
 
MW: I think the characteristics of a professional journalist, is someone who is 
dedicated to the craft, now that’s a very general statement, but someone who is 
committed to the truth and committed to people is interested in people, is sceptical of 
government and bureaucracy and authority.  Not cynical of course, but sceptical.  
Someone who is willing to do primary reporting and get out there, into the field or to 
meet the people who are in the story.  And someone who, I don’t think anyone can be 
objective, I really don’t – I think that someone who could mask or hide or suppress and 
bias or anything like that and to approach the story in an honest way, you know we are 
all human beings.  Having worked here with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict you’ve got to 
learn to be thorough, and you’ve got to learn to be dispassionate in a lot of ways. 
 
GD: Reading about journalism and talking to journalists and that sort of thing – 
objectivity is either sort of a central value or a value which can be pursued but never 
attained. 
 
MW: Yeah, I think it’s the latter.  To be brutally honest I really do.  I don’t think we are 
objective about anything in our lives pretty much. 
 
GD: How is that negotiated then, as a journalist and especially as a journalist in a 
situation like you just described, in Palestine and Israel or a very very controversial 
situation like the Iraq war.  How is it possible to maintain any sort of professional 
credibility if one accepts already that one can’t be objective? 
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MW: Yeah, well it’s a battle a daily battle and you’ve got to approach each story and 
interview with that in mind and especially with an organization like the ABC you have to 
be extremely careful and extremely thorough and I think that was borne out by Richard 
Alston’s complaints about our coverage.  And a couple of people were caught out, but 
luckily, I had a couple of complaints brought against me, but they were dismissed at 
every level of the inquiry.  Look, it’s a hard question, I have biases and am not objective 
as a human being about certain things, but as a journalist – one way I do it is that if I 
have a sympathy one way or another, if I have a sympathy on a particular issue I will go 
harder on the people in that issue to satisfy myself that doesn’t mean I will give the 
other people an easy ride.  But it’s just a matter of I want to get to the bottom of it and 
make sure I have thoroughly investigated everything these people say or the issue.  
And any journalist who tells you they’re objective or that you can be objective is telling 
you a bit of a white lie.  I just don’t think objectivity is achievable.  It’s one of those things 
if you’re in the field and you are seeing things with your own eyes and you’ve reported 
on the story for three months or years or whatever, you know very well who is right and 
who is wrong.  The good thing about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that there are 
people on both side who are right and people on both sides who are wrong. 
 
GD: Does objectivity become replaced by values of honesty and credibility and 
integrity and those sorts of things? 
 
MW: Yeah, I think you have to open and thorough and you know you have to…you 
know if I do a story on the death toll amongst Palestinian children I always do another 
story about the Israeli children who have died in this conflict.  You know that’s a fairly 
obvious way of trying to be balanced or objective, but that’s not to say I agree with the 
Palestinians or the Israelis what I don’t agree with is the killing of children by either side 
or it’s a legitimate issue to explore.  And who kills the children? 
 
GD: Do you not encounter the danger though, almost as you’ve just described, two 
sides to every story – the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is almost the ultimate in this sort of 
debate.  But you can take it back a few steps and talk about an environmental debate or 
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a labour debate, that sort of thing, and when you are talking about the interests of 
someone who is polluting a river versus someone who doesn’t want the river polluted 
and there aren’t necessarily two equal points of view, this is a complex negotiation, that 
weighing up a two sides of a story or three sides, or whatever. 
 
MW: That’s right, journalism is a tangled web and you know you’ve got to sort your 
way through it.  All I know is that here, you know we have had to jump though so many 
hoops, with the lobby groups on both sides, they are trying to manipulate and pressure 
you to use certain language.  One word – terrorist – is a weapon.  You know the ABC’s 
been in the firing line quite a bit over the different definitions we use. 
 
GD: Did you find that in Iraq that you were very very careful about the sorts of 
language that you used and about how your news was going to be received.   
 
MW: Yeah.  Well there was one occasion, with the cluster bombs story, the 
Americans.  Let me back track a minute.  The American military use a lot of words and 
phrases like target “rich environment” and “collateral damage” all this sort of rubbish 
intended to dehumanise the whole thing.  Anyway we questioned the Americans about it 
and the Americans said something along the lines of we only know of one case of 
collateral damage, and I said in my report, “collateral damage is a rather offensive way 
of saying someone who they didn’t mean to kill or harm was killed or harmed”.  To me 
that was probably the product of three months reporting in a very difficult environment, 
but I found that offensive and I sort of stated it and a few people didn’t like what I said, 
but I think after three months on the road, fatigue and anger tends to get the better of 
you. 
 
GD: And I would think that once you’ve actually spent the time doing the reporting you 
can actually back up what you’re reporting with knowledge.  You’re almost entitled, 
perhaps, if you can to make those sorts of calls.  Listen how, how was it possible, like 
we talked about before for a professional journalist to combat the efforts that are made 
to manage and manipulate the news, you know, generally but also in a specific instance 
 
 
365 
in Iraq you have propaganda coming from both sides, the official sources spinning the 
war, the various circumstances, how is it possible for a professional journalist to do their 
job in that environment? 
 
MW: Well, it’s difficult – but I actually think the manipulation is more serious in the 
power centres of Washington, London and Canberra than in Baghdad.  Because in 
Baghdad you’re getting out and meeting people and the people at the grassroots, to use 
that hoary old cliché, that, who are affected by what Washington or London or Canberra 
or whoever is implementing.  But obviously there is a lot of pressure on journalists in 
Baghdad to, you know, pick up the language of the bureaucracy, of the military and 
apply that because it tends to keep things fuzzier. 
 
GD: Again language is a big issue there – because you’ve got, just take for example 
Central Command during the war, you know people talking about collateral damage, 
target rich environments, smart bombs all that sort of stuff – how possible it is for 
journalists to not take that language on board?  Bcause it’s very seductive imagery. 
 
MW: It is, it’s very seductive and especially what we saw was the phenomenon of the 
embedded reporter and constantly referring to “we” and “us” in terms of the unit they 
were embedded with.  That’s why I think with embedding there’s a great ethical dilemma 
there for journalists and why I refuse to do it and why I want to be based in Baghdad – 
to be what the Americans called unilateral.  The Americans don’t like unilaterals 
because unilaterals cannot be controlled, they can be discouraged, they can even be 
threatened, you know?  But yeah, I think in Qatar for example in Central Command 
there, there was a lot I saw a lot, well Fox News is a disgrace and it’s not hard to see 
why for anybody with any basic journalistic training, they adopted all that language and 
it even crept into the BBC and that’s where I reckon the danger really is as a journalist is 
to be involved in those sorts of scenarios.   
 
GD: Does that mean not working for those sorts of organizations? 
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MW: Or not getting posted to those sorts of places.  You know to that particular 
assignment, but again you can’t really avoid some assignments, but yeah for sure, I 
would never like to work for CNN or Fox – I think you’d be compromised.  The other 
thing is, when I was in Baghdad – the Americans might have had a briefing, but I never 
went to it.  You know, I would rather get out and about on the ground and if I want to 
know what the Americans said at the briefing, I’ll check AFP or Reuters and maybe get 
a grab from APTN or Reuters who were there and then put it in my report if it was 
worthwhile.  But I prefer to talk to ordinary Iraqis or the GIs out in the street and see 
what they’d seen.  In the early part of the war they were authorised to talk and the thing 
about Americans is that they love to talk and they are pretty open and pretty honest, 
these young soldiers and the military cottoned on to that after a while and the next trip 
that I took in you couldn’t do that. 
 
GD: So what was it that triggered your news sense when you were in Baghdad, what 
was it that you found newsworthy? 
 
MW: Well, you know, my fixer came in one day and said, “look people are pouring out 
to Abu Ghraib” and you think, that was the most notorious prison in the Middle East, 
50000 people were held there, we’ll go out there.  You know it was one of those 
situations where you could look out your window and see what was happening, there 
were gun battles along the Tigris for weeks after the war.  So yeah, so if I read 
something about the Americans not dropping cluster bombs I’d ask my fixer and say 
what do you know.  You know, your fixer is your eyes and your ears, he, well mainly as 
they were he’s, there were a few she’s, but he’s your eyes and your ears, if you got a 
good fixer, he’d tell you what was happening out on the street.  A good story to me was 
the, well it’s hard to define, it one that made me interested it could be anything from the 
cluster bomb story, to the Abu Ghraib story to anything. 
 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX VII - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
ERIC CAMPBELL (ABC) 
19 MAY 2006 
 
Giles Dodson: What I might just begin by asking you was, what was it that you 
were most perhaps proud of or the thing that you best achieved during you time in Iraq.  
And in asking you that, I am asking you for a bit of a description of your time there. 
 
EC: Its one story where I don’t really look back on achievements, because we got 
there and my cameraman got killed.  So it’s all a bit of a black murky area.  I mean you 
take a certain pride in covering the big stories and getting to the centre of the big 
stories, but in this case events interceded that stopped the coverage in a very tragic 
way so I did a couple of stories before my cameraman was killed.  But the story really 
hadn’t started, we were planning on being there about a month and that all went arse 
about. 
 
GD: I just want to ask you a bit more generally about journalism, but also relating to 
journalism during war, but what in your opinion is a professional journalist? 
 
EC:  That’s a broad question.  At the simplest level its someone who is a journalist for a 
living.  If you want to look at what professionalism means, I have a great antipathy for 
the idea of what’s commonly called the ‘independent journalist’ which usually means the 
leftwing journalist who takes a very polemical stance irrespective of the facts.  What 
journalism is, is having a loyalty to no-one but the story, so you go into a story have a 
look at the facts and the situation on the ground and you report down the line what you 
see, rather than what you would like to see or what you would like to be the reality. 
 
GD: How central are the values that are sort of traditionally symbolised by the idea of 
objectivity to the practice of a professional journalist? 
 
 
 
368 
EC: Well I think objectivity is absolutely crucial there is this sort of [sic] [in] the 1970s 
developed this school of journalism called “New Journalism” which held that objectivity 
doesn’t exist, that we are all biased, and that we should present our biases, which I feel 
is utter crap and an utter betrayal of the craft.  Objectivity is what it is all about – which 
doesn’t mean you are a stenographer who simply reports what people say, you do 
analyse things, you approach things with certain values. 
 
GD: How is that negotiated?  The fine line between stenography and, how would you 
say, and objectivity? 
 
EC: I don’t think it is a fine line.   I think there is a process in journalism called 
analysis where you look at a situation, you make decisions about it, you make 
judgements about it as to what is the story, what is the reality of the situation.  You 
approach it from a perspective based on various principles, such as a desire to tell 
what’s really going on a sympathy towards the underdog is quite legitimate, you know 
you look at the human side of what’s going on, all these things that do involve some 
empathy with the people you are reporting on.  But as far as the bigger picture of the 
politics goes you take a very hard clinical look at what’s going on rather than trying to 
presuppose what the situation is so if you’re doing a story about the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict you don’t go in with a perception that Israel is bad, the Palestinians are 
oppressed, you actually look to the complexities of the situation, whatever you think 
about the establishment of Israel you also have to look at the reality on the ground, 
which people are behaving in a way that is moral, that is consistent with international 
law, which people are doing things that are counterproductive, which people are 
respecting the tenets tenets of international law, all these things apply to different 
situations, with the knowledge that the story you may finally come up with is not the 
story that you may want yourself personally to be telling, it’s the real story on the 
ground.   
 
GD: How did your experience doing journalism during war confront these values? 
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EC: Well, when you’re reporting a war you are only, you are normally looking at it 
from a particular theatre of the war, you usually can’t be giving an overall 
comprehensive picture of the war, because what you are seeing is always a particular 
theatre of the battle.  Now when I was in Iraq we were reporting from Northern Iraq, 
from the Kurdish area that was opposed to Saddam Hussein.  The people we were 
talking to were very much in favour of US intervention, they had suffered enormously 
under Saddam Hussein, the kind of, feelings that you find in other parts of the war, 
people opposed to the war weren’t evident there, people were very much supportive of 
it.  So when you’re reporting you’re not sort of saying whether the war was right of 
wrong, you’re basically saying [sic] what does it mean to these people?  Why do they 
feel this way?  What are the consequences likely to be for them?  What are they 
prepared to suffer for the military intervention? 
 
GD: When you were in Northern Iraq, what determined, for example, who became 
sources, because there was the Kurdish side, there were the Americans floating around 
up there and the local Iraqis. 
 
EC: Well, at that stage we didn’t have any access to the Americans, because that 
theatre didn’t have embedding and the only Americans up there were Special Forces. 
They did not have an embedding program, so there was no options of going out with an 
Army unit, cause they avoided the media at all costs.  So what we were reporting on 
was what it is like for the ordinary people there in Sulaymaniyah.  The fears they had of 
chemical weapons being used, the fears they had for being victimised by Saddam 
Hussein in retaliation for the American intervention, we’d speak to the Kurdish 
leadership, for the political aspect but in the three days I was there before this 
happened, there wasn’t a great deal of reporting to be done. 
 
GD: Obviously reporting in war is extremely dangerous, up until the point where Paul 
was killed, what were you doing to sort of mitigate your exposure to the dangers? 
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EC: Well, at that stage, in the lead up to the war, we all know now there were no 
weapons of mass destruction, the perception among journalists, as much as amongst 
anyone else, was that there was a very strong likelihood of chemical weapons strikes.  I 
had done a course with the with the DoD in Britain, an ABC course – atomic, biological 
and chemical for looking at ways to protect yourself from attacks by weapons of mass 
destruction.  We’d suck on the gas chamber [sic], we’d stick on gas masks, all that sort 
of thing – all of which proved to be pointless.  But at the time people were carrying 
around, a biological suit in a backpack on our backs at all times, we’d take them to the 
toilet with us, we’d never take them off, only in the shower. 
 
GD: Were there instances where the dangers, or elements of danger, were 
considered too great to permit reporting to go on? 
 
EC: One of the reasons we had decided to go to northern Iraq was that the ABC had 
decided that Baghdad was too dangerous, so it was felt that Northern Iraq would be a 
relatively safe theatre of the war where we could still be in Iraq, giving the Iraq dateline, 
giving a sense of what was going on but not actually in an area that was being targeted 
by the Coalition.  At the time, I mean suicide bombing has become a big issue, at that 
stage it wasn’t really seen a major risk to journalists.  The course I did in London, it was 
in Stonehedge – Southampton I think, the military didn’t even mention suicide bombing 
because at that stage it wasn’t really a prevalent threat.  Paul’s death was the first death 
by suicide bombing in the Iraq war, and we happened to be the ones that became the 
example of things to watch out for in the future. 
 
GD: Having Paul killed, did make you reflect or reconsider your role as a journalist? 
 
EC: Well, obviously it does, in an extreme a way as you can imagine.  Yeah, in 
hindsight I wouldn’t have gone to Iraq at that particular time in my life, because I had a 
new-born baby.  But because I had covered a number of wars in the past quite safely 
and because suicide bombing wasn’t the prevalent threat then as it has become, I made 
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the decision that I should go, but in hindsight I wouldn’t have made that decision, 
obviously. 
 
GD: Of course, of course.  To talk about a different aspect of the war – what is your 
attitude towards the notion of or the idea of embedding journalist with the military? 
 
EC: Well, there’s a lot of nonsense spoken about embedding as though it’s some new 
thing, um embedding, in the sense of putting yourself with a particular party in a story is 
something that has been going on for as long as there has been journalists.  If you go 
back to an environmentalist group like the Franklin Dam in 1982-3, journalists would 
base themselves with an environmentalist group who were guerrilla protest groups who 
were doing raids out in the wilds of the west coast of Tasmania.  It was a more 
formalised situation in the Iraq war, but it was seen as a means of improved media 
access, after Vietnam where journalists had complete freedom and actually had a 
military ranking, freedom to move around, there had been a sort of lowering of the 
shutters on journalistic access.  So this was actually seen as a bit of a break through, 
that journalists could actually be with a US military unit.  But all you’re seeing is a 
snapshot of the war, all you’re seeing is what the 18yr old grunts you’re with are seeing.  
The problem with embedding is where its being used, where that snapshot picture is 
being presented as the overall picture, so it really comes down to the basic practice, the 
basic craft of journalism, where you don’t make what you’re seeing appear to be greater 
than what it is, pretending greater knowledge than you actually have, but there is 
nothing wrong with actually being in a military unit as long as you present it as a 
snapshot of the war.  This is what these troops are seeing, this is a bit of a sniff of the 
reality of what’s happening for US troops on the ground.   
 
GD: Leading into my next question, to do also with the, some would argue the efforts 
of coalition officials, and also Iraqi officials, to manage the news, the various strategies 
that were used, especially down at Centcom, with the military briefings that were, how 
do you say, not really revealing much at all. 
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EC: No, well, Doha was a complete farce.  The journalists we had at Doha just 
thought it was a complete waste of time because they weren’t being given any usable 
information, it was just the worst sort of PR exercise. 
 
GD: What can objective journalism do to combat the obfuscation of the officials? 
 
EC: Well, you report that.  That we are being treated like mushrooms – being kept in 
the dark and fed bullshit.  You don’t actually pretend that you know what is going on.  
From the point of view of Jonathan Harley who was the ABC correspondent in Doha, 
that was the gist of his report, that this is the US trying to manage, trying to stage-
manage what’s seen, what’s being heard, it bears no relation to reality.  So that’s quite 
different from being embedded which has a purpose in itself, if you approach it for what 
it is, rather than use it as a kind a fudge to pretend that you are seeing the whole 
picture. 
 
GD: When you’ve got a situation where you’ve got embedded reporters or officials 
who are being less than 100% with the truth and then you’ve got extreme danger, how 
challenging to one’s idea of professionalism, or to objectivity or to their idea about how 
they should be doing their job is that, you know?  Especially in the context of civilian 
deaths. 
 
EC: Well, I question the premise of the question.  Because actually the safest place to 
be covering the war was with a US military unit.  It was much safer than being a 
unilateral.  Most of the deaths that occurred in the actual invasion were, among 
journalists were unilaterals, rather than embedded journalists. 
 
GD: I meant in terms of challenging one’s idea of how one should be doing one’s job, 
the embedded journalist is restricted in what they can do. 
 
EC: No, I think that’s wrong too.  They weren’t actually restricted.  I think you have to 
give some credit to the Americans that the embedment process was actually quite open. 
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A colleague of mine Geoff Thompson, who was the only ABC journalist to be 
embedded, was able to film an incident where badly trained US soldiers opened fire on 
civilians and killed them, he was able to interview the commander who admitted that 
they had behaved badly, he was able to cut and broadcast the story for the unit he was 
embedded with, so it was actually relatively, surprisingly open access in a military 
situation.  This idea that the US military was censoring what was coming out is not true; 
it is not borne out by the facts.  They were actually, commendably open, um the shame 
is that so many journalists that were embedded were (not to mention Fox News) were 
behaving in such an irresponsible manner that they were not reporting what they should 
have been reporting and reporting it in ways that were quite wrong.   
 
GD: Now the ABC, I believe, after the war, came in for quite a lot of criticism, or even 
during the war from the minister of broadcasting – was there any concern by people like 
yourself in the field, over how your news that you were generating was being received 
or did you think about it beforehand – how are we going to approach the war? 
 
EC: Well, you do but I think it’s like any other story, you don’t care about how the 
military’s going to react to what it is that you are reporting, um if they don’t like it they 
can lump it.  But that’s the same with anything you’re reporting on if you are close to the 
source and the source doesn’t like it, well, you move on.  If you’re doing your job 
properly.  I don’t think anyone who reported the war was concerned about how the 
military would react to it as long as your story stands up to scrutiny, then its fine if 
people don’t like it that’s their problem. 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX VIII - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
GEOFF THOMPSON (ABC)  
30 NOVEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  What was it that you found most rewarding about being an embedded 
reporter in Iraq? 
 
Geoff Thompson:  I think the most rewarding thing was access to one element of the 
story.  As a journalist you’re never going to have access to all side of the story, but 
access is always good.  And the thing is you’re only seeing the American invasion from 
that one perspective but that is still a valid thing to witness.  You’re certainly seeing it 
from a privileged position as a journalist but it is only one position and the danger is 
that, or the thing you must ensure, is that it’s never anything more than that.   
 
GD:  How did you go about preparing yourself for that, not in a material way but in a 
psychological way, coming from a tradition of professional objective journalism, in which 
you’re not constrained or restricted by your circumstances – how did you go about 
adjusting to that? 
 
GT:  The short answer is that didn’t adjust anything – I just went in there as an objective 
professional journalist.  And we weren’t constrained.  We’d jump between units, as we 
want to [sic].  We didn’t have our own transport, but we’d hitch rides with people, which 
is not that dissimilar to what you would do anyway.  I went into Afghanistan with the 
Northern Alliance and I was more or less hitching a ride with the BBC or with whomever 
else I could cadge a lift from.  In terms of the invasion, which we were covering, there 
were people in Baghdad for most of the war, there were people in the North covering 
the war and there were people elsewhere covering other aspects of the war, but our job 
was to cover the invasion and only one aspect of the invasion, and I applied the same 
rules I always would apply.  The thing is we could never see the whole battlefield, but 
we could see what was in front of us and the same rules of objectivity would apply to 
that.  There was only one incident, in which an artillery cannon bolt backfired on a guy’s 
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leg and we ran over to film it and they went, “no no no, you can’t film it”.  Now we kind of 
protested about that and very quickly they were falling over themselves to apologise 
and that it was a misunderstanding on the ground, the guys got a bit emotional or 
whatever.  There was never any, this is what you have to remember about Americans 
and American forces, they are - and I have said this about this war - a lot of the guys on 
the ground, it not that they were ever trying to hide anything from you, they just didn’t 
know anything.  All they knew was get to Baghdad, this is your mission today, fulfil your 
mission.  Now in terms of the awareness that we had of that mission there wasn’t any 
attempt to restrict our knowledge of it.  At that point, they didn’t really think they had 
much to worry about, and really they didn’t have much to worry about although they 
didn’t know that at the time.  The guys on the ground didn’t and we didn’t know it at the 
time particularly.  But there wasn’t any intentional obfuscation of what we were allowed 
to do.  There was nervousness at certain points when we witnessed a shooting of 
civilians, but from the command point of view they were actually quite open about what 
happened and they allowed it to be investigated.  My point would be that in essence I 
never ever shifted my basic principles which I base my journalism on, which is 
objectivity and only reporting that which you know to be true, and if its anything more 
than what you know to be true allowing that to be clear.   
 
GD:  I was interested to ask you about your technique of interviewing people, is it part of 
your technique to allow people to reveal themselves rather than to come out and make 
judgements yourself? 
 
GT:  I think so, at that point, going back to that time of war, it was probably not since 
Vietnam that an Australian audience had been up close and personal with American 
grunts fighting a war.  It changed very much since then, we’ve had saturation of it, but at 
that point I knew that is was interesting and newsworthy in itself.  Even the angle of the 
American war machine and the way these guys are geared and wound up and have, 
certainly at the lower ranks level, have a pretty simple idea of what they doing, “we’re 
gonna go and kill shit, this is fun”  basically.  But I knew that was interesting and news 
worthy.  But you don’t need to [inaudible] a combination of interviewing techniques to 
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some degree, also the simple fact that knowing you didn’t need to grill Americans for 
them to say things and couch things in a way that was interesting, certainly interesting 
for Australians at that point.  I wasn’t goading them or anything.  You didn’t need to do 
that.   
 
GD:  There has been a lot of controversy about embedding.  From talking to journalists I 
get the response that people could protect their own independence and their own 
objectivity by approaching their task a certain way, do you have an opinion about that 
sort of saturation coverage, not so much the ABC but perhaps some of the British and 
American television networks and their round the clock, up close and personal coverage 
that actually trivialises war. 
 
GT:  Yeah, well we’re in the age of reality TV.  These days increasingly having a sort of 
worthy generic shots and worthy interviews and subjects, doesn’t really cut it anymore – 
these days because of the YouTube phenomenon and everyone’s a video journalist, 
you either live or die by your access.  If you don’t have good access then people lose 
interest, they actually want to see from the ground up, people living their lives.  So you 
can see that that Iraq war and the embedded experience was like “Big Brother at War”, 
in many ways and that's all part of the phenomenon.  Them allowing the embedded 
process, I don’t know if it was influenced by that, I think it was probably more influenced 
by ideology – “we’re right and have got nothing to hide, so come on board and we’ll 
show you”.  In a sense, people getting caught up in the personalities does perhaps 
trivialise it, but on the other hand it can also be immensely powerful.  
 
GD:  To what extent is the objective, aloof, independent journalist model is somehow, 
comes into question?  Especially with reference to the “YouTube generation” – is the 
professional model undermined by the news demands of journalism. 
 
GT:  I don’t think so.  I think it’s really easy to under-estimate the filtering process that is 
really difficult.  Taking white noise and turning it into something actually intelligible and 
interesting and illuminating.  The caveat I always put on this is that embedded reporting 
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is only one perspective on the war.  If the only reporting the ABC was doing was during 
the invasion…in essence the ABCs coverage, our coverage was only one aspect of it – 
there were people doing the big picture, there were people in Baghdad for a period at 
least and there were people in the north.  The ideal is to have someone everywhere, but 
you don’t cut yourself out of some access because, my beef with the people who are 
against embedding is that they have a narrow view – access is always good, its only 
when you pretend that that access tells the whole picture. 
 
GD:  And you were obviously quite conscious and quite careful in your representations 
of what you experienced, yeah? 
 
GT:  I have actually spoken to someone like yourself before and they used it as a point 
of saying, “oh look, he’s made this admission”, I thought it was a little bit silly but the 
admission they focused on was I had made sure I only reported on that which I saw in 
front of me and that which I knew to be true.  Right, now you can flip that each way and 
say “a-ha, he can only see what’s in front of him!”  And therefore embeddings invalid.  
Well, that’s just stupid.  I saw what was in front of me and that was true other people 
were looking at other things and the bigger picture and that was also true and then it’s 
up to the intelligent viewer to interpret all that stuff and walk away with an opinion.   
 
GD:  There’s also a filtering process that news goes through – once it’s left your hands 
the report can be manipulated in many ways. 
 
GT:  Well, everything we shot we actually cut ourselves in the field, it was all [sic] and it 
was actually we were the first Australian film crew to do feeds from the middle of the 
desert, shooting, editing and sending complete cut packages and using satellite phones.  
The ABC was giving us three or four minutes sometimes to run a package, only 
because it was unique in comparison to what else was on in Australia.  That’s why and 
that’s because of the access.  Because that was interesting because that hadn’t been 
seen before. These days watching Americans talking to you down a camera, I mean 
turn it over, because we’ve see so much of it.   
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GD:  The reason I tried to make that point was that two journalists can see the same 
events and report them in quite different ways – an example being the reporting of 
events on say Fox as opposed to the ABC – in this case the professional responsibility 
comes down almost to a kind of morality – how should something be presented. 
 
GT:  Well Fox is patriotic TV.   
 
GD:  But there are shades of that throughout the array of media outlets. 
 
GT:  Yeah, well look, obviously the idea of pure objectivity is a myth but that doesn’t 
mean that it shouldn’t be strived for. 
 
GD:  What is your response to accusations that constantly having war on TV screens 
and in newspapers is not only privileging of military perspectives but it dangerous in and 
of itself? 
 
GT:  I think it definitely privileges the military perspective and is it dangerous – yes and 
no.  It’s embedded reporting that got a soldier shooting a guy half dead on the floor in 
Karbala or somewhere.  That stuff we filmed young grunts shooting up a car full of 
civilians.  Yes it does privilege their perspective and it doesn’t make them immune from 
criticism or surveillance.  But does that mean it would be great to be embedded with the 
insurgents, oh yeah.  But apart from Michael Ware and a few other brave souls, who are 
also working for organizations that have got the time and security and commitment and 
resources to be there and develop that access.  If you want to cover Iraq its easier and 
safer to do it embedded, although that’s questionable these days because you’re a 
target.  That’s doesn’t mean that roaming around on your own – very few people are 
doing that these days because it’s just so goddamn dangerous.  So, look the idea 
opposed to embedding is based on this idea that journalists are by choice not hanging 
out with insurgents, not sort of driving around Baghdad, living with people who have just 
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had their entire clan wiped out – that’s what every journalist wants to do, but can they 
do it without being strung up from a lamp post.   
 
GD:  What sort of sensitivities do you take into account when doing such interviews 
(case in point soldiers who had shot up the civilian’s vehicle)?  Also do you let subjects 
reveal themselves rather than digging or pushing for comment? 
 
GT:  I think both.  That particular incident took place over a 6 hour period – from when it 
happened to actually realising that it probably wasn’t a threat to establishing that there 
wasn’t actually a threat. 
 
GD:  Your situation is quite tricky there as the embedded journalist trying to cover this 
major blunder. 
 
GT:  I felt sorry for the young grunts.  And it was a weird experience. It wouldn’t be valid 
now because those guys are so battle weary and battle aware – and if you think about it 
from the viewfinder of the present, looking back they have every reason to be nervous.  
What if the reality of Baghdad streets then was what it is now?  Those guys always go 
up the streets if they’re in a vehicle they’ve always got their finger on the trigger.  People 
are trying to kill them.  The fact that they weren’t then is why it was true and why our 
story was valid.  I felt sorry for them – I’ve been in those situation before, where it all get 
blurred and everyone gets very excited and the bloods flowing and rumour and 
misjudgement bubble to the surface very quickly.  Coming off that battle high they 
couldn’t with any sort of sober perspective actually look at what had happened, so yeah 
I felt sorry for them and the main trigger man who egged them on but in the context of 
three thousand civilians getting killed in October – it begins to fade into irrelevancy I 
suppose.  The truly interesting thing and the devastating impact it’s going to have on 
Iraq for I don’t know how many decades it’s going to affect them – also the generation of 
young Americans – 2800 killed, but 22000 wounded, the Iraq war veterans generation 
and the problems that’s actually going to present to America, will be very interesting 
down the track and I am fascinated by all that stuff.  
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GD:  Do you think the interrogation of the logic of the war and the interrogation of the 
war should have been much harder, and what lessons could be learnt from that, given 
that things have unfolded the way they have? 
 
GT:  Yeah I think that absolutely, I have to admit though having been in countries where 
entire societies do lie, particularly being in East Timor in 1999 and being very much 
aware of Indonesia lying as a state about what it was doing. Kind of expecting in a way.  
I guess what I am saying is when I saw Colin Powell give that speech, and people said, 
“Look where’s the real evidence” but I sort of thought, “yeah well entire countries do lie, 
so maybe they’re right”.  But having said that there was a huge rah rah [sic] element 
going into that war, coming off the back of September 11 and all the rest of it.  There 
was this whole sort of, America was very hurt and like a bumbling kind of wounded bull. 
 
GD:  Do you think if a similar campaign commenced today or in the near future, 
involving the States and presumably Australia, do you think the World’s press would be 
as eager again to go along for the ride… 
 
GT:  Well, I was just reading Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker and this battle is being 
waged at the moment – even though the Republicans have lost a lot of power there is 
still a certain block within the White House that wants to bomb Iran.  The press and the 
military would be much more questioning, basically they’ve cried wolf once to many 
times.  And I think that will have a huge bearing on it, the American press now is deeply 
questioning.  Its fascinating to back and look at “Fog of War” or Robert McClellan and 
the Kennedy Administration and the degree of handwringing that went on say over the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and you sort of think [pause] Willy Smitts was the Chief of Staff 
and he wanted to bomb Cuba, right.  That could have trigger a nuclear war, that’s how 
close it was.  That was one person’s position was resisted, now at the moment 
potentially you’ve got Cheney wanting to bomb Iran and the military preventing it, but it 
can be that close and suddenly world history can take a very bad, dramatic turn.  So I 
think that yeah, that the press is certainly gonna be more vigilant next time round, but 
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what is a little depressing is that given the lessons of history in Vietnam, in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and other times, that the Administration wasn’t more wary of unilateralism 
and “faith-based thinking” and I mean that in the broader sense of faith in your own 
opinions, even if you don’t have the evidence. 
 
GD:  There were a couple of events one being the whole Iraq saga and the other the 
Hurricane Katrina catastrophe last year and people have been saying that those events, 
the exposure of the American administration as a pack of liars and as completely 
incompetent with dealing with disasters has allowed journalists a fresh space with which 
to question and openly be more critical of policy, do you think that has any sort of 
credibility, that argument? 
 
GT:  Yeah, I think there is, but I don’t think there was anything stopping them being 
critical the first time round.   
 
GD:  What processes have been going on that have dulled journalists senses in a 
sense? 
 
GT:  I think, basically it was because journalists wrongly bought into a way of thinking 
and policy, sort of archetype that was an oxymoron, which is that there can ever be a 
war on terror.  When it’s confusing, all the war on terror means is a strategy against a 
strategy, its making the mistake of confusing terrorism with state actors, using a 
terminology used to describe relations between nation states, which is war and combine 
it with non-state actors, because terrorism has existed since the American revolution – 
what was the Patriot about if it wasn’t about guerrilla fighting.  Everything that has been 
written about military strategy since Sun Tzu and the Art of War, Mao Tse-tung and Che 
Guevara who wrote so much about guerrilla warfare, you don’t try to attack guerrilla 
insurgencies with conventional means, and it’s very rarely proved to be a happy result.  
I thing that the war on terror was always oxymoronic and I think if people were honest 
with themselves they would acknowledge that war is the privilege of the powerful and 
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terrorism is the necessity of the weak.  And its strategy is not a philosophy – terrorism is 
a way of killing people, not an ideology. 
 
GD:  What was your relationship with the editors and the people back at the ABC who 
were producing what you were sending back there?  Were you in touch with those 
people on a regular basis, did they provide you with direction? 
 
GT:  Not really, look they do sometimes, but in that situation it wasn’t really possible.  A 
part of that was because we resisted, and this became a key point, we resisted any 
pressure to be doing constant live updates.  Because that I felt was going to be facile 
television.  With things going on you’re talking in the middle of nowhere.   
 
GD:  That is what I meant earlier about the trivialisation of warfare. 
 
GT:  Well, we didn’t do that.  And it’s certainly what happened on CNN and FOX.  We 
kind of tried to make each report or piece a little slice.   
 
GD:  To add some newsworthy element as some sort of justification. 
 
GT:  Yeah and that was just a decision we made on the road, partly as we were not able 
to go live all the time and also, you’d stop for a few hours and then you might take off 
again, we decided we’d give them what was possible and to be honest half the reason 
was that when we left the base to head off into Iraq, we thought we were coming back 
the next night so we left half our gear behind, so we didn’t have a live capacity anyway.   
 
GD:  Were you under pressure at all from Sydney to provide that live coverage? 
 
GT:  A little bit, a little bit.  But I kind of resisted it because I thought it was more 
valuable for us to actually send something back which was a bit illuminating. 
 
THE END   
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APPENDIX IX - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS 
RORY CALLINAN (NEWS LIMITED) 
18 DECEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  What did you find most rewarding or most satisfying about your posting 
to Iraq, both stories and your experiences as a journalist? 
 
Rory Callinan:  Look, I think one was it was rewarding to be chosen to do that job.  
News Ltd only chose three journalists to do it, so that was rewarding.  Then getting to 
Doha and getting a couple of breaks on stories, there was a break I got on a story in 
Doha that I was particularly happy with.  I don’t look back at that experience and go 
“jeez, wow [sic] that was a really fulfilling experience as a journalist.  It was a very 
frustrating experience”.  But there were things you felt “oh, well I’m reasonably…I 
wouldn’t say happy, but I suppose came reasonably close to what I was trying to 
achieve.  My problem is that I never feel happy with anything.  There were a couple of 
things.  There was a story I did in Doha, there was a story at Um Qasr that I did and 
then there were one or two stories that I did in Baghdad that I was happy with or 
satisfied with and then there was a story I did up in the North of the country, but I can 
explain to you more about that later. But that was the way I felt.  But there were little 
things, you might get an incremental break on a story or something and you might think 
that’s something nobody knows about, and you might think that’s relevant to what’s 
happening and it’s relevant to the people back in Australia.   
 
GD:  You were based initially at Central Command in Doha, how did you find that? 
 
RC:  That was horrific. 
 
GD:  How did it challenge you as a professional journalist? 
 
RC:  It was just a theatre, I wrote a piece at the time for the Australian’s media guide. 
We sort of got there, we went into the place, you know – you’d stay in a nice hotel out in 
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the capital somewhere and then you sort of half an hour’s drive to get to the place and 
then you sort of hit this huge, like a fortress basically of security and you went through 
several gates.  And once you started going through that security apparatus, you 
suddenly realise that this is an intensely controlled environment.  The guys will either do 
a strip search of you or you had to walk through the X-ray machine that was like getting 
zapped, whatever it was.  And the control just increased from that moment.   
 
GD:  And that was an affront to your journalistic sensibilities was it? 
 
RC:  Sort of.  Whenever you’re put in those circumstances you always think, “it’s my job 
to get around this stuff, it’s all part of the business”.  But you know you start to get quite 
surprised with the level of control from that point, you know.  From the moment you’re 
herded into the bus and you’ve got all these name tags and the bus goes to one 
particular compound about the size of a football field and you can’t leave that 
compound. 
 
GD:  Do people start thinking “oh, god what have I got myself into”? 
 
RC:  Oh, completely. It wasn’t the way I envisaged we’d be reporting on it, but then I 
was the third choice to be reporting on it and I was lucky to get that third choice.  So I 
was grateful initially.  And when you got into that compound, it was very well set up, 
there was a great coffee shop, a nice Starbucks or whatever it was, you could plug into 
the net and use the net at 10 billion bytes or whatever the top speed is.  It was very 
comfortable and air-conditioned and they had these auditoriums set up where people 
would theoretically be briefing you.  And then we obviously as Australians, the 
Australians had their own little PR team in this area as well.  And I think I wrote in that 
piece in the Australian something about “you need to be prepared or if your enemy’s 
unprepared then you’ve won the battle”.  And the Australian media guys had put this up 
on their door.  The guy who ran the show, Pup Elliot, he’s a very professional operator 
and that’s the way they proceeded to deal with the media, they were very very good.   
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GD:  Even you as a military correspondent?  
 
RC:  Not really, no initially I was just sent to cover it.  But when you got there it was, 
your sole point of contact was the military – you know, Australia’s got 5 F-18s and today 
they bombed three places and didn’t bomb somewhere because they might have killed 
civilians, so I was dealing with a flow of military information.  What they did initially was, 
they said to me you’ll do the write-off from Doha, the battle as it unfolds.  But what we 
found was that people in New York and journalists back in Australia, started to get 
briefings from politicians, like Downer – I can’t remember who the Defence Minister at 
the time was – they started to get briefings from Canberra that we weren’t getting, while 
we were in Doha, where theoretically there was a command HQ.  So it just made it 
completely ridiculous.  And we just sat there.  That was the theory, we got it once I think 
when the SAS went in we got that break once and then when the Australian troops went 
in.  It was really interesting at this point.  This is right at the start, just before the whole 
thing kicks off.  And the auditoriums where there with Hollywood designed sets 
basically.  And there were even camo-nets up against one wall so it would look as 
though you were doing your live cross.  They weren’t going to be used until Tommy 
Franks came and christened them, until the big boss arrived.  So everyone was just 
waiting and waiting and waiting and the Australians suddenly said “Oh, look we’re at 
war and we want to do a briefing”.  I think the first American troops had gone in at that 
stage, but Franks hadn’t shown up at that stage, so you had hundreds of media just 
sitting there waiting for Tommy Franks to come along and he hadn’t showed.  We then 
went to the Australians and said we really need to know something, they were much 
more, as I said they were very professional, but they were a bit more reasonable about 
what they were prepared to tell us.  So the Australians went, “right we’ll give you a 
briefing, we’ll do it in this auditorium” – the number two auditorium or something.  And 
they got blocked from doing that.  We heard later the Gen Franks’ people and the 
American media machine had gone, “no way is some Australian low-level partner going 
to christen this stage.  We want the big fanfare”.  So we had to go out into a compound 
next door, and stood there with McNairn and basically did a press conference.  They 
blocked all other international media, so all these international media were leaning over 
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the fence and climbing over the fence to film down to get some sort of action.  So they 
gave us a reasonable briefing and said, “we’ve gone into combat”.  So we raced out and 
filed that.  And that was what we were supposed to do there – receive those briefings 
and then file straight away.  But with that was one occasion in which we got a breaking 
news lead that hadn’t been leaked or officially given in some sort of press conference in 
Canberra, so tightly was the message being controlled by the politicians. 
 
GD:  With that management of the news, how possible is it for and independent 
journalist to deal with that and to retain some sort of professionalism in that situation? 
 
RC:  Well you can ask questions in the press conferences, probing and probing and 
probing – there were guys from the ABC – Peter Lloyd – would stand up in the press 
conference later on with Franks and say things like “you’ve shown us the camera 
footage of the smart bombs where they’ve hit – will you show us footage of the bombs 
that miss”.  You can imagine those questions!  They were very good at that, but the 
trouble for us as print journalists it’s no good to ask a question in that forum, because 
then everybody else then knows your answer, the wire services are there and if the 
question is relevant to Australia then they can just pump out a story on the web, so that 
makes it hard.  But to work around that you’re also supposed to get sources on the side 
and build relationships with people who will tell you stuff that nobody else will tell you.  
And I was able to that a little bit and I got a story  about all these other Australians who 
were serving as embeds with the Americans, and I was reasonably happy with that, 
they ran it ok in Australia, but not very well.  But that was something that no one else 
had at the time and it became relevant later for us. 
 
GD:  You talked about the piece you wrote for the media section of the Australian – 
quite a few of the journalists I spoke to have been, especially in the embedding 
situation, have been very cautious about “making the media the story”.  But it seems to 
me that the management of the media and the information management strategies of 
the military authorities is crucially central to the story. 
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RC:  You mean this Horaldo presence on the battlefield? 
 
GD:  And the day-to-day frustrations the journalists experience trying to get some 
information out of the Australian military people or the Yanks or who ever.  I am just 
wondering, because when you read this stuff in the paper, especially in the paper, 
there’s not so much sense of the day to day management of the information.  Just in 
your opinion is it legitimate to make that a more central part of the story – that 
propaganda aspect of it? 
 
RC:  Well I think so.  I think you should be doing that if you can.  It would be interesting 
to talk to Tom Allard from the Sydney Morning Herald if you can.  In press conferences 
he asked some good questions – we had a press conference at one stage and this was 
about the F-18s and what they were going to do and what they had done and how many 
bombs they’d dropped.  And they wheeled in an F-18 pilot to brief us, and we started 
asking questions and Tom’s asked a question about, I can’t quite remember, but it was 
quite controversial and the military media guy, Pup Elliot said “well, that’s just not on 
and this press conference is finished” and took the guy out.  And everybody blew up.  
Everybody backed Tom’s question and said you’ve got to answer it, you should answer 
it, c’mon c’mon c’mon [sic] and it got quite ugly at that point.  And I think Tom went away 
and wrote a story where he said they basically squibbed us, they wouldn’t answer us in 
the press conference.  I am not sure if I wrote something I can’t remember now, there 
were a lot of journalists who weren’t bothering to focus on that, maybe not Australian 
journalists. 
 
GD:  It seems to me and inherently interesting aspect of the whole goings on, you know.   
 
RC:  And it should be, the fact the Australian newspaper has the Media Guide makes it 
the perfect vehicle to write stories like that.  A lot of other newspapers, like the wire 
services, didn’t have it.  Having said that I agree, but I still think it’s newsworthy. 
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GD:  Perhaps you can speculate a little about embedding as well, and the danger of 
journalists being so close to the military, but also in that “fortress” media arena, the 
danger of that sort of privileging of the military perspective. 
 
RC:  Oh, for sure.  I’ve been embedded since in other circumstances and I never really 
did a proper embed at that stage.  What they did for us is flew us to Um Qasr and said 
we could spend a day or a night with the mine clearance divers.  So frustrated were 
people becoming with being locked up in the Doha centre, that this was a real 
adventure, things were coming great.  And every day I or others would say, “Look, when 
can you actually take us into Iraq and show us what you do, we don’t what to just get 
press conferences”.  I suppose you sort of reach a point where you don’t want to…I can 
see a point where you could get so desperate, and might start thinking, “should I go a 
bit soft on these guys and they might start looking after us, or maybe take us to the next 
level”.  It didn’t happen for me and I didn’t feel that it coloured in any way my reporting, 
but I could that you had to think about stuff and you had to think, “well, if I include that 
I‘ve got bugger all chance of getting out of here”.   
 
GD:  That seems like a very vulnerable position for a journalist to be in. 
 
RC:  Oh, you could be.  Having said that there were journalists who were very happy 
being in Doha, they didn’t want to move – go to the hotel, there’s no problems filing.  
They didn’t really care.  You could see situations where a thought like that might cross 
your mind, but it never influenced the way I reported because I wouldn’t see the point 
you know.   
 
GD:  So how do you reconcile that dependence on the military and the dependence on 
the military managers for the info and the access with the traditional journalistic ideals of 
independence and objectivity and impartiality and that kind of stuff?   
 
RC:  I think it’s really difficult, it’s really difficult.  And the thing too, with the way in which 
Australia sent people in there is that Australia is not well resourced.  So they were 
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behind it from the start.  I think Ian McPhedran, I think it might be difficult for Ian 
because he still works for News Ltd, but I do know that Ian and others, he felt he should 
take a photographer with him, because one it would be relevant for the stuff he was 
filing, but also to watch his back.  And, they said “No, we can’t really do that”.  And Ian 
gets there and he’s competing against people who have photographers and the latest 
sat phones and they have drivers and teams and all the rest of it.  It becomes quite hard 
and quite dangerous.  So if you’re not well resourced you tend to rely on the army to 
take you places and that’s what happened in Doha.  I was constantly on the phone to 
News Ltd, saying I need to get out of here, this is ridiculous – the briefings are 
happening overseas, they’re not happening here.  The people who are here, you get 
very little access to them, it would be much better if we were on the ground, seeing what 
Australians are doing and they would just be going, “No, this is the situation” and later I 
would find out that…its very expensive for them to have 3, 4 or 5 journalists on the 
ground in Iraq, simply because of insurance purposes.  So yeah, I do believe you are 
vulnerable.   
 
GD:  What was your relationship with your editors or whoever it was you were dealing 
with back in Australia – would they provide you with updates from their end and point 
you in the right direction or ask you to cover certain things in certain ways? 
 
RC:  First of all, in terms of editorial pressure, about whether they wanted you to push a 
certain line, I never really felt that.  People talk about all these conspiracies with Fox 
and Murdoch and the rest of it – just in terms of the logistical nightmare of receiving 
copy from us over there, to try and spin it or direct you to cover a certain angle was just 
not feasible – we were flat out just setting things up just so we could file and file at the 
right time and file enough copy and chase…in terms of direction as to what they wanted 
us to do.  I don’t know about the other guys, but my initial direction was that I would do a 
big write through as the battle unfolded and as we got all the briefings and say, “today 
they got through Nasiryah and five dead here and fifty dead here” but we worked out 
that people sitting in New York in immense comfort could get that information off the 
web faster than we could get it off the briefings. 
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GD:  Did that mean then that your reporting became focused on the sort of micro goings 
on of “Australian diggers”? 
 
RC:  More so yeah, it did.  That was the other thing, the one occasion when I sort of felt 
there was a problem was, I’d gone to Um Qasr and I’d hitched a lift with some TV 
journos up to Basra.  Now Basra was still, it had still not fallen.  The Brits [sic] had gone 
in there, come under really heavy attack, and turned around and come back again.  I 
had filed this story saying that you couldn’t even go up the road because snipers were 
shooting at people. And that story, I think that story, I can’t remember, but they either re-
topped it, or didn’t use it properly or something to basically to go along with a line out of 
one of these places – either Doha or New York – you know, “Today Basra has fallen”.  
And that was the one thing that I think they did get wrong.  But I think it was the case 
that they weren’t set up logistically to handle rapid copy coming in like that.  It might 
have been they couldn’t change the story in time.  I don’t think there was any great 
conspiracy, but I think they might have seen it on wire services that, “hey Basra’s 
fallen”, but that was completely false and I was quite annoyed about that and I felt also 
that it was more so of [sic], I was more likely to get stories in the paper that were more 
“micro – level” about Australians and all the rest of it.  And felt that I’d just file that story, 
now I’ll move to this.  Saying that I did file stories on other stuff, like when Basra did fall 
that got a run in the Oz [The Australian] and a few other places as well.  But that was 
probably the one occasion, but I don’t think there was any great conspiracy with that.  I 
think it was the case that they might not have understood that I had moved so quickly, 
from one place to the next, to get this information.  You’ve got people who were the 
foreign editors, who were just being bombarded with so much information and they were 
having to make decisions really quickly that was putting them under immense pressure.   
 
GD:  Who would you deal with in the first instance back in Australia? 
 
RC:  I can’t remember. I think I was dealing with in terms of being able to move out of 
and in terms of where we were positioned [sic], I dealt with Bruce Laudon at News Ltd.  
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I found him very professional and he knows the job, he’s been a foreign correspondent 
and done it tough, before sat phones [sic] and all that kind of stuff.  He was good on that 
stuff.  In terms of that stuff on Basra, I was dealing with chief-of-staffs who were in 
Brisbane, Sydney, in Melbourne.  That was another thing; each newspaper had its own 
interests about what it wanted to cover. 
 
GD:  I am actually focusing primarily on the Australian, combined with Fairfax and the 
ABC.  Of course a lot of your stuff was run in the Courier-Mail, which I would say has a 
completely different sort of focus than the Australian.  Were they asking for something 
different than say was the Australian? 
 
RC:  Not really no.  I think the case was they were just really happy to be getting 
anything.  I never received any…towards the end I was getting a few clear things that 
the Oz [sic] wanted me to chase.  But, no it wasn’t like they would say go after this or go 
after that.  The thing I would say is that the Courier-Mail, their a small operation, they 
had a small team of people putting out what was basically a war paper every day, so it 
was pretty stressful for them.  I can’t remember where that Basra story ran, but it just...I 
don’t think it was in Oz [sic].  I think it was the Courier-Mail.  It’s quite frustrating 
because you don’t find out for a day or so, what runs and what doesn’t.   
 
GD:  Talking more generally about reporting on war, do you think there is a danger from 
a journalist’s perspective when you’re covering war to end up romanticising military 
operations. 
 
RC:  Yeah, definitely.  I think that’s definitely a problem.  That’s something I look back 
on over the stuff I did and think, “Oh, you know, probably might have used a few less 
adjectives in some of the stuff.  But it is a problem, especially when you haven’t done it 
before and I don’t think any of the journalists that turned up from Australia had done it 
before.  Yeah, you do trend to champion that sort of “Australian troops during war”.  
That sort of parochial Australian interest.  And the papers do – that sort of stuff does get 
a run, so you do.  I wrote a story about a marine, using a jaffle iron to cook food for the 
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troops.  So you do get a bit caught up in that.  I think that’s probably a sign of the first 
time Australian troops had been in that scenario and Australian journalists had been 
that close to write about them, that sort of stuff.  The other issue is that the newspapers 
did pick that sort of stuff up and you might have been filing something that was much 
less like that one day and it’s not getting a run, and the next day you file it and it gets a 
run. 
 
GD:  You might call someone a few days later and they might tell you what made the 
paper or not, but you wouldn’t know on a day to day basis which stories were getting 
picked up and which were not? 
 
RC:  If you got something on Page 1 you certainly knew, but it was in the back, in the 
wrap up – you go a little bit of feedback from the chief of staff. 
 
GD:  But you are in a sense working a little bit blind and you don’t get a chance to 
calibrate your reporting to what is likely to get a run. 
 
RC:  That’s all to do with the fact that Australia’s a long way away, and they’ve got such 
limited equipment.  I think I had to share a bulletproof vest at one stage. 
 
GD:  There’s also a difficulty I would imagine with a paper having access not only to the 
wires, but also the large news organisations from overseas, the big American outlets, 
better resourced and I would imagine that it is much more difficult to compete. 
 
RC:  Oh yeah, that’s completely right.  That said have you spoken to Peter Wilson at 
all? 
 
GD: Yes. 
 
RC:  He did really good job in Baghdad, he certainly competed with those guys and so 
he should.  But again he was not as well resourced as those others guys. 
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GD:  He sounded as though he had the most backing from the guys I have spoken with 
– he had an interpreter with him, a jeep he was allowed to drive around in and a 
photographer. 
 
RC:  The other thing, what you say is very right about those American papers.  The 
Times of London has one of the best networks of correspondents in the world and when 
those guys ring up the chief of staff, he’s used to dealing with people telling him, “I can’t 
leave my hotel room because there’s shooting outside”.  He’s used to people telling him 
that.  Whereas The Australian, a classic example was I got car jacked at one stage and 
felt I couldn’t really go into the details of it with the bosses, because they’ll just say, “oh, 
look what are you doing? Get out and go home”.  So I thought I can’t really make a big 
deal about it. 
 
GD:  You don’t want to be pulled out. 
 
RC:  So, if that happened to you and you were working for the Times, they’d just say 
“Bad luck old chap, we’ll wire you another three thousand pounds for another vehicle”.   
 
GD:  Within the context of Centcom and more generally reporting on military goings on 
– especially for the embedded journalists – how relevant or how challenged are those 
ideals of objectivity and impartiality in journalism, when the range of sources you can 
use is limited, and the information you are getting is coming from a very interested 
source. 
 
RC:  Certainly, it challenges you, but if you’re in this job for the right reasons, then it’s 
your job to get around that. 
 
GD:  And not just become… 
 
 
 
394 
RC:  A mouthpiece for the military, yeah.  If I had seen scenarios where Australian 
soldiers had killed someone or done something bad or what have you, you know, I 
would have loved to write that story.  That’s a great story that needs to be told.  But 
definitely the newspapers that I was dealing with would have loved to report on that 
story.  I have since written about similar things, and have never had a problem with any 
Australian news organization putting a spin on it.   
 
GD:  There’s never a tendency to give the establishment an easy go? 
 
RC:  No, it’s more the case, I mean people complain about Fox and Murdoch and all the 
rest of it, but newspapers love to, the newspapers [sic] I know and the people that work 
there, really love to nail it, to uncover something.  That is, if you’re a good journalist and 
a keen journalist, then that’s what you live for.  If I had come across anything like that in 
Doha, it wouldn’t have bothered me in the least.  The biggest issue was, or the essential 
tools you need to get the information you use to those stories, well the army had set up 
a very efficient mechanism of defence, stopping you from getting those things. 
 
GD:  Cultivating sources basically? 
 
RC:  Normally on the battlefield, when you talk to soldiers, they’ll just tell you anything. 
But in Doha, at Centcom, we never even saw an Australian soldier, we might see one 
for five or ten minutes, but they were all locked up in a really controlled environment, 
where everything was monitored; their emails their phones, they couldn’t do anything, 
but as soon as I got to Um Qasr you got some great stories there, with a much more 
interesting perception.  We found out these Australians were selling water, exchanging 
water for mines and ammunition and stuff being brought in by local kids, which was 
quite handy for the Australians, but quite dangerous and I know that was a story they 
probably wouldn’t have allowed, or told us in Doha, as piss weak as it sounds, because 
the families back home might have thought, “Oh, no”.  The Australians had this mad 
idea, that was the other problem with the Australian coverage, they wouldn’t let you 
name people, identify people for some extraordinary reason, meanwhile the marines are 
 
 
395 
going, Bill Smith from (such and such a place) giving a street address almost in 
California, has flown fifteen missions.  The Australians are going, “No, it’ll have to be 
Trooper X or Pilot Y”.  The Australians put up this immense blocking mechanism or 
defence to try and stop you doing it.  But if anything it made people angrier and keener 
to get around it. But having said that it was a very effective defence…Doha was a very 
frustrating place, and I can see what you’re saying with the question, when you’re 
confronted with that sort of thing you tend just to sit back and go “alright, I’ll just toe the 
line and write what they like”.  But I don’t feel I did that, even though I probably wrote 
stories later on that I felt were maybe a little, parochial.  In hindsight I might not have 
written them quite as parochially, but still I felt they were of relevant.  But I was really 
happy that I was able to get out of Qatar and actually go out and speak to people and 
find out what was actually happening on the ground.  And I think if you are…I felt 
comfortable professionally to be able to look back and say “yeah, I was there, but I 
didn’t spend the whole time there, you know!”… 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX X - SECOND ROUND INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
IAN MCPHEDRAN (NEWS LTD)  
18 DECEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  Could you describe the style that you used in your reporting from Iraq? 
 
Ian McPhedran:  I wanted to keep it personal really, to make it the story of the people, 
the people in the war.  That’s entirely what I tried to do and get into the human interest 
side of it, rather than the strategic side of it because obviously being there and seeing 
things through just one set of eyes it’s difficult to have a big picture view, so I was keen 
just to make it a personal account. 
 
GD:  Is that sort of style easily reconciled with the overall objective, impartial model, 
being there on the ground telling the human story, lends itself to a more “experiential” 
style, doesn’t it?   
 
IMc:  Yeah, that’s right, but there not too many options.  You’re really limited by the 
options you’ve got there.  While it would be great to do a broad brush coverage, when 
you sitting in a hotel in a city, you’re limited, particularly in those circumstances when 
you’re under the control of the local Information Ministry and so on.  Given those 
limitations I think the human angle was the best way for me to go.   
 
GD:  Were you quite conscious of the terminology and so on that you used, given that it 
was such a tense and controversial time?  The portrayal of the city and the people and 
the government there, were you particularly conscious of the language that you used?  
Talking about Saddam as a “brutal dictator” or his palaces as “evil lairs”, its quite sort of 
lurid terminology. 
 
IMc:  It is it is, yeah, but that’s the sort of reality though.  This is not a Sunday school 
picnic.  This is a dictator, and he’s brutal and that’s the way it is.  And I don’t think that’s 
propaganda, I think that’s accurate.   
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GD:  Again, I think you’ll probably say you were being realistic, but there’s an almost 
sarcastic portrayal of the Iraqi defence forces and that sort of thing, obviously they didn’t 
provide much in the way of defence, but again it’s that sort of objective idea where one 
must be very even handed I suppose. 
 
IMc:  Yeah, that’s right I guess.  You do sort of fall into that, given the sort of people that 
you’re dealing with and the propaganda that they are trying to peddle.  If someone is 
telling you that their divisions of soldiers are repelling the enemy at the border, and 
when you know the soldier are actually on the other side of town, that’s a complete lie.  
You can’t really respect that.   
 
GD:  And they would take you out around Baghdad to see civilian damage and to see 
suburbs bombed.  What was your approach to that?  It must have been quite difficult to 
at once judge the news or truth value of it, but at the same time you didn’t want to 
ignore it. 
 
IMc:  Well, I think you’ve got to be very careful when you’re dealing with these people. 
When going to the site of a missile strike or whatever, you’d find a particular group of 
people there willing to talk to you, when you’d go further and get into the bomb site and 
try to talk to the neighbours, it was often difficult to get to the truth of the matter and find 
out who lived there and that sort of stuff, so you had to be very careful.   
 
GD:  Did you find that later on, when you went back to Baghdad – I presume people 
were more open and talkative, that the deeper truth of what had happened came out. 
 
IMc:  Yeah, that’s right, I mean the more you got in behind it the better it was, but you 
know time constraints, risks, dangers, “get back on the bus, let’s go” and given the fact 
that some crews were actually caught with missiles coming in as they were at these 
sites, it was quite hectic. 
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GD:  I suppose also one you’ve got the news cycle, but also you restrictions in terms of 
being able to get an internet or email link that must have placed quite heavy restrictions 
on the degree to which you can pursue issues? 
 
IMc:  That’s right.  I was filing by satellite phone directly into our mainframe, I wasn’t 
using the internet, but you had to get back to the hotel and file at certain times and there 
was a six or seven hour time difference.  All these things add to the pressure on the 
ground.  These things are always there, but when there’s a war it just adds and extra 
dimension and magnifies the problems. 
 
GD:  Talking once more about your style, as we were before, is that sort personalised, 
episodic or travelogue style, is that narrative style, as opposed to a hard news style, 
was that something that the Australian or you editors were encouraging you to do? 
 
IMc:  Well, not really there wasn’t really much discussion about that at all; it was simply 
the way it happened.  They got what they got.  They must have been happy with it as 
they ran it pretty well.  I was the only bloke there so it was as good as it was going to 
be.  If you had had a couple of other people there you could have done hard news, 
colour and movement on the side, but doing it the way I did it I thought was the best 
way.  So I’ll certainly stand corrected if anyone wants to debate it. 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX XI - SECOND ROUND INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS  
JONATHAN HARLEY (ABC) 
30 NOVEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  What for did the day to day routine and activities take at Centcom? 
 
Jonathan Harley:  Well, for me, and this is in the context that it’s a while ago now, a 
typical day in that gig, and I was predominantly doing ABC Radio news and current 
affairs, was not that dissimilar to any moving story.  Get up at about 5am, what the time 
difference in that part of the world?  About five or six hours.   So you want to up in time 
to meet the lunch time bulletin.  Get up at five, quickly get on the web and get on the 
phone to the foreign desk, get a quick sense of what they’re seeing. 
 
GD:  And what direction would they give you in terms of things to cover? 
 
JH:  Look, at that time of the day, if you’ve just got up, then yeah.  You know, they 
would have been following it through their morning, so they’ll have a pretty clear sense 
of what they want and you know it can be as directive as, “there’s been a “black hawk 
down” in Baghdad, or wherever, we’ve got some wire copy, we’re sending it through to 
you now”.  To work up into a script, so it can be prescriptive as that. 
 
GD:  And presumably, anything to do with Australians or Australian soldiers? 
 
JH:  Yeah absolutely.  Although, you know, that was such a small part of the story.  It 
was such a small part and I thought we were making it disproportionately large, but 
that’s just the nature of it really.   
 
GD:  Did that opinion bring you into conflict with people? 
 
JH:  No not really.  I just think that was one of the inherent tensions about covering the 
story from an Australian angle, where you’ve got this major military campaign, of which 
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the Australian element was just fractional.  But journalism being what it is the Australian 
angle is of greater interest and that’s why you have Australian journalists to portray that.   
 
GD:  If you were consuming news from Australian papers and possibly from the TV as 
well, during that period, you would have got an absolute deluge of stories covering what 
Australian soldier were up to and it would have come across extremely disproportionate 
to the actual involvement.   
 
JH:  But just to be clear, my frustration is more on the fact, not that they were doing a 
fractional amount of the heavy lifting, because you don’t want to belittle what they were 
doing.  But, that the media bureaucracy and the military command were so obstructive 
and so obtuse in giving solid information or real access in any way, shape or form.  But 
that was the nub of the frustration.   
 
GD:  Presumably that sort of uncooperative posture encourages journalists even more 
to try and get something from these people and sort of inflates the idea as well.   
 
JH:  Well, I think it just means that when you get anything its importance seems 
magnified.  So any little thing becomes relatively large, and in that sense it is 
disproportionate. 
 
GD:  Conflict anywhere is controversial, but there was especial controversy surrounding 
the embedment of soldiers with military units and of course the Centcom theatrics, how 
easy or how difficult is it for a journalist to convey that sense of what’s really going on at 
Centcom, other than conveying simply what the military press officers are giving out at 
press conferences? 
 
JH:  Well, I just think you weave that into your story.  I mean what’s really going on at 
Centcom is that there are two worlds – there is the media world and then there’s the 
operational world.  And you’re never really going to know what the operational world is – 
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so part of your writing is always going to be about trying to dis-assemble the spin or the 
PR or the propaganda, call it what you will. 
 
GD:  Because quite few of the journalists who were at Centcom and also those who 
were embedded made point of commenting on that in their reporting alongside their day 
to day reporting of events, but that seems to me the discussion of controversial aspects 
of the coverage, the uncooperative nature of the military bureaucracy, the control of 
media and the management of information, seems relegated to the second rung of 
reporting. 
 
JH:  Well, I think it is second rung – the reality is you’ve got the largest military machine  
rumbling through the desert and folks dying both civilian and in uniform, I just don’t think 
you can make the media story the story all the time, it’s just a part of it.  And I think 
you’ve got to keep a perspective on it.  To me, the media story is always part of the 
story, the military presentation is always part of it, but it’s never, well, it’s rarely the 
story.  When you’re in Centcom and you’re reporting from military spin central, I’m not a 
huge fan of the word spin, but you always have to work that into your copy, but you 
can’t just make it your copy, because it just become repetitive, and there is media 
awareness.   
 But to get back to the original question – up at 5, breakfast, file some early stuff 
for the lunch time bulletins, maybe do a Q&A on the phones with The World Today or 
the noon TV programs, then you might get in the car and drive to Centcom and door to 
door, by the time you got through security and were frisked, x-rayed and your bags got 
sniffed and pulled apart and you get in the minivan to go from the perimeter to the 
media centre it was basically an hour.  So you probably getting out there at about seven 
or so, and the you’re checking in – both in terms of what’s on the banks of monitors 
from the American networks, the Am-nets, the internet and you’ll scour the NYT and the 
Washington Post and Al-Jazeera and all that sort of stuff.  You’ll talk to anyone you can 
if you can get them, you’ll try to get a sense of what’s going to happen through the day 
in terms of briefings and then you start writing again – for the afternoon bulletin, for 
news, for the five o’clock, six o’clock, for PM you do some Q&A’s for five and six [sic].  If 
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you’re doing TV you’ll being writing your script, doing your stand-up, etcetera.  You’re 
talking to the desk in Sydney.  There might be a briefing.  And then you’ll start working 
your way towards the morning bulletins.  And you’ll start crafting you AM story, you’ll be 
hassling to get an interview, you’ll be kind of working all of that stuff.  You’ll be preparing 
your Lateline stuff.  And then there’s probably a briefing late in the day, back to the 
hotel, you probably get back at about 7 or 8, you’ll often sit down and write your AM 
story and your news stories and if you’re lucky you’ll be finished by about ten or eleven, 
maybe. Maybe.  Eleven or twelve you’ll check in with the foreign desks for the seven 
forty-five bulletin and for AM.  You’ll update accordingly, maybe a live cross to AM.  And 
by which time it’s about midnight and once they’re all tickety-boo [sic], you try to get a 
few hours sleep before getting up and doing it all again.   
 
GD:  Given the power of the military bureaucracy to control journalists, their schedules 
and the release of information that they can use, it must be a position in which 
journalists squirm, naturally people who are independently minded and used to doing 
their own thing – it’s a particularly difficult place to work professionally? 
 
JH:  It’s frustrating, but it’s not uncomfortable.  It’s difficult in a different sort of way. Are 
you embedded, on the frontlines, no way – are you in a comfortable, ridiculous five star 
hotel, you bet.  Basically, it’s frustrating because there’s so little to work with and 
basically often there’s just not a story to tell and you’re not bearing witness – I am the 
sort of journalist that needs to see and feel things to kind of really tell it, and there’s just 
no narrative at Centcom.  I certainly wouldn’t put my hand up in a hurry to do that sort of 
thing again.  But I also think it’s a fantastic thing to do, I think it's such a peculiar 
environment, it’s such a hothouse for information and disinformation, and it’s that 
fabulous, perverse media circus at its most extreme and it’s most insane.  I think it’s a 
great thing to do at some stage. 
 
GD:  Did you, or amongst the press corps there was there a sense at all that the whole 
operation was helping to justify a military campaign?  The same way that embedding 
has been accused of doing. 
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JH:  Well, of course it is!  I am not of the view that embedding is a bad thing.   
 
GD:  No no no, but that criticism has been made. 
 
JH:  Yeah, I know and I think it’s an unfair one.  I think embedding is a part of the 
journalistic coverage.  The problem is if embedding is your only coverage.  Look, the 
first casualty of war is truth.  We know that.  We know what the exercise is; we know it’s 
about PR and propaganda.  So do you feel sullied by that?  Yeah, a little bit.  But you’re 
part of it as well, and I think if you present it for what it is.  You know I can’t imagine any 
journalist in 2003 going to that experience and not being aware of what exercise.  I think 
you can be really blown away by the scale and the audacity of it.  I think what really was 
extraordinary in that instance was how little General Tommy Franks fronted the media.  
I think he presented himself I think it was three times, in the month of the roll to 
Baghdad and the rest of the time it was much more junior generals saying really very 
little.   
 
GD:  That was very much part of their strategy though really wasn’t it, to reduce that star 
quality of their generals. 
 
JH:  Yeah, obviously they weren’t trying to repeat the performance of Schwarzkopf in 
Gulf War One.  And in many ways I think that was an effective strategy.   
 
GD:  To diffuse the… 
 
JH:  But I did find that breathtaking, that audacity.  Absolutely.  If you say to the world’s 
media this is going to be the place, this is going to be information Central Command, 
media central command.  Here’s the big stage and the big lights and the big production, 
which they did.  And then not actually put anyone of substance on that stage – I find that 
incredible!   
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GD:  To talk of the coverage of that but also of other stories that came through, for 
example civilian killings at checkpoints.  Reading some of your own reports, There 
seems to be a very fine line between almost a sarcastic or a critically ironic telling of a 
story and that tension with having to stay ‘objective’.  I can tell by reading some of those 
dispatches I can read between the lines and get the meaning but it must be very difficult 
to negotiate that tension is it not? 
 
JH:  Yeah, but that’s why they pay us the big money…I just think that’s the eternal 
tension and eternal challenge of journalism… 
 
GD:  Is it possible then to come out and say – “these guys are a pack of liars or what 
they’re doing is...” 
 
JH:  Not from Centcom, because you’re not seeing it.  You know, Geoff Thompson had 
that great story outside of Baghdad, with the shootout, which was just extraordinary, 
that Michael Cox shot.  And he was able to say, what they are saying is wrong because 
I saw different.  You can’t do that at Centcom, and that’s the frustration, but you have to 
write it hard.  That’s what it’s about – it’s not just about he said she said exercise, it’s 
about analysis and interpretation and having the courage of your…it’s the courage of 
your observations.  Because language, it’s a study in language.  I can remember, early 
on Tommy Franks talking about “terrorists”.   
 
GD:  Terrorist death squads, or something like that. 
 
JH:  Yeah.  And it was the national front or whatever they were called.  They were 
regular soldiers.  And they (US military) were clearly trying that on to see if it would fly.  
And I just thought it was fascinating, but you also had to call them on it.  So, you know 
in that case, the language really is the story because they are really, consciously trying 
to weave that into the subconscious, but it’s probably not even as subtle as that.  They 
did drop it, they dropped it pretty quickly actually.  I don’t know what level of monitoring 
they did and whether they monitored the Australian media, but obviously having the 
 
 
405 
Australians there, they would have monitored pretty closely what we did so who knows 
why they decided to.  Clearly it wasn’t kind of registering.  That’s really fascinating to 
me. 
 
GD:  Did you feel enough was made of it in your reports and general ABC coverage of 
Centcom and the war, this sort of linguistic aspect, or this propagandistic aspect of 
things.  My interpretation of it is that journalists were restrained in their reporting of it. 
 
JH:  Well I think you’re always, is it restrained.  Maybe it is restrained, but I‘m not sure 
that’s a bad thing. 
 
GD:  Rather than coming across as a loose cannon? 
 
JH:  You certainly don’t want to be.  You don’t want stridency.  Clearly the tone is really 
important.  And I’d remind you that Richard Alston’s office waged a major assault on the 
ABC’s coverage of the war.  I was mentioned indirectly, never particularly singled out so 
given that that report symbolised the height of sensitivities about our coverage of it, 
you’d like to think I wasn’t overly strident about it.  Do you feel a bit restrained?  Yeah.  
You do feel a bit restrained, but that’s what ABC news and current affairs reporting is 
and if you want to write and opinion piece then go and be an opinion editor.  I there’s 
always that tension between writing it as hard as you can and not overcooking it. 
 
GD:  We’re your editors and people producing for you and providing you with advice, 
were they more conscious and sensitive of the way your coverage was being perceived 
in Australia than for example you were in Doha to the potential criticisms of the ABC.   
 
JH:  I think it’s fair to say that. 
 
GD:  It’s a perennial issue? 
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JH:  No, it’s more than that.  Australian journalists and editors and producers are 
increasingly sensitive to how the ABC’s coverage is perceived.  There is increasing 
pressure on the ABC to, pull its punches, to put it frankly. 
 
GD:  And how does that manifest itself in a journalist’s day-to-day experiences.  Be it 
during war or whatever. 
 
JH:  How does that impact a journalist’s coverage of war?  I just think is an assault.  It 
has had the effect of undermining the courage and confidence of ABC news and current 
affairs.  I really really think that that has been both the intention and the effect.  I still 
think that ABC journalism does something that nobody else does, by sheer weight of 
coverage, for sure.   And it’s held in a particular way by the community at large, no 
doubt about it.  It’s a unique beast which should not only be celebrated but nurtured.  I 
think it’s being tested at the moment, like never before.   
 
GD:  Given the situation you’re in a Centcom with a relatively restricted information 
environment and given that you’re not witnessing things for yourself – plus that linguistic 
manipulation that goes on by the military authorities, is the idea that a journalist can 
remain objective, is that something that needs to be reconsidered? 
 
JH:  I think you’re always striving for objectivity.  But we also know that ever since 
Einstein scribbled E=mc2 we’ve understood that objectivity is not absolute and we all 
bring our prejudices to the job, but that’s not to say that the objectivity of the job, of 
news reporting, cannot be learnt and that’s not to say it’s not and effective discipline, 
that you exercise in the doing of your job.  Now I think the different between news and 
current affairs is subtle but significant and I think that this cuts to the nub of the tension 
surrounding Richard Alston’s campaign around the ABC.  Because current affairs are 
not news reporting, it is not simply about the presentation of facts in some clinical form.  
It’s about analysis and interpretation, and inevitably there is a degree of editorialising 
that goes on in that exercise and should go on in that exercise.  And if you have 
journalists there, then you have journalists there to think, and you don’t have some cub, 
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you have senior experienced journalists to do a job and think and present it as they see 
it.  And that is still under the umbrella of “as fairly and objectively” as they can be – I 
don’t think the two are mutually exclusive.  I think it’s about a duty of bearing witness 
and conveying that to the Australian audience.   
 
 
GD:  Aside from official briefings, who were the most newsworthy sources? 
 
JH:  Your always trading, trading information and ideas, it’s always imprecise.  There 
are always those journalists with their finger more on the pulse than others.  In a perfect 
world you’re trading info with journalists who are not competitors.  So, old mates from 
British papers who were there – perfect.  Guys that I knew from South Asia.  Writing for 
the Guardian, he doesn’t care what’s on the ABC and I don’t care what’s in the 
Guardian.  And the British guys were the ones you wanted because the British guys 
were the most media friendly.  The British Military were by far the most giving and the 
most nuanced in terms of their media relationship.   
 
GD:  Were the British journalists there also of a different calibre? 
 
JH:  Yeah.  They’re just so good.  It's such a huge media market in the UK, it so 
massive.  You just need to arrive in London to get that incredible quantity and quality.  
There a great pool, it’s competitive and there’s a great heritage there.  And as a result 
there’s more mobility, you can move around a lot.  You don’t have that in Australia.   
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX XII - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS SECOND ROUND 
PETER WILSON (NEWS LIMITED) 
5 DECEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  I was going to begin by asking you to explain the style that you used in 
your approach to writing, which I thought in reading what you wrote, was more of a 
narrative style than a “hard news style”. 
 
Peter Wilson:  My strategy was that all of the basic news that was coming out was going 
to be covered by the wires and the other sources, so the aim was to add value and do 
something that your readers wouldn’t otherwise be getting, so to give them a sense of 
what it was actually like there on the ground.  That’s why I was really concentrating on 
the people, that’s why I took a translator with me when most of the people who did get 
into the south didn’t take translators, which absolutely amazed me.  I wanted to cover 
the people’s war and write about how it is affecting the people on the ground, what do 
they think about it, because like with any story, no matter how complicated or esoteric 
the issue if you can humanise it, then it’s going to reach your readers much more easily.  
So the aim or basic tool is trying to tell a story through a person or through some people 
so that your readers can relate to it more and understand it and the way to do that is to 
portray people there as ordinary human beings with wives and children and jobs and 
fears and try and find out what the public attitude and reaction is going to be.  We kept 
hearing the Americans saying that people will be throwing flowers in our paths and 
Saddam’s saying they’ll fight to the death and it will be Stalingrad.  So what I wanted to 
do was talk to ordinary people to get a sense of what their attitude was.   
 
GD:  Do you think that in some ways the traditional liberal method of journalism is 
somewhat not well suited to that style of reporting, you’re talking of an experiential sort 
understanding. 
 
PW:  Well, by definition you’re going to give a bit of the picture, you’re going to give 
what you see.  That’ll be limited to where you are and the people you come across.  So 
 
 
409 
yeah, you’ve got to acknowledge that it is not going to be an overall, universal objective 
picture, but you can do that objectively, if you are determined just to write what you see.  
And what people give you and not the preconceptions that you carry in there.  You know 
like [sic] a lot of people go into situations like that with an agenda, they are either 
against the war or for the war or whatever and if you want to you can twist anything.  
Any news story you can fit to your agenda if you want to.  In London all you have to do 
is read the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph every day, the way they cover exactly the 
same set of facts in totally different ways almost.  You just put it through your own 
ideological prism.  That is what I was trying very very hard not to do. 
 
GD:  How did you go about doing that on a day to day basis?  How do you maintain that 
centrist line? 
 
PW:    Well, I’ve never seen myself as a commentator or a genius who knows the truth 
behind every current affair issue.  And I just don’t think that my job.  When I used to be 
an industrial relations reporter years ago in Australia, I used to resist being asked to do 
comment pieces all the time, because I don’t see why people should give a shit what I 
think or what my comment is.  An analysis piece [sic].  I’d break some story or whatever 
and they’d go “what about a comment piece”.  And I’d go “what about an analysis 
piece”.  You should really do an analysis piece discussing what this means, why should 
I write what my opinion is.  Who gives a shit what I think.  And so with the war that had 
always been my approach.  I was never into preaching but I also went there with 
ambivalent views.  I didn’t see it as a black and white issue, I could see both sides and 
because I didn’t have a single definitive view the war is right or the war is wrong that 
made it easier for me to focus on what I saw, what people said, stuff I found, rather than 
going “See, I told you the war was wrong”. 
 
GD:  What determined for you who became talent in your stories, was it just people 
being available? 
 
 
 
410 
PW:  Well, yeah, a combination, people who looked like they had interesting stories.  So 
if you had someone who looked as though they had a family, or some tragedy, or they 
were in an unusually good position, like their house was near a battle front or 
something, and then just their attitude, if they were welcoming and cooperative, you’re 
naturally going to go with them. 
 
GD:  Do you think it’s possible maybe not just in your own experience, but as a Western 
journalist, do you think it’s possible to cover the “people’s perspective” without 
constructing the regime, Saddam’s loyalists as that enemy, which was so much done by 
the more propagandistic American style.  Do you think it’s possible to cover that without 
crossing that line? 
 
PW:  What do you mean?   
 
GD:  In one’s writing about civilians experiences do you think it is possible to write 
about, to do that without characterising regime figures or Iraqi army figures as some sort 
of enemy. 
 
PW:  Yeah, absolutely.  In the recent Lebanese war, I was there for a while, you know 
Hezbollah – I certainly wasn’t cheering them but I wasn’t presenting them as Nazis.  
And that was just based on the attitudes I was getting from ordinary people.  People 
were telling me, “Hezbollah represent me”.  They are not some terrorist organisation to 
be demonised by Washington.  It is the most popular political party among Shia, the 
largest minority in Lebanon.  And they provide the schools, the TV station, they pick up 
the garbage, they insure people’s homes.  Once you got a sense of that from people 
then that affected the way I reported on Hezbollah.  People here don’t see them as a 
military fringe; they see them as a mainstream.  So I don’t know if that answers your 
question, but I was trying to find out what ordinary people thought of the Saddam 
regime.  And so with everything you’re using your gut instincts in those situations and 
trying to figure out now are these people just telling me this because they think it’s what 
I want to hear, or are they scared that I’ll get the Americans on to them if they don’t bag 
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Saddam.  And you know, they didn’t have to come out and say they liked Saddam, it’s 
just the way they spoke about the Americans. 
 
GD:  Did you have a mind to include those people in your coverage just as much as 
those whose families were on the run or… 
 
PW:  Yeah, If got there and everyone was saying that then I definitely wanted to cover 
that, because that was what I was trying to find out.  I was trying to find out what the 
Iraqi reaction was going to be, because I believed that that would in the long run 
determine the success or otherwise of the occupation.  And I think that was right.  You 
could see in the first two weeks of the occupation that ordinary people did have an open 
mind about the invasion.  We’d dropped all these pamphlets and stuff, radios 
broadcasts saying we’re not coming to get the oil, we’re not invaders we are liberators.  
Saddam is the enemy not you.  Stay home stay out of the way, we’ll restore electricity 
and public order and everything will be ok.  And they went, “ok, we’ll see what 
happens”.  And as the days went by all those promises were broken and you could see 
that open mind closing and people’s attitudes changing and they were just making their 
judgements based on the evidence.  After a week or ten days they started to say, “Fuck 
you, the Americans are not here to help, they are here for the oil.  There’s been no food 
for my children there’s been no electricity, you people clearly don’t care about us”.  And 
that has panned out over the last three years.  The coalition blew the opportunity of Iraq 
popular goodwill.  But that’s what I was trying to find out – what was the Iraqi public 
attitude.  My time in Japan really influenced my thinking on that, because the history of 
the occupation of Japan was that Macarthur was incredibly sensitive to the Japanese 
popular opinion.  And that’s why they lied about the history and pretended that Hirohito 
was not a war criminal and just fabricated his role during the war and didn’t hang him.  
They did a straight out calculation.  They got the OSS (precursor to the CIA) to present 
two figures – how many Americans will die if we kill Hirohito and how many if we don’t.  
And it came back sort of 250,000 and 10 if we don’t. So they went that path.  One of the 
most cynical deceptions of history.  I don’t think any Americans died during the 
occupation.  And that really informed my thinking about Iraqi public opinion and what I 
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have never been able to figure out is that the American military, which is the same 
institution that produced MacArthur has somehow lost that institutional wisdom.  
Normally institutional wisdom is a real thing, especially with the Brits.  That’s why the 
British military are so much better in Iraq than the Americans. People were saying “oh, 
because they’re experience in Northern Ireland”.  I thought it was more than that, I 
thought it was to do with centuries of imperialism and they have for generations have 
been in situations where British soldiers have been outnumbered but the locals and 
they’ve realised, “well, you can’t kill them all” which is the American approach, sheer 
military power.  So you’ve got to understand them, work out their power structures, get 
the local chiefs onside all that sort of stuff.  So from day one the Brits were walking 
around with soft berets instead of hard hats, they were forbidden to wear sunglasses, 
they weren’t pointing guns at people and it was much more successful. 
 
GD:  In amongst your articles, especially before you were arrested in that South Iraq 
area, there were a few things thrown into the mix, including Australian soldiers, and 
John Feder’s amazing technology that he took along with him.  I wonder was stuff sort 
of chucked in there off your own bat so to speak, or was it ordered by the editors. 
 
PW:  No that was all from me and a reflection of my sort of background as a generalist 
foreign correspondent.  There are two sort of styles a specialist, where you just cover 
the oil industry or Wall street or Washington, and the other side of it is what I am doing 
here which is all of Europe, so you’re not a specialist and it’s about trying to be as broad 
and reflective and versatile in your coverage as possible, so one day your covering 
soccer, the next day it’s an economic report, German politics, fashion.  It’s not one 
instrument it’s playing the whole orchestra.  So therefore it was sort of instinctive for me, 
you know I would have written a business report if I could have.  Trying to get all 
different sections of the paper.  That one you were talking about, John Feder’s 
technology, that was for the Media section, tailored to various holes in The Australian 
that can be filled.  I always want to get as much in the paper as possible.  The way to do 
that is to understand your paper and its range of interests and hit as many sections as 
you can.  And obviously there’s also the Australian stories or stories with as many 
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Australian angles as possible.  As I said at the start, Reuters and AP are providing the 
basic coverage of, “the Americans today advanced on Basra”.  You don’t go there to 
duplicate stuff, or so that the same information runs with your name on it, that’s not the 
point, particularly in a dangerous situation.  Why risk your life if you’re not adding 
something to the equation?   
 
GD:  Is there a danger do you think, especially in Iraq of the media becoming “the 
story”?   
 
PW:  Yeah I think always. 
 
GD:  It’s actually quite an interesting story too. 
 
PW:  If it tells people a broader truth if it shows them what it’s like and what’s going on 
there then it’s worthwhile.  If it is just about “Hey, I went and did this”, then it’s not worth 
it.  In that experience, in the things I saw and the impressions I got, I got to talk to Iraqi 
soldiers, I got interrogated by them, and they told me things.    I remember one 
exchange that got people excited on the Oz (The Australian) this Iraqi soldier on his way 
out before we were taken to Baghdad, turned to us and said, “Tell me, will we face 
chemical weapons from the Americans”.  And this is really revealing that they didn’t 
have the gas masks, and thought it was the Americans who were going to use it on 
them.  In Lebanon recently I was very sensitive about situations.  I was driving around 
the Hezbollah headquarters area with Stuart Innes the same translator, half Lebanese 
half Scottish, and we got nabbed by Hezbollah supporters who stuck a gun in our face 
and rang up Hezbollah and they came and took us away and held us, going through the 
paper work in the car and passports.  An hour or two and they let us go.  I wasn’t even 
going to mention it in my story except I was writing a story about who are these 
Hezbollah fighters.  Are they educated?  What class are they?  What sort of people are 
they?  Where are they from?  So that was the story I was writing and that was what we 
were doing when we got grabbed and I put at the bottom…”and these ones I met 
yesterday, when they stopped me for two hours”.  They were obviously educated, 
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extremely well spoken, they could have been dentists, if not gunmen.  I filed the story 
and when they saw it in Sydney they went ape, and said “what happened?”  I said that’s 
what happened, they said, “no you got to lift that higher and put it at the top of the story”  
and we got into this big argument and I was saying it was no big deal, they detain 
journalists all the time.  Its hairy, because it could go wrong, but it happens all the time, 
in different areas to establish that you’re not an Israeli spy, and so the usual trade off 
where they wanted to lift it and I didn’t want to at all and we sort of compromised a little 
bit.  It was a bit of an arm-wrestle that I sort of lost.  
 
GD:  So what is their interest in doing that do you think? 
 
PW:  They think it’s a sexy story, they think it’s going to get readers in to actually read 
the story.  Our man on the spot, it emphasises the fact that your there for the reader, not 
just sitting in Canberra or wherever. 
 
GD:  It’s also an interest in the drama of it over the substance. 
 
PW:  Yeah, exactly, which is not necessarily an inherently bad thing, you need the 
drama to get people to read the story, you need some aspect [sic].  It’s the basic 
challenge of journalism to make often uninteresting things interesting.  And present it in 
a way that people will actually read it.  It’s no use being worthy, but no one reads your 
stories.   
 
GD:  My next question was about the Palestine Hotel after the tank fired the round into 
the hotel room, again very vivid dramatic story reporting the events of that day.  I just 
wonder if the horror and the action and the emotion of describing something like that 
detracts from the larger issues of American incompetence or systematic targeting. 
 
PW:  No, it’s the opposite, I think it underlines it, it shows people what this means.  It 
nots just two people died or 75 people died today in Somalia or whatever; they’re all just 
numbers who don’t mean anything.  Its saying to people that “Fuck!  This is what 
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happens when they just fire off rounds at a hotel”.  You get guts splattered all over the 
wall, you get a human being, who I was able to describe, and the father of an eight year 
old, is now dead.  The night before he was sitting here having a beer.  Now he’s dead.  
That I think is the sort of coverage that the Americans hated, because it humanised 
what was going on.  There is a very good reason why during the first Gulf war and the 
second [sic] the Coalition refused to even issue numbers for Iraqi dead let alone names 
and details, because as soon as you start putting number that can make the reader, or 
the voter think, “Fuck!, 2450 people died today!”.  That’s why Bob Hawke, they all just 
refused to put a number on “collateral damage” because they don’t want it to have that 
impact on the readers.  Once again when you focus on something like that you are 
giving a skewed view of things and you have to be aware, it’s just because you happen 
to be there.  You’re trying to make a point but you are not trying to make out that the 
death of a journalist is a bigger deal than the death of anyone else.  On a basic 
professional level the other problem with reporting in that sort of emotional shock is you 
make mistakes.  I made basic mistakes in what I described – when I wrote a book about 
it and went back over my notes and material, I realised first that I got two guys mixed 
up, these two guys who had been sharing the room, and I had been drinking with the 
two of them and I wasn’t sure of which one of them it was.  I still can’t understand, 
because I was trying to put his guts back in and looking in his eyes and talking to him.  
But he was lying down covered in blood, I was in shock, everyone was screaming “get 
out of the room; they’re going to fire again.”  I was wrong again in describing the time.  I 
went downstairs straight away, I couldn’t go to hospital because I was still under house 
arrest, so I went downstairs and filed.  So I wrote that we had him in the room for fifteen 
minutes working on him.  In hind sight it was probably about two minutes. For me time 
stopped.  I thought it was very long, laborious [sic] sensory overload slows time down.  
That is one of the hazards of reporting under those circumstances that you’ve got to be 
aware of. 
 
GD:  Was there any direction given by Australian editors over what you should be 
doing? 
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PW:  It was more me ringing them and telling them what I am doing.  Working for the 
Murdoch press there’s often the suspicion that there’s an ideological line being put 
through everything, especially on an issue like the Iraq war, where all of our papers 
editorials ran very strongly in one direction, except for the Port Moresby Post or 
whatever it was.  There was none of that, I was never told, “this is our party line, try and 
put spin on it”.  People know that I wouldn’t do that anyway.  I am not really interested in 
that.  And it was also because I would ring in on sat phone and say, right, this is what I 
am planning to write, how does that sound.  And they would say yes, or no, we haven’t 
got enough space or we need more, instead of 500 words can you make it 1000.  Or 
they tell me something that has just happen that I didn’t know about which would mean 
what I was going to write was redundant, or that a much bigger story had happened.  
Don’t bother writing four stories, we won’t have room for them just write one. You’ve 
always got to have that sort of coordination but there wasn’t direction given, no one had 
a clue to tell you what was going on.   
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX XIII - INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT – SECOND ROUND 
MARK WILLACY 
7 NOVEMBER 2006 
 
Giles Dodson:  The ABC in general and you in particular were quick to mention the 
possibility of American war plans going awry, how careful or sensitive did you have to 
be in reporting that, especially given the potential for controversy over war plans going 
badly, were you sensitive to that at all? 
 
Mark Willacy:  Not really, because where I was I didn’t really get a sense of what was 
going on back in Australia or what sort of parameters were put on the ABC, what 
warnings were given to the ABC, and the ABC gave me very little instruction.  It was 
very hands-off, they deferred to my judgement on everything.  Obviously after the war 
we were accused of anti-Americanism, which to me was a load of crap.  It was just 
Alston on a mission [sic].  Having since read a lot about the campaign and how it was 
conducted, I don’t think we went hard enough.  The thing is my job wasn’t to comment 
on the campaign as such but to comment on the impact on Iraq and its people, so that’s 
how I focused.  We had a guy embedded, Geoff Thompson with the military, we had 
Jonathan Harley and Peter Lloyd in Qatar.  So you know they could handle that, I just 
dealt with what was happening in Iraq or around.  But having worked in Israel the time 
before that I was very distrustful of what the media tells you, the Israelis would tell lies, I 
am not singling them out, all militaries tell lies, that’s because they have to, and often 
they choose to.   
 
GD:  What was it that you sought to achieve from this specific instance of the Iraq war, 
given that there are wire services and ABC people and saturation coverage of this 
event, what did you seek specifically to achieve yourself? 
 
MW:  You’re right there was saturation coverage, but I was in a very privileged position 
to be inside there, there was only me and Trevor Bormann and the cameraman Louis, it 
was the most important angle, because before the war we wanted to ascertain the 
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American allegations of WMD [sic] were right, really how could we do that in a 
totalitarian state?  You’ve got to try.  We also wanted to ascertain before the war 
whether the Iraqi people did want the American forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  
Again, very difficult because of the totalitarian regime.  And after the war that was 
extremely important to find out if the Americans had conducted themselves in a manner 
that they should have, and they didn’t.  They failed to secure Baghdad, they used an 
invasion force of only a third of what was recommended in their war plans in the late-
nineties.  The whole thing was a schmozzle [sic]. 
 
GD:  I noticed in your reporting as opposed to some of the print journalists, and some of 
the other ABC guys, you’re less willing to poke fun at the Iraqi official view and less 
willing to report the information ministry pronouncements on whatever issue in a quite 
satiric tone.  Was that something you were quite conscious of?    
 
MW:  Yeah, not really.  The mood in there was not a very satiric mood. 
 
GD:  Perhaps more dismissive.  Your reporting gave time to the Iraqi government, which 
is fair enough.   
 
MW:  Well it is, in the ABC you’re taught to give fair amounts of time and emphasis to 
both sides no matter how stupid the pronouncements coming from Saddam Hussein 
and Sahaf were.  I don’t try to put ideas into the listener’s heads.  They can tell if this 
guy is being ridiculous.  I have often been accused of being too subtle in my reporting.  I 
am writing this book, and the publisher’s saying, “well, you need to say this” and I am 
saying, “well it’s inherent within the text”.  So maybe that’s just my style.  If al-Sahaf is 
making statements saying American troops are committing suicide at the gates of 
Baghdad in their hundreds – that’s patently false.  I think just running that is satire 
enough.  Can I just add – Saddam Hussein, what he says can sound ludicrous, but he 
has committed ludicrous acts that have resulted in many deaths, so I took Saddam 
Hussein reasonably seriously.  
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GD:   There were plenty of instances in which journalists were treating those sorts of 
pronouncements in an off-hand way or dismissively, and yet they have been able to 
discuss their own reporting as being objective or whatever – within that scheme and 
professional model, fairness, impartiality, independence – there does seem a lot of 
leeway to find your own style. 
 
MW:  I think so yeah.  I wanted to tell the story of the ordinary people.  Really, I was in 
Iraq and had to report the pronouncements of Saddam Hussein and his officials, but I 
wanted to get out and talk to real Iraqis – these are the people who are out there in the 
firing line, so that was my style.  And to be honest I don’t have to be objective within a 
report by balancing it up with a comment from the Americans, that’d be done by another 
reporter.  I wasn’t given a mission by the ABC.  I think if you were dropped in Iraq at the 
beginning of the war and told this is your, this is where you’ll be, this is who you’ll talk to, 
you speak to ordinary Iraqis [sic].  We did that every day, before during and after the 
war. 
 
GD:  Quite a few of the journos who weren’t on specific postings, either embedded or at 
Qatar, have said, yeah, it was the people’s war which I wanted to cover.  Do you think 
that a different style of journalism is required to understand the “truth” of the 
experiences of the Iraqi people, perhaps a more experiential way of understanding their 
lives. 
 
MW:  You’ve got to have a good background in the culture and you know I had a little bit 
of a background in Arabic culture, having been to Iraq a couple of times before the war 
had helped me.  I got to know people, I was invited into homes and I got to know 
people.  I would have hated to be embedded. Qatar would have been like hell to me.  
And embedding you can say well you’re in Iraq covering one side of the war, and 
embedding is covering the other – but embedding is covering it from a very very specific 
perspective, because you are lobbing shells with an army unit in the direction of 
somewhere and you don’t know who they are landing on or the damage they are doing.  
But anyway, I digress.  I think you had to have a background you had to have a feel for 
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the place.  One thing I had to remind myself is that these are ordinary bloody [sic] 
people, they could have been anywhere, they could be living in Brisbane, or anywhere.  
The difference was they were under the gun and they also had their president who 
could knock on the door in the middle of the night and drag them out.  So I always try to 
treat people with compassion wherever they are, but I felt that these people had been 
through a lot and were about to go through a lot more.   
 
GD:  Were you witness to reporting of journos who did things in quite the opposite way 
– this idea of a “parachute journalist” who drops in from CNN or whoever, and doesn’t 
know anything. 
 
MW:  I met a lot like that, but I met a lot who were very committed to the story and very 
sympathetic to the culture and when I say culture I mean very sympathetic to the 
people, the traditions, but not the mode of government they were living under.  But you 
did get the fly-in-fly-out, as you mentioned it was from CNN, even the BBC had a 
couple.  But that could just be the demands of their network, often you can’t find a 
dozen reporters who necessarily know much about that region.   
 
GD:  Were journo’s also in your experience quite conscious of their intrusion into 
people’s lives as well? 
 
MW:  Yes I suppose they were.  And there was also the intrusion on the part of the 
regime.  Before the war if you wanted to meet a family of Shi’ites in Sadr City or 
Saddam City as it was known then, then you knew they were going to hand pick 
someone, every word they were saying was going to be monitored, and if they said one 
thing wrong or maybe told the truth, then that could have resulted in a bullet in the back 
of the head.  So we tried to minimise that amount of setting up a story, but you did have 
to be very conscious of what you said, what you asked and you didn’t want to push 
people.  That was the hardest thing, and I always reminded my listeners that we were 
accompanied by an Iraq Information Ministry minder and what people were saying was 
being listened to very carefully.    
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GD:  Were there issues which didn’t receive as substantive coverage as you would 
have liked?  There was one on cluster bombs.  Is it possible to slow down the news 
cycle in these situations and to give these issues more substantive treatment? 
 
MW:  In the medium I was working in which was radio and AM which is the best radio 
current affairs in the country, there was because we had the correspondents placed 
everywhere else and if OK, there’s a bit of military activity or broad scale issues going 
on then someone else can cover it from somewhere else.  I can be given the task to go 
and ferret out stories, do the feature stories, like the cluster bombs, like the digging up 
of graves at Abu-Ghraib.  Other little stories about a family who lost two sons because 
an American tank commander fired a round into their house inexplicably – just these 
little issues, and that’s what basically I did and I am very proud of that reporting, more 
so than reporting Mohammed al-Sahaf and all these other idiots and their crazy 
pronouncements.   
 
GD:  Quite a few of the journos, the Australian guys, in amongst the body of their 
journalism that was produced in that sort of month period, there’s the obligatory stories 
of the Australian involvement, in terms of providing aid, or the Australian divers clearing 
mines, or Australian boats waiting in the Gulf to do something.  Obviously, Australian 
audiences are going to interested in what Australians are doing, there must be a fine 
line between gratuitous reporting on the “diggers in the desert” and the more 
substantive issues.  How do you balance those two? 
 
MW:  Well you’re right, and it was gratuitous.  And that was one area that the ABC 
ordered me to cover – get down to Kuwait, or Bahrain, I think it was, jump on a Sea-
King helicopter to the Kanimbla.  To me that was the most boring bloody story I covered 
in the whole time.  And I’ll tell you why, because they were sitting on a billiard flat sea, 
with their thumbs up their arse and their minds in neutral.  And that’s not to detract from 
these people, because they were sent there and they did a very professional job and 
they were looking for mines and there were mines, but you know, big whoop [sic].  And I 
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know Australian audiences are interested, but I also think that sometimes Australian 
audiences need to be told what the story is, because they were not there and I could 
hardly wait to get back into Iraq to do some more reporting, which I did because that’s 
where the story was, people were dying and that was the most important time too, when 
I was on the bloody Kanimbla, the Americans were trying to secure Baghdad and that 
was when and that’s when the seeds of the insurgency were planted, during that period.  
I got back and I did reports on it and how there was looting and the Americans weren’t 
finding weapons of mass destruction, they were finding giant stashes of conventional 
weapons.  They didn’t find a lot of those stashes because the insurgents, who were 
then ordinary Iraqi military personnel, didn’t want them to.  And now they are using 
those weapons to fight the Americans, so those were very important stories and to be 
sitting on the Kanimbla in the ward room, with the chef asking what did you want for 
dinner that night, it was very frustrating.   
 
GD:  So how do you manage that relationship between ABC head office, or your 
producer who’s asking you to go do these things and your own news sense that is 
saying to you, “well, no the stories are elsewhere” – there’s tension in that relationship 
and how do you manage it? 
 
MW:  Sometimes you don’t manage it because you lose your temper, but I tried to argue 
this one out, I tried to argue it very hard and I lost because I sometimes feel that the 
person who made this call, is too busy chasing Channel Nine, who had been on the 
boat a week earlier.  In my opinion that makes the story redundant anyway, because it 
had been done.  And that put a bit of tension in the relationship, and sometimes you 
argue a story so vigorously with someone that it creates tension in the relationship that 
lasts and in this case it did.  And from then on I questioned this person’s news 
judgement.  I got back in there and I worked very hard to do the stories that I wanted to 
do in Iraq.  The story that eventually won me a Walkley Award, I don’t think that’s the be 
all and end all, but it’s a degree of recognition for a story that is important.  Not that the 
Walkley Awards are a judge of everything in journalism, but I don’t think I was going to 
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win a Walkley Award for sitting on the Kanimbla eating duck a l’orange in the ward 
room.   
 
GD:  Is that a tendency do you think more generally within the ABC to try to keep up 
with the commercial networks? 
 
MW:  Generally it’s not, but on those big stories I suppose it is important for the ABC.  
Overall I do think it’s important for the ABC to keep the news agenda focused on what 
we’re good at and that’s serious hardcore news and very incisive current affairs, but 
occasionally there is a lapse, and I think what should have happened in that case, if we 
go back is that I should have gone back into Iraq and they should have sent someone 
from Qatar where they had two journalists. 
 
GD:  As you mentioned before those sorts of lapses can be the result of one person’s 
decision.   
 
MW:  Very much and you’ve got to put faith in people’s judgement and once they are 
given a task you back them, or you sack them.  But I didn’t agree on this occasion, 
overall this person does a reasonable job, but that was a big lapse.  But also to be fair 
to this person maybe they were thinking, “well Iraq’s a bit dangerous at the moment and 
we probably can’t get them in anyway”.  So to be fair, there might have been other 
considerations, but I would have still attempted to go back into Iraq. 
 
GD:  When you did get back in there, towards the beginning of the occupation, there 
was on story I remember reading of the celebrations of American troops, described by 
you as a football team.  Obviously you are implying a certain sort of attitude amongst 
the occupation forces, but it is possible to take that even further and say explicitly the 
sort of attitude these guys have, the insensitivity. 
 
MW:  That was the first time I had seen the Americans during ground campaign in Iraq 
so I didn’t want to paint the whole campaign based on that one incident, but it didn’t 
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instil me with a great deal of confidence.  You’ve read the transcript, there was one guy 
standing tall like John Wayne with a pistol unloading across the river.  Now if the source 
of fire was that serious, I don’t think you’d be standing up there with a pistol.  They way 
they responded was patchy and funny in a lot of ways.  The Americans stopped after a 
while and they realised that maybe whoever they were firing on could have left in the 
first two minute of the engagement, they were too busy pouring thousands of rounds 
across the river.  I did another story for PM where I met this American marine who 
showed me this weapons stash.  He was decent young guy and I kind of felt for him, he 
didn’t really want to be there but he had a job to do.  I met another young marine, I don’t 
think I reported this, on the banks of the Tigris, and he had a thick Southern accent and 
he says to me, “so what river is this?”  I said, “that’s the Tigris, where the first city states 
and civilisations were born”.  I didn’t feel like deriding the guy, but it highlighted to me 
the overall lack of cultural awareness and so I was starting [sic] they did pose like a 
football team, and they did so because they were very blasé in the way they 
approached this and it was just like a football game gone mad, and it was the only 
analogy I could think of. 
 
GD:  I have a quote “That sort of optimism is easily bred behind the insulation of an 
armoured vehicle mounted with heavy machine guns, but that insulated thinking will not 
sit well with the supposedly liberated Iraqi people”.  That’s a very pointed comment to 
make and quite incisive at that stage of the occupation, you could see it going down the 
gurgler.  Do you think that was reported well enough at the time? 
 
MW:  The seeds were being planted.  The thing about that comment, I can tell you why I 
made it – I had spoken to Iraqis before the war and they had secretly said to me if the 
Americans come as liberators then we will welcome them, if they come as occupiers 
then there will be problems.  So that is where that comment comes from, I could make 
that comment with some authority.  Not a hell of a lot, at that point.  I don’t want to 
sound as though I told you so – but I told you so.  The biggest problem with the 
Americans was their lack of understanding about this culture and about what they’d 
done and what they were about to do.  Unfortunately for these Marines and these 
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soldiers, they couldn’t change it any way, what needed to change was Tommy Franks 
and Bremmer who came after him who was a total bloody disaster.   
 
GD:  Is it possible for journalists to get up and say “these guys don’t have a clue”? 
 
MW:  I think there are more subtle ways of saying that.  Richard Alston would have 
been apoplectic and to be honest I probably would have been found guilty of breeching 
editorial standards.  But saying that as I did, Alston – not that I am here to please 
Richard Alston, but there are ways of saying things and there are ways of saying things, 
but that comment was not picked up by his bunch of little helpers who were pouring 
over every transcript.  And it’s a better ways of saying it than saying, “these guys are 
clueless” because you’re saying he here in he’s sitting in his vehicle, surrounded by 
weaponry, he’s a confident guy, but he can’t see the wood for the trees.  So anyway, 
that’s the way I justify it.  I think it’s a legitimate way of questioning, I think the listener 
doesn’t need to have it blurted out, sometimes we can just feed it out.  And the listener 
can make up their own mind.  If I just say they’re clueless, well shit he’s got a point of 
view, I know where he’s coming from now and its going to colour the way I listen to his 
reports and what I think of them.  Where as if I stand there in front of that the listener 
may think “well, he’s there, he’s looking at that and he knows what he’s talking about”. 
 
THE END 
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 APPENDIX XIV - EDITOR INTERVIEWS 
MICHAEL CAREY – EXECUTIVE PRODUCER (ABC) 
22/12/2007 
 
MICHAEL CAREY:  We’d talk to our reporters over there - say to Jon Harley or to Peter 
Lloyd.  And then we would try to talk to one of two reporters who remained in Baghdad 
and that was Paul McGeough, the Fairfax journalist, so we tried to get him on most 
nights.   
 
GILES DODSON:  Trying to get the fullest picture, I suppose?   
 
MC:  Look, it’s a war so the full picture is simply not readily available.  Basically, what 
you’ve got to do is focus on getting as many details right as you can as you go along, 
and you know, there’s always the temptation to try to do the big overview, of where the 
war is going and stuff like that.  I think you can actually fall into traps doing that.   
 
GD:  How possible is it to direct, to be able to manage reporters production of news?   
 
MC:  In those circumstances we really weren’t, because basically the packages that we 
were doing from back here would sort of mine what the BBC or CNN had and mine the 
raw audio there.  The reporters on the ground we really wanted to know, well what had 
they been told.  We were not trying to push them much beyond that.  Paul McGeough 
was very interesting because he had some freedom to get around Baghdad a little bit.  
So someone like that, he could use his eyes and talk about what he was seeing.  Eric 
Campbell, before Paul Moran got blown up, the same thing he could actually use his 
eyes and talk around it.  Jon Harley and Peter Lloyd were basically office bound, but in 
an office in the Middle East.  They really just had to talk about what they were being told 
and what the daily briefings were.  Geoff Thompson who was embedded, he provided a 
fair degree of colour.  And he provided a fairly stunning piece about the US force 
shooting up what looked like a civilian car.  A lot of it is just “suck it and see”, you get 
people who you rely on, and people you think are good. 
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GD:  So those who are out there they are the crème de la crème?  
 
MC:  They are all very professional, they are all experienced foreign reporters, who 
hopefully don’t get snowed that easily and understand what their role is and what our 
role is.   
 
GD:   And were you able to achieve what you set out to achieve.   
 
MC:  Yeah, I was very proud of the reporting.  As I said the time zone suited us very 
well. 
 
GD:  What is something that you found particularly satisfying or particularly proud of? 
 
MC:  I think the stuff that Paul McGeough was painting of Baghdad before the fall was 
extremely dramatic.  Radio is also very nimble, so we able to get the rioting or 
celebrations in Sadr-City, whereas the TV news people here didn’t have the time or 
were not nimble enough to turn that around.  So we were basically able to call key 
events much more quickly.  We were able to, for example, in that first week when there 
was that talk of whether or not Saddam had been killed in the bombing, we were able to 
go live with the press conference as it happened and basically able to log it and he had 
a few details there that proved that this was not pre-recorded, that he was there.  So 
there’s an immediacy that you can get out of radio and as I said I think we did it really 
well.  But you can fall into traps, I remember when Afghanistan was on, I was in 
Washington, and there was an attention span or something, about journalism and 
reporting, that the fact that five weeks in,  and the fact that the Taliban hadn’t fallen and 
people were saying , “oh is it a bad plan” and so on and so forth, and you just can’t do it 
in those sorts of times, war is a messy, long range thing.  The Northern Alliance, a week 
or so after those stories were starting around, basically toppled the Taliban.  So there is 
a danger of too much reading into minute developments.   
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GD:   Which I suppose is encouraged these days with the immediacy of everything, with 
24 hr news etcetera? 
 
MC:  Well that’s right, exactly.   
 
GD:  How do you mitigate that? 
 
MC:  By just doing your job as well as you can really.  You want to be there first, but 
accuracy is key.  And is a war, so much is unclear, that if you do get Reuters or CNN or 
whoever is calling a development, and you can’t verify it all you can do is say, “CNN and 
Reuters are saying that…”.  Just attribute everything.   
 
GD:  Is there an acceptance then that what was claimed the previous day might be 
disproved the next day, that acceptance of the news bein, reality being more fluid that 
say a domestic politics setting? 
 
MC:  As I said you basically just attribute everything, and you have to assume you have 
an intelligent audience – they want to know what is happening and they want to know 
what the debates are, but they don’t want to be spoon-fed the stuff.  They also respect 
being told what we can’t know and what we don’t know and what we are not being told, 
what we haven’t heard and stuff like that.   
 
GD:  And part of that is obviously the relationship between the news organisations and 
the military, which was sort of a significant part of the Iraq story and the stage 
management that the military tried to get away with? 
 
MC:  But all you can do in those circumstances is talk about it, constantly 
acknowledging that this is coming out of the US military, or this is coming out of the 
Pentagon.  I know that Richard Allston got terribly excited by a little bit of attitude being 
shown by one of our reporters, whereas in fact what he was doing was – maybe his 
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terminology could have been better, but constantly pointing out “this is a military 
briefing”, and people can take, people understand what this means.   
 
GD:  I was talking to Jonathan Harley about this and he was saying really given that 
Centcom was really the epicentre of that stage management – how do you contend with 
that as a journalist, and he said you just write it as hard as you can.  But it seemed to 
me that there was a sort of parallel universe, at Centcom, on one had the daily news 
conference and the ‘story’ based on the little bits of information that come out.  On the 
other there was this Hollywood studio, set up in the desert, really nothing of any 
importance coming out of it, particularly from the ADF, being particularly tight lipped 
about it.   
 
MC:  That’s part of the story – you talk about that and you acknowledge it.  But you 
know after acknowledging it there’s only so much you can do with it.   
 
GD:   Again with embedding, was that a concern? 
 
MC:  There’s a lot of discussion about embedding, there are issues there that the 
journalist becomes very dependent on the protective force around them and they can 
come to empathise with them, and the embedding was with the American force and not 
an Australian force, but in the end we got good material out of it, so you know, there 
was even talking to the soldier can be really interesting [sic].  I don’t know if you saw the 
documentary Soundtrack to War, an Australian documentary maker who basically spent 
a lot of time with the infantry and so on.  Basically, talking to them about what music 
they like and so on, and as a result, you actually get a much better insight into the 
cultural ‘gap’ between the soldiers and the situation they were going into.   
 
GD:  And in that situation, given the political pressure coming to bear on the ABC is 
there ever an anxiety about going too far with anything. 
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MC:  I wouldn’t say anxiety, there’s a constant awareness that you have to look at facts 
and opinions in some ways, we reflect the political debates that circulates around this 
stuff.  But we try not to be a part of the political debates ourselves.  Alston’s intervention 
was completely outrageous, although it really happens after the war so it was really in 
the mop up.  The US was on a bit a of a victory dance at that stage. 
 
GD:  Presumably these are all considerations that take place from your perspective as a 
producer, in coordination of the coverage. 
 
MC:  To some extent the issues there are not that different from the issues if you’re 
doing Canberra.  How do you cover emotional issues without becoming partisan?  The 
2001 election I was overseas for, but some of the ABC’s coverage did get quite 
emotional. 
 
GD:  So how does a journalist try to negotiate that then?   
 
MC:  You just try to apply what your professional instincts are, and that is to be as 
honest as you can be and to not shield the public from the implications of what’s going 
on, but at the same time not running a campaign on it.   
 
GD:  And at what level were decisions occurring with regards the sorts of interviews you 
do or the sorts of people you get on…? 
 
MC:  Well, the only, there was a bit of logistic negotiation that so and so was going to be 
asleep until this time [sic]. 
 
GD:  How does the ABC distinguish itself, I suppose? 
 
MC:  For one thing we actually take foreign news much more seriously than other 
organisations, certainly any other electronic media.  There’s SBS (Special Broadcasting 
Service) but SBS don’t have the resources.  We distinguish ourselves by having 
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experienced foreign correspondents on the ground and having the outlets and, certainly 
in radio, by actually talking about these things at some length.   
 
GD:  How important is scepticism? 
 
MC:  Essential.  If you are not sceptical about what you’re being told, not cynical, 
sceptical – you don’t assume that the people are lying to you.  Journalism is partly 
saying, “what is their interest in this?”  If you are not sceptical you may as well just be 
running press releases.  And I think to some extent the federal governments complaints 
about the ABC were that we were not just running press releases – they would be much 
happy with just a wire service. 
 
GD:  Is there any place for the national broadcaster to be a more patriotic broadcaster? 
 
MC:  It depends how you define patriotism. I think you can define various concepts and 
principles – the freedom of information and an informed public is quite patriotic [sic].  I 
think that if your defining it in terms of being more gung-ho, then no, that is not our job.   
 
GD:  What about the ABC having to compete against commercial organisations. 
 
MC:  Well, we do. You have to watch what the commercials are doing.   
 
GD:  When does that become a consideration? 
 
MC:  It becomes a consideration when you think we are lagging behind other people’s 
coverage.  The ABC justifies itself as the premier electronic news organisation in the 
country.  If people are finding they get their information more quickly somewhere else, 
then they probably will.  And that sort of lessens our importance, so there a fair degree 
of enlightened self interest in all of this.   
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GD:  Successful operation from your point of view? 
 
MC:  I think we did extremely good reporting.   
 
GD:  What might you have done better? 
 
MC:  You know, thing that is showed up to me was how absurd and overwrought the 
ABCs complaints system was.  Apart from that you know, I think we were appropriately 
dispassionate and appropriately comprehensive. And I hope we were up to date.   
 
GD:  Security 
 
MC:  We didn’t have someone in Baghdad because of concerns over security.  So you 
can flip your coin on that one.  You have to keep your journalists alive – and embedding 
is one way of getting some access to a frontline somewhere with some degree of safety. 
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX XV – EDITOR INTERVIEWS 
PETER KERR - FOREIGN EDITOR SMH (2003) 
18 MAY 2006 
 
Giles Dodson: What was it that you were most proud of or what do you consider 
the most valuable achievement of the SMH in the reporting from Iraq? 
 
Peter Kerr:  It was on a par with the best coverage anywhere, and I think part of that 
was the ability of the Herald to provide a very comprehensive rundown of what was 
going on.  Drawing on sources of reporters on the ground either in Iraq or around Iraq 
but also in Washington and London and Turkey and other places, but also because the 
Herald draws information by subscribing to publications like the Washington Post, the 
New York Times, the LA Times, the Boston Globe, the Telegraph of London, the 
Guardian, among others.  I think broadly, the balance and comprehensiveness of the 
coverage was good, because it didn’t have, in my opinion, it didn’t have the American 
slant or the British slant or the Iraqi slant, I think it was you know, very balanced – but 
probably the single most achievement was probably having Paul McGeough in 
Baghdad, when shock and awe began and through that period, so I think the single 
most achievement would be the bravery of McGeough to remain in there and the 
courage of Fairfax in agreeing to let him being there. 
 
GD: Was pulling people out something you considered? 
 
PK: Absolutely, yes, no there was a lot of concern, at Fairfax, not only for McGeough, 
but for everyone involved in the war.  There was talk in the lead up to the invasion, 
Saddam having chemical and biological weapons, no one knew exactly what would 
happen, there was concern that people on the front line, whether that be actually in Iraq 
or in countries that might have been hit if Iraq struck back.  Turkey or Kuwait or Qatar or 
Israel.  If it had the capacity to deliver chemical or biological weapons then reporters 
would have to be ready for that and there was debate at Fairfax over whether we should 
have people inside Iraq or nearby.  If we did have them there, how we could do as much 
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as we could do to guarantee their safety and with McGeough there was significant 
debate about whether he should remain in Baghdad when we knew that the Americans 
were planning to bomb Baghdad and the Americans warned all journalists to leave.  So 
it wasn’t just a matter of us worrying about him, it was a matter of us being warned by 
the invading power that journalists should be removed.  So therefore that adds another 
level of responsibility in keeping him safe.  But on balance it was decided that he should 
stay. 
 
GD: Was it simply the fact that it was simply too important a story to miss out on, so to 
speak?  Presumably you could have used stock footage from the BBC or purchased 
photographs from agencies or someone else who was there?  It was important for the 
Herald to have their own people on the ground? 
 
PK: I think so, that as a matter of principle it’s important for the Herald, it’s important 
for any news organization, who is trying to report accurately, fairly and in a balanced 
fashion to have a firsthand account of what’s going on.  The invasion of Iraq was one of 
the most significant events in recent years and we thought that it was important for 
impartial and balanced coverage and to bring an accurate account for readers of the 
Herald, for someone to be there, rather than us to rely for example on the Washington 
Post or the New York Times that would provide a good viewpoint but perhaps one that 
was slanted from an American point of view.   
 
GD: What would you do differently in terms of you coverage, if you had your time 
again or there was another war, for example? 
 
PK: I’d be stretched to think how we would have covered Iraq much more differently – 
we had, as I said very comprehensive coverage, we had photographers and journalists 
placed in Baghdad, embedded with US forces, with the Australians at the central 
Command post in Qatar.  We had the London correspondent who also travelled to 
Turkey, we had Washington covered, we had London covered and it was probably the 
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most planned in advance coverage the Herald’s had in some time.  I suppose you can 
always do things better but I can’t think of any major flaw in the way it was covered. 
 
GD: Sure, sure, can you explain to me, I know it is complex I’m sure, but can you 
explain the actual process you go through as an editor, and especially given the wealth 
of information – all that stuff coming to you and having to process that.  What is the 
actual process that you go through?  How do you decide what becomes front page, 
what gets left out that sort of thing?  Because there must have been such an 
overwhelming amount of information coming out of Iraq. 
 
PK: I think when you have that amount of information coming on such an event of 
such magnitude then you are to an extent swamped and it’s a matter of trying to keep 
your head above water, but it’s something we do every day in a sense.  A large part of 
the day is the news gathering process and everyday it’s not dissimilar, just a smaller 
magnitude, it’s a matter of gathering news from the wires and from the papers that we 
get news from, I think with Iraq there was probably a greater effort to get up to the 
minute information from cable news services and websites.  We do that anyway, but 
with Iraq it was the first time that that war was enacted real time on Fox and CNN and 
the BBC so that was something that was more of a focus in Iraq than otherwise.  And 
then the rest of the news comes from the reporters and local news services and all that 
is gathered and continued to be gathered throughout the news cycle.  In terms of Iraq 
and how it was dealt with, a lot of extra staff were put on to gather that from all those 
different sources, put it into a central place and then it has to, as in any news day, go 
through a conference process where a list of everything that is available at that given 
time is put to the editorial conference.  The photos are shown on a screen in the 
conference room or printed out and laid on a board.  With Iraq it was often themed so it 
was broken down into themed pages – page one is the biggest and the best and the 
most dramatic, and then beyond that we tended to theme things on whether it was say, 
external influences, what was going on the ground, the impact on Iraqis that sort of 
thing. 
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GD:  And what sorts of things determined what became front page?  What determined 
the biggest or most dramatic? 
 
PK: Well, same as any newsgathering and news judgement exercise.  Part of it is 
exclusiveness, part of it is what would be regarded as the most newsworthy and I think, 
I don’t know how much you are reviewing what different news outlets did on any 
particular day, but I think you would find, if you compared say the Herald or The 
Australian or the Telegraph or the Independent, the Guardian and the Telegraph there, 
if you matched like outlets or publications I think you would find that there becomes 
what is regarded as a natural news lead for the day.  That tends to be what is on the 
front page the same way that Kovco was on the front page of all the newspapers here 
today.  Then beyond that it becomes a matter of trying to create balance and 
comprehensiveness and also to tell a human tale, so often on a given day, in the 
specific instance of Iraq coverage it might have been an image that was particularly 
emotive, or was seen to have a particular part of the news theme of the day. 
 
GD: You were talking just before about the similarities that tend to arise in terms of 
the leading stories of the day and about general judgments in terms of newsworthiness, 
do think that things tend towards a certain similarity is because there is an inherent 
essence or character of something which is newsworthy or is that people are thinking 
about things in the same way as each other, editors at the Herald are thinking about 
things the same way as the editors of the Australian are because they’ve worked in the 
same industry for so long or they have had the same training. 
 
PK: I think it’s a mix of both, I do believe in the idea that there is an inherent 
newsworthiness in something and I think for example that someone leaving a CD-ROM 
of the interim Kovco investigation in an airport lounge when the investigation has 
already been a stuff up before, there is an inherent newsworthiness in that and that’s 
identified by the people who work for the Australian or the Herald. 
 
 
 
437 
GD: But something like that feeds into many stories, simply the act of leaving 
something behind is not newsworthy, but because on so many levels it says something 
about the management of the defence department, it says something about the army, 
all those sorts of things on top of the human story of this tragedy.  Now in terms of a 
war, you’ve got a bomb blowing up a building, it might be any other day of the week that 
it would be front page news.  But it’s a war and bombs go off and they’re dramatic and 
interesting.  In terms of from a photographic sense, something like that, they are not 
telling you much more about [sic], just a building being blown up is not telling you much 
more about what’s actually going on – do you understand? 
 
PK: I think so.  Let’s say if you’ve got a situation like in Iraq where a war happens 
over a number of weeks and on some days there might be a story of natural obvious 
newsworthiness and it might be, Blair announcing that he may do something in 
particular to help the war effort – that is a significant news development in terms of that 
story and it might be identified naturally by a range of different media as a natural 
inherently newsworthy occurrence, but with an event as big as a war from many 
different fronts um there won’t always be that and people make different judgements 
and they make different judgments for hugely complex range of reasons.  I think and in 
the same way that different news judgements will be made on any given day between a 
broadsheet Herald and a tabloid Telegraph then different judgements are going to be 
made also on an event like Iraq.  I think the Herald is quite rightly proud of trying to be 
as balanced and as fair and as comprehensive as possible and tries to go beyond a 
single bomb blast to tell the story, but on the other hand I think the Herald should also 
acknowledge that they can’t come to an editorial conference table without preconceived 
notions of what the news is and how it should be told. 
 
GD: Just to move away from the mechanics of newsgathering and production and that 
sort of thing, I just wanted to ask a few questions more generally about journalism.  I am 
sort of interested in the idea of professionalism amongst journalists and I was 
wondering what in your opinion, I am sure through your long experience as a journalist 
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and now as a more senior journalist, what is or what makes up, or what defines, a 
professional journalists? 
 
PK: One is accuracy, so wanting to get it right and be willing to go the extra distance 
to get it right, part of getting it right is fairness and that involves a level of commitment to 
the reader and also to the people or person whose story is being told, along with that 
comes balance, there is a effort in a professional journalist to recognise that there are 
various different side to any story and viewpoints and effort to balance all those different 
viewpoints out and to portray them. 
 
GD: Just on the question of balance, there is two sides to every story, of course? 
 
PK: More than two sides. 
 
GD: More than two sides.  But are there not many sides which are not of, necessarily 
of equal importance or inherent news value.  How does this get negotiated, by a 
professional journalist?  You know, for example you may have a story – the Iraqi 
propagandists pushing a line and on the other side the American propagandists doing 
the same and in the end you are not actually left with much. 
 
PK: There’s no in between. 
 
GD: Well, there is no in between, yeah.  You have two false sides, one might argue, 
to the same issue. 
 
PK: Yeah, well you can only try I suppose and you don’t throw your hands up and say 
it all too hard.  You have to approach every issue on a case by case basis and you can 
only delve as far as you can given the time frame you have available and remembering 
that a lot of these things are done with a deadline and I am constantly amazed that 
journalists I deal with can do what they do with such tight time frames. 
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GD: Presumably context is a big one as well – in terms of weighing up sides of stories 
and balance and claims of truthfulness that sort of thing? 
 
PK: Yeah, I think that, yeah, well it has to be. 
 
GD: How valid or how central is the value of ‘objectivity’ in professional journalism do 
you think? 
 
PK: Well I think objectivity comes into that sense of accuracy, balance and fairness.  I 
think if you are serious about getting those things right, then you can’t do it without 
attempting to be objective, and the journalists that I deal with at the Herald, I am sure, 
because I see it, do make an effort to be as objective as they can be.  Sometimes that 
might mean a journalist, or an editor acting on their behalf seeking for them not to be 
involved in a story because they might be regarded as being partial or involved or they 
might be perceived to be seen that way.  But on the other hand I have also seen 
enough to know that there is really is no such thing as complete objectivity and to 
acknowledge that any news person the same as any academic or the same as anyone 
in any field bring to any situation that they’re dealing with a range of biases and 
preconceived notions so it’s a constant battle but it’s a battle that I think journalists are 
aware of and deal with as best they can. 
 
GD:  It becomes particularly, um how shall we say, important during war for example, 
when you have such a contentious issue as in the, you know, illegality of war, one might 
argue, or the possible consequences and there is someone reporting on that, um and 
then you might have someone who is confined to a hotel room in Baghdad or 
embedded with American forces how relevant or how possible is objectivity during 
wartime and how is it negotiated, what things are done to maximise the potential for 
balance and fairness, all that sort of thing. 
 
PK: Well, I think any individual, whether they are in a Baghdad hotel or embedded 
with an American unit is mindful of where they are and the restrictions that they have 
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and tries to if they can to counterbalance their specific moment in time and place with 
information from other sources for a start.  So that even if you are in a Baghdad hotel 
you have access via the internet if that is available or by phone to knowledge of what’s 
going on out there.  Away from that I think that the person who’s embedded is the one 
who, that would be locked away from information also, but I know that that was 
recognised by the journalist who was embedded, Lindsay Murdoch and by the editors 
who put him there, was something that we hadn’t really done before and it carried with it 
the burdens of being able to tell a story from what might be regarded as only one 
viewpoint.  But on the other hand one of the I think you just have to recognise that and 
its balanced by the individual and by the editors by knowing they are drawing 
information from a huge range of sources and situations so when it comes to putting 
that story or stories in the paper you’re not just drawing on an single source and copy 
coming from McGeough in Baghdad would be informed by information we were getting 
from other sources, and I think that’s one of the benefits the Herald had from the array 
of other journalists that were involved, the array of other sources, not just the 
Washington Post and the New York Times, but as I said monitoring the BBC, CNN and 
Fox and indeed Al-Jazeera. 
 
GD: Talking of embedding, what your attitude as an editor or as a journalist yourself 
to that whole exercise? 
 
PK:  Yeah, I think it was useful, I think we got some very good stories out of being there, 
one of the stories Lindsay reported on was a claim by one of the Americans that he was 
with that they had used as an agent orange type material. 
 
GD: Was that the one, was it napalm? 
 
PK: Yeah, napalm. 
 
GD: He reported it as being napalm but it was actually ‘white phosphorous’ or 
something like that, but it was more or less the same thing. 
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PK: Yeah, and we wondered at the time if it could possibly be napalm and we 
wondered perhaps we shouldn’t run a story saying that is was napalm, if perhaps it 
turned out it wasn’t and I think ultimately some British, I think it was British, anyway 
British or American journos managed to establish afterwards that is was phosphorous 
and it wasn’t dramatically different from napalm anyway, so being embedded allowed 
that story to be told, in the scale of things it might not be a massive story, but it’s one 
you otherwise wouldn’t have had. 
 
GD: How acute was the concern of how the news you were generating of Iraq, was 
going to be received in Australia – especially with regard to the governments criticisms 
of the ABC, for example was there much concern in the news room? 
 
PK: No, I don’t think so. No I think that an editor comes in, like any of the journalists 
around them, has a belief that you can do your job as best you can and in a fair a way 
as possible and as balanced a way as you can do and that’s the best you can do. 
 
GD: There was a lot of frustration though with the strategies of the Australian military 
officials, especially in the initial stages. 
 
PK: Oh, the Australian military has an appalling reputation with any of the journalists 
that I have dealt with who have had anything to do with them.  They are, whether or not 
you think it’s a good or a bad thing, it is acknowledged that they way they approach the 
media is very different to the Americans or the British or other, but if we are talking 
about the Coalition they’re the ones that really count. They lock down information, 
incredibly protective and this is amazingly frustrating for any journalist who has anything 
to do with them. 
 
GD: And I imagine that’s the same but to a lesser degree with the Americans and the 
UK? 
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PK: Well the American military is quite open, that’s my experience anyway,  they’re 
are the ones who allowed, they went out of their way to help journalist become 
embedded and while some of that material was censored as they were concerned that 
reporters didn’t give out information that would endanger military or indeed civilian lives.  
Lindsay managed to tell a story that a material like napalm had been used, quoting an 
American military official, I mean that’s pretty amazing really, meanwhile you have and 
the British tend to be more cooperative, although less so than the Americans, but the 
Australians go out of their way to obfuscate and make life difficult and [Tom] Allard , if 
you have spoken to him can expand on that. 
 
GD: What do you think can be done when the media comes up against this 
obfuscatory tactic? 
 
PK: Yeah, look, not much I don’t think. It’s a product of a range of different things 
someone like Allard or McGeough might be able to expand on it, but part of it is a 
product of a military like other departments, being driven by a government that is 
entrenched, that has been in for ten years now and I think whenever you get a 
government that has been in power that long you get a level of control over the 
bureaucracy.  But I think it’s a cultural thing within the defence dept, that’s the way they 
operate and I don’t think it’s going to suddenly change, there has to be an impetus for 
change and I suspect a bunch of journalists complaining about it is not a significant 
enough impetus for change. 
 
GD: Just to end on a couple of things.  In terms of the Australian military officials 
being difficult to deal with but also there have been stories, perhaps not in your direct 
experience, but there have been stories coming out of Centcom of people questioning 
the usefulness of journalists being there because they were getting so little good 
information coming out – do you think that the military always has the edge over the 
media and if it does what can the journalists do to sort of resist the logic of the military?  
We’ve all seen the Centcom displays with the videos of bombs hitting targets and all 
 
 
443 
that sort of stuff – it becomes an irresistible logic almost in people’s reporting, they ask 
questions but there are themes that end up rising to the top, do you know? 
 
PK: Yeah, I think that um, those daily briefings at Centcom to an extent became 
counterproductive or lacking in advantage for the military in what they were aiming for, 
which was putting their spin on what was going.  For Australian purposes those 
briefings became almost immaterial because we were getting information in advance of 
that to an extent anyway, particularly when you had American and others journalists 
embedded from CNN and Fox and getting firsthand accounts that were ahead of what 
Centcom was doing. 
 
GD: And having to wait for confirmation of those. 
 
PK: yeah, so I suppose in terms of what can be done it’s the same as anything in a 
situation where journalists are being hamstrung or frozen out you chip away as best you 
can and in terms of, it’s slightly different in a wartime scenario.  You’ve got the battle 
zone and outside the battle zone and it was particularly for Allard where you had not 
really much access other than what you were being spoon fed, he found he actually got 
better information for outside those daily briefing from the Americans than from inside 
the briefing from the Australians who basically just wouldn’t talk. 
 
GD: I was interested to watch the documentary ‘Control Room’ about Al-Jazeera and 
their operations in Iraq of journalist talking, I suppose you’d say behind the scenes with 
American press officers in their little back rooms – and I never actually saw any of that 
or any expositions of that in the media, there was the daily conferences with the 
generals, but then even in the news stories it didn’t really come across that this other 
sort of informal area of activity was going on. 
 
PK: I think you’ll find that whenever there is a media event going on, I imagine that 
sort of thing happened in Beaconsfield – you have a press conference where things are 
 
 
444 
said in public but where a lot of your useful information comes from is outside those 
scripted events. 
 
THE END 
 
 
445 
APPENDIX XVI - EDITOR INTERVIEWS 
PETER KERR - FOREIGN EDITOR SMH (2003) 
22 DECEMBER 2007 
 
Giles Dodson: Please discuss the Herald’s aims in reporting the Iraq war? 
 
Peter Kerr: It was a bit unusual given the amount of time there was to get ready for it 
and there was a lot of preparation involved.  And in terms of goals and aims it was to 
cover the war as comprehensively as possible and is as balanced a fashion as possible, 
drawing on all sources of information that were available and anticipating the places that 
reporters and photographers would have to be, while also guaranteeing the safety of 
those reporters and photographers, so there was considerable planning to do with 
getting reporters and photographers physically prepared for those sorts of things.  
Everyone undertook hostile environment and training, and they were equipped with all 
the necessary technological gear that might anticipate them being in the field, and 
anyone who was going to be in the field anywhere near there was going to be violence 
was and anticipating at the time the claims that Hussein chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons.  The company actually went to the trouble of buying suits for those 
people that might be on the ground in Iraq, or nearby like in Istanbul or on the border 
with Turkey or in Kuwait or Qatar. 
 
GD: Given that you had all these people in the field, how were the decisions made 
what would run prominently, from an editorial perspective, presumably ….daily meeting 
 
PK: There was material not only from the people in the field, but also people in say 
London or in Washington, and also the not inconsiderable access to information through 
the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Guardian, 
etcetera.  So the structure of the team or teams that were in place in Sydney to cover it 
was fairly sophisticated in terms of having the general run of the way that the news desk 
gathers and considers news in editorial conferences and after that dealing with a lot of 
different pages and breaking those pages up into “pod” editors, an editor for a package, 
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we might have someone in charge of a page or two pages or four pages, but the shifts 
had to start a little bit earlier and finish a little bit late to cover all that, information 
gathering happens as it happens on any news paper anywhere – you gather all your 
information as early and as best you can and then you sit down with it in editorial 
conference say say, “ok we’ve got this, this, this and this, you would have heard on 
radio that this and this, we have reports from London and Washington, we’ve got this 
person on the ground here”, and we consider that.  The photographic editor would run 
through.  We had greater than usual access to photographs I think, so that would be a 
morning meeting and then another early afternoon meeting. 
 
GD: And who is present at those sorts of meetings? 
 
PK: My memory, is pretty much everyone; the editor, the deputy editor, the 
photographic editor, myself as foreign editor, my deputy was the Iraq news editor at the 
time, but generally everyone and it was pretty much all in because there was so much 
interest in it and the news was swamping most of the paper, we found that there were a 
lot of people there just because the sheer volume of it.   
 
GD: In that situation where there is such a volume of information coming in, it must be 
particularly difficult to exclude things? 
 
PK: Once you’ve got a system in place, there is a system in any newspaper or and 
media organisation, particularly now that you’re getting more information from wires 
than you would have, you’re getting more information from people in the field because 
they have got access to satellite phones and that sort of technology, you’re getting 
photographs from a wider range of sources and you’re also getting other new 
technologies too like videos that we can tap into too, being run on TV or online.  But the 
filtering process is much the same with any project.  It might be a bit more sophisticated, 
in terms of what you pick, any particular gatekeeper, whether it’s someone monitoring 
an agency wire, or photographs or someone monitoring reporters in the field, every 
particular gatekeeper who’s the liaison point person, has to make decisions on the run 
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and where will that story be filed because [sic] – here’s a story on AAP out of Istanbul, 
well, we’ve actually already covered that in this morning’s paper, or its actually only an 
incremental development so I’ll discard it, or it updates the information a little bit so I will 
file it according to a particular topic. 
 
GD: Presumably there’s also the foreign correspondents, either embedded or in 
Baghdad or where ever they were are dealing with a similar thing in a sense, what they 
produce has to be a substantive change from what they produced yesterday to what 
degree do people in the field take direction from you 
 
PK: Generally there’s a fair amount of flexibility, but at the Herald we tend to leave it 
up to the people that we trust in the field, because those people are there because we 
trust them and for the most part they are the most experienced journalists.  And 
depending on where they are, if you were for example Lindsay Murdoch, embedded 
with US forces then we might ask a question of Lindsay, “do you know anything about 
this claim that such and such happened”  But generally speaking, you would have to 
accept that Lindsay is bound by being with a particular group and whatever agreement 
he’s made, and is also only going to see a narrowly focus on stuff.  So it’s very flexible 
and it’s not cut and dried, but generally we trust the correspondents to make their own 
decisions and it really depends on where they are, if you were in Washington for 
example, we have access to information and we would be asking them for their 
particular interpretation, and there might be give and take and we might say well 
actually that’s already been on radio this morning so why don’t you, for freshness of 
news, emphasis some other aspect of the story for tomorrow’s news. 
 
GD: How aware was the Herald at the time of the dangers of being too close I 
suppose of too credulous [sic] when it comes to reporting the military operations – 
generally covering such an orchestrated event, both in a military and a media sense. 
 
PK: Very aware, I think.  I think some people found it more difficult than others, I 
know that Tom Allard found it very frustrating, because the Australians would tell him 
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nothing, so it was all but impossible to any information accurate or otherwise, from the 
Australians, only sort of very old and very militarised information from them.  He found 
the British and the Americans more open and on the other hand the Americans were 
very good at putting on their slide shows and their spin on what they wanted to tell, I 
think everyone recognised that embedding with US forces gives you a particular view 
through a prism and a debate can go on about the values of embedding or not, but I 
think it was a useful exercise and I think if the opportunity was to come up again I think 
we would probably accept it while also accepting its limitation.  But I think the benefit for 
the Herald as quite a big newspaper with quite a lot of resources is that we were able to 
balance our own information from eyewitness sources  and correspondents in the field, 
a range of different media that we have access to, some left wing, some right wing, and 
some sort of in the middle, and my feeling is that having participated in we did the best 
we could to tread something of a middle path through the propaganda that would come 
from the Americans versus the propaganda that would come from the Iraqis and try as 
be as comprehensive and as balanced as possible with all the media we had out there.    
 
THE END 
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APPENDIX XVIII – EDITOR INTERVIEWS 
MICHAEL GAWENDA – EDITOR THE AGE (2003) 
 7 JANUARY 2008 
 
GILES DODSON: What were the Age’s goals with regards to reporting the Iraq war?  
Given the significant lead time? 
 
MICHAEL GAWENDA: There was a lead time obviously with the war; it was pretty 
clear there was going to be a conflict.  I guess looking back there were two things we 
wanted to achieve – one to make sure we had our own unique coverage, when I say 
that we share with the Sydney Morning Herald, of the war so we had to look at what sort 
of contingencies were in place.  It was expensive, so we were limited as to how much 
we could afford to do.  But that was the first thing.  The second thing was what other 
resources could we use, we have access to the Guardian, to the Daily Telegraph, to the 
New York Times and Washington Post, among other things and we wanted to make 
sure that we used those resources as well as we could within an Australian context.  So 
that was the goal, obviously there were limits on funding – so we had Lindsay Murdoch 
embedded, Paul McGeough in Baghdad, there people who came in and out of the 
Middle East that helped with the coverage, but I would say that for the war itself, there 
were two main components, Lindsay’s embedded coverage there was Paul McGeough 
in Baghdad, and there was what we thought was applicable and appropriate from the 
services that we had. 
 
GD: And how were decisions over resourcing made, by you? 
 
MG: Well, it was made by me in consultation with the editor of the Sydney Morning 
Herald at the time as well, so it wasn’t just me, it would have been both of us talking 
about that and would have been made in consultation with senior editors on the papers, 
with the Foreign Editor and the Deputy Editor, so it would have been done on that sort 
of basis.   
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GD: With regards to editorial meeting, with regards to what gets included? 
 
MG: We had an Iraq desk which we set up especially for the war, which the Foreign 
editor ran, we put some extra resources into it, plus we had sub which spent, months 
probably that covered the war.  We did have an afternoon news conference at which 
Iraq was briefly discussed.  Where was it up to?  What was it doing?  But then we would 
have a separate conference on the war with that team. 
 
GD: That desk worked with a degree of autonomy then? 
 
MG: That desk worked autonomously in the sense that it worked separately from the 
general news desk.  Yes it was.  You can imagine that was a very busy time – they 
worked damn hard, fifteen to sixteen hour days.   
 
GD: And in your role as an editor, would you ever have to make calls that this would 
be excluded and this would be included? 
 
MG: I made that call all the time.  All the time.   
 
GD: Overriding at time the opinions of subordinates? 
 
MG: I can’t remember if there were major disputes about things.  No I don’t think there 
were any major disputes about things.  But in the end, most of the photographs chosen I 
approved, or I changed if I changed my mind changed the photograph.  Or said maybe 
that story should be on the front and that story shouldn’t, but it was to do with what we 
were doing for that day and the next day and for Saturday, so I was regularly doing – 
that’s what editors do – I don’t know if they always do, but that’s what I thought my role 
was. 
 
GD: Do you think because of the sheer volume of information coming out – I know at 
the Herald they were doing sort of weekly round ups,  
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MG: That’s what I mean.  Because there was so much gong an and so much 
happening that had to be done – the other concern of course was the safety of the 
correspondents, there was a big question about whether McGeough should stay in 
Baghdad – so I remember that was a sizable issue 
 
GD: And that was a decision made ultimately by Paul?   
 
MG: I think it was made by Paul in the sense that I think we took, there were some 
doubts about whether he should stay, there were doubts in my mind about whether he 
should stay, no one knew what would happen, it was dangerous, but in the end Paul 
convinced us that staying was the right thing to do.  But it was a big issue.  And I think 
that in terms of our coverage Paul, and to a certain extent Lindsay, was [sic] at the 
centre of our coverage, the rest was sort of an add on. 
 
GD:  And that decision to remain in Baghdad was entirely justified in the end?   
 
MG: Well, in the end it was.  I mean it was hairy at times and after the invasion 
especially there were times when it was dangerous.  Yes, I think it was justified.  When 
you say it was justified, well, he survived it.  
 
GD: But also the quality of what he was reporting and the insight that this gained 
 
MG: Absolutely, had we not had that been an issue [sic], I would have said “good, go”.  
But the fact that he was there, he’s a terrific correspondent that he was Australian, 
which he gave us a perspective that we probably couldn’t have gotten from the other 
services, yes it was entirely justified.   
 
GD: Who gets to be the foreign correspondents, how are they selected and who gets 
to go away and do those jobs? 
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MG: Well, there are a limited number of those jobs and a lot of people want to do 
them.  And so you make the decision on the basis of, especially in a dangerous 
situation, you make the decision really on the basis of who has the experience, who is 
likely to be able to cope with the difficulties that the foreign correspondent in that 
particular situation is going to confront.  There were, honestly, gender issues as well, 
there were women journalists on both papers, who I think felt aggrieved that they were 
somehow excluded, and I think there was some truth in that – that we did, without 
consciously thinking about it go for men.  I think that that changed before the Iraq war, 
although there were women who put their hands up for Iraq, Paul was a natural choice. 
But it really changed with Bali.  Where the women complained we were only sending 
men, and we started sending women. But I did think that this gender issue was 
neutralised, but I did think that not very many women had the experience of dealing with 
this kind of thing and those sorts of situations.  But really you’re looking for someone 
who’s experienced, who’s done this sort of thing before,  as far as possible will be able 
to look after themselves.  And someone who is a terrific reporter.  And knows the story. 
 
GD: A once in a lifetime opportunity? 
 
MG: Well, it was, obviously there are journalists who see it that way.  And there are 
journalists who don’t.  I mean there were journalists who...I think it’s a personal thing, 
and I think Lindsay had a pretty tough time, physically it was very very demanding, but 
he was desperate to do it and he had experience having been through the Timor thing, 
so yes it was tough.  And there was competition too of course.  I think he would have 
felt competitive too with Paul, that’s part of the whole system.   
 
GD: And embedding? 
 
MG: Well, my view is very simple.  If the embedded reporting was all you had then 
that wouldn’t be very good and it would be a major concern.  But taken in context as 
part of the coverage, it was better to have than not to have it.   
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GD: And now people have come to expect it.  Is a precedent set? 
 
MG: Yes, they demand it.  And these days the technology demands it.  I think that it 
will continue.  It depends on the war, however.  I hope there are no more wars, but I 
imagine there will be.  And there will be situation where embedding will be impossible.  
You can’t for instance embed with the SAS and even the Americans didn’t embed with 
their special forces.  So you have to take all that into account, but I do think that in 
general, the expectation will be that there will be embedding.  What as journalists we’ve 
got to make sure is that that is not the only coverage we have.  And that is difficult you 
see, I was worried about encouraging people to go in.  There were freelancers who 
wanted to go in, not embedded, and I was worried about encouraging that in terms of 
the danger involved in doing that.  You have to have a look at your responsibilities, here 
are people prepared to take risks that maybe they shouldn’t take.  As it turned out it was 
relatively safe to be in Kurdistan, I am not sure how safe it was to be on your own 
elsewhere. 
 
GD: With regards to embedding and the Central command theatre of news, and the 
Americans being particularly sophisticated in their attempts to spin the war, how does 
one deal with that relationship? 
 
MG: It’s very difficult, the ADF were particularly difficult and they have remained 
difficult throughout the time the Australian troops have been in Iraq, access has been 
very difficult to get. 
 
GD: How can journalists work towards to get the services to open up? 
 
MG: With great difficulty.  What it takes are journalists with experience to be able to 
cover it and cut through the spin, to be able to get a view beyond the spin.  I think 
McGeough managed that, I think to a certain extent Lindsay managed that but it’s very 
difficult to do so you have to hope they can do that.  In terms of telling the story, you 
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have to make sure you are telling your readers this is what the American’s are saying.  
This is what’s happening.   
 
GD: Is this a story in itself?   
 
MG: Yes it always is yes.  You’ve got to remember that that this is not unique, it 
happens in every conflict that journalists have covered.  There was a turning point in the 
Vietnam War, in a way, was the journalists on the ground, no longer believing what the 
military was saying.  And saying that their eyes are telling them something totally 
different from what the military are spinning.  So that challenge is there no matter what 
war you are covering.   
 
GD: The military doesn’t forget.   
 
MG: That’s true.  But you would hope that there is some institutional memory (within 
the media corps). That senior editors or someone have been through this.  That’s why I 
said to you we planned to send people who have been there before, and if they haven’t, 
then you send them with someone who has.   
 
GD: Is the training sufficient? 
 
MG: I think probably not.  I think one of the problems of journalism in Australia is that 
the culture of news organisations is one that doesn’t consider training very highly.  They 
think on the job training is all that is it about.  We are better than we used to be and 
there are training course form journalists heading to dangerous places and we do send 
our journalists to those courses, but they’re expensive, and a five day training course is 
not enough.  In some ways I think it should be incorporated into journalism training and 
teaching but it needs to be taught by people who have done it.   
 
GD: How would you assess the quality of journalists these days? 
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MG:  This is a vexed question.  I think that, my view is that people who want to be 
journalists these days are better off doing a general course or a specialised course 
even, like law or science or even medicine.  And then go into journalism, do a master’s 
or diploma or whatever, rather than the undergraduate training in journalism which I 
don’t think is all that useful.   
 
GD: Was there any consideration about how the Age’s coverage would be received in 
a political context?  Given the context of Alston’s attacks on the ABC for supposedly 
being biased. 
 
MG: Yeah, there was no consideration on my part of that.  I wanted to report the war 
as fairly and as accurately and as trenchantly as we possibly could.  In terms of the 
reporting I think we did that, if there we any sort of consideration they were about 
“there’s so much material, how do we get this down to a package that both captures 
what’s going on and doesn’t distort.”  So there were no political considerations for me 
that I could think of.  I mean there was covering the debate in Australia and on the op-
ed pages I needed to make sure there was a rage of opinions about what was going on 
and why and I think we managed that pretty well as well. 
 
GD:  What improvements would you make? 
 
MG: I think we did about as well as we could.  There were some stories where I think 
we should have been more sceptical than we were.  There was the story of that young 
woman the American,  Private Lynch, which we swallowed at first and ran, and I think 
looking back it was probably an improbable story.  We should have said “hang on, this 
is …” But it’s hard at the time, you make a decision, you’re on the spot you’re relying on 
other people’s reporting, you haven’t got your own reporter there that you can ask, “well, 
can you confirm this, is this true”.  So there were several stories like that, looking back I 
think we could have been more sceptical about.   
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GD: Is there a danger for journalism – in so far as there is a need to be on the story 
as it happens, but without capacity to verify things? 
 
MG: Absolutely, and it’s very frustrating when you’re running copy from journalists – 
and I think John Burns is a terrific reporter and has reporter on Iraq really well. 
Nevertheless, I could never speak to John Burns, I couldn’t, well I did once or twice, and 
it was impossible for him, he wasn’t going to some editor in Australia regularly about his 
coverage.  So that’s a huge frustration.  You’re running this copy but you can’t talk to 
the reporter.  And you can’t say, what about this, why this, you know?  That’s a 
frustration, but that’s about the limitation of what we can spend given the size of our 
papers and the size of our market.  And I think we did pretty damn well, and it wasn’t 
cheap.  And I think we did better than comparable papers in the UK or US.  The US has 
got four or five really good news papers, and the rest are rubbish, dealing with a similar 
size market as the Age of the Sydney Morning Herald [sic].   
 
THE END 
 
